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Preface Introduction

Organization

This seventh edition of Human Geography benefits from some format revisions suggested by helpful users of earlier versions, but retains the basic format of its predecessors. It does contain, of course, significant content changes, including revised and new tables, maps, and text, required by rapidly altering world cultural, economic, and political patterns. In all regards, however, the current edition maintains the structure and objectives of its earlier versions.

The emphasis on human geographic current events and interpretations builds on our felt initial obligation to set the stage in Chapter 1 by briefly introducing students to the scope, methods, and background basics of geography as a discipline and to the tools—especially maps—that all geographers employ. It is supplemented by Appendix A giving a more detailed treatment of map projections than is appropriate in a general introductory chapter. Both are designed to be helpful, with content supportive of, not essential to, the later chapters of the text. The arrangement of those chapters reflects our own sense of logic and teaching experiences. The chapters are unevenly divided among five parts, each with a brief orienting introduction. Those of Part I, “Themes and Fundamentals,” examine the basis of culture, culture change, and cultural regionalism, review the concepts of spatial interaction and spatial behavior, and consider population structures, patterns, and change. Parts II through IV (Chapters 5 through 12) discuss the landscapes of cultural distinction and social organization resulting from human occupance of the earth. These include linguistic, religious, ethnic, folk, and popular differentiation of peoples and societies and the economic, urban, and political organization of space. Chapter 13—Part V—draws together in sharper focus selected aspects of the human impact on the natural landscape to make clear to students the relevance of the earlier-studied human geographic concepts and patterns to matters of current national and world environmental concern. Among those concepts is the centrality of gender issues that underlie all facets of human geographic inquiry. Because they are so pervasive and significant we felt it unwise to relegate their consideration to a single separate chapter, thus artificially isolating women and women’s concerns from all the topics of human geography for

Audience Designed for students enrolled in a one-semester or onequarter course, the text seeks to introduce its users to the scope and excitement of human geography and its relevance to their daily lives and roles as informed citizens. We recognize that for many of its readers their course in human geography may be their first or only work in geography and this their first or only textbook in the discipline. For those students particularly, we take seriously the obligation not only to convey the richness and breadth of human geography but also to give insight into the nature and intellectual challenges of the field of geography itself. Our goals have been to be inclusive in our content, current in our data, and relevant in our interpretations. These goals are elusive. Because of the time lapse between world events and the publication of a book, inevitably events outpace analysis. We therefore depend on a continuing partnership with classroom instructors to provide the currency of information and the interpretation of new patterns of human geographic substance.

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which gender concerns are relevant. Instead, we have incorporated significant gender/female issues within the several chapters where those issues apply—either within the running text of the chapter or, very often, highlighted in boxed discussions. We hope by means of these chapter clusters and sequence to convey to students the logic and integration we recognize in the broad field of human geography. We recognize that our sense of organization and continuity is not necessarily that of instructors using this text and have designed each chapter to be reasonably self-contained, able to be assigned in any sequence that satisfies the arrangement preferred by the instructor.

Features Instructor contributions and suggestions are gratefully acknowledged by the content changes incorporated in this seventh edition. The basic structure of the book and its instructional philosophy and teaching aids have, however, been retained. The chapter title page “Focus Preview” alerting students to the three, four, or five main themes of the chapter and the summarizing “Focus Follow-up” section in the end-of-chapter material remain as does our use of map and photograph captions as teaching opportunities, conveying additional information and explanation as integral parts of the text. As in earlier editions of Human Geography, chapter introductions take the form of interest-arousing vignettes to focus student attention on the subject matter that follows. The boxed inserts that are part of each chapter expand on ideas included within the text proper or introduce related examples of chapter concepts and conclusions, often in gender-related contexts. Almost every chapter contains at least one special-purpose box labeled “Geography and Public Policy” introducing a discussion of a topic of current national or international interest and concluding with a set of questions designed to induce thought and class discussion of the topic viewed against the background of human geographic insights students have mastered. Increasingly for today’s students, the learning process is electronically based. We have therefore included in each chapter a preliminary guide to Internet and World Wide Web sources of information related to the contents of the chapter. We do not pretend that the references given are exhaustive or represent the best sites currently available on the given topics; we hope, however, they will be useful starting points for student exploration and for instructor-supplied corrections and additions. We also periodically update these “On-Line” reports on the text’s home page maintained by the publisher at http://www.mhhe.com/ earthsci/geography/fellmann7e/. This current edition of Human Geography continues our practice of identifying new terms and special usages of common words and phrases by boldface or italic type. Many of these are included in the Key Words list at

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the end of each chapter and defined in an inclusive cross-referenced glossary at the end of the text. Each chapter also includes other repeated pedagogical aids. Summary reiterates the main points of the chapter and provides a bridge to the chapter that follows. For Review contains questions that direct student attention to important concepts developed within the chapter and that may serve, if the instructor chooses, as the basis for written assignments. Selected References suggests a number of book and journal articles that expand on topics presented within the chapter. Appendix B at the end of the book is a modified version of the Population Reference Bureau’s 2001 World Population Data Sheet containing economic and demographic data and projections for countries, regions, and continents. Although inevitably dated, these provide a wealth of useful comparative statistics for student projects and study of world patterns. Finally, Appendix C, a single-page “Anglo American Reference Map,” provides name identification of all U.S. states and Canadian provinces and showing the location of principal cities.

What’s New in this Edition A great deal of new or expanded text has been incorporated in this seventh edition of Human Geography, including revised considerations of how maps show data and fundamentals of GIS in Chapter 1. Part I benefits from new material on stimulus diffusion; globalization and cultural convergence; gender and migration; and the population impact of AIDS. Part II revisions and additions include immigrant language contributions, migration and ethnicity impacts, and changing national and world demographic patterns. Part III incorporates new or reconsidered treatments of the intensification of agriculture and the green revolution; changing trends in world trade flows; post-Fordist, just-in-time, and flexible manufacturing processes; world industrial patterns; and tourism as a tertiary activity, while major revisions of central elements of the urban and political geography chapters help restructure Part IV. These and many other text changes are supplemented by totally new or extensively revised and updated content and “public policy” boxed discussions in all chapters and by more than a score of new and revised maps and graphs and updated tables and statistics.

Supplements and Learning Aids A book-specific website is located at http://www.mhhe.com/ earthsci/geography/fellmann7e. This site provides complimentary access to PowerWeb Geography—McGraw-Hill’s online articles from the popular press as well as links and quizzing. Bookmark this URL so you can review material or prepare for class. Here’s what you will find:

For Instructors: Please note that all instructor’s material is password protected to ensure that students do not gain access to this portion of the site. • • • • •

Instructor’s Manual Test Item File Lecture Outlines PowerPoint Lectures FREE access to PowerWeb Geography

For Students: • • • • • •

Student Study Guide is available for FREE Online Quizzing Geography Crossword Puzzles Flashcards Links to Chapter-Specific Web Sites FREE access to PowerWeb Geography

Other Supplements: • • • • •

Transparencies Slides MicroTest Hybrid CD-ROM PowerPoint CD-ROM Visual Resource Library CD-ROM containing 544 images from various McGraw-Hill GeoScience texts, many specific to Human Geography • Qualified adopters can choose from an extensive GeoScience Videotape Library

Packaging Opportunities Many helpful, inexpensive supplements are available for packaging. Check with your McGraw-Hill sales representative for specific ISBN information and pricing. All of the following items are available at a significant discount when packaged with Human Geography: • Allen: Student Atlas of World Geography • Allen: Student Atlas of World Politics • Dorling/Kindersley: EyeWitness World Atlas CD-ROM • Fuson: Fundamental Place-Name Geography • Getis: You Can Make a Difference: Be Environmentally Responsible • Pitzl: Annual Editions - Geography • Rand McNally: New Millennium CD-ROM (windows only) • Rand McNally: Atlas of World Geography

Acknowledgements It is with great pleasure that we again acknowledge our debts of gratitude to both departmental colleagues—at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and at both San

Diego State University and the University of California, Santa Barbara—and all others who have given generously of their time and knowledge in response to our requests. These have been identified in earlier editions and although their names are not repeated here they know of our continuing appreciation. We specifically, however, wish to recognize with gratitude the advice, suggestions, corrections, and general assistance in matters of content and emphasis provided by the following reviewers of the manuscript for this edition. • Frank Ainsley, University of North Carolina—Wilmington • Jeff Allender, University of Central Arkansas • David Anderson, Louisiana State University— Shreveport • A. Steele Becker, University of Nebraska—Kearney • Margaret Boorstein, C.W. Post College • Henry Bullamore, Frostburg State University • Susan Davgun, Bemidji State University • Daniel Donaldson, University of Central Oklahoma • Roy Doyon, Ball State University • Richard Grant, University of Miami • Harold Gulley, University of Wisconsin—Oshkosh • J. Douglas Heffington, Middle Tennessee State University • Andrew Herod, University of Georgia • John Hickey, Inver Hills Community College • Bella Bychkova Jordan, University of Texas—Austin • Michael Kelsey, Aims Community College • Paul Larson, Southern Utah University • Jose Lopez, Minnesota State University—Mankato • James Lowry, East Central University • Ralph Meuter, California State University—Chico • John Milbauer, Northeastern State University • David Nemeth, University of Toledo • Karen Nichols, SUNY—Geneseo • Walter Peace, McMaster University • Neil Reid, University of Toledo • James Saku, Frostburg State University • Wendy Shaw, Southern Illnois University—Edwardsville • Thomas Tharp, Purdue University • George White, Frostburg State University We appreciate their invaluable help, as we do that of the many other previous reviewers recognized in earlier editions of this book. None except the authors, of course, is responsible for final decisions on content or for errors of fact or interpretation the reader may detect. A final note of thanks is reserved for the publisher’s “book team” members separately named on the copyright page. It is a privilege to emphasize here their professional competence, unflagging interest, and always courteous helpfulness. J. D. F. A. G. J. G. Preface

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

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The Trans-Alaska pipeline carries the imprint of human action to the remotest of North America’s natural landscapes.

Focus Preview 1. The nature of geography and the role of human geography, pp. 2–5. 2. Seven fundamental geographic observations and the basic concepts that underlie them, pp. 5–15. 3. The regional concept and the characteristics of regions, pp. 15–19.

4. Why geographers use maps and how maps show spatial information, pp. 19–26. 5. Other means of visualizing and analyzing spatial data: mental maps, systems, and models, pp. 26–28.

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Getting Started The fundamental question asked by geographers is “Does it make a difference where things are located?” If for any one item or group of objects the answer is “You bet it does!” the geographer’s interest is aroused and geographic investigation is appropriate. For example, it matters a great deal that languages of a certain kind are spoken in certain places. But knowledge of the location of a specific language group is not of itself particularly significant. Geographic study of a language requires that we try to answer questions about why and how the language shows different characteristics in different locations and how the present distribution of its speakers came about. In the course of our study, we would logically discuss such concepts as migration, acculturation, the diffusion of innovation, the effect of physical barriers on communication, and the relationship of language to other aspects of culture. As geographers, we are interested in how things are interrelated in different regions and give evidence of the existence of “spatial systems.” Geography is often referred to as the spatial science, that is, the discipline concerned with the use of earth space. In fact, geography literally means “description of the earth,” but that task is really the responsibility of nearly all the sciences. Geography might better be defined as the study of spatial variation, of how—and why—physical and cultural items differ from place to place on the surface of the earth. It is, further, the study of how observable spatial patterns evolved through time. If things were everywhere the same, if there were no spatial variation, the kind of human curiosity that we call “geographic” simply would not exist. Without the certain conviction that in some interesting and important way landscapes, peoples, and opportunities differ from place to place, there would be no discipline of geography. But we do not have to deal in such abstract terms. You consciously or subconsciously display geographic awareness in your daily life. You are where you are, doing what you are doing, because of locational choices you faced and spatial decisions you made. You cannot be here reading this book and simultaneously be somewhere else—working, perhaps, or at the gym. And should you now want to go to work or take an exercise break, the time involved in going from here to there (wherever “there” is) is time not available for other activities in other locations. Of course, the act of going implies knowing where you are now, where “there” is in relation to “here,” and the paths or routes you can take to cover the distance. These are simple examples of the observation that “space matters” in a very personal way. You cannot avoid the implications of geography in your everyday affairs. Your understanding of your hometown, your neighborhood, or your college campus is essentially a geographic understanding. It is based on your awareness of where things are, of their spatial relationships, and of the varying

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

content of the different areas and places you frequent. You carry out your routine activities in particular places and move on your daily rounds within defined geographic space, following logical paths of connection between different locations. Just as geography matters in your personal life, so it matters on the larger stage as well. Decisions made by corporations about the locations of manufacturing plants or warehouses in relation to transportation routes and markets are spatially rooted. So, too, are those made by shopping center developers and locators of parks and grade schools. On an even grander scale, judgments about the projection of national power or the claim and recognition of “spheres of influence and interest” among rival countries are related to the implications of distance and area. Geography, therefore, is about space and the content of space. We think of and respond to places from the standpoint not only of where they are but, rather more importantly, of what they contain or what we think they contain. Reference to a place or an area usually calls up images about its physical nature or what people do there and often suggests, without conscious thought, how those physical objects and human activities are related. “Colorado,” “mountains,” and “skiing” might be a simple example. The content of area, that is, has both physical and cultural aspects, and geography is always concerned with understanding both (Figure 1.1).

Evolution of the Discipline Geography’s combination of interests was apparent even in the work of the early Greek geographers who first gave structure to the discipline. Geography’s name was reputedly coined by the Greek scientist Eratosthenes over 2200 years ago from the words geo, “the earth” and graphein, “to write.” From the beginning, that writing focused both on the physical structure of the earth and on the nature and activities of the people who inhabited the different lands of the known world. To Strabo (ca. 64 B.C.–A.D. 20) the task of geography was to “describe the several parts of the inhabited world . . . to write the assessment of the countries of the world [and] to treat the differences between countries.” Greek (and, later, Roman) geographers measured the earth, devised the global grid of parallels and meridians (marking latitude and longitude), and drew upon that grid surprisingly sophisticated maps (Figure 1.2). Employing nearly modern concepts, they discussed patterns and processes of climates, vegetation, and landforms and described areal variations in the natural landscape. Against that physical backdrop, they focused their attention on what humans did in home and distant areas—how they lived; what their distinctive similarities and

Figure 1.1

The ski development at Whistler Mountain, British Columbia, Canada clearly shows the interaction of physical environment and human activity. Climate and terrain have made specialized human use attractive and possible. Human exploitation has placed a cultural landscape on the natural environment, thereby altering it.

Figure 1.2

World map of the 2nd century A.D. Greco-Egyptian geographer-astronomer Ptolemy. Ptolemy (Claudius Ptolemaeus) adopted a previously developed map grid of latitude and longitude based on the division of the circle into 360°, permitting a precise mathematical location for every recorded place. Unfortunately, errors of assumption and measurement rendered both the map and its accompanying sixvolume gazetteer inaccurate. Ptolemy’s map, accepted in Europe as authoritative to the time of Columbus and later, was published in many variants in the 15th and 16th centuries. The version shown here summarizes the extent and content of the original. Introduction: Some Background Basics

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differences were in language, religion, and custom; and how they used, altered, and perhaps destroyed the lands they inhabited. These are enduring and universal interests. The ancient Chinese, for example, were as involved in geography as an explanatory viewpoint as were Westerners, though there was no exchange between them. Further, as Christian Europe entered its Middle Ages between A.D. 500 and 1400 and lost its knowledge of Greek and Roman geographical work, Muslim scholars—who retained that knowledge—undertook to describe and analyze their known world in its physical, cultural, and regional variation (see “Roger’s Book”). Modern geography had its origins in the surge of scholarly inquiry that, beginning in the 17th century, gave rise to many of the traditional academic disciplines we know today. In its European rebirth, geography from the outset was recognized—as it always had been—as a broadly based integrative study. Patterns and processes of the physical landscape were early interests, as was concern with humans as part of the earth’s variation from place to place. The rapid development of geology, botany, zoology, and other natural sciences by the end of the 18th century strengthened regional geographic investigation and increased scholarly and popular awareness of the intricate interconnections of items in space and between places. By that same time, accurate determination of latitude and longitude and scientific mapping of the earth

made assignment of place information more reliable and comprehensive. During the 19th century, national censuses, trade statistics, and ethnographic studies gave firmer foundation to human geographic investigation. By the end of the 19th century, geography had become a distinctive and respected discipline in universities throughout Europe and in other regions of the world where European academic examples were followed. The proliferation of professional geographers and geography programs resulted in the development of a whole series of increasingly specialized disciplinary subdivisions.

Geography and Human Geography Geography’s specialized subfields are not divisive but are interrelated. Geography in all its subdivisions is characterized by three dominating interests. The first is in the areal variation of physical and human phenomena on the surface of the earth. Geography examines relationships between human societies and the natural environments that they occupy and modify. The second is a focus on the spatial systems1 that link physical phenomena and 1A “system” is simply a group of elements organized in a way that every element is to some degree directly or indirectly interdependent with every other element. For geographers, the systems of interest are those that distinguish or characterize different regions or areas of the earth.

Roger’s Book

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he Arab geographer Idrisi, or Edrisi (ca. A.D. 1099–1154), a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, was directed by Roger II, the Christian king of Sicily in whose court he served, to collect all known geographical information and assemble it in a truly accurate representation of the world. An academy of geographers and scholars was gathered to assist Idrisi in the project. Books and maps of classical and Islamic origins were consulted, mariners and travelers interviewed, and scientific expeditions dispatched to foreign lands to observe and record. Data collection took 15 years before the final world map was fabricated on a silver disc some 200 centimeters (80 inches) in diameter and weighing over 135 kilograms

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

(300 pounds). Lost to looters in 1160, the map is survived by “Roger’s Book,” containing the information amassed by Idrisi’s academy and including a world map, 71 part maps, and 70 sectional itinerary maps. Idrisi’s “inhabited earth” is divided into the seven “climates” of Greek geographers, beginning at the equator and stretching northward to the limit at which, it was supposed, the earth was too cold to be inhabited. Each climate was then subdivided by perpendicular lines into 11 equal parts beginning with the west coast of Africa on the west and ending with the east coast of Asia. Each of the resulting 77 square compartments was then discussed in sequence in “Roger’s Book.”

Though Idrisi worked in one of the most prestigious courts of Europe, there is little evidence that his work had any impact on European geographic thought. He was strongly influenced by Ptolemy’s work and misconceptions and shared the then common Muslim fear of the unknown western ocean. Yet Idrisi’s clear understanding of such scientific truths as the roundness of the earth, his grasp of the scholarly writings of his Greek and Muslim predecessors, and the faithful recording of information on little-known portions of Europe, the Near East, and North Africa set his work far above the mediocre standards of contemporary Christian geography.

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Cultural Geography

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human activities in one area of the earth with other areas. Together, these interests lead to a third enduring theme, that of regional analysis: geography studies human– environmental—“ecological”—relationships and spatial systems in specific locational settings. This areal orientation pursued by some geographers is called regional geography. Other geographers choose to identify particular classes of things, rather than segments of the earth’s surface, for specialized study. These systematic geographers may focus their attention on one or a few related aspects of the physical environment or of human populations and societies. In each case, the topic selected for study is examined in its interrelationships with other spatial systems and areal patterns. Physical geography directs its attention to the natural environmental side of the human–environment structure. Its concerns are with landforms and their distribution, with atmospheric conditions and climatic patterns, with soils or vegetation associations, and the like. The other systematic branch of geography—and the subject of this book—is human geography.

omic Econ aphy r g o e G

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Figure 1.3

Human Geography Human geography deals with the world as it is and with the world as it might be made to be. Its emphasis is on people: where they are, what they are like, how they interact over space, and what kinds of landscapes of human use they erect on the natural landscapes they occupy. It encompasses all those interests and topics of geography that are not directly concerned with the physical environment or, like cartography, are technical in orientation. Its content provides integration for all of the social sciences, for it gives to those sciences the necessary spatial and systems viewpoint that they otherwise lack. At the same time, human geography draws on other social sciences in the analyses identified with its subfields, such as behavioral, political, economic, or social geography (Figure 1.3). Human geography admirably serves the objectives of a liberal education. It helps us to understand the world we occupy and to appreciate the circumstances affecting peoples and countries other than our own. It clarifies the contrasts in societies and cultures and in the human landscapes they have created in different regions of the

Some of the subdivisions of human geography and the allied fields to which they are related. Geography, “the mother of sciences,” initiated in antiquity the lines of inquiry that later led to the development of these and other separate disciplines. That geography retains its ties to them and shares their insights and data reinforces its role as an essential synthesizer of all data, concepts, and models that have integrative regional and spatial implications.

earth. Its models and explanations of how things are interrelated in earth space give us a clearer understanding of the economic, social, and political systems within which we live and operate. Its analyses of those spatial systems make us more aware of the realities and prospects of our own society in an increasingly connected and competitive world. Our study of human geography, therefore, can help make us better-informed citizens, more able to understand the important issues facing our communities and our countries and better prepared to contribute to their solutions. Importantly, it can also help open the way to wonderfully rewarding and diversified careers as professional geographers (see “Careers in Geography”).

Background Basics Basic Geographic Concepts The topics included in human geography are diverse, but that very diversity emphasizes the reality that all geographers—whatever their particular topical or regional specialties—are united by the similar questions they ask and the common set of concepts they employ to consider their answers. Of either a physical or cultural

phenomenon they will inquire: What is it? Where is it? How did it come to be what and where it is? Where is it in relation to other things that affect it or are affected by it? How is it part of a functioning whole? How does its location affect people’s lives and the content of the area in which it is found? These questions are spatial in focus and systems analytical in approach and are derived from enduring central

Introduction: Some Background Basics

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Careers in Geography

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eography admirably serves the objectives of a liberal education. It can make us better informed citizens, more able to understand the important issues facing our communities, our country, and our world and better prepared to contribute solutions. Can it, as well, be a pathway to employment for those who wish to specialize in the discipline? The answer is “Yes,” in a number of different types of jobs. One broad cluster is concerned with supporting the field itself through teaching and research. Teaching opportunities exist at all levels, from elementary to university postgraduate. Teachers with some training in geography are increasingly in demand in elementary and high schools throughout the United States, reflecting geography’s inclusion as a core subject in the federally adopted Educate America Act (Public Law 103227) and the national determination to create a geographically literate society (see “National Geography Standards,” p. 8). At the college level, specialized teaching and research in all branches of geography have long been established, and geographically trained scholars are prominently associated with urban, community, and

environmental studies, regional science, locational economics, and other interdisciplinary programs. Because of the breadth and diversity of the field, training in geography involves the acquisition of techniques and approaches applicable to a wide variety of jobs outside the academic world. Modern geography is both a physical and social science and fosters a wealth of technical skills. The employment possibilities it presents are as many and varied as are the agencies and enterprises dealing with the natural environment and human activities and with the acquisition and analysis of spatial data. Many professional geographers work in government, either at the state or local level or in a variety of federal agencies and international organizations. Although many positions do not carry a geography title, physical geographers serve as water, mineral, and other natural resource analysts, weather and climate experts, soil scientists, and the like. An area of recent high demand is for environmental managers and technicians. Geographers who have specialized in environmental studies find jobs in both public and private agencies.

themes in geography.2 In answering them, geographers draw upon a common store of concepts, terms, and methods of study that together form the basic structure and vocabulary of geography. Collectively, they reflect the fundamental truths addressed by geography: that things are rationally organized on the earth’s surface and that recognizing spatial patterns is an essential starting point for

2Five fundamental themes of geography—basic concepts and topics that are essential elements in all geographic inquiry and at all levels of instruction—have been recognized by a joint committee of the National Council for Geographic Education and the Association of American Geographers. They are: (1) the significance of absolute and relative location; (2) the distinctive physical and human characteristics of place; (3) relationships, including human–environmental relationships, within places; (4) movement, expressing patterns and change in human spatial interaction; and (5) how regions form and change.

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

Their work may include assessing the environmental impact of proposed development projects on such things as air and water quality and endangered species, as well as preparing the environmental impact statements required before construction can begin. Human geographers work in many different roles in the public sector. Jobs include data acquisition and analysis in health care, transportation, population studies, economic development, and international economics. Many geography graduates find positions as planners in local and state governmental agencies concerned with housing and community development, park and recreation planning, and urban and regional planning. They map and analyze land use plans and transportation systems, monitor urban land development, make informed recommendations about the location of public facilities, and engage in basic social science research. Most of these same specializations are also found in the private sector. Geographic training is ideal for such tasks as business planning and market analysis; factory, store, and shopping center site selection;

understanding how people live on and shape the earth’s surface. That understanding is not just the task and interest of the professional geographer; it should be, as well, part of the mental framework of all informed persons. As the publication Geography for Life summarizes, “There is now a widespread acceptance . . . that being literate in geography is essential . . . to earn a decent living, enjoy the richness of life, and participate responsibly in local, national, and international affairs.” (See “The National Standards.”) Geographers use the word spatial as an essential modifier in framing their questions and forming their concepts. Geography, they say, is a spatial science. It is concerned with spatial behavior of people, with the spatial relationships that are observed between places on the earth’s surface, and with the spatial processes that create or maintain those behaviors and relationships. The word

community and economic development programs for banks, public utilities, and railroads, and similar applications. Publishers of maps, atlases, news and travel magazines, and the like employ geographers as writers, editors, and map makers. The combination of a traditional, broadly based liberal arts perspective with the technical skills

required in geographic research and analysis gives geography graduates a competitive edge in the labor market. These field-based skills include familiarity with geographic information systems (GIS), cartography and computer mapping, remote sensing and photogrammetry, and competence in data analysis and problem solving. In particular, students with expertise in

GIS, who are knowledgeable about data sources, hardware, and software, are finding that they have ready access to employment opportunities. The following table, based on the booklet “Careers in Geography,”* summarizes some of the professional opportunities open to students who have specialized in one (or more) of the various subfields of geography.

Geographic Field of Concentration

Employment Opportunities

Cartography and geographic information systems

Cartographer for federal government (agencies such as Defense Mapping Agency, U.S. Geological Survey, or Environmental Protection Agency) or private sector (e.g., Environmental Systems Research Institute, ERDAS, Intergraph, or Bentley); map librarian; GIS specialist for planners, land developers, real estate agencies, utility companies, local government; remote-sensing analyst; surveyor

Physical geography

Weather forecaster; outdoor guide; coastal zone manager; hydrologist; soil conservation/agricultural extension agent

Environmental studies

Environmental manager; forestry technician; park ranger; hazardous waste planner

Cultural geography

Community developer; Peace Corps volunteer; health care analyst

Economic geography

Site selection analyst for business and industry; market researcher; traffic/route delivery manager; real estate agent/broker/appraiser; economic development researcher

Urban and regional planning

Urban and community planner; transportation planner; housing, park, and recreation planner; health services planner

Regional geography

Area specialist for federal government; international business representative; travel agent; travel writer

Geographic education or general geography

Elementary/secondary school teacher; college professor; overseas teacher

*”Careers in Geography,” by Richard G. Boehm. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1996. Previously published by Peterson’s Guides, Inc.

spatial comes, of course, from space, and to geographers it always carries the idea of the way items are distributed, the way movements occur, and the way processes operate over the whole or a part of the surface of the earth. The geographer’s space, then, is earth space, the surface area occupied or available to be occupied by humans. Spatial phenomena have locations on that surface, and spatial interactions occur between places, things, and people within the earth area available to them. The need to understand those relationships, interactions, and processes helps frame the questions that geographers ask. Those questions have their starting point in basic observations about the location and nature of places and about how places are similar to or different from one another. Such observations, though simply stated, are profoundly important to our comprehension of the world we occupy.

• Places have location, direction, and distance with respect to other places. • A place has size; it may be large or small. Scale is important. • A place has both physical structure and cultural content. • The attributes of places develop and change over time. • The elements of places interrelate with other places. • The content of places is rationally structured. • Places may be generalized into regions of similarities and differences. These are basic notions understandable to everyone. They also are the means by which geographers express fundamental observations about the earth spaces they examine Introduction: Some Background Basics

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The National Standards

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eography is a core subject in the national Educate America Act. Its inclusion reflects a national conviction that a grasp of the skills and understandings of geography are essential in an American educational system “tailored to the needs of productive and responsible citizenship in the global economy.” The National Geography Standards 1994 were developed to help achieve that goal. They specify the essential subject matter, skills, and perspectives that students who have gone through the U.S. public school system should acquire and use. Although not all of the standards are relevant to our study of human geography, together they help frame the kinds of understanding we will seek in the following pages and suggest the purpose and benefit of further study of geography. The 18 standards from Geography for Life tell us: The geographically informed person knows and understands: The World in Spatial Terms 1. How to use maps and other geographic tools and technologies to acquire,

process, and report information from a spatial perspective. 2. How to use mental maps to organize information about people, places, and environments in a spatial context. 3. How to analyze the spatial organization of people, places, and environments on Earth’s surface. Places and Regions 4. The physical and human characteristics of places. 5. That people create regions to interpret Earth’s complexity. 6. How culture and experience influence people’s perceptions of places and regions. Physical Systems 7. The physical processes that shape the patterns of Earth’s surface. 8. The characteristics and spatial distribution of ecosystems on Earth’s surface. Human Systems 9. The characteristics, distribution, and migration of human populations on Earth’s surface.

and put those observations into a common framework of reference. Each of the concepts is worth further discussion, for they are not quite as simple as they at first seem.

Location, Direction, and Distance Location, direction, and distance are everyday ways of assessing the space around us and identifying our position in relation to other items and places of interest. They are also essential in understanding the processes of spatial interaction that figure so importantly in the study of human geography.

Location The location of places and objects is the starting point of all geographic study as well as of all our personal movements and spatial actions in everyday life. We think of and refer to location in at least two different senses, absolute and relative.

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

10. The characteristics, distribution, and complexity of Earth’s cultural mosaics. 11. The patterns and networks of economic interdependence on Earth’s surface. 12. The processes, patterns, and functions of human settlement. 13. How the forces of cooperation and conflict among people influence the division and control of Earth’s surface. Environment and Society 14. How human actions modify the physical environment. 15. How physical systems affect human systems. 16. The changes that occur in the meaning, use, distribution, and importance of resources. The Uses of Geography 17. How to apply geography to interpret the past. 18. How to apply geography to interpret the present and plan for the future. Source: Geography for Life: National Geography Standards 1994. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Research and Exploration, 1994.

Absolute location is the identification of place by some precise and accepted system of coordinates; it therefore is sometimes called mathematical location. We have several such accepted systems of pinpointing positions. One of them is the global grid of parallels and meridians (discussed later on page 20). With it the absolute location of any point on the earth can be accurately described by reference to its degrees, minutes, and seconds of latitude and longitude (Figure 1.4). Other coordinate systems are also in use. Survey systems such as the township, range, and section description of property in much of the United States give mathematical locations on a regional level, while street address precisely defines a building according to the reference system of an individual town. Absolute location is unique to each described place, is independent of any other characteristic or observation about that place, and has obvious

Figure 1.4

The latitude and longitude of Hong Kong is 22° 15' N, 114° 10’ E (read as 22 degrees, 15 minutes north; 114 degrees, 10 minutes east). The circumference of the earth measures 360 degrees; each degree contains 60 minutes and each minute has 60 seconds of latitude or longitude. What are the coordinates of Hanoi?

value in the legal description of places, in measuring the distance separating places, or in finding directions between places on the earth’s surface. When geographers—or real estate agents—remark that “location matters,” however, their reference is usually not to absolute but to relative location—the position of a place in relation to that of other places or activities (Figure 1.5). Relative location expresses spatial interconnection and interdependence. On an immediate and personal level, we think of the location of the school library not in terms of its street address or room number but where it is relative to our classrooms, or the cafeteria, or some other reference point. On the larger scene, relative location tells us that people, things, and places exist not in a spatial vacuum but in a world of physical and cultural characteristics that differ from place to place. New York City, for example, may in absolute terms be described as located at (approximately) latitude 40° 43' N and longitude 73° 58' W. We have a better understanding of the meaning of its location, however, when reference is made to its spatial relationships: to the continental interior through the Hudson–Mohawk lowland corridor or to its position on the eastern seaboard of the United States. Within the city, we gain understanding of the locational significance of Central Park or the Lower

Figure 1.5

The reality of relative location on the globe may be strikingly different from the impressions we form from flat maps. The position of Russia with respect to North America when viewed from a polar perspective emphasizes that relative location properly viewed is important to our understanding of spatial relationships and interactions between the two world areas.

East Side not solely by reference to the street addresses or city blocks they occupy, but by their spatial and functional relationships to the total land use, activity, and population patterns of New York City. In view of these different ways of looking at location, geographers make a distinction between the site and the situation of a place. Site, an absolute location concept, refers to the physical and cultural characteristics and attributes of the place itself. It is more than mathematical location, for it tells us something about the internal features of that place. The site of Philadelphia, for example, is an area bordering and west of the Delaware River north of its intersection with the Schuylkill River in southeast Pennsylvania (Figure 1.6). Situation, on the other hand, refers to the external relations of a locale. It is an expression of relative location with particular reference to items of significance to the place in question. The situation of Chicago might be described as at the deepest penetration of the Great Lakes system into the interior of the United States, astride the Great Lakes–Mississippi waterways, and near the western margin of the manufacturing belt, the northern boundary of the corn belt, and the southeastern reaches of a major dairy region. Reference to railroads, coal deposits, and ore fields would amplify its situational characteristics (Figure 1.7).

Introduction: Some Background Basics

9

Figure 1.7

Figure 1.6

The site of Philadelphia.

Direction Direction is a second universal spatial concept. Like location, it has more than one meaning and can be expressed in absolute or relative terms. Absolute direction is based on the cardinal points of north, south, east, and west. These appear uniformly and independently in all cultures, derived from the obvious “givens” of nature: the rising and setting of the sun for east and west, the sky location of the noontime sun and of certain fixed stars for north and south. We also commonly use relative or relational directions. In the United States we go “out West,” “back East,” or “down South”; we worry about conflict in the “Near East” or economic competition from the “Far Eastern countries.” These directional references are culturally based and locationally variable, despite their reference to cardinal compass points. The Near and the Far East locate parts of Asia from the European perspective; they are retained in the Americas by custom and usage, even though one would normally travel westward across the Pacific, for example, to reach the “Far East” from California, British Columbia, or Chile. For many Americans, “back East” and “out West” are reflections of the migration paths of earlier generations for whom home was in the eastern part of the country, to which they might look back. “Up North” and “down South” reflect our accepted custom of putting north at the top and south at the bottom of our maps.

Distance Distance joins location and direction as a commonly understood term that has dual meanings for geographers. Like its two companion spatial concepts, distance may be viewed in both an absolute and a relative sense.

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

The situation of Chicago helps suggest the reasons for its functional diversity.

Absolute distance refers to the spatial separation between two points on the earth’s surface measured by some accepted standard unit such as miles or kilometers for widely separated locales, feet or meters for more closely spaced points. Relative distance transforms those linear measurements into other units more meaningful for the space relationship in question. To know that two competing malls are about equidistant in miles from your residence is perhaps less important in planning your shopping trip than is knowing that because of street conditions or traffic congestion one is 5 minutes and the other 15 minutes away (Figure 1.8). Most people, in fact, think of time distance rather than linear distance in their daily activities; downtown is 20 minutes by bus, the library is a 5-minute walk. In some instances, money rather than time may be the distance transformation. An urban destination might be estimated to be a $10 cab ride away, information that may affect either the decision to make the trip at all or the choice of travel mode to get there. A psychological transformation of linear distance is also frequent. The solitary late-night walk back to the car through an unfamiliar or dangerous neighborhood seems far longer than a daytime stroll of the same distance through familiar and friendly territory. A firsttime trip to a new destination frequently seems much longer than the return trip over the same path. Distance relationships, their measurement, and their meaning for human spatial interaction are fundamental to our understanding of human geography. They are a subject of Chapter 3, and reference to them recurs throughout this book.

Size and Scale

Figure 1.8

Lines of equal travel time (isochrones) mark off different linear distances from a given starting point, depending on the condition of the route and terrain and changes in the roads and traffic flows over time. On this map, the areas within 30 minutes’ travel time from downtown Los Angeles are recorded for the period 1953 to 1971. Redrawn by permission from Howard J. Nelson and William A.V. Clark, The Los Angeles Metropolitan Experience, page 49, Association of American Geographers, 1976.

(a)

When we say that a place may be large or small, we speak both of the nature of the place itself and of the generalizations that can be made about it. In either instance, geographers are concerned with scale, though we may use that term in different ways. We can, for example, study a problem—say, population or agriculture—at the local scale, the regional scale, or on a global scale. Here the reference is purely to the size of unit studied. More technically, scale tells us the mathematical relationship between the size of an area on a map and the actual size of the mapped area on the surface of the earth. In this sense, scale is a feature of every map and essential to recognizing the areal meaning of what is shown on that map. In both senses of the word, scale implies the degree of generalization represented (Figure 1.9). Geographic inquiry may be broad or narrow; it occurs at many different size scales. Climate may be an object of study, but research and generalization focused on climates of the world will differ in degree and kind from study of the microclimates of a city. Awareness of scale is very important. In geographic work, concepts, relationships, and understandings that have meaning at one scale may not be applicable at another. For example, the study of world agricultural patterns may refer to global climatic regimes, cultural food preferences, levels of economic development, and patterns of world trade. These large-scale relationships are of little

(b)

Figure 1.9

Population density and map scale. “Truth” depends on one’s scale of inquiry. Map (a) reveals that the maximum population density of Midwestern states is no more than 123 people per square kilometer (319 per sq mi). From map (b), however, we see that population densities in two Illinois counties exceed 494 people per square kilometer (1280 per sq mi). Were we to reduce our scale of inquiry even further, examining individual city blocks in Chicago, we would find densities as high as 2000 people per square kilometer (5200 per sq mi). Scale matters!

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concern in the study of crop patterns within single counties of the United States, where topography, soil and drainage conditions, farm size, ownership, and capitalization, or even personal management preferences may be of greater explanatory significance.

Physical and Cultural Attributes All places have physical and cultural attributes that distinguish them from other places and give them character, potential, and meaning. Geographers are concerned with identifying and analyzing the details of those attributes and, particularly, with recognizing the interrelationship between the physical and cultural components of area: the human–environmental interface. Physical characteristics refer to such natural aspects of a locale as its climate and soil, the presence or absence of water supplies and mineral resources, its terrain features, and the like. These natural landscape attributes provide the setting within which human action occurs. They help shape—but do not dictate—how people live. The resource base, for example, is physically determined, though how resources are perceived and utilized is culturally conditioned. People modify the environmental conditions of a given place simply by occupying it. The existence of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (and its counterparts elsewhere) is a reminder that humans are the active and frequently harmful agents in the continuing interplay between the cultural and physical worlds (Figure 1.10).

Virtually every human activity leaves its imprint on an area’s soils, water, vegetation, animal life, and other resources and on the atmosphere common to all earth space. The impact of humans has been so universal and so long exerted that essentially no “natural landscape” any longer exists. The visible expression of that human activity is the cultural landscape. It, too, exists at different scales and different levels of visibility. Differences in agricultural practices and land use between Mexico and southern California are evident in Figure 1.11, while the signs, structures, and people of, for instance, Los Angeles’s Chinatown leave a smaller, more confined imprint within the larger cultural landscape of the metropolitan area itself. Although the focus of this book is on the human characteristics of places, geographers are ever aware that the physical content of an area is also important in understanding the activity patterns of people and the interconnections between people and the environments they occupy and modify. Those interconnections and modifications are not static or permanent, however, but are subject to continual change.

Figure 1.11 Figure 1.10

Sites (and sights) such as this devastation of ruptured barrels and petrochemical contamination near Texas City, Texas are all-too-frequent reminders of the adverse environmental impacts of humans and their waste products. Many of those impacts are more hidden in the form of soil erosion, water pollution, increased stream sedimentation, plant and animal extinctions, deforestation, and the like.

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

This Landsat image reveals contrasting cultural landscapes along the Mexico-California border. Move your eyes from the Salton Sea (the dark patch at the top of the image) southward to the agricultural land extending to the edge of the image. Notice how the regularity of the fields and the bright colors (representing growing vegetation) give way to a marked break, where irregularly shaped fields and less prosperous agriculture are evident. Above the break is the Imperial Valley of California; below the border is Mexico.

© NASA.

The Changing Attributes of Place The physical environment surrounding us seems eternal and unchanging but, of course, it is not. In the framework of geologic time, change is both continuous and pronounced. Islands form and disappear; mountains rise and are worn low to swampy plains; vast continental glaciers form, move, and melt away, and sea levels fall and rise in response. Geologic time is long, but the forces that give shape to the land are timeless and relentless. Even within the short period of time since the most recent retreat of continental glaciers—some 11,000 or 12,000 years ago—the environments occupied by humans have been subject to change. Glacial retreat itself marked a period of climatic alteration, extending the area habitable by humans to include vast reaches of northern Eurasia and North America formerly covered by thousands of feet of ice. With moderating climatic conditions came associated changes in vegetation and fauna. On the global scale, these were natural environmental changes; humans were as yet too few in numbers and too limited in technology to alter materially the course of physical events. On the regional scale, however, even early human societies exerted an impact on the environments they occupied. Fire was used to clear forest undergrowth, to maintain or extend grassland for grazing animals and to drive them in the hunt, and, later, to clear openings for rudimentary agriculture. With the dawn of civilizations and the invention and spread of agricultural technologies, humans accelerated

their management and alteration of the now no longer “natural” environment. Even the classical Greeks noted how the landscape they occupied differed—for the worse— from its former condition. With growing numbers of people and particularly with industrialization and the spread of European exploitative technologies throughout the world, the pace of change in the content of area accelerated. The built landscape—the product of human effort— increasingly replaced the natural landscape. Each new settlement or city, each agricultural assault on forests, each new mine, dam, or factory changed the content of regions and altered the temporarily established spatial interconnections between humans and the environment. Characteristics of places today, therefore, are the result of constantly changing past conditions. They are, as well, the forerunners of differing human–environmental balances yet to be struck. Geographers are concerned with places at given moments of time. But to understand fully the nature and development of places, to appreciate the significance of their relative locations, and to comprehend the interplay of their physical and cultural characteristics, geographers must view places as the present result of the past operation of distinctive physical and cultural processes (Figure 1.12). You will recall that one of the questions geographers ask about a place or thing is: How did it come to be what and where it is? This is an inquiry about process and about becoming. The forces and events shaping the

Figure 1.12

The process of change in a cultural landscape. Before the advent of the freeway, this portion of suburban Long Island, New York, was largely devoted to agriculture (left). The construction of the freeway and cloverleaf interchange ramps altered nearby land use patterns (right) to replace farming with housing developments and new commercial and light industrial activities.

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physical and explaining the cultural environment of places today are an important focus of geography. They are, particularly in their human context, the subjects of most of the separate chapters of this book. To understand them is to appreciate more fully the changing human spatial order of our world.

Interrelations between Places The concepts of relative location and distance that we earlier introduced lead directly to a fundamental spatial reality: Places interact with other places in structured and comprehensible ways. In describing the processes and patterns of that spatial interaction, geographers add accessibility and connectivity to the ideas of location and distance. A basic law of geography tells us that in a spatial sense everything is related to everything else but that relationships are stronger when items are near one another. Our observation, therefore, is that interaction between places diminishes in intensity and frequency as distance between them increases—a statement of the idea of distance decay, which we explore in Chapter 3. Consideration of distance implies assessment of accessibility. How easy or difficult is it to overcome the “friction of distance”? That is, how easy or difficult is it to surmount the barrier of the time and space separation of places? Distance isolated North America from Europe until the development of ships (and aircraft) that reduced the effective distance between the continents. All parts of the ancient and medieval city were accessible by walking; they were “pedestrian cities,” a status lost as cities expanded in area and population with industrialization. Accessibility between city districts could only be maintained by the development of public transit systems whose fixed lines of travel increased ease of movement between connected points and reduced it between areas not on the transit lines themselves. Accessibility therefore suggests the idea of connectivity, a broader concept implying all the tangible and intangible ways in which places are connected: by physical telephone lines, street and road systems, pipelines and sewers; by unrestrained walking across open countryside; by radio and TV broadcasts beamed outward uniformly from a central source. Where routes are fixed and flow is channelized, networks—the patterns of routes connecting sets of places—determine the efficiency of movement and the connectedness of points. There is, inevitably, interchange between connected places. Spatial diffusion is the process of dispersion of an idea or an item from a center of origin to more distant points with which it is directly or indirectly connected. The rate and extent of that diffusion are affected by the distance separating the originating center of, say, a new idea or technology and other places where it is eventually adopted. Diffusion rates are also affected by population densities, means of communication, obvious advantages of the innovation, and importance or prestige of the originating node. These ideas of diffusion are further explored in Chapter 2.

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

Geographers study the dynamics of spatial relationships. Movement, connection, and interaction are part of the social and economic processes that give character to places and regions (Figure 1.13). Geography’s study of those relationships recognizes that spatial interaction is not just an awkward necessity but a fundamental organizing principle of human life on earth.

The Structured Content of Place A starting point for geographic inquiry is how objects are distributed in area—for example, the placement of churches or supermarkets within a town. That interest distinguishes geography from other sciences, physical or social, and

Figure 1.13

The routes of the 5 million automobile trips made each day in Chicago during the late 1950s are recorded on this light-display map. The boundaries of the region of interaction that they created are clearly marked and document the centrality of Chicago at that time as the employment destination of city-fringe and suburban residents. Those boundaries (and the dynamic region they defined) were subject to change as residential neighborhoods expanded or developed, as population relocations occurred, and as the road pattern was altered over time. If made today, the lightdisplay would show a much more complex commuting pattern, with most trips between suburbs and not from suburbs to the central city.

From Chicago Area Transportation Study, Final Report, 1959, Vol. I, p. 44, figure 22 “Desire Lines of Internal Automobile Driver Trips.”

underlies many of the questions geographers ask: Where is a thing located? How is that location related to other items? How did the location we observe come to exist? Such questions carry the conviction that the contents of an area are comprehensibly arranged or structured. The arrangement of items on the earth’s surface is called spatial distribution and may be analyzed by the elements common to all spatial distributions: density, dispersion, and pattern.

Density The measure of the number or quantity of anything within a defined unit of area is its density. It is therefore not simply a count of items but of items in relation to the space in which they are found. When the relationship is absolute, as in population per square kilometer, for example, or dwelling units per acre, we are defining arithmetic density (see Figure 1.9). Sometimes it is more meaningful to relate item numbers to a specific kind of area. Physiological density, for example, is a measure of the number of persons per unit area of arable land. Density defined in population terms is discussed in Chapter 4. A density figure is a statement of fact but not necessarily one useful in itself. Densities are normally employed comparatively, relative to one another. High or low density implies a comparison with a known standard, with an average, or with a different area. Ohio, with (2000) 107 persons per square kilometer (277 per sq mi), might be thought to have a high density compared to neighboring Michigan at 68 per square kilometer (175 per sq mi), and a low one in relation to New Jersey at 438 (1134 per sq mi).

Dispersion Dispersion (or its opposite, concentration) is a statement of the amount of spread of a phenomenon over an area. It tells us not how many or how much but how far things are spread out. If they are close together spatially, they are considered clustered or agglomerated. If they are spread out, they are dispersed or scattered (Figure 1.14).

If the entire population of a metropolitan county were all located within a confined central city, we might say the population was clustered. If, however, that same population redistributed itself, with many city residents moving to the suburbs and occupying a larger portion of the county’s territory, it would become more dispersed. In both cases, the density of population (numbers in relation to area of the county) would be the same, but the distribution would have changed. Since dispersion deals with separation of things one from another, a distribution that might be described as clustered (closely spaced) at one scale of reference might equally well be considered dispersed (widely spread) at another scale.

Pattern The geometric arrangement of objects in space is called pattern. Like dispersion, pattern refers to distribution, but that reference emphasizes design rather than spacing (Figure 1.15). The distribution of towns along a railroad or houses along a street may be seen as linear. A centralized pattern may involve items concentrated around a single node. A random pattern may be the best description of an unstructured irregular distribution. The rectangular system of land survey adopted in much of the United States under the Ordinance of 1785 creates a checkerboard rural pattern of “sections” and “quarter-sections” of farmland (see Figure 6.26). As a result, in most American cities, streets display a grid or rectilinear pattern. The same is true of cities in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, which adopted similar geometric survey systems. The hexagonal pattern of service areas of farm towns is a mainstay of central place theory discussed in Chapter 11. These references to the geometry of distribution patterns help us visualize and describe the structured arrangement of items in space. They help us make informed comparisons between areas and use the patterns we discern to ask further questions about the interrelationship of things.

Place Similarity and Regions The distinctive characteristics of places in content and structure immediately suggest two geographically important ideas. The first is that no two places on the surface of

Figure 1.14

Density and dispersion each tell us something different about how items are distributed in an area. Density is simply the number of items or observations within a defined area; it remains the same no matter how the items are distributed. The density of houses per square mile, for example, is the same in both (a) and (b). Dispersion is a statement about nearness or separation. The houses in (a) are more dispersed than those shown clustered in (b).

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 1.15

Pattern describes spatial arrangement and design. The linear pattern of towns in (a) perhaps traces the route of a road or railroad or the course of a river. The central city in (b) with its nearby suburbs represents a centralized pattern, while the dots in (c) are randomly distributed.

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the earth can be exactly the same. Not only do they have different absolute locations, but—as in the features of the human face—the precise mix of physical and cultural characteristics of a place is never exactly duplicated. Since geography is a spatial science, the inevitable uniqueness of place would seem to impose impossible problems of generalizing spatial information. That this is not the case results from the second important idea: The physical and cultural content of an area and the dynamic interconnections of people and places show patterns of spatial similarity. Often the similarities are striking enough for us to conclude that spatial regularities exist. They permit us to recognize and define regions—earth areas that display significant elements of internal uniformity and external difference from surrounding territories. Places are, therefore, both unlike and like other places, creating patterns of areal differences and of coherent spatial similarity. The problem of the historian and the geographer is similar. Each must generalize about items of study that are essentially unique. The historian creates arbitrary but meaningful and useful historical periods for reference and study. The “Roaring Twenties” and the “Victorian Era” are shorthand summary names for specific time spans, internally quite complex and varied but significantly distinct from what went before or followed after. The region is the geographer’s equivalent of the historian’s epoch. It is a device of areal generalization that segregates into component parts the complex reality of the earth’s surface. In both the time and the space need for generalization, attention is focused on key unifying elements or similarities of the era or area selected for study. In both the historical and geographical cases, the names assigned to those times and places serve to identify the time span or region and to convey a complex set of interrelated attributes.

(a)

(b)

All of us have a general idea of the meaning of region, and all of us refer to regions in everyday speech and action. We visit “the old neighborhood” or “go downtown”; we plan to vacation or retire in the “Sunbelt”; or we speculate about the effects of weather conditions in the “Corn Belt” on next year’s food prices. In each instance we have mental images of the areas mentioned, and in each we have engaged in an informal place classification to pass along quite complex spatial, organizational, or content ideas. We have applied the regional concept to bring order to the immense diversity of the earth’s surface. What we do informally as individuals, geography attempts to do formally as a discipline—define and explain regions (Figure 1.16). The purpose is clear: to make the infinitely varying world around us understandable through spatial summaries. That world is only rarely subdivided into neat, unmistakable “packages” of uniformity. Neither the environment nor human areal actions present us with a compartmentalized order, any more than the sweep of human history has predetermined “eras” or all plant specimens come labeled in nature with species names. We all must classify to understand, and the geographer classifies in regional terms. Regions are spatial expressions of ideas or summaries useful to the analysis of the problem at hand. Although as many possible regions exist as there are physical, cultural, or organizational attributes of area, the geographer studies selected areal variables that contribute to the understanding of a specific topic or areal problem. All other variables are disregarded as irrelevant. Regional boundaries are assumed to be marked where the region’s internal unifying characteristics change so materially that different regional summaries are required.

(c)

Figure 1.16

The Middle West as seen by different professional geographers. Agreement on the need to recognize spatial order and to define regional units does not imply unanimity in the selection of boundary criteria. All the sources concur in the significance of the Middle West as a regional entity in the spatial structure of the United States and agree on its core area. These sources differ, however, in their assessment of its limiting characteristics.

Sources: (a) John H. Garland, ed., The North American Midwest (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1955); (b) John R. Borchert and Jane McGuigan, Geography of the New World (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961); and (c) Otis P. Starkey and J. Lewis Robinson, The Anglo-American Realm (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

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The Characteristics of Regions The regional concept tells us that all regions share certain common characteristics related to earth space. • Regions have location, often expressed in the regional name selected, such as the Middle West, the Near East, North Africa, and the like. This form of regional name underscores the importance of relative location. • Regions have spatial extent. They define territories across which are found uniform sets of physical, cultural, or organizational features. • Regions have boundaries based on the areal spread of the features selected for study. Since regions are the recognition of the features defining them, their boundaries are drawn where those features no longer occur or dominate (Figure 1.17). Regional boundaries are rarely as sharply defined as those suggested by Figure 1.17 or by the regional maps in this and other geography texts. More frequently, broad zones of transition from one distinctive core area to another exist, as the dominance of the defining regional features gradually diminishes outward from the core to the regional periphery. Linear boundaries are arbitrary divisions made necessary by the scale of world regional maps and by the summary character of most regional discussions.

Figure 1.17

Aachen, Germany, in 1649. The acceptance of regional extent implies the recognition of regional boundaries. At some defined point, urban is replaced by nonurban, the Midwest ends and the Plains begin, or the rain forest ceases and the savanna emerges. Regional boundaries are, of course, seldom as precisely and visibly marked as were the limits of the walled medieval city. Its sprawling modern counterpart may be more difficult to define, but the boundary significance of the concept of urban remains.

Regions are hierarchically arranged. Although regions vary in scale, type, and degree of generalization, none stands alone as the ultimate key to areal understanding. Each defines a part of spatial reality (Figure 1.18) and at the same time exists as a part of a larger, equally valid regional unit.

Types of Regions Regions may be either formal, functional, or perceptual. Formal or uniform regions are areas of essential uniformity in one or a limited combination of physical or cultural features. Your home state is a precisely bounded formal political region within which uniformity of law and administration is found. Later in this book we will encounter formal (homogeneous) cultural regions in which standardized characteristics of language, religion, ethnicity, or economy exist. The frontpaper foldout maps of landform regions and country units show other formal regional patterns. Whatever the basis of its definition, the formal region is the largest area over which a valid generalization of attribute uniformity may be made. Whatever is stated about one part of it holds true for its remainder. The functional or nodal region, in contrast, is a spatial system defined by the interactions and connections that give it a dynamic, organizational basis (Figure 1.19).

Figure 1.18

A hierarchy of regions. One possible nesting of regions within a regional hierarchy defined by differing criteria. On a formal regional scale of size progression, the Delmarva Peninsula of the eastern United States may be seen as part of the Atlantic Coastal Plain, which is in turn a portion of the eastern North American humid continental climatic region. Each regional unit has internal coherence. The recognition of its constituent parts aids in understanding the larger composite areal unit.

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(a)

SONOMA SOLANO MARIN

SILICON VALLEY Total number of trips by place of residence 10–50 51–100 101–200 201–500 501–1000 1001–2000

CONTRA COSTA

Oakland SAN FRANCISCO

ALAMEDA

N

SAN MATEO SILICON VALLEY

San Jose 0

5 MILES

(b)

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Introduction: Some Background Basics

SANTA CLARA

Figure 1.19

(a) The functional (or nodal) regions shown on this map were based on linkages between large banks of major central cities and the “correspondent” banks they served in smaller towns in the 1970s, before the advent of electronic banking and bank consolidation. (b) A different form of connectivity is suggested by the “desire line” map recording the volume of daily work trips within the San Francisco Bay area to the Silicon Valley employment node. The outer periphery of a dynamic functional region is marked by the farthest extent of the commuting lines. The intensity of interchange and the strength of regional identity increases toward the center or core. See also Figure 1.13.

(a) Redrawn by permission from Annals of the Association of American Geographers, John R. Borchert, vol. 62, p. 358, Association of American Geographers, 1972. (b) Reprinted with permission from Robert Cervero, Suburban Gridlock, © 1986 Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.

Those characterizing features are most clearly defined at the core of the region and lessen in dominance toward its margins or periphery. The region’s boundaries remain constant only as long as the interchanges establishing it remain unaltered. Perceptual regions are less rigorously structured than the formal and functional regions geographers devise. They reflect feelings and images rather than objective data and because of that may be more meaningful in the lives and actions of those who recognize them than are the more abstract regions of geographers. Ordinary people have a clear idea of spatial variation and employ the regional concept to distinguish between territorial entities. People individually and collectively agree on where they live. The vernacular regions they recognize have reality in their minds and are reflected in regionally based names employed in businesses, by sports teams, or in advertising slogans. The frequency of references to “Dixie” in the southeastern United States represents that kind of regional consensus and awareness. Such vernacular regions reflect the way people view space, assign their loyalties, and interpret their world. At a different scale, such urban ethnic enclaves (see Chapter 6) as “Little Italy” or “Chinatown” have comparable regional identity in the minds of their inhabitants. Less clearly perceived by outsiders but unmistakable to their inhabitants are the “turfs” of urban clubs or gangs. Their boundaries are sharp, and the perceived distinctions between them are paramount in the daily lives and activities of their occupants.

Maps Maps are tools to identify regions and to analyze their content. The spatial distributions, patterns, and relations of interest to geographers usually cannot easily be observed or interpreted in the landscape itself. Many, such as landform or agricultural regions or major cities, are so extensive spatially that they cannot be seen or studied in their totality from one or a few vantage points. Others, such as regions of language usage or religious belief, are spatial phenomena, but are not tangible or visible. Various interactions, flows, and exchanges imparting the dynamic quality to spatial interaction may not be directly observable at all. And even if all matters of geographic interest could be seen and measured through field examination, the infinite variety of tangible and intangible content of area would make it nearly impossible to isolate for study and interpretation the few items of regional interest selected for special investigation. Therefore, the map has become the essential and distinctive tool of geographers. Only through the map can spatial distributions and interactions of whatever nature be reduced to an observable scale, isolated for indi-

vidual study, and combined or recombined to reveal relationships not directly measurable in the landscape itself. But maps can serve their purpose only if their users have a clear idea of their strengths, limitations, and diversity and of the conventions observed in their preparation and interpretation.

Map Scale We have already seen that scale (page 11) is a vital element of every map. Because it is a much reduced version of the reality it summarizes, a map generalizes the data it displays. Scale—the relationship between size or length of a feature on the map and the same item on the earth’s surface—determines the amount of that generalization. The smaller the scale of the map, the larger is the area it covers and the more generalized are the data it portrays. The larger the scale, the smaller is the depicted area and the more accurately can its content be represented (Figure 1.20). It may seem backward, but large-scale maps show small areas, and small-scale maps show large areas. Map scale is selected according to the amount of generalization of data that is acceptable and the size of area that must be depicted. The user must consider map scale in evaluating the reliability of the spatial data that are presented. Regional boundary lines drawn on the world maps in this and other books or atlases would cover many kilometers or miles on the earth’s surface. They obviously distort the reality they are meant to define, and on small-scale maps major distortion is inevitable. In fact, a general rule of thumb is that the larger the earth area depicted on a map the greater is the distortion built into the map. This is so because a map has to depict the curved surface of the three-dimensional earth on a two-dimensional sheet of paper. The term projection designates the method chosen to represent the earth’s curved surface as a flat map. Since absolutely accurate representation is impossible, all projections inevitably distort. Specific projections may be selected, however, to minimize the distortion of at least one of the four main map properties—area, shape, distance, and direction.3

The Globe Grid Maps are geographers’ primary tools of spatial analysis. All spatial analysis starts with locations, and all locations are related to the global grid of latitude and longitude. Since these lines of reference are drawn on the spherical earth, their projection onto a map distorts their grid relationships. The extent of variance between the globe grid and a map grid helps tell us the kind and degree of distortion the map will contain.

3A more detailed discussion of map projections, including examples of their different types and purposes, may be found in Appendix A, beginning on page 529.

Introduction: Some Background Basics

19

Figure 1.20

The effect of scale on area and detail. The larger the scale, the greater the number and kinds of features that can be included. Scale may be reported to the map user in one (or more) of three ways. A verbal scale is given in words (“1 centimeter to 1 kilometer” or “1 inch to 1 mile”). A representative fraction (such as that placed at the left, below each of the four maps shown here) is a statement of how many linear units on the earth’s surface are represented by one unit on the map. A graphic scale (such as that placed at the right and below each of these maps) is a line or bar marked off in map units but labeled in ground units.

The key reference points in the grid system are the North and South poles and the equator, which are given in nature, and the prime meridian, which is agreed on by cartographers. Because a circle contains 360 degrees, the distance between the poles is 180 degrees and between the equator and each pole, 90 degrees (Figure 1.21). Latitude measures distance north and south of the equator (0°), and parallels of latitude run due east-west. Longitude is the angular distance east or west of the prime meridian and is depicted by north-south lines called meridians, which converge at the poles. The properties of the globe grid the mapmaker tries to retain and the map user should look for are as follows: 1. 2.

20

All meridians are of equal length; each is one-half the length of the equator. All meridians converge at the poles and are true north–south lines.

Introduction: Some Background Basics

3. 4. 5. 6.

All lines of latitude (parallels) are parallel to the equator and to each other. Parallels decrease in length as one nears the poles. Meridians and parallels intersect at right angles. The scale on the surface of the globe is the same in every direction.

Only the globe grid itself retains all of these characteristics. To project it onto a surface that can be laid flat is to distort some or all of these properties and consequently to distort the reality the map attempts to portray.

How Maps Show Data The properties of the globe grid and of various projections are the concern of the cartographer. Geographers are more interested in the depiction of spatial data and in the analysis of the patterns and interrelationships those data present. Out of the myriad items comprising the content

Figure 1.21

The grid system of parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude. Since the meridians converge at the poles, parallels become increasingly shorter away from the equator. On the globe, the 60th parallel is only one-half as long as the equator, and a degree of longitude along it measures only about 55 1⁄2 kilometers (about 34 1⁄2 miles) compared to about 111 kilometers (about 69 miles) at the equator (0°).

of an area, the geographer must, first, select those that are of concern to the problem at hand and, second, decide on how best to display them for study or demonstration. In that effort, geographers can choose between different types of maps and different systems of symbolization. General-purpose, reference, or location maps make up one major class of maps familiar to everyone. Their purpose is simply to show without analysis or interpretation a variety of natural or human-made features of an area or of the world as a whole. Familiar examples are highway maps, city street maps, topographic maps (Figure 1.22), atlas maps, and the like. Until about the middle of the 18th century, the general-purpose or reference map was the dominant map form, for the primary function of the mapmaker (and the explorer who supplied the new data) was to “fill in” the world’s unknown areas with reliable locational information. With the passage of time scholars saw the possibilities to use the accumulating locational information to display and study the spatial patterns of social and physical data. The maps they made of climate, vegetation, soil, population, and other distributions introduced the thematic map, the second major class of maps. Thematic map is the general term applied to a map of any scale that presents a specific spatial distribution or a single category of data—that is, presents a graphic theme. The way the information is shown on such a map may

vary according to the type of information to be conveyed, the level of generalization that is desired, and the symbolization selected. Thematic maps may be either qualitative or quantitative. The principal purpose of the qualitative map is to show the distribution of a particular class of information. The world location of producing oil fields, the distribution of U.S. national parks, or the pattern of areas of agricultural specialization within a state or country are examples. The interest is in where things are and nothing is reported about—in the examples cited—barrels of oil extracted or in reserve, number of park visitors, or value or volume of crops or livestock produced. In contrast, quantitative thematic maps show the spatial characteristic of numerical data. Usually, a single variable such as population, income, wheat, or land value is chosen and the map displays the variation from place to place in that feature. Important types of quantitative thematic maps include graduated circle, dot, isometric and isopleth, and choropleth maps (Figure 1.23). Graduated circle maps use circles of different size to show the frequency of occurrence of a topic in different places; the larger the circle, the more frequent the incidence. On dot maps, a single or specified number of occurrences of the item studied is recorded by a single dot. The dot map serves not only to record data but to suggest their spatial pattern, distribution, and dispersion. An isometric map features lines (isolines) that connect points registering equal values of the item mapped (iso means “equal”). The isotherms shown on the daily weather map connect points recording the same temperature at the same moment of time or the same average temperature during the day. Identical elevations above sea level may be shown by a form of isoline called a contour line. On isopleth maps, the calculation refers not to a point but to an areal statistic—for example, persons per square kilometer or average percentage of cropland in corn—and the isoline connects average values for unit areas. For emphasis, the area enclosed by isolines may be shaded to indicate approximately uniform occurrence of the thing mapped, and the isoline itself may be treated as the boundary of a uniform region. A choropleth map presents average value of the data studied per preexisting areal unit—dwelling unit rents or assessed values by city block, for example, or (in the United States) population densities by individual townships within countries. Each unit area on the map is then shaded or colored to suggest the magnitude of the event or item found within its borders. Where the choropleth map is based on the absolute number of items within the unit area, as it is in Figure 1.23d, rather than on areal averaging (total numbers, that is, instead of, for example, numbers per square kilometer), a misleading statement about density may be conveyed. A statistical map records the actual numbers or occurrences of the mapped item per established unit area or location. The actual count of each state’s colleges and

Introduction: Some Background Basics

21

Figure 1.22

A portion of the Santa Barbara, California, topographic quadrangle of the US Geological Survey 1:24,000 series. Topographic maps portray the natural landscape features of relatively small areas. Elevations and shapes of landforms, streams, and other water bodies, vegetation, and coastal features are recorded, often with great accuracy. Because cultural items that people have added to the physical landscape, such as roads, railroads, buildings, political boundaries, and the like are also frequently depicted on them, topographic maps are classed as general purpose or reference maps by the International Cartographic Association. The scale of the original map no longer applies to this photographic reduction. Source: U.S. Geological Survey.

universities shown on an outline map of the United States or the number of traffic accidents at each street intersection within a city are examples of statistical maps. A cartogram uses such statistical data to transform territorial space so that the largest areal unit on the map is the one showing the greatest statistical value (Figure 1.24). Maps communicate information but, as in all forms of communication, the message conveyed by a map reflects the intent and, perhaps, the biases of its author. Maps are persuasive because of the implied precision of their lines, scales, color and symbol placement, and information content. But maps, as communication devices, can subtly or blatantly manipulate the message they impart or contain intentionally false information. (Figure 1.25). Maps, then, can distort and lie as readily as they can convey verifiable spatial data or scientifically valid analyses. The more map users are aware of those possibilities and the more understanding of map

22

Introduction: Some Background Basics

projections, symbolization, and common forms of thematic and reference mapping standards they possess, the more likely are they to reasonably question and clearly understand the messages maps communicate.

Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Increasingly, digital computers, mapping software, and computer-based display units and printers are employed in the design and production of maps and in the development of databases used in map production. In computerassisted cartography, the content of standard maps—locational and thematic—is digitized and stored in computers. The use of computers and printers in map production permits increases in the speed, flexibility, and accuracy of many steps in the mapmaking process but in no way reduces the obligation of the mapmaker to employ sound judgment in the design of the map or the communication of its content.

Population by county 10,000,000 4,000,000

Population by county 10,000 100,000 1,000,000

1,000,000

10,000,000

100,000

Population per square mile 0–25 25–65

Population by county data in thousands 0–99 100–999

65–130

1000–1999

130–250

2000–16000

More than 25

Figure 1.23

Types of thematic maps. Although population is the theme of each, these different California maps present their information in strikingly different ways. (a) In the graduated circle map, the area of the circle is approximately proportional to the absolute number of people within each county. (b) In a dot-distribution map where large numbers of items are involved, the value of each dot is identical and stated in the map legend. The placement of dots on this map does not indicate precise locations of people within the county, but simply their total number. (c) Population density is recorded by the isopleth map, while the choropleth map (d) may show absolute values as here or, more usually, ratio values such as population per square kilometer. Source: Fred M. Shelley and Audrey E. Clarke, Human and Cultural Geography, © 1994. Reproduced by permission of Wm. C. Brown Publishers, Dubuque, Iowa.

Introduction: Some Background Basics

23

Figure 1.24

Relative traffic congestion. A typical value-by-area cartogram with states drawn in proportion to the number of vehicle-miles driven per road mile.

Source: Borden D. Dent, Cartography: Thematic Map Design, 4th ed., © 1996. Reproduced by permission of Times Mirror Higher Education Group, Dubuque, Iowa.

Bol'shoy Sovetskiy Atlas Mira, 1939

ze Ala

Logashkino

Atlas Mira, 1954

R. ya

Karta SSSR, 1958

Atlas SSSR, 1962

Logashkino

Logashkino

Atlas Mira, 1967

Atlas SSSR, 1969

Logashkino Logashkino

Figure 1.25

The wandering town of Logashkino, as traced in various Soviet atlases by Mark Monmonier. Deliberate, extensive cartographic “disinformation” and locational falsification, he reports, became a Cold War tactic of the Soviet Union. We usually use—and trust— maps to tell us exactly where things are located. On the maps shown, however, Logashkino migrates from west of the river away from the coast to east of the river on the coast, while the river itself gains and loses a distributary and, in 1954, the town itself disappears. The changing misinformation, Monmonier suggests, was intended to obscure from potential enemies the precise location of possible military targets.

Source: Mark Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps, 2nd ed. © 1996. Reproduced by permission of the University of Chicago.

24

Introduction: Some Background Basics

Geographic information systems (GIS) extend the use of digitized data and computer manipulation to investigate and display spatial information. A GIS is both an integrated software package for handling, processing, and analyzing geographical data and a computer database in which every item of information is tied to a precise geographic location. In the raster approach, that tie involves dividing the study area into a set of rectangular cells and describing the content of each cell. In the vector

INPUTS: Questions

approach, the precise location of each object—point, line, or area—in a distribution is described. In either approach, a vast amount of different spatial information can be stored, accessed, compared, processed, analyzed, and displayed. A GIS database, then, can be envisioned as a set of discrete informational overlays linked by reference to a basic locational grid of latitude and longitude (Figure 1.26). The system then permits the separate display of the spatial

Human landscape Settlement Railroad Road

From stereoscopic aerial photographs

Topography

From stereoscopic aerial photographs

Surface drainage

From satellite images

Vegetation and land use

From agency records

Data of past river flow

OUTPUTS: Answers: graph - runoff and catchment area map and table - vegetation change

Figure 1.26

A model of a geographic information system. A GIS incorporates three primary components: data storage capability, computer graphics programs, and statistical packages. In this example, the different layers of information held are important in monitoring a river system. Different data sets, all selected for applicability to the questions asked, may be developed and used in human geography, economic geography, transportation planning, industrial location work, and similar applications. Source: Michael Bradshaw and Ruth Weaver, Foundations of Physical Geography, © 1995. Reproduced by permission of Wm. C. Brown Publishers, Dubuque, Iowa.

Introduction: Some Background Basics

25

information contained in the database. It allows the user to overlay maps of different themes, analyze the relations revealed, and compute spatial relationships. It shows aspects of spatial associations otherwise difficult to display on conventional maps, such as flows, interactions, and three-dimensional characteristics. In short, a GIS database, as a structured set of spatial information, has become a powerful tool for automating geographical analysis and synthesis. A GIS data set may contain the great amount of place-specific information collected and published by the U.S. Census Bureau, including population distribution, race, ethnicity, income, housing, employment, industry, farming, etc. It may also hold environmental information downloaded from satellite imagery or taken from Geological Survey maps and other governmental and private sources. In human geography, the vast and growing array of spatial data has encouraged the use of GIS to explore models of regional economic and social structure, to examine transportation systems and urban growth patterns, to study patterns of voting behavior, disease incidence, the accessibility of public services, and a vast array of other topics. For physical geographers, the analytic and modeling capabilities of GIS are fundamental to the understanding of processes and interrelations in the natural environment. Because of the growing importance of GIS in all manner of public and private spatial inquiries, demand in the job market is growing for those skilled in its techniques. Most university courses in GIS are taught in Geography departments, and “GIS/remote sensing” is a primary occupational specialty for which many geography undergraduate and graduate majors seek preparation.

Mental Maps Maps that shape our understanding of distributions and locations or influence our perception of the world around us are not always drawn on paper. We carry with us mental maps that in some ways are more accurate in reflecting our view of spatial reality than the formal maps created by geographers or cartographers. Mental maps are images about an area or an environment developed by an individual on the basis of information or impressions received, interpreted, and stored. We use this information—this mental map—in organizing our daily activities: selecting our destinations and the sequence in which they will be visited, deciding on our routes of travel, recognizing where we are in relation to where we wish to be. Such maps are every bit as real to their creators (and we all have them) as are the street maps or highway maps commercially available, and they are a great deal more immediate in their impact on our spatial decisions. We may choose routes or avoid neighborhoods not on objective grounds but on emotional or perceptual ones. Whole sections of a community may be voids on our mental

26

Introduction: Some Background Basics

maps, as unknown as the interiors of Africa and South America were to Western Europeans two centuries ago. Our areas of awareness generally increase with the increasing mobility that comes with age (Figure 1.27), affluence, and education and may be enlarged or restricted for different social groups within the city (Figure 1.28).

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 1.27

Three children, aged 6, 10, and 13, who lived in the same house, were asked to draw maps of their neighborhood. They received no further instructions. Notice how perspectives broaden and neighborhoods expand with age. (a) For the 6-year-old, the “neighborhood” consists of the houses on either side of her own. (b) The square block on which she lives is the neighborhood for the 10-year-old. (c) The wider horizons of the 13-year-old are reflected in her drawing. The square block that the 10-year-old drew is shaded in this sketch.

Figure 1.28

Four mental maps of Los Angeles. The upper-middle-income residents of Northridge and Westwood have expansive views of the metropolis, reflecting their mobility and area of travel. Residents of Boyle Heights and Avalon, both minority districts, have a much more restricted and incomplete mental image of the city. Their limited mental maps reflect and reinforce their spatial isolation within the metropolitan area. From Department of City Planning, City of Los Angeles, The Visual Environment of Los Angeles, 1971. Reprinted by permission.

Introduction: Some Background Basics

27

Systems, Maps, and Models The content of area is interrelated and constitutes a spatial system that, in common with all systems, functions as a unit because its component parts are interdependent. Only rarely do individual elements of area operate in isolation, and to treat them as if they do is to lose touch with spatial reality. The systems of geographic concern are those in which the functionally important variables are spatial: location, distance, direction, density, and the other basic concepts we have reviewed. The systems that they define are not the same as regions, though spatial systems may be the basis for regional identification. Systems have components, and the analysis of the role of components helps reveal the operation of the system as a whole. To conduct that analysis, individual system elements must be isolated for separate identification and, perhaps, manipulated to see their function within the structure of the system or subsystem. Maps and models are the devices geographers use to achieve that isolation and separate study. Maps, as we have seen, are effective to the degree that they can segregate at an appropriate level of generalization those system elements selected for examination. By compressing, simplifying, and abstracting reality, maps record in manageable dimension the real-world conditions of interest. A model is a simplified abstraction of reality, structured to clarify causal relationships. Maps are a kind of model. They represent reality in an idealized form so that certain aspects of its properties may be more clearly seen. They are a special form of model, of course. Their abstractions are rendered visually and at a reduced scale so they may be displayed, for example, on the pages of this book. The complexities of spatial systems analysis—and the opportunities for quantitative analysis of systems made possible by computers and sophisticated statistical techniques—have led geographers to use other kinds of models in their work. Model building is the technique social scientists use to simplify complex situations, to eliminate (as does the map) unimportant details, and to isolate for special study and analysis the role of one or more interacting elements in a total system. An interaction model discussed in Chapter 3, for instance, suggests that the amount of exchange expected between two places depends on the distance separating them and on their population size. The model indicates that the larger the places and the closer their distance, the greater is the amount of interaction. Such a model helps us to isolate the important components of the spatial system, to manipulate them separately, and to reach conclusions concerning their relative importance. When a model satisfactorily predicts the volume of intercity interaction

28

Introduction: Some Background Basics

in the majority of cases, the lack of agreement between what is observed and what is expected in a particular case leads to an examination of the circumstances contributing to the disparity. The quality of connecting roads, political barriers, or other variables may affect the specific places examined, and these causative elements may be isolated for further study. Indeed, the steady pursuit of more refined and definitive analysis of human geographic questions—the “further study” that continues to add to our understanding of how people occupy and utilize the earth, interact with each other, and organize and alter earth space—has led to the remarkably diversified yet coherent field of modern human geography. With the content of this introductory chapter as background to the nature, traditions, and tools of geography, we are ready to begin its exploration.

The Structure of This Book By way of getting started, it is useful for you to know how the organization and topics of this text have been structured to help you reach the kinds of understandings we seek. We begin by exploring the roots and meaning of culture (Chapter 2), establishing the observed ground rules of spatial interaction and spatial behavior (Chapter 3), and examining the areal variations in patterns of population distribution and change (Chapter 4). These set the stage for following separate discussions of spatial patterns of language and religion, ethnic distinctions, and folk and popular culture (Chapters 5–7). These are the principal expressions of unity and diversity and of areal differentiation among the peoples and societies of the earth. Understanding their spatial patterns and interrelations goes far toward providing the world view that is our objective. Beginning with Chapter 8, our focus shifts more to the economic and organizational landscapes humans have created. In turn, we look at economic geography and economic development (Chapters 8–10), urban systems and structures (Chapter 11), and patterns of the political ordering of space (Chapter 12). Finally, in Chapter 13, dealing with human impacts, we return to the underlying concern of all geographic study: the relationship between human geographic patterns and processes and both the present conditions and the future prospects of the physical and cultural environments we occupy, create, or modify. To help clarify the connections between the various topics of human geography, the chapters of this book are grouped by common theme and separately introduced.

Introduction The Internet, a vast network of computers electronically joining millions of people and thousands of organizations and institutions throughout the world, has become in its multimedia component, the World Wide Web, or WWW, an important tool for academic research and general information gathering. Users of the Web, navigating through a graphic interface combining hypertext and hypermedia to link documents, images, video clips, and sound files, gain access to vast stores of data not easily (or at all) accessible with other research tools. There are numerous Internet resources for geography, and many of its websites present more current information in ways not possible with traditional printed sources. For your guidance, each chapter of this text contains a boxed “On-Line” section (like this one) discussing World Wide Web sites that may themselves be data sources of value in expanding topics of the chapter or be linked to other websites concerned with those chapter topics.a Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, some of the on-line addresses listed in this book may have changed or may no longer exist when you try to consult them. In most instances, cross-references and directions to replacement addresses are cited at the old website locations for your guidance. And new and useful sites are constantly being developed. You are invited to report those new sources and addresses you have found valuable and wish to share with other readers. Check our home page at www.mhhe.com/fellmann7e/ for directions for leaving an e-mail message with your information and suggestions. There you will also find additional Web addresses for geography in general and for the individual chapter “On-Line” reports, many of them added by the publisher or contributed by helpful users. For those interested in professional geographic associations and activities, the home page of the Association of American Geographers at www.aag.org/ is a good initial point. It offers information about the association itself, its publications and “specialty groups” (complete with e-mail addresses), and, importantly, gives access to a revealing discussion of “Careers in Geography” and through its “Ask a aFor

Chapter 1, web sites concerned with maps and cartography are cited in the Appendix A On-Line box, p. 537.

Summary Geography is about earth space and its physical and cultural content. Throughout its long history, geography has remained consistent in its focus on human–environmental interactions, the interrelatedness of places, and the likenesses and differences in physical and cultural content of area that

Geographer” option, offers links to experts in various fields of geography who may be contacted with inquiries about topics and issues in their fields of expertise. The AAG site also provides links to such other organizations as the Canadian Association of Geographers, the National Council for Geographic Education, and the National Geographic Society. Are you interested in furthering your geography education or in learning about geography programs worldwide? A good—but older—starting point is the Ryerson University geography department list at www.geo.ryerson.ca/html/ geograph.html. A valuable general set of links and references to a variety of geography (and related) resources may be found on the CU Resources for Geographers site at www.Colorado.EDU/ geography/virtdept/resources/contents.htm. Be sure also to scan that site’s “Starting Places” section (www.Colorado.EDU/ geography/virtdept/resources/startplc/start.htm) for quick access to search engines, lists, and libraries to help you in browsing the Web for geography interests. The University of Wisconsin—Stevens Point Internet resources guide at www.uwsp.edu/geo/internet/geog_geol_resources.html is valuable, and Michigan State University maintains a useful guide to Geography Related Web Links at www.geo.msu.edu/wlinks.html. Although each chapter’s “On-Line” report has references to subject-specific sites, some general background sites useful for all chapters also exist. For example, a deeper understanding of “Geography for Life: the National Geography Standards” can be found through a tutorial conducted by the National Council of Geography Teachers: www.ncge.org/publications/tutorial/. Check out as well the wide variety of popular and scientific departments linked to the home page of the National Geographic Society at www.nationalgeographic.com/ The CIA’s World Factbook is a useful annually updated collection of information about the geography, climate, people, customs, and governments of the world organized by region and country. Consult it as an on-line reference at www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ factbook. Finally, a visit to the Geography site at About.com is a good starting point for searching out many geography interests. It features a comprehensive topical set of “Subject” links to selected geographical resources, on-line maps, data, and weekly articles, along with a chat room and bulletin board: http://geography.about.com/.

exist from place to place. The collective interests of geographers are summarized by the spatial and systems analytical questions they ask. The responses to those questions are interpreted through basic concepts of location, distance, direction, content evolution, spatial interaction, and regional organization.

Introduction: Some Background Basics

29

Geographers employ maps and models to abstract the complex reality of space and to isolate its components for separate study. Maps are imperfect renderings of the three-dimensional earth and its parts on a twodimensional surface. In that rendering, some or all of the characteristics of the globe grid are distorted, but convenience and data manageability are gained. Spatial information may be depicted visually in a number of ways, each designed to simplify and to clarify the infinite complexity of spatial content. Geographers also use verbal and mathematical models for the same purpose, to abstract and analyze. In their study of the earth’s surface as the occupied and altered space within which humans operate, geographers may concentrate on the integration of physical and cultural phenomena in a specific earth area (regional geography). They may, instead, emphasize systematic

geography through study of the earth’s physical systems of spatial and human concern or, as here, devote primary attention to people. This is a text in human geography. Its focus is on human interactions both with the physical environments people occupy and alter and with the cultural environments they have created. We are concerned with the ways people perceive the landscapes and regions they occupy, act within and between them, make choices about them, and organize them according to the varying cultural, political, and economic interests of human societies. This is a text clearly within the social sciences, but like all geography, its background is the physical earth as the home of humans. As a human geography, its concern is with how that home has been altered by societies and cultures. Culture is the starting point, and in the next chapter we begin with an inquiry about the roots and nature of culture.

Key Words absolute direction

geographic information system (GIS) 25

relative distance

10

absolute distance

10

mental map

relative location

9

absolute location

8

model

accessibility

14

concentration connectivity

15

28

pattern 11

15

functional region

17

17

11

site 9 situation

9

spatial diffusion

perceptual region region

17

12

15

projection

formal region

scale

nodal region

15

dispersion

26

natural landscape

14

cultural landscape density

10

19

19

16

spatial distribution

15

spatial interaction

14

spatial system

regional concept

16

relative direction

10

14

uniform region

28 17

For Review 1.

In what two meanings and for what different purposes do we refer to location?

2.

Describe the site and the situation of the town where you live, work, or go to school.

3.

30

What kinds of distance transformations are suggested by the term relative distance? How is the concept of psychological distance related to relative distance?

Introduction: Some Background Basics

4.

What are the common elements of spatial distribution? What different aspects of the spatial arrangement of things do they address?

5.

What are the common characteristics of regions? How are formal and functional regions different in concept and definition? What is a perceptual region?

6.

List at least four properties of the globe grid. Why are globe grid properties apt to be distorted on maps?

7.

What does prime meridian mean? What happens to the length of a degree of longitude as one approaches the poles?

8.

What different ways of displaying statistical data on maps can you name and describe?

Focus Follow-Up 1.

What is the nature of geography and the role of human geography? pp. 2–5. Geography is a spatial science concerned with how the content of earth areas differs from place to place. It is the study of spatial variation in the world’s physical and cultural (human) features. The emphasis of human geography is on the spatial variations in characteristics of peoples and cultures, on the way humans interact over space, and the ways they utilize and alter the natural landscapes they occupy.

2.

What are the fundamental geographic observations and their underlying concepts? pp. 5–15. Basic geographic observations all concern the characteristics, content, and interactions of places. Their underlying concepts involve such place specifics as location, direction, distance, size, scale, physical and cultural attributes, interrelationships, and regional similarities and differences.

3.

What are the regional concept and the generalized characteristics of regions? pp. 15–19. The regional concept tells us that physical and cultural features of the earth’s surface are rationally arranged by understandable processes. All recognized regions are characterized by location, spatial extent, defined boundaries, and position within a hierarchy of regions. Regions may be “formal” (uniform) or “functional” (nodal) in nature.

4.

Why do geographers use maps and how do maps show spatial information? pp. 19–26. Maps are tools geographers use to identify and delimit regions and to analyze their content. They permit the study of areas and areal features too extensive to be completely viewed or understood on the earth’s surface itself. Thematic (single category) maps may be either qualitative or quantitative. Their data may be shown in graduated circle, dot

distribution, isometric, choropleth, statistical, or cartogram form. 5.

In what ways in addition to maps may spatial data be visualized or analyzed? pp. 26–28. Informally, we all create “mental maps” reflecting highly personalized impressions and information about the spatial arrangement of things (for example, buildings, streets, landscape features). More formally, geographers recognize the content of area as forming a spatial system to which techniques of spatial systems analysis and model building are applicable.

Selected References Agnew, John, David N. Livingstone, and Alisdair Rogers, eds. Human Geography: An Essential Anthology. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996. Demko, George J., with Jerome Agel and Eugene Boe. Why in the World: Adventures in Geography. New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1992. Dent, Borden D. Cartography: Thematic Map Design. 5th ed. Dubuque, Iowa: WCB/McGraw-Hill, 1999. Gersmehl, Phil. The Language of Maps. 15th ed. Indiana, Pa.: National Council for Geographic Education, 1996. Gould, Peter, and Rodney White. Mental Maps. 2d. ed. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986.

Gritzner, Charles F., Jr. “The Scope of Cultural Geography.” Journal of Geography 65 (1966): 4–11. Johnston, Ronald J., Derek Gregory, Geraldine Pratt, and Michael Watts. The Dictionary of Human Geography. 4th ed. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers, 2000. Johnston, Ronald. J., J. Hauer, and G. A. Koekveld, eds. Regional Geography: Current Developments and Future Prospects. New York: Routledge, 1990. Lanegran, David A., and Risa Palm. An Invitation to Geography. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.

Ley, David. “Cultural/Humanistic Geography.” Progress in Human Geography 5 (1981): 249–257; 7 (1983): 267–275. Livingstone, David N. The Geographical Tradition. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992. Lobeck, Armin K. Things Maps Don’t Tell Us: An Adventure into Map Interpretation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Martin, Geoffrey J., and Preston E. James. All Possible Worlds: A History of Geographical Ideas. 3d ed. New York: Wiley, 1993.

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Monmonier, Mark. How to Lie with Maps. 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Pattison, William D. “The Four Traditions of Geography.” Journal of Geography 63 (1964): 211–216.

Morrill, Richard L. “The Nature, Unity and Value of Geography.” Professional Geographer 35 (1983): 1–9.

Rogers, Alisdair, Heather Viles, and Andrew Goudie. The Student’s Companion to Geography. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992.

Muehrcke, Phillip C., and Juliana O. Muehrcke. Map Use: Reading, Analysis, and Interpretation. 4th ed. Madison, Wis.: J.P. Publications, 1998.

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White, Gilbert F. “Geographers in a Perilously Changing World.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 75 (1985): 10–15. Wood, Tim F. “Thinking in Geography.” Geography 72 (1987): 289–299.

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These Bushmen of Namibia, preparing an ostrich egg omelette next to the spoils of their hunt, are modern day remnants of the hunter-gatherer way of life that was universal before the domestication of plants and animals.

Focus Preview 1. Culture components and the nature of human–environmental relations, pp. 37–43. 2. Culture origins and culture hearths, pp. 43–52.

3. The structure of culture and forms of culture change, pp. 52–62.

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hey buried him there in the cave where they were working, less than 6 kilometers (4 miles) from the edge of the ice sheet. Outside stretched the tundra, summer feeding grounds for the mammoths whose ivory they had come so far to collect. Inside, near where they dug his grave, were stacked the tusks they had gathered and were cutting and shaping. They prepared the body carefully and dusted it with red ochre, then buried it in an elaborate grave with tundra flowers and offerings of food, a bracelet on its arm, a pendant about its throat, and 40 to 50 polished rods of ivory by its side. It rested there, in modern Wales, undisturbed for some 18,000 years until discovered early in the 19th century. The 25-year-old hunter had died far from the group’s home some 650 kilometers (400 miles) away near present-day Paris, France. He had been part of a routine annual summer expedition overland from the forested south across the as-yet-unflooded English Channel to the mammoths’ grazing grounds at the edge of the glacier. As always, they were well prepared for the trip. Their boots were carefully made. Their sewn skin leggings and tunics served well for travel and work; heavier fur parkas warded off the evening chill. They carried emergency food, fire-making equipment, and braided cord that they could fashion into nets, fishing lines, ropes, or thread. They traveled by reference to sun and stars, recognizing landmarks from past journeys and occasionally consulting a crude map etched on bone. Although the hunters returned bearing the sad news of their companion’s death, they also brought the ivory to be carved and traded among the scattered peoples of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

As shown by their tools and equipment, their behaviors and beliefs, these Stone Age travelers displayed highly developed and distinctive characteristics, primitive only from the vantage point of our own different technologies and customs. They represented the culmination of a long history of development of skills, of invention of tools, and of creation of lifestyles that set them apart from peoples elsewhere in Europe, Asia, and Africa who possessed still different cultural heritages. To writers in newspapers and the popular press, “culture” means the arts (literature, painting, music, and the like). To a social scientist, culture is the specialized behavioral patterns, understandings, adaptations, and social systems that summarize a group of people’s

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learned way of life. In this broader sense, culture is an ever-present part of the regional differences that are the essence of human geography. The visible and invisible evidences of culture—buildings and farming patterns, language, political organization, and ways of earning a living, for example—are all parts of the spatial diversity human geographers study. Cultural differences over time may present contrasts as great as those between the Stone Age ivory hunters and modern urban Americans. Cultural differences in area result in human landscapes with variations as subtle as the differing “feel” of urban Paris, Moscow, or New York or as obvious as the sharp contrasts of rural Zimbabwe and the Prairie Provinces of Canada (Figure 2.1).

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Figure 2.1

Cultural contrasts are clearly evident between (a) a subsistence maize plot in Zimbabwe and (b) the immense fields and mechanized farming of the Canadian prairies.

Since such tangible and intangible cultural differences exist and have existed in various forms for thousands of years, human geography addresses the question, Why? Why, since humankind constitutes a single species, are cultures so varied? What and where were the origins of the different culture regions we now observe? How, from whatever limited areas individual culture traits developed, were they diffused over a wider portion of the globe? How did people who had roughly similar origins come to display significant areal differences in technology, social structure, ideology, and the innumerable other expressions of human geographic diversity? In what ways and why are there distinctive cultural variations even in presumed “melting pot” societies such as the United States and Canada or in the outwardly homogeneous, long-established countries of Europe? Part of the answer to these questions is to be found in the way separate human groups developed techniques to solve regionally varied problems of securing food, clothing, and shelter and, in the process, created areally distinctive customs and ways of life.

Components of Culture Culture is transmitted within a society to succeeding generations by imitation, instruction, and example. In short, it is learned, not biological. It has nothing to do with instinct

or with genes. As members of a social group, individuals acquire integrated sets of behavioral patterns, environmental and social perceptions, and knowledge of existing technologies. Of necessity, each of us learns the culture in which we are born and reared. But we need not—indeed, cannot—learn its totality. Age, sex, status, or occupation may dictate the aspects of the cultural whole in which an individual becomes fully indoctrinated. A culture, that is, despite overall generalized and identifying characteristics and even an outward appearance of uniformity, displays a social structure—a framework of roles and interrelationships of individuals and established groups. Each individual learns and adheres to the rules and conventions not only of the culture as a whole but also of those specific to the subculture to which he or she belongs. And that subgroup may have its own recognized social structure (Figure 2.2). Many different cultures, then, can coexist within a given area, each with its own influence on the thoughts and behaviors of their separate members. Within the United States, for example, we can readily recognize masculine and feminine; majority white and minority black, Hispanic, Asian American, or other ethnic groups; gay and straight, urban and rural; and many other subcultures. All, of course, are simultaneously part of a larger “American” culture marked by commonalities of traditions, behaviors, loyalties, and beliefs. Human geography increasingly recognizes the plurality of cultures within

Figure 2.2

Both the traditional rice farmer of rural Japan and the harried commuter of Tokyo are part of a common Japanese culture. They occupy, however, vastly different positions in its social structure.

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regions. In addition to examining the separate content and influence of those subcultures, it attempts to record and analyze the varieties of contested cultural interactions between them, including those of political and economic nature. Culture is a complexly interlocked web of behaviors and attitudes. Realistically, its full and diverse content cannot be appreciated, and in fact may be wholly misunderstood, if we concentrate our attention only on limited, obvious traits. Distinctive eating utensils, the use of gestures, or the ritual of religious ceremony may summarize and characterize a culture for the casual observer. These are, however, individually insignificant parts of a much more complex structure that can be appreciated only when the whole is experienced. Out of the richness and intricacy of human life we seek to isolate for special study those more fundamental cultural variables that give structure and spatial order to societies. We begin with culture traits, the smallest distinctive items of culture. Culture traits are units of learned behavior ranging from the language spoken to the tools used or the games played. A trait may be an object (a fishhook, for example), a technique (weaving and knotting of a fishnet), a belief (in the spirits resident in water bodies), or an attitude (a conviction that fish is superior to other animal protein). Such traits are the most elementary expression of culture, the building blocks of the complex behavioral patterns of distinctive groups of peoples. Individual cultural traits that are functionally interrelated comprise a culture complex. The existence of such complexes is universal. Keeping cattle was a culture trait of the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania. Related traits included the measurement of personal wealth by the number of cattle owned, a diet containing milk and the blood of cattle, and disdain for labor unrelated to herding. The assemblage of these and other related traits yielded a culture complex descriptive of one aspect of Maasai society (Figure 2.3). In exactly analogous ways, religious complexes, business behavior complexes, sports complexes, and others can easily be recognized in American or any other society. Culture traits and complexes have areal extent. When they are plotted on maps, the regional character of the components of culture is revealed. Although human geographers are interested in the spatial distribution of these individual elements of culture, their usual concern is with the culture region, a portion of the earth’s surface occupied by populations sharing recognizable and distinctive cultural characteristics. Examples include the political organizations societies devise, the religions they espouse, the form of economy they pursue, and even the type of clothing they wear, eating utensils they use, or kind of housing they occupy. There are as many such conceptual culture regions as there are culture traits and complexes recognized for population groups. Their recognition will be particularly important in discussions of ethnic, folk, and popular cultures in later chapters of this

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book. In those later reviews as within the present chapter, we must keep in mind that within any one recognized culture region, groups united by the specific mapped characteristics may be competing and distinctive in other important cultural traits. Finally, a set of culture regions showing related culture complexes and landscapes may be grouped to form a culture realm. The term recognizes a large segment of the earth’s surface having an assumed fundamental uniformity in its cultural characteristics and showing a significant difference in them from adjacent realms. Culture realms are, in a sense, culture regions at the broadest scale of recognition. In fact, the scale is so broad and the diversity within the recognized realms so great that the very concept of realm may mislead more than it informs.

Figure 2.3

The formerly migratory Maasai of Kenya are now largely sedentary, partially urbanized, and frequently owners of fenced farms. Cattle formed the traditional basis of Maasai culture and were the evidence of wealth and social status. They provided, as well, the milk and blood important in the Maasai diet. Here, a herdsman catches blood released from a small neck incision he has just made.

If a global culture can be discerned, it may best be seen as a combination of multiple territorial cultures, rather than a completely standardized uniformity. It is those territorially different cultural mixtures that are recognized by the culture realms suggested on Figure 2.4, which itself is only one of many such possible divisions. The spatial pattern and characteristics of these generalized realms will help us place the discussions and examples of human geography of later chapters in their regional context.

Indeed, the current validity of distinctive culture realms has been questioned in light of an assumed globalization of all aspects of human society and economy. The term globalization implies the increasing interconnection of all parts of the world as the full range of social, cultural, political, and economic processes becomes international in scale and effect. The result, it has been suggested, is a homogenization of cultures as economies are integrated and uniform consumer demands are satisfied by standardized products produced by international corporations. Certainly, the increasing mobility of people, goods, and information have reduced the rigidly compartmentalized ethnicities, languages, and religions of earlier periods. Cultural flows and exchanges have increased over the recent decades and with them has come a growing worldwide intermixture of peoples and customs. Despite that growing globalism in all facets of life and economy, however, the world is far from homogenized. Although an increased sameness of commodities and experiences is encountered in distant places, even common and standardized items of everyday life—branded soft drinks, for example, or American fast food franchises—take on unique regional meanings and roles, conditioned by the total cultural mix they enter. Those multiple regional cultural mixes are often defiantly distinctive and separatist as recurring incidents of ethnic conflict, civil war, and strident regionalism attest.

Interaction of People and Environment Culture develops in a physical environment that, in its way, contributes to differences among people. In premodern subsistence societies, the acquisition of food, shelter, and clothing, all parts of culture, depends on the utilization of the natural resources at hand. The interrelations of people to the environment of a given area, their perceptions and utilization of it, and their impact on it are interwoven themes of cultural ecology—the study of the relationship between a culture group and the natural environment it occupies.

Environments as Controls Geographers have long dismissed as intellectually limiting and demonstrably invalid the ideas of environmental determinism, the belief that the physical environment

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exclusively shapes humans, their actions, and their thoughts. Environmental factors alone cannot account for the cultural variations that occur around the world. Levels of technology, systems of organization, and ideas about what is true and right have no obvious relationship to environmental circumstances. The environment does place certain limitations on the human use of territory. Such limitations, however, must be seen not as absolute, enduring restrictions but as relative to technologies, cost considerations, national aspirations, and linkages with the larger world. Human choices in the use of landscapes are affected by group perception of the feasibility and desirability of their settlement and exploitation. These are not circumstances inherent in the land. Mines, factories, and cities were (and are being) created in the formerly nearly unpopulated tundra and forests of Siberia as a reflection of Russian developmental programs, not in response to recent environmental improvement. Possibilism is the viewpoint that people, not environments, are the dynamic forces of cultural development. The needs, traditions, and level of technology of a culture affect how that culture assesses the possibilities of an area and shape what choices the culture makes regarding them. Each society uses natural resources in accordance with its circumstances. Changes in a group’s technical abilities or objectives bring about changes in its perceptions of the usefulness of the land. Simply put, the impact of the environment appears inversely related to the level of development of a culture, while perception of environmental opportunities increases directly with growth in economic and cultural development. Map evidence suggests the nature of some environmental limitations on use of area. The vast majority of the world’s population is differentially concentrated on less than one-half of the earth’s land surface, as Figure 4.22 suggests. Areas with relatively mild climates that offer a supply of fresh water, fertile soil, and abundant mineral resources are densely settled, reflecting in part the different potentials of the land under earlier technologies to support population. Even today, the polar regions, high and rugged mountains, deserts, and some hot and humid lowland areas contain very few people. If resources for feeding, clothing, or housing ourselves within an area are lacking or if we do not recognize them there, there is no inducement for people to occupy the territory. Environments that do contain such resources provide the framework within which a culture operates. Coal, oil, and natural gas have been in their present locations throughout human history, but they were of no use to preindustrial cultures and did not impart any recognized advantage to their sites of occurrence. Not until the Industrial Revolution did coal deposits gain importance and come to influence the location of such great industrial complexes as the Midlands in England, the Ruhr in Germany, and the steel-making districts formerly so important in parts of northeastern United States. Native

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Americans made one use of the environment around Pittsburgh, while 19th-century industrialists made quite another.

Human Impacts People are also able to modify their environment, and this is the other half of the human–environment relationship of geographic concern. Geography, including cultural geography, examines both the reactions of people to the physical environment and their impact on that environment. By using it, we modify our environment—in part, through the material objects we place on the landscape: cities, farms, roads, and so on (Figure 2.5). The form these take is the product of the kind of culture group in which we live. The cultural landscape, the earth’s surface as modified by human action, is the tangible physical record of a given culture. House types, transportation networks, parks and cemeteries, and the size and distribution of settlements are among the indicators of the use that humans have made of the land. Human actions, both deliberate and inadvertent, modifying or even destroying the environment are perhaps as old as humankind itself. People have used, altered, and replaced the vegetation in wide areas of the tropics and midlatitudes. They have hunted to extinction vast herds and whole species of animals. They have, through overuse and abuse of the earth and its resources, rendered sterile and unpopulated formerly productive and attractive regions. Fire has been called the first great tool of humans, and the impact of its early and continuing use is found on nearly every continent. Poleward of the great rain forests of equatorial South America, Africa, and South Asia lies the tropical savanna of extensive grassy vegetation separating scattered trees and forest groves (Figure 2.6). The trees appear to be the remnants of naturally occurring tropical dry forests, thorn forests, and scrub now largely obliterated by the use, over many millennia, of fire to remove the unwanted and unproductive trees and to clear off old grasses for more nutritious new growth. The grasses supported the immense herds of grazing animals that were the basis of hunting societies. After independence, the government of Kenya in East Africa sought to protect its national game preserves by prohibiting the periodic use of fire. It quickly found that the immense herds of gazelles, zebras, antelope, and other grazers (and the lions and other predators that fed on them) that tourists came to see were being replaced by less-appealing browsing species—rhinos, hippos, and elephants. With fire prohibited, the forests began to reclaim their natural habitat and the grassland fauna was replaced. The same form of vegetation replacement occurred in midlatitudes. The grasslands of North America were greatly extended by Native Americans who burned the forest margin to extend grazing areas and to drive animals in the hunt. The control of fire in modern times has resulted in the advance of the forest once again in formerly grassy areas (“parks”) of Colorado, northern Arizona, and other parts of the United States West.

Figure 2.5

The physical and cultural landscapes in juxtaposition. Advanced societies are capable of so altering the circumstances of nature that the cultural landscapes they create become the controlling environment. The city of Cape Town, South Africa, is a “built environment” largely unrelated to its physical surroundings.

Figure 2.6

The parklike landscape of grasses and trees characteristic of the tropical savanna is seen in this view from Kenya, Africa.

Examples abound. The Pleistocene overkill—the Stone Age loss of whole species of large animals on all inhabited continents—is often ascribed to the unrestricted hunting to extinction carried on by societies familiar with fire to drive animals and hafted (with handles) weapons to slaughter them. With the use of these, according to one estimate, about 40% of African large-animal genera passed to extinction. In North America, most of the original largeanimal species had disappeared by 10,000 years ago under pressure from the hunters migrating to and spreading across the continent. Although some have suggested that climatic changes or pathogens carried by dogs, rats, and other camp followers were at least partially responsible, human action is the more generally accepted explanation for the abrupt faunal changes. No uncertainty exists in the record of faunal destruction by the Maoris of New Zealand or of Polynesians who had exterminated some 80% to 90% of South Pacific bird species—as many as 2000 in all—by the time Captain Cook arrived in the 18th century. Not only destruction of animals but of the life-supporting environment itself has been a frequent Roots and Meaning of Culture

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consequence of human misuse of area (see “Chaco Canyon Desolation”). North Africa, the “granary of Rome” during the empire, became wasted and sterile in part because of mismanagement. Roman roads standing high above the surrounding barren wastes give testimony to the erosive power of wind and water when natural vegetation is unwisely removed and farming techniques are inappropriate. Easter Island in the South Pacific was covered lushly with palms and other trees when Polynesians settled there about A.D. 400. By the beginning of the 18th century, Easter Island had become the barren wasteland it remains today. Deforestation increased soil erosion, removed the supply of timbers needed for the vital dugout fishing canoes, and made it impossible to move

the massive stone statues that were significant in the islanders’ religion (Figure 2.7). With the loss of livelihood resources and the collapse of religion, warfare broke out and the population was decimated. A similar tragic sequence is occurring on Madagascar in the Indian Ocean today. Despite current romantic notions, not all early societies lived in harmony with their environment. The more technologically advanced and complex the culture, the more apparent is its impact on the natural landscape. In sprawling urban-industrial societies, the cultural landscape has come to outweigh the natural physical environment in its impact on people’s daily lives. It interposes itself between “nature” and humans, and residents of the cities of such societies—living and

Chaco Canyon Desolation

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t is not certain when they first came, but by A.D. 1000 the Anasazi people were building a flourishing civilization in present-day Arizona and New Mexico. In the Chaco Canyon alone, they erected as many as 75 towns, all centered around pueblos, huge stone-and-adobe apartment buildings as tall as five stories and with as many as 800 rooms. These were the largest and tallest buildings of North America prior to the construction of iron-framed “cloudscrapers” in major cities at the end of the 19th century. An elaborate network of roads and irrigation canals connected and supported the pueblos. About A.D. 1200, the settlements were abruptly abandoned. The Anasazi, advanced in their skills of agriculture and communal dwelling, were—according to some scholars— forced to move on by the ecological disaster their pressures had brought to a fragile environment. They needed forests for fuel and for the hundreds of thousands of logs used as beams and bulwarks in their dwellings. The pinyon-juniper woodland of the canyon was quickly depleted. For larger timbers needed for construction, the Anasazi first harvested stands of ponderosa pine found some 40 kilometers (25 miles) away. As early as A . D . 1030 these, too, were

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exhausted, and the community switched to spruce and Douglas fir from mountaintops surrounding the canyon. When they were gone by 1200, the Anasazi fate was sealed—not only by the loss of forest but by the irreversible ecological changes deforestation and agriculture had occasioned. With forest loss came erosion that destroyed the topsoil. The surface water channels that had been built for irrigation were deepened by accelerated erosion, converting them into enlarging arroyos useless for agriculture.

The material roots of their culture destroyed, the Anasazi turned upon themselves; warfare convulsed the region and, compelling evidence suggests, cannibalism was practiced. Smaller groups sought refuge elsewhere, re-creating on reduced scale their pueblo way of life but now in nearly inaccessible, highly defensible mesa and cliff locations. The destruction they had wrought destroyed the Anasazi in turn.

Figure 2.7

Now treeless, Easter Island once was lushly forested. The statues (some weighing up to 85 tons) dotting the island were rolled to their locations and lifted into place with logs.

continent with the best-documented evidence of Paleolithic culture) were covered with tundra vegetation, the mosses, lichens, and low shrubs typical of areas too cold to support forests. Southeastern Europe and southern Russia had forest, tundra, and grasslands, and the Mediterranean areas had forest cover (Figure 2.9). Gigantic herds of herbivores—reindeer, bison, mammoth, and horses— browsed, bred, and migrated throughout the tundra and the grasslands. An abundant animal life filled the forests. Human migration northward into present-day Sweden, Finland, and Russia demanded a much more elaborate set of tools and provision for shelter and clothing than had previously been required. It necessitated the crossing of a number of ecological barriers and the occupation of previously avoided difficult environments. By the end of the Paleolithic period, humans had spread to all the continents but Antarctica, carrying with them their common hunting-gathering culture and social organization. The settlement of the lands bordering the Pacific Ocean is suggested in Figure 2.10. While spreading, the total population also increased. But hunting and foraging bands require considerable territory to support a relatively small number of individuals. There were contacts between groups and, apparently, even planned gatherings for trade, socializing, and selecting spouses from outside the home group. Nevertheless, the bands tended to live in isolation. Estimates place the Paleolithic population of the entire island of Great Britain, which was on the northern margin of habitation, at only some 400–500 persons living in widely separated families of 20–40 people. Total world population at about 9000 B.C.

working in climate-controlled buildings, driving to enclosed shopping malls—can go through life with very little contact with or concern about the physical environment.

Roots of Culture Earlier humans found the physical environment more immediate and controlling than we do today. Some 11,000 years ago, the massive glaciers—moving ice sheets of great depth—that had covered much of the land and water of the Northern Hemisphere (Figure 2.8) began to retreat. Animal, plant, and human populations that had been spatially confined by both the ice margin and the harsh climates of middle-latitude regions, began to spread, colonizing newly opened territories. The name Paleolithic (Old Stone Age) is used to describe the period near the end of glaciation during which small and scattered groups like the ivory hunters at this chapter’s start began to develop regional variations in their ways of life and livelihood. All were hunter-gatherers, preagricultural people dependent on the year-round availability of plant and animal foodstuffs they could secure with the limited variety of rudimentary stone tools and weapons at their disposal. Even during the height of the Ice Age, the unglaciated sections of western, central, and northeastern Europe (the

Figure 2.8

Maximum extent of glaciation. In their fullest development, glaciers of the most recent Ice Age covered large parts of Eurasia and North America. Even areas not covered by ice were affected as ocean levels dropped and rose and climate and vegetation regions changed with glacial advance and retreat.

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probably ranged from 5 to 10 million. Variations in the types of tools characteristic of different population groups steadily increased as people migrated and encountered new environmental problems. Improved tool technology greatly extended the range of possibilities in the use of locally available materials. The result was more efficient and extensive exploitation of the physical environment than earlier had been possible. At the same time, regional contrasts in plant and animal life and in environmental conditions accelerated the differentiation of culture between isolated groups who under earlier, less varied conditions had shared common characteristics. Within many environments, even harsh ones, the hunting and foraging process was not particularly demanding of either time or energy. Recent studies of South African San people (Bushmen), for example, indicate that such bands survive well on the equivalent of a 2 1⁄2-day

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workweek. Time was available for developing skills in working flint and bone for tools, in developing regionally distinctive art and sculpture, and in making decorative beads and shells for personal adornment and trade. By the end of the Ice Age (about 11,000 to 12,000 years ago), language, religion, long-distance trade, permanent settlements, and social stratification within groups appear to have been well developed in many European culture areas. What was learned and created was transmitted within the cultural group. The increasing variety of adaptive strategies and technologies and the diversity of noneconomic creations in art, religion, language, and custom meant an inevitable cultural variation of humankind. That diversification began to replace the rough cultural uniformity among hunting and gathering people that had been based on their similar livelihood patterns, informal leadership structures, small-band kinship groups, and the like (Figure 2.11).

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30°

Figure 2.10

Settlement of the Americas and the Pacific basin. Genetic studies suggest humans spread around the globe from their Old World origins beginning some 100,000 years ago. Their time of arrival in the Western Hemisphere, however, is uncertain. The older view claimed earliest migrants to the Americas, the ancestors of modern Amerindian groups, crossed the Bering land bridge in three different waves beginning 11,500 years ago. Recent evidence suggests those North Asian land migrants encountered (and conquered or absorbed) earlier occupants who had arrived from Europe, Polynesia, and coastal East Asia by boat traveling along frozen or open shorelines. Although genetic and linguistic research yields mixed conclusions, physical evidence considered solid by some investigators indicates the first Asian arrivals came at least 22,000 and more likely 30,000 or more years ago. Eastern United States artifacts that have been assigned dates of 17,000 to 30,000 years ago hint at European arrivals as early as those of coastal Asians. Other researchers caution that any New World population dates earlier than 11,500 to 12,000 years ago are questionable.

Figure 2.11

Hunter-gatherers practiced the most enduring lifestyle in human history, trading it for the more arduous life of farmers under the necessity to provide larger quantities of less diversified foodstuffs for a growing population. For hunter-gatherers (unlike their settled farmer rivals and successors), age and sex differences, not caste or economic status, were and are the primary basis for the division of labor and of interpersonal relations. Here a San (Bushman) hunter of Botswana, Africa, stalks his prey. Men also help collect the gathered food that constitutes 80% of the San diet.

Roots and Meaning of Culture

45

Seeds of Change The retreat of the last glaciers marked the end of the Paleolithic era and the beginning of successive periods of cultural evolution leading from basic hunting and gathering economies at the outset through the development of agriculture and animal husbandry to, ultimately, the urbanization and industrialization of modern societies and economies. Since not all cultures passed through all stages at the same time, or even at all, cultural divergence between human groups became evident. Glacial recession brought new ecological conditions to which people had to adapt. The weather became warmer and forests began to appear on the open plains and tundras of Europe and northern China. In the Middle East, where much plant and animal domestication would later occur, savanna (grassland) vegetation replaced more arid landscapes. Populations grew and through hunting depleted the large herds of grazing animals already retiring northward with the retreating glacial front. Further population growth demanded new food bases and production techniques, for the carrying capacity— the number of persons supportable within a given area by the technologies at their disposal—of the earth for huntergatherers is low. The Mesolithic (Middle Stone Age) period, from about 11,000 to 5000 B.C. in Europe, marked the transition from the collection of food to its production. These stages of the Stone Age—occurring during different time spans in different world areas—mark distinctive changes in tools, tasks, and social complexities of the cultures that experience the transition from “Old” to “Middle” to “New.”

Agricultural Origins and Spread The population of hunter-gatherers rose slowly at the end of the glacial period. As rapid climatic fluctuation adversely affected their established plant and animal food sources, people independently in more than one world area experimented with the domestication of plants and animals. There is no agreement on whether the domestication of animals preceded or followed that of plants. The sequence may well have been different in different areas. What appears certain is that animal domestication—the successful breeding of species that are dependent on human beings—began during the Mesolithic, not as a conscious economic effort by humans but as outgrowths of the keeping of small or young wild animals as pets and the attraction of scavenger animals to the refuse of human settlements. The assignment of religious significance to certain animals and the docility of others to herding by hunters all strengthened the human-animal connections that ultimately led to full domestication. Radiocarbon dates suggest the domestication of pigs in southeastern Turkey and of goats in the Near East as early as 8000 to 8400 B.C., of sheep in Turkey by about 7500 B.C., and of cattle and pigs in both Greece and the Near East about 7000 B.C. North Africa, India, and south-

46

Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

eastern Asia were other Old World domestication sources, as were—less successfully—Meso-America and the Andean Uplands. Although there is evidence that the concept of animal domestication diffused from limited source regions, once its advantages were learned numerous additional domestications were accomplished elsewhere. The widespread natural occurrence of species able to be domesticated made that certain. Cattle of different varieties, for example, were domesticated in India, north-central Eurasia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Pigs and various domestic fowl are other examples. The domestication of plants, like that of animals, appears to have occurred independently in more than one world region over a time span of between 10,000 and perhaps as long as 20,000 years ago. A strong case can be made that most widespread Eurasian food crops were first cultivated in the Near East beginning some 10,000 years ago and dispersed rapidly from there across the midlatitudes of the Old World. However, clear evidence also exists that African peoples were raising crops of wheat, barley, dates, lentils, and chickpeas on the floodplains of the Nile River as early as 18,500 years ago. In other world regions, farming began more recently; the first true farmers in the Americas appeared in Mexico no more than 5000 years ago. Familiarity with plants of desirable characteristics is universal among hunter-gatherers. In those societies, females were assigned the primary food-gathering role and thus developed the greatest familiarity with nutritive plants. Their fundamental role in initiating crop production to replace less reliable food gathering seems certain. Indeed, women’s major contributions as innovators of technology—in food preparation and clothing production, for example—or as inventors of such useful and important items as baskets and other containers, baby slings, yokes for carrying burdens, and the like are unquestioned. Agriculture itself, however, seems most likely to have been not an “invention” but the logical extension to food species of plant selection and nurturing habits developed for nonfood varieties. Plant poisons applied to hunting arrows or spread on lakes or streams to stun fish made food gathering easier and more certain. Plant dyes and pigments were universally collected or prepared for personal adornment or article decoration. Medicinal and mood-altering plants and derivatives were known, gathered, protected, and cultivated by all early cultures. Indeed, persuasive evidence exists to suggest that early gathering and cultivation of grains was not for grinding and baking as bread but for brewing as beer, a beverage that became so important in some cultures for religious and nutritional reasons that it may well have been a first and continuing reason for sedentary agricultural activities. Nevertheless, full-scale domestication of food plants, like that of animals, can be traced to a limited number of origin areas from which its techniques spread (Figure 2.12). Although there were several source regions, certain uniformities united them. In each, domestication focused on

Figure 2.12

Chief centers of plant and animal domestication. The southern and southeastern Asian center was characterized by the domestication of plants such as taro, which are propagated by the division and replanting of existing plants (vegetative reproduction). Reproduction by the planting of seeds (e.g., maize and wheat) was more characteristic of Meso-America and the Near East. The African and Andean areas developed crops reproduced by both methods. The lists of crops and livestock associated with the separate origin areas are selective, not exhaustive.

Atlantic

Genetically least similar

Ocean

C

an pi as

Sea ack Bl

Med 500 mi 500 km

iterra

n ean

Se a

a Se

plant species selected apparently for their capability of providing large quantities of storable calories or protein. In each, there was a population already well fed and able to devote time to the selection, propagation, and improvement of plants available from a diversified vegetation. Some speculate, however, that grain domestication in the Near East may have been a forced inventive response, starting some 12,000 years ago, to food shortages reflecting abrupt increases in summertime temperatures and aridity in the Jordan Valley. That environmental stress—reducing summer food supplies and destroying habitats of wild game—favored selection and cultivation of short-season annual grains and legumes whose seeds could be stored and planted during cooler, wetter winter growing seasons. In the tropics and humid subtropics, selected plants were apt to be those that reproduced vegetatively—from roots, tubers, or cuttings. Outside of those regions, wild plants reproducing from seeds were more common and the objects of domestication. Although there was some duplication, each of the origin areas developed crop complexes characteristic of itself alone, as Figure 2.12 summarizes. From each, there was dispersion of crop plants to other areas, slowly at first under primitive systems of population movement and communication (Figure 2.13), more rapidly and extensively with the onset of European exploration and colonization after A.D. 1500.

Genetically most similar

Figure 2.13

The migration of first farmers out of the Middle East into Europe starting about 10,000 years ago is presumably traced by blood and gene markers. If the gene evidence interpretation is valid, the migrants spread at a rate of about one kilometer (fiveeighths of a mile) per year, gradually interbreeding with and replacing the indigenous European hunter-gatherers throughout that continent. Source: L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi, and Alberto Piazza. The History and Geography of Human Genes. Copyright © 1994 Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

Roots and Meaning of Culture

47

While adapting wild plant stock to agricultural purposes, the human cultivators, too, adapted. They assumed sedentary residence to protect the planted areas from animal, insect, and human predators. They developed labor specializations and created more formalized and expansive religious structures in which fertility and harvest rites became important elements. The regional contrasts between hunter-gatherer and sedentary agricultural societies increased. Where the two groups came in contact, farmers were the victors and hunter-gatherers the losers in competition for territorial control. The contest continued into modern times. During the past 200 years, European expansion totally dominated the hunting and gathering cultures it encountered in large parts of the world such as North America and Australia. Even today, in the rain forests of central Africa, Bantu farmers put continuing pressure on hunting and gathering Pygmies; and in southern Africa, Hottentot herders and Bantu farmers constantly advance on the territories of the San (Bushmen) hunter-gatherer bands. The contrast and conflict between the hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists provide dramatic evidence of cultural divergence.

By the end of the Neolithic period, certain spatially restricted groups, having created a food-producing rather than a foraging society, undertook the purposeful restructuring of their environment. They began to modify plant and animal species; to manage soil, terrain, water, and mineral resources; and to utilize animal energy to supplement that of humans. They used metal to make refined tools and superior weapons—first pure copper and later the alloy of tin and copper that produced the harder, more durable bronze. Humans had moved from adopting and shaping to the art of creating. As people gathered together in larger communities, new and more formalized rules of conduct and control emerged, especially important where the use of land was involved. We see the beginnings of governments to enforce laws and specify punishments for wrongdoers. The protection of private property, so much greater in amount and variety than that carried by the nomad, demanded more complex legal codes, as did the enforcement of the rules of societies increasingly stratified by social privileges and economic status.

Neolithic Innovations The domestication of plants and animals began during the Mesolithic period, but in its refined form it marked the onset of the Neolithic (New Stone Age). Like other Stone Age levels, the Neolithic was more a stage of cultural development than a specific span of time. The term implies the creation of an advanced set of tools and technologies to deal with the conditions and needs encountered by an expanding, sedentary population whose economy was based on the agricultural management of the environment (Figure 2.14). Not all peoples in all areas of the earth made the same cultural transition at the same time. In the Near East, from which most of our knowledge of this late prehistoric period comes, the Neolithic lasted from approximately 8000 to 3500 B.C. There, as elsewhere, it brought complex and revolutionary changes in human life. Culture began to alter at an accelerating pace, and change itself became a way of life. In an interconnected adaptive web, technological and social innovations came with a speed and genius surpassing all previous periods. Humans learned the arts of spinning and weaving plant and animal fibers. They learned to use the potter’s wheel and to fire clay and make utensils. They developed techniques of brick making, mortaring, and construction, and they discovered the skills of mining, smelting, and casting metals. On the foundation of such technical advancements, a more complex exploitative culture appeared, a stratified society to replace the rough equality of adults in hunting and gathering economies. Special local advantages in resources or products promoted the development of long-distance trading connections, which the invention of the sailboat helped to maintain.

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Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

Figure 2.14

The Mediterranean scratch plow, the earliest form of this basic agricultural tool, was essentially an enlarged digging stick dragged by an ass, an ox, or—as here near Cairo, Egypt—by a pair of oxen. The scratch plow represented a significant technological breakthrough in human use of tools and animal power in food production. Its earliest evidence is found in Egyptian tomb drawings and in art preserved from the ancient Middle East but was elsewhere either independently invented or introduced by those familiar with its use. See also Figure 2.17a.

Religions became more formalized. For the hunter, religion could be individualistic, and his worship was concerned with personal health and safety. The collective concerns of farmers were based on the calendar: the cycle of rainfall, the seasons of planting and harvesting, the rise and fall of waters to irrigate the crops. Religions responsive to those concerns developed rituals appropriate to seasons of planting, irrigation, harvesting, and thanksgiving. An established priesthood was required, one that stood not only as intermediary between people and the forces of nature but also as authenticator of the timing and structure of the needed rituals. In daily life, occupations became increasingly specialized. Metalworkers, potters, sailors, priests, merchants, scribes, and in some areas, warriors complemented the work of farmers and hunters.

a party to their creation. The term culture hearth is used to describe such centers of innovation and invention from which key culture traits and elements moved to exert an influence on surrounding regions. The hearth may be viewed as the “cradle” of a culture group whose developed systems of livelihood and life created distinctive cultural landscapes. All hearth areas developed the trappings of civilizations. The definition of that term is not precise, but indicators of its achievement are commonly assumed to be writing, metallurgy, longdistance trade connections, astronomy and mathematics, social stratification and labor specialization, formalized governmental systems, and a structured urban culture. Several major culture hearths emerged in the Neolithic period. Prominent centers of early creativity were found in Egypt, Crete, Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley of the Indian subcontinent, northern China, southeastern Asia, several locations in sub-Saharan Africa, in the Americas, and elsewhere (Figure 2.15). They arose in widely separated areas of the world, at different times, and under differing ecological circumstances. Each displayed its own unique mix of culture traits and amalgams, some aspects of which are summarized in Table 2.1. All were urban centered, the indisputable mark of civilization first encountered in the Near East 5500–6000 years ago, but the urbanization of each was differently arrived at

Culture Hearths The social and technical revolutions that began in and characterized the Neolithic period were initially spatially confined. The new technologies, the new ways of life, and the new social structures diffused from those points of origin and were selectively adopted by people who were not

Mesopotamia/ Middle East 5500 BCE

North China 2200 BCE

Crete 2500 BCE Meso-America 1250 BCE West Africa 400 BCE

Egypt 3300 BCE

Indus Valley 2300 BCE

Southeast Asia 1500 BCE

Andean 1500 BCE Diffusion routes

Figure 2.15

Early culture hearths of the Old World and the Americas. The BCE (Before the Common Era) dates approximate times when the hearths developed complex social, intellectual, and technological bases and served as cultural diffusion centers. Generalized hearth characteristics are summarized in Table 2.1.

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TABLE 2.1

Emerging Culture Hearths: Periods and Features of Development

Hearth Region

Before 10,000 B.C.

10,000– 8000 B.C.

8000– 6000 B.C.

6000– 4000 B.C.

4000– 2000 B.C.

2000 B.C.– A.D. 1

Near East

Earliest domestication of dog

Domestication of sheep, pigs, and goats

First farming villages

First irrigation

First cities

First alphabet

Early records on clay tablets

Earliest writing

Glass

Wheeled vehicles

Iron smelting

Early huntergatherer villages

First permanent communities

Potter’s wheel

First legal codes

Birth of Christ

Long-distance trade

Wheat, barley, legumes Sophisticated houses

A.D. 1–1000

Birth of Mohammed (A.D. 570) Arab/Muslim expansion

Bronze Age Plow

Metalworking Pottery, textiles

Nile Valley

Pottery

Evidence of cultivation of wheat, barley, lentils, dates

Fishing villages

Domestication of cattle

Cattle herding

Metalworking

Cloth

Farming villages

Sailing ships

Farming

Cities Writing Long-distance trade

Indus Valley

Village farming Rise of cities

End of Indus Valley cities (1600 B.C.)

Long-distance trade

East Asia

Cultivation of rice; root crops, beans, millet Pottery

Europe

Cave art Ivory, stone figurines

Long-distance trade

Settled villages Wide range of crops, domestic animals

Domestication of pigs

Plow

First farming in Greece and Aegean

Megalithic tombs

West Africa

Metalworking (bronze)

Chinese walled cities

First Chinese city

Confucius (551–479 B.C.)

First Southeast Asian cities

Ideographic script

Irrigation

Pottery

Buddha (563–483 B.C.)

Iron working (China) Olive, grape domestication

Minoan civilization on Crete

Fall of Roman Empire

First European cities

Mycenaean culture in Greece

Dark Ages

Copper working

“Golden Age” of Greece and Rome

Yam cultivation

Village clusters

Farming

Ceramic art First cities Well-developed agriculture Iron smelting Long-distance trade Empire of Ghana

Andean America

Roots, tubers (potato) as food crops

MesoAmerica

Pottery

Beans, pepper, other plant domestications Maize domestication (Mexico)

Metalworking

City formation

Ceramics

City-state conquests

Textiles Beans, squash, chili peppers

First farming villages

Olmec culture Early cities

Apex of Mayan culture

Early Mayan culture Astronomy Writing Raised field agriculture

Adapted with permission from John E. Pfeiffer, The Emergence of Society: A Prehistory of the Establishment. Copyright © 1977 McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, New York, NY.

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Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

and expressed (Figure 2.16). In some hearth areas, such as Mesopotamia and Egypt, the transition from settled agricultural village to urban form was gradual and prolonged. In Minoan Crete, urban life was less explicitly developed than in the Indus Valley, where early trade contacts with the Near East suggest the importance of exchange in fostering urban growth (see “Cities Brought Low”). Trade seems particularly important in the development of West African culture hearths, such as Ghana and Kanem. Coming later (from the 8th to the 10th centuries) than the Nile or Mesopotamian centers, their numerous stone-built towns seem to have been supported both by an extensive agriculture whose origins were probably as early as those of the Middle East and, particularly, by long-distance trade across the Sahara. The Shang kingdom on the middle course of the Huang He (Yellow River) on the North China Plain had walled cities containing wattle-and-daub buildings but no monumental architecture. Each culture hearth showed a rigorous organization of agriculture resulting in local productivity sufficient to

enable a significant number of people to engage in nonfarm activities. Therefore, each hearth region saw the creation of a stratified society that included artisans, warriors, merchants, scholars, priests, and administrators. Each also developed or adopted astronomy, mathematics, and the all-essential calendar. Each, while advancing in cultural diversity and complexity, exported technologies, skills, and learned behaviors far beyond its own boundaries. Writing appeared first in Mesopotamia and Egypt at least 5000 years ago, as cuneiform in the former and as hieroglyphics in the latter. The separate forms of writing have suggested to some that they arose independently in separate hearths. Others maintain that the idea of writing originated in Mesopotamia and spread outward to Egypt, to the Indus Valley, to Crete, and perhaps even to China, though independent development of Chinese ideographic writing is usually assumed. The systems of record keeping developed in New World hearths were not related to those of the Old, but once created they spread widely in areas

Figure 2.16

Urbanization was invariably a characteristic of culture hearths of both the Old and the New Worlds. Pictured is the Pyramid of the Moon and Avenue of the Dead at Teotihuacán, a city that at its height between A.D. 300 and 700 spread over nearly 18 square kilometers (7 square miles). Located some 50 kilometers (30 miles) northeast of Mexico City in the Valley of Mexico, the planned city of Teotihuacán featured broad, straight avenues and an enormous pyramid complex. The Avenue of the Dead, bordered with low stone-faced buildings, was some 3 kilometers (nearly 2 miles) in length.

Roots and Meaning of Culture

51

Cities Brought Low

S

ustainable development requires a long-term balance between human actions and environmental conditions. When either poor management of resources by an exploiting culture or natural environmental alteration unrelated to human actions destroys that balance, a society’s use of a region is no longer “sustainable” in the form previously established. Recent research shows that over 4000 years ago an unmanageable natural disaster spelled the death of half a dozen ancient civilizations from the Mediterranean Sea on the west to the Indus Valley on the east. That disaster took the form of an intense 300-year drought that destroyed

the rain-based agriculture on which many of the early civilizations were dependent. Although they prospered through trade, urban societies were sustained by the efforts of farmers. When, about 2200 B.C., fields dried and crops failed through lack of rain, urban and rural inhabitants alike were forced to flee the dust storms and famine of intolerable environmental deterioration. Evidence of the killer drought that destroyed so many Bronze Age cultures—for example, those of Mesopotamia, early Minoan Crete, and the Old Kingdom in Egypt— includes: cities abandoned in 2200 B.C.

under the influence of Andean and Meso-American hearths. Skill in working iron, so important in Near Eastern kingdoms, was an export of sub-Saharan African hearths. The anthropologist Julian Steward (1902–1972) proposed the concept of multilinear evolution to explain the common characteristics of widely separated cultures developed under similar ecological circumstances. He suggested that each major environmental zone—arid, high altitude, midlatitude steppe, tropical forest, and so on—tends to induce common adaptive traits in the cultures of those who exploit it. Those traits were, at base, founded on the development of agriculture and the emergence of similar cultural and administrative structures in the several culture hearths. But similar does not imply identical. Steward simply suggested that since comparable sequences of developmental events cannot always or even often be explained on the basis of borrowing or exporting of ideas and techniques (because of time and space differences in cultures sharing them), they must be regarded as evidence of parallel creations based on similar ecologies. From similar origins, but through separate adaptations and innovations, distinctive cultures emerged. Diffusionism is the belief that cultural similarities occur primarily—perhaps even solely—by spatial spread (diffusion) from one or at most a very few common origin sites. Cultural advancement and civilizations, that is, are passed on along trade routes and through group contact rather than being the result of separate and independent

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Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

and not reoccupied for over 300 years; deep accumulations (20–25 cm, or 8–10 in.) of windblown sand over farmlands during the same three centuries; abrupt declines in lake water levels; and thick lake- and seabed deposits of windblown debris. Similar, but differently timed drought periods—such as the catastrophic aridity between A.D. 800 and 1000 that destroyed Mayan culture in Meso-America—have been blamed for the collapse of advanced societies in the New World as well. Not even the most thriving of early urban cultures were immune to restrictions arbitrarily imposed by nature.

creation. Although long out of favor, diffusionism has recently received renewed support from archaeological discoveries apparently documenting very long-distance transfer of ideas, technologies, and language by migrating peoples. In any event, the common characteristics deriving from multilinear evolution and the spread of specific culture traits and complexes contained the roots of cultural convergence. That term describes the sharing of technologies, organizational structures, and even cultural traits and artifacts that is so evident among widely separated societies in a modern world united by instantaneous communication and efficient transportation. Convergence in those worldwide terms is, for many observers, proof of the pervasive globalization of culture.

The Structure of Culture Understanding a culture fully is, perhaps, impossible for one who is not part of it. For analytical purposes, however, the traits and complexes of culture—its building blocks and expressions—may be grouped and examined as subsets of the whole. The anthropologist Leslie White (1900–1975) suggested that for analytical purposes, a culture could be viewed as a three-part structure composed of subsystems that he termed ideological, technological, and sociological. In a similar classification, the biologist Julian Huxley (1887–1975) identified three

components of culture: mentifacts, artifacts, and sociofacts. Together, according to these interpretations, the subsystems—identified by their separate components— comprise the system of culture as a whole. But they are integrated; each reacts on the others and is affected by them in turn. The ideological subsystem consists of ideas, beliefs, and knowledge of a culture and of the ways in which these things are expressed in speech or other forms of communication. Mythologies and theologies, legend, literature, philosophy, and folk wisdom make up this category. Passed on from generation to generation, these abstract belief systems, or mentifacts, tell us what we ought to believe, what we should value, and how we ought to act. Beliefs form the basis of the socialization process. Often we know—or think we know—what the beliefs of a group are from their oral or written statements. Sometimes, however, we must depend on the actions or objectives of a group to tell us what its true ideas and values are. “Actions speak louder than words” or “Do as I say, not as I do” are commonplace recognitions of the fact that actions, values, and words do not always coincide. Two basic strands of the ideological subsystem—language and religion—are the subject of Chapter 5. The technological subsystem is composed of the material objects, together with the techniques of their use, by means of which people are able to live. The objects are the tools and other instruments that enable us to feed, clothe, house, defend, transport, and amuse ourselves. We must have food, we must be protected from the elements, and we must be able to defend ourselves. Huxley termed the material objects we use to fill these

basic needs artifacts (Figure 2.17). In Chapter 10 we will examine the relationship between technological subsystems and regional patterns of economic development. The sociological subsystem of a culture is the sum of those expected and accepted patterns of interpersonal relations that find their outlet in economic, political, military, religious, kinship, and other associations. These sociofacts define the social organization of a culture. They regulate how the individual functions relative to the group—whether it be family, church, or state. There are no “givens” as far as the patterns of interaction in any of these associations are concerned, except that most cultures possess a variety of formal and informal ways of structuring behavior. Differing patterns of behavior are learned and are transmitted from one generation to the next (Figure 2.18). Classifications are of necessity arbitrary, and these classifications of the subsystems and components of culture are no exception. The three-part categorization of culture, while helping us to appreciate its structure and complexity, can simultaneously obscure the many-sided nature of individual elements of culture. A dwelling, for example, is an artifact providing shelter for its occupants. It is, simultaneously, a sociofact reflecting the nature of the family or kinship group it is designed to house, and a mentifact summarizing a culture group’s convictions about appropriate design, orientation, and building materials of dwelling units. In the same vein, clothing serves as an artifact of bodily protection appropriate to climatic conditions, available materials and techniques, or the activity in which the wearer is engaged. But garments also may be sociofacts, identifying

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.17

(a) This Balinese farmer working with draft animals uses tools typical of the lower technological levels of subsistence economies. (b) Cultures with advanced technological subsystems use complex machinery to harness inanimate energy for productive use.

Roots and Meaning of Culture

53

Figure 2.18

All societies prepare their children for membership in the culture group. In each of these settings, certain values, beliefs, skills, and proper ways of acting are being transmitted to the youngsters.

an individual’s role in the social structure of the community or culture, and mentifacts, evoking larger community value systems (Figure 2.19). Nothing in a culture stands totally alone. Changes in the ideas that a society holds may affect the sociological and technological systems just as changes in technology force adjustments in the social system. The abrupt alteration of the ideological structure of Russia following the

54

Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

1917 communist revolution from a monarchical, agrarian, capitalistic system to an industrialized, communistic society involved sudden, interrelated alteration of all facets of that country’s culture system. The equally abrupt disintegration of Russian communism in the early 1990s was similarly disruptive of all its established economic, social, and administrative structures. The interlocking nature of all aspects of a culture is termed cultural integration.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.19

(a) When clothing serves primarily to cover, protect, or assist in activities, it is an artifact. (b) Some garments are sociofacts, identifying a role or position within the social structure: the distinctive “uniforms” of the soldier, the cleric, or the beribboned ambassador immediately proclaim their respective roles in a culture’s social organizations. (c) The mandatory chadors of Iranian females are mentifacts, indicative not specifically of the role of the wearer but of the values of the culture the wearer represents.

Culture Change The recurring theme of cultural geography is change. No culture is, or has been, characterized by a permanently fixed set of material objects, systems of organization, or even ideologies. Admittedly, all of these may be longenduring within a stable, isolated society at equilibrium with its resource base. Such isolation and stability have always been rare. On the whole, while cultures are essentially conservative, they are always in a state of flux. Some changes are major and pervasive. The transition from hunter-gatherer to sedentary farmer, as we have seen, affected markedly every facet of the cultures experiencing that change. Profound, too, has been the impact of the Industrial Revolution and its associated urbanization on all societies it has touched. Not all change is so extensive as that following the introduction of agriculture or the Industrial Revolution. Many changes are so slight individually as to go almost unnoticed at their inception, though cumulatively they may substantially alter the affected culture. Think of how the culture of

the United States differs today from what you know it to have been in 1940—not in essentials, perhaps, but in the innumerable electrical, electronic, and transportational devices that have been introduced and in the social, behavioral, and recreational changes they and other technological changes have wrought. Among these latter have been shifts in employment patterns to include greater participation by women in the waged workforce and associated adjustments in attitudes toward the role of women in the society at large. Such cumulative changes occur because the cultural traits of any group are not independent; they are clustered in a coherent and integrated pattern. Change on a small scale will have wide repercussions as associated traits arrive at accommodation with the adopted adjustment. Change, both major and minor, within cultures is induced by innovation, diffusion, and acculturation.

Innovation Innovation implies changes to a culture that result from ideas created within the social group itself and adopted by the culture. The novelty may be an invented improvement

Roots and Meaning of Culture

55

Diffusion Diffusion is the process by which an idea or innovation is transmitted from one individual or group to another across space. Diffusion may assume a variety of forms, each different in its impact on social groups. Basically, however, two processes are involved: (1) People move, for any of a number of reasons, to a new area and take their culture with them. For example, immigrants to the American colonies brought along crops and farming tech-

56

Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

Rate of Innovation

in material technology, like the bow and arrow or the jet engine. It may involve the development of nonmaterial forms of social structure and interaction: feudalism, for example, or Christianity. Premodern and traditional societies characteristically are not innovative. In societies at equilibrium with their environment and with no unmet needs, change has no adaptive value and no reason to occur. Indeed, all societies have an innate resistance to change. Complaints about youthful fads or the glorification of times past are familiar cases in point. However, when a social group is inappropriately unresponsive—mentally, psychologically, or economically—to changing circumstances and to innovation, it is said to exhibit cultural lag. Innovation—invention—frequently under stress, has marked the history of humankind. As we have seen, growing populations at the end of the Ice Age necessitated an expanded food base. In response, domestication of plants and animals appears to have occurred independently in more than one world area. Indeed, a most striking fact about early agriculture is the universality of its development or adoption within a very short span of human history. In 10,000 B.C., the world population of no more than 10 million was exclusively hunter-gatherers. By A . D . 1500, only 1% of the world’s 350 million people still followed that way of life. The revolution in food production affected every facet of the threefold subsystems of culture of every society accepting it. All innovation has a radiating impact on the web of culture; the more basic the innovation, the more pervasive its consequences. In most modern societies, innovative change has become common, expected, and inevitable. The rate of invention, at least as measured by the number of patents granted, has steadily increased, and the period between idea conception and product availability has been decreasing. A general axiom is that the more ideas available and the more minds able to exploit and combine them, the greater the rate of innovation. The spatial implication is that larger urban centers of advanced technologies tend to be centers of innovation. This is not just because of their size but because of the number of ideas interchanged. Indeed, ideas not only stimulate new thoughts and viewpoints but also create circumstances in which the society must develop new solutions to maintain its forward momentum (Figure 2.20).

Agricultural Revolution

Paleolithic

Time

Industrial Revolution

Present

Figure 2.20

The rate of innovation through human history. Hunter-gatherers, living in easy equilibrium with their environment and their resource base, had little need for innovation and no necessity for cultural change. Increased population pressures led to the development of agriculture and the diffusion of the ideas and techniques of domestication, urbanization, and trade. With the Industrial Revolution, dramatic increases in innovation began to alter cultures throughout the world.

niques, building styles, or concepts of government alien to their new home. (2) Information about an innovation (e.g., hybrid corn or compact discs) may spread throughout a society, perhaps aided by local or mass media advertising; or new adopters of an ideology or way of life—for example, a new religious creed—may be inspired or recruited by immigrant or native converts. The former is known as relocation diffusion, the latter as expansion diffusion (Figure 2.21). Expansion diffusion involves the spread of an item or idea from one place to others. In the process the thing diffused also remains—and is frequently intensified— in the origin area. Islam, for example, expanded from its Arabian Peninsula origin locale across much of Asia and North Africa. At the same time it strengthened its hold over its Near Eastern birthplace by displacing pagan, Christian, and Jewish populations. When expansion diffusion affects nearly uniformly all individuals and areas outward from the source region, it is termed contagious diffusion. The term implies the importance of direct contact between those who developed or have adopted the innovation and those who newly encounter it, and is reminiscent of the course of infectious diseases (Figure 2.22). The rate of expansion diffusion of a trait or idea may be influenced by time-distance decay, which simply tells us that the spread or acceptance of an idea is usually delayed as distance from the source of the innovation increases. In some instances, however, geographic distance is less important in the transfer of ideas than is communication between major centers or important people. News of new clothing styles, for example, quickly spreads

Initial Stage

Later Stage

0 miles 0 km

600 600

(a) RELOCATION DIFFUSION Initial Stage

Later Stage

Figure 2.22

The process of contagious diffusion is sensitive to both time and distance, as suggested by the diffusion pathways of the European influenza pandemic of 1781. The pattern there was a wavelike radiation from a Russian nodal origin area.

Source: Based on Gerald F. Pyle and K. David Patterson, Ecology of Disease 2, no. 3 (1984):179.

(b) EXPANSION DIFFUSION

Figure 2.21

Patterns of diffusion (a) In relocation diffusion, innovations or ideas are transported to new areas by carriers who permanently leave the home locale. The “Pennsylvania Dutch” barn (Figure 6.24) was brought to Pennsylvania by German immigrants and spread to other groups and areas southward through Appalachia and westward into Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. Not all farmers or farm districts in the path of advancement adopted the new barn design. (b) In expansion diffusion, a phenomenon spreads from one place to neighboring locations, but in the process remains and is often intensified in the place of origin (see Figure 5.28). Source: Redrawn by permission from Spatial Diffusion, by Peter R. Gould, Resource Paper no. 4, page 4, Association of American Geographers, 1969.

internationally between major cities and only later filters down irregularly to smaller towns and rural areas. The process of transferring ideas first between larger places or prominent people and only later to smaller or less important points or people is known as hierarchical diffusion (Figure 2.23). The Christian faith in Europe, for example, spread from Rome as the principal center to provincial capitals and thence to smaller Roman settlements in largely pagan occupied territories (see Figure 5.22). While the diffusion of ideas may be slowed by timedistance decay, their speed of spread may be increased to the point of becoming instantaneous through the space-time

Figure 2.23

The process of hierarchical diffusion is one of transfer between the large and the important before subsequent transmittal to the smaller or less important places or people lower down on the hierarchy. New discoveries, for example, are shared among scientists at leading universities before they appear in textbooks or become general knowledge through the public press. The process works because, for many things, distance is relative to the communication network involved. Big cities or leading scientists, connected by strong information flows, are “closer” than their simple distance separation suggests. Source: Redrawn by permission from Spatial Diffusion, by Peter R. Gould, Resource Paper no. 4, page 6, Association of American Geographers, 1969.

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compression made possible by modern communication. Given access to radios, telephones, and—perhaps most importantly—to computers and the Internet, people and areas distantly separated can immediately share in a common fund of thought and innovation. Stimulus diffusion is a third form of expansion diffusion. The term summarizes situations in which a fundamental idea, though not the specific trait itself, stimulates imitative behavior within a receptive population. A documented case in point involves the spread of the concept but not of a specific system of writing from European American settlers to at least one Native American culture group. Observing that white people could make marks on pieces of paper to record agreements and repeat lengthy speeches, Sequoyah, a Cherokee who could neither read nor write any language, around 1820 devised a system for writing the Cherokee language, eventually refining his initially complex pictorial system to a set of 86 syllabic signs. With time, literacy in the new system spread to others and The Cherokee Phoenix, a Cherokee language newspaper, was established in 1828. There was no transfer between cultures or groups of a specific technique of writing, but there was a clear-cut case of the idea of writing diffusing by stimulating imitative behavior. In relocation diffusion, the innovation or idea is physically carried to new areas by migrating individuals or populations that possess it (Figure 2.21a). Mentifacts or artifacts are therefore introduced into new locales by new settlers who become part of populations not themselves associated or in contact with the origin area of the innovation. The spread of religions by settlers or conquerors is a clear example of relocation diffusion, as was the diffusion of agriculture to Europe from the Middle East (Figure 2.13). Christian Europeans brought their faiths to areas of colonization or economic penetration throughout the world. At the world scale, massive relocation diffusion resulted from the European colonization and economic penetration that began in the 16th century. More localized relocation diffusion continues today as Asian refugees or foreign “guest workers” bring their cultural traits to their new areas of settlement in Europe or North America. Innovations in the technological or ideological subsystems may be relatively readily diffused to, and accepted by, cultures that have basic similarities and compatibilities. Continental Europe and North America, for example, could easily and quickly adopt the innovations of the Industrial Revolution diffused from England with which they shared a common economic and technological background. Industrialization was not quickly accepted in Asian and African societies of totally different cultural conditioning. On the ideological level, too, successful diffusion depends on acceptability of the

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innovations. The Shah of Iran’s attempt at rapid westernization of traditional Iranian, Islamic culture after World War II provoked a traditionalist backlash and revolution that deposed the Shah and reestablished clerical control of the state. It is not always possible, of course, to determine the precise point of origin or the routes of diffusion of innovations now widely adopted (see “Documenting Diffusion”). Nor is it always certain whether the existence of a cultural trait in two different areas is the result of diffusion or of independent (or parallel) invention. Cultural similarities do not necessarily prove that diffusion has occurred. The pyramids of Egypt and of the Central American Maya civilization most likely were separately conceived and are not necessarily evidence, as some have proposed, of pre-Columbian voyages from the Mediterranean to the Americas. A monument-building culture, after all, has only a limited number of shapes from which to choose. Historical examples of independent, parallel invention are numerous: logarithms by Napier (1614) and Burgi (1620), the calculus by Newton (1672) and Leibnitz (1675), the telephone by Elisha Gray and Alexander Graham Bell (1876) are commonly cited. It appears beyond doubt that agriculture was independently developed not only in both the New World and the Old but also in more than one culture hearth in each of the hemispheres.

Acculturation and Cultural Modification A culture group may undergo major modifications in its own identifying traits by adopting some or all of the characteristics of another, dominant culture group. Such is the case in acculturation—discussed at greater length in Chapter 6 (pp. 195 to 196)—as immigrant populations take on the values, attitudes, customs, and speech of the receiving society. A different form of contact and subsequent cultural alteration may occur in a conquered or colonized region where the subordinate or subject population is either forced to adopt the culture of the new ruling group, introduced through relocation diffusion, or does so voluntarily, overwhelmed by the superiority in numbers or the technical level of the conqueror. Tribal Europeans in areas of Roman conquest, native populations in the wake of Slavic occupation of Siberia, and Native Americans stripped of their lands following European settlement of North America experienced this kind of cultural modification or adoption. In extreme cases, of course, small and, particularly, primitive indigenous groups brought into contact with conquering or absorbing societies may simply cease to exist as separate cultural entities. Although presumably such cultural loss has been part of all of human history, its occurrence has been noted and its pace quickened over the past 500 years. By one informed estimate, at

Documenting Diffusion

T

he places of origin of many ideas, items, and technologies important in contemporary cultures are only dimly known or supposed, and their routes of diffusion are speculative at best. Gunpowder, printing, and spaghetti are presumed to be the products of Chinese inventiveness; the lateen sail has been traced to the Near Eastern culture world. The moldboard plow is ascribed to 6th-century Slavs of northeastern Europe. The sequence and routes of the diffusion of these innovations has not been documented. In other cases, such documentation exists, and the process of diffusion is open to analysis. Clearly marked is the diffusion path of the custom of smoking tobacco, a practice that originated among Amerindians. Sir Walter Raleigh’s Virginia colonists, returning home in 1586, introduced smoking in English court circles, and the habit very quickly spread among the general populace. England became the source region of the new custom for northern Europe; smoking was introduced to Holland by English medical students in 1590. Dutch and English together spread the habit by sea to the Baltic and Scandinavian areas and overland through Germany to Russia. The innovation continued its eastward diffusion, and within a

Source: Map based on data from Thomas O. Graff and Dub Ashton. “Spatial Diffusion of Wal-Mart: Contagious and Reverse Hierarchical Elements.” Professional Geographer 46, no. 1 (1994):19–29.

hundred years tobacco had spread across Siberia and was, in the 1740s, reintroduced to the American continent at Alaska by Russian fur traders. A second route of diffusion for tobacco smoking can be traced from Spain, where the custom was introduced in 1558, and from which it spread more slowly through the Mediterranean area into Africa, the Near East, and Southeast Asia. In more recent times, hybrid corn was first adopted by imaginative farmers of northern Illinois and eastern Iowa in the mid-1930s. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, the new seeds were being planted as far east as Ohio and north to Minnesota, Wisconsin,

least one-third of the world’s inventory of human cultures has totally disappeared since A.D. 1500, along with their languages, traditions, ways of life, and, indeed, with their very identity or remembrance. In many instances, close contact between two different groups may involve adjustments of the original cultural patterns of both rather than disappearance of either. For example, changes in Japanese political organization and philosophy were imposed by occupying Americans after World War II, and the Japanese voluntarily adopted some more

and northern Michigan. By the late 1940s, all commercial corn-growing districts of the United States and southern Canada were cultivating hybrid corn varieties. A similar pattern of diffusion marked the expansion of the Wal-Mart stores chain. From its origin in northwest Arkansas in 1962, the discount chain had dispersed throughout the United States by the 1990s to become the country’s largest retailer in sales volume. In its expansion Wal-Mart displayed a “reverse hierarchical” diffusion, initially spreading by way of small towns before opening its first stores in larger cities and metropolitan areas.

frivolous aspects of American life (Figure 2.24). In turn, American society was enriched by the selective importation of Japanese cuisine, architecture, and philosophy, demonstrating the two-way nature of cultural diffusion. Where that two-way flow reflects a more equal exchange of cultural outlooks and ways of life, a process of transculturation has occurred. That process is observable within the United States as massive South and Central American immigration begins to intertwine formerly contrasting cultures, altering both.

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Figure 2.24

Baseball, an import from America, is one of the most popular sports in Japan, attracting millions of spectators annually.

Roots and Meaning of Culture As Chapter 1 and Figure 1.3 discussed, geography draws upon and integrates data from a number of sister disciplines to document and support the insights geography itself develops. Both the original contributions of geography and their factual dependence on other fields of research are clearly evident in the subject matter of this chapter dealing with culture, innovation, and diffusion. For example, many of the classical cultural geographic concepts of landscape, culture hearths, agricultural origins, and cultural ecology developed and refined by geographers depend for their data and documentation on research by scholars in such other disciplines as archaeology, ethnobotany, and plant genetics. Few, if any, websites exist specifically devoted to the individual topics of this chapter. However, some Internet addresses that may provide links to the literature of allied fields pertinent to those topics are indicated here. The collection of Internet environment and ecology sites is large and growing; it is in part reviewed in the OnLine discussion of Chapter 13. Few have relevance for our culture history or cultural ecology discussions here, but some useful links are included in the location Landscape ecology & biogeography maintained by Australia’s Charles Sturt University: www.csu.edu.au/landscape_ecology/landscape.html. The Ancient World Web is the highly rated work of Julia Hayden; a well-organized, comprehensive resource “for scholars, teachers, and students,” it includes both subject and geographical indexes, an information exchange, and links to related Internet resources: www.julen.net/ancient/.

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The University of Evansville hosts a similar site, Exploring Ancient World Cultures, at http://eawc.evansville.edu/. The EAWC is an on-line resource for the study of ancient societies with extensive Internet links and connection with the Argos Project search engine. Washington State University presents World Cultures, “an on-line research textbook of world cultures and histories” that includes Internet resource directories on its specific cultures and eras pages: www.wsu.edu/%7edee/. Academic Info is a directory of Internet resources designed for college student study needs. Its extensive Main Subject Index at www.academicinfo.net/table.html includes “anthropology” and “archeology” among topics of interest to this chapter, plus an expansive list of area and country sites. The World Wide Web Virtual Library listings on various topics provide website access to resources of interest. The “library” for Anthropology is sponsored by Anthro TECH at http://vlib.anthrotech.com/ and that for Archaeology is maintained by ArchNet at the Arizona State University: http://archnet.asu.edu/. Another server with multiple subject entries worth a look is Alan Liu’s Voice of the Shuttle pages for humanities research: http://vos.ucsb.edu/. Finally, don’t forget to check our own textbook’s home page at www.mhhe.com/fellmann7e/ for additional websites added by the publisher or contributed by helpful users.

Contact between Regions All cultures are amalgams of innumerable innovations spread spatially from their points of origin and integrated into the structure of the receiving societies. It has been estimated that no more than 10% of the cultural items of any society are traceable to innovations created by its members and that the other 90% come to the society through diffusion (see “A Homemade Culture”). Since, as we have seen, the pace of innovation is affected strongly by the mixing of ideas among alert, responsive people and is increased by exposure to a variety of cultures, the most active and innovative historical hearths of culture were those at crossroads locations and those deeply involved in distant trade and colonization. Ancient Mesopotamia and classical Greece and Rome had such locations and involvements, as did the West African culture hearth after the 5th century and, much later, England during the Industrial Revolution and the spread of its empire. Recent changes in technology permit us to travel farther than ever before, with greater safety and speed, and

to communicate without physical contact more easily and completely than was previously possible. This intensification of contact has resulted in an acceleration of innovation and in the rapid spread of goods and ideas. Several millennia ago, innovations such as smelting of metals took hundreds of years to diffuse. Today, worldwide diffusion— through Internet interest groups, for example—may be almost instantaneous. Obstacles do exist, of course. Diffusion barriers are any conditions that hinder either the flow of information or the movement of people and thus retard or prevent the acceptance of an innovation. Because of the friction of distance, generally the farther two areas are from each other, the less likely is interaction to occur, an observation earlier (p. 56) summarized by the term time-distance decay. Distance as a factor in spatial interaction is further explored in Chapter 3. For now it is sufficient to note that distance may be an absorbing barrier, halting the spread of an innovation. Interregional contact can also be hindered by the physical environment and by a lack of receptivity by a contacted culture. Oceans and rugged terrain can and

A Homemade Culture

R

eflecting on an average morning in the life of a “100% American,” Ralph Linton noted: Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. . . . He takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. . . . Returning to the bedroom, . . . he puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the

Asiatic steppes [and] puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean. . . . Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella invented in southeastern Asia. . . . [At breakfast] a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. He begins breakfast with an orange, from the eastern Mediterranean, a cantaloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of

African watermelon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant. . . . [H]e may have the egg of a species of bird domesticated in Indo-China, or thin strips of flesh of an animal domesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in northern Europe. When our friend has finished eating . . . he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American.

Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction. © 1936, renewed 1964, pp. 326–327. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, N.J.

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Figure 2.25

Foreign foods modified for American tastes and American palates growing accustomed to dishes from all cultures together represent syncretism in action.

have acted as physical interrupting barriers, delaying or deflecting the path of diffusion. Cultural obstacles that are equally impenetrable may also exist. For example, for at least 1500 years most California Indians were in contact with cultures utilizing both maize and pottery, yet they failed to accept either innovation. Should such reluctant adopters intervene between hearths and receptive cultures, the spread of an innovation can be slowed. It can also be delayed when cultural contact is overtly impeded by governments that interfere with radio reception, control the flow of foreign literature, and discourage contact between their citizens and foreign nationals. More commonly, barriers are at least partially permeable; they permit passage (acceptance) of at least some innovations encountering them. The more similar two cultural areas are to each other, the greater is the likelihood of the adoption of an innovation, for diffusion is a selective process. The receiver culture may adopt some goods or ideas from the donor society and reject others. The decision to adopt is governed by the receiving group’s own culture. Political restrictions, religious taboos, and other social customs are cultural barriers to diffusion. The French Canadians, although close geographically to many centers of diffusion such as Toronto, New York, and Boston, strive to be only minimally influenced by such centers. Both their language and culture complex govern their selective acceptance of Anglo influences, and restrictive French-only language regulations are enforced to preserve the integrity

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of French culture. Traditional groups, perhaps controlled by firm religious conviction, may very largely reject culture traits and technologies of the larger society in whose midst they live (see Figure 7.2). Adopting cultures do not usually accept intact items originating outside the receiving society. Diffused ideas and artifacts commonly undergo some alteration of meaning or form that makes them acceptable to a borrowing group. The process of the fusion of the old and new is called syncretism and is a major feature of culture change. It can be seen in alterations to religious ritual and dogma made by convert societies seeking acceptable conformity between old and new beliefs; the mixture of Catholic rites and voodooism in Haiti is an example. On a more familiar level, syncretism is reflected in subtle or blatant alterations of imported cuisines to make them conform to the demands of America’s palate and its fast-food franchises (Figure 2.25).

Summary The web of culture is composed of many strands. Together, culture traits and complexes in their spatial patterns create human landscapes, define culture regions, and distinguish culture groups. Those landscapes, regions, and group characteristics change through time as human societies interact with their environment, develop for themselves new

solutions to collective needs, or are altered through innovations adopted from outside the group itself. The cultural uniformity of a preagricultural world composed solely of hunter-gatherers was lost as domestication of plants and animals in many world areas led to the emergence of culture hearths of wide-ranging innovation and to a cultural divergence between farmers and gatherers. Innovations spread outward from their origin points, carried by migrants through relocation diffusion or adopted by others through a variety of expansion diffusion and acculturation processes. Although diffusion barriers exist, most successful or advantageous innovations find adopters, and both cultural modification and cultural convergence of different societies result. The details of the technological, sociological, and ideological subsystems of culture define the differences that still exist between world areas.

The ivory hunters who opened our chapter showed how varied and complex the culture of even a primitive group can be. Their artifacts of clothing, fire making, hunting, and fishing displayed diversity and ingenuity. They were part of a structured kinship system and engaged in organized production and trade. Their artistic efforts and ritual burial customs speak of a sophisticated set of abstract beliefs and philosophies. Their culture complex did not develop in isolation; it reflected at least in part their contacts with other groups, even those far distant from their Paris Basin homeland. As have culture groups always and everywhere, the hunters carried on their own pursuits and interacted with others in spatial settings. They exhibited and benefitted from structured spatial behavior, the topic to which we next turn our attention.

Key Words acculturation artifact

58

culture hearth

53

carrying capacity

46

cultural convergence cultural divergence cultural ecology

39

culture

54

38

mentifact

diffusion

38

56

40

39

hunter-gatherer 38

39

56

sociofact

43

58

53

sociological subsystem syncretism

ideological subsystem

52

40

relocation diffusion

environmental determinism globalization

53

possibilism 61

58

55

multilinear evolution

expansion diffusion

36

culture complex

innovation

diffusion barrier

56

cultural landscape

culture trait

independent invention

38

culture region 52

46

cultural integration cultural lag

49

culture realm

53

62

technological subsystem

53

53

For Review 1.

2.

What is included in the concept of culture? How is culture transmitted? What personal characteristics affect the aspects of culture that any single individual acquires or fully masters?

3.

What do we mean by domestication? When and where did the domestication of plants and animals occur? What impact on culture and population numbers did plant domestication have?

4.

What is a culture hearth? What new traits of culture characterized the early hearths? Identify and locate some of the major culture hearths that emerged at the close of the Neolithic period. What do we mean by innovation? By diffusion? What different patterns of diffusion can you describe? Discuss the role played by innovation and diffusion in altering the cultural structure in

which you are a participant from that experienced by your greatgrandparents. 5.

Differentiate between culture traits and culture complexes. Between environmental determinism and possibilism.

6.

What are the components or subsystems of the three-part system of culture? What characteristics are included in each of the subsystems?

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Focus Follow-up 1.

What are the components of culture and nature of culture–environment interactions? pp. 37–43. Culture traits and complexes may be grouped into culture regions and realms. Differing developmental levels color human perceptions of environmental opportunities. In general, as the active agents in the relationship, humans exert adverse impacts on the natural environment.

2.

How did cultures develop and diverge (pp. 43–45), and where did cultural advances originate? pp. 46–52. From Paleolithic hunting and gathering to Neolithic farming and then to city civilizations, different groups made differently timed cultural transitions. All early cultural advances had their origins in a few areally distinct “hearths.”

3.

What are the structures of culture and forms of culture change? pp. 52–62. All cultures contain ideological, technological, and sociological components that work together to create cultural integration. Cultures change through innovations they themselves invent or that diffuse from other areas and are accepted or adapted.

Selected References Brown, Lawrence A. Innovation Diffusion: A New Perspective. London and New York: Methuen, 1981.

Isaac, Erich. Geography of Domestication. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970.

Coe, Michael, Dean Snow, and Elizabeth Benson. Atlas of Ancient America. New York: Facts on File Incorporated, 1986.

Kroeber, Alfred L., and Clyde Kluckhohn. “Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions,” Harvard University. Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology 47, no. 2 (1952).

Cowan, C. Wesley, and Patty Jo Watson, eds. The Origins of Agriculture: An International Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992. Denevan, William M. “The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82, no. 3 (1992): 369–385. Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: Norton, 1997. Gebauer, Anne B., and T. Douglas Price, eds. Transitions to Agriculture in Prehistory. Monographs in World Archeology, no. 4. Madison, Wis.: Prehistory Press, 1992. Gore, Rick. “The Most Ancient Americans.” National Geographic (October 1997): 92–99. Gould, Peter. Spatial Diffusion. Association of American Geographers, Commission on College Geography. Resource Paper No. 4. Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1969. Haggett, Peter. “Geographical Aspects of the Emergence of Infectious Diseases.” Geografiska Annaler 76B, no. 2 (1994): 91–104.

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Lamb, H. H. Climate, History, and the Modern World. New York: Routledge, 1995. MacNeish, Richard S. The Origins of Agriculture and Settled Life. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Morrill, Richard, Gary L. Gaile, and Grant Ian Thrall. Spatial Diffusion. Scientific Geography Series vol. 10. Newbury Park, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 1988. Parfit, Michael. “Hunt for the First Americans.” National Geographic (December 2000): 41–67. “The Peopling of the Earth.” National Geographic (October 1988): 434–503. Rodrique, Christine M. “Can Religion Account for Early Animal Domestications . . . ?” Professional Geographer 44, no. 4 (1992): 417–430. Rogers, Alisdair, ed. Peoples and Cultures. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of World Geography. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Runnels, Curtis N. “Environmental Degradation in Ancient Greece.” Scientific American (March 1995): 96–99. Sauer, Carl. Agricultural Origins and Dispersals. New York: American Geographical Society, 1952. Sebastian, Lynne. The Chaco Anasazi: Sociopolitical Evolution in the Prehistoric Southwest. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Sjoberg, Gideon. “The Origin and Evolution of Cities.” Scientific American 213 (1965): 54–63. Steward, Julian H. Theory of Culture Change. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955. Thomas, William L., Jr., ed. Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. White, Leslie A. The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1969. White, Randall. Dark Caves, Bright Visions: Life in Ice Age Europe. New York: American Museum of Natural History in Association with W. W. Norton & Company, 1986. Zohary, Daniel, and Mari Hopf. Domestication of Plants in the Old World. 2d ed. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1993.

C

H

A

P

T

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Spatial Interaction and Spatial Behavior

3

Spatial interaction in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), Vietnam.

Focus Preview 1. The three bases for all spatial interaction, pp. 66–68. 2. How the probability of aggregate spatial interaction is measured, pp. 68–71. 3. The special forms and nature of human spatial behavior, pp. 71–76.

4. The roles of information and perception in human spatial behavior, pp. 76–84. 5. Migration patterns, types, and controls, pp. 84–94.

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arly in January of 1849 we first thought of migrating to California. It was a period of National hard times . . . and we longed to go to the new El Dorado and “pick up” gold enough with which to return and pay off our debts. Our discontent and restlessness were enhanced by the fact that my health was not good. . . . The physician advised an entire change of climate thus to avoid the intense cold of Iowa, and recommended a sea voyage, but finally approved of our contemplated trip across the plains in a “prairie schooner.” Full of the energy and enthusiasm of youth, the prospects of so hazardous an undertaking had no terror for us, indeed, as we had been married but a few months, it appealed to us as a romantic wedding tour.1

So begins Catherine Haun’s account of their 9-month journey from Iowa to California, just two of the quartermillion people who traveled across the continent on the Overland Trail in one of the world’s great migrations. The migrants faced months of grueling struggle over badly marked routes that crossed swollen rivers, deserts, and mountains. The weather was often foul, with hailstorms, drenching rains, and burning summer temperatures. Graves along the route were a silent testimony to the lives claimed by buffalo stampedes, Indian skirmishes, cholera epidemics, and other disasters. What inducements were so great as to make emigrants leave behind all that was familiar and risk their lives on an uncertain venture? Catherine Haun alludes to economic hard times gripping the country and to their hope for riches to be found in California. Like other migrants, the Hauns were attracted by the climate in the West, which was said to be always sunny and free of disease. Finally, like most who undertook the perilous journey West, the Hauns were young, moved by restlessness, a sense of adventure, and a perception of greater opportunities in a new land. They, like their predecessors back to the beginnings of humankind, were acting in space and across space on the basis of acquired information and anticipation of opportunity—prepared to pay the price in time, money, and hardship costs of overcoming distance. A fundamental question in human geography is: What considerations influence how individual human beings use space and act within it? Related queries

include: Are there discernible controls on human spatial behavior? How does distance affect human interaction? How do our perceptions of places influence our spatial activities? How do we overcome the consequences of distance in the exchange of commodities and information? How are movement and migration decisions (like that of the Hauns) reached? These are questions addressing geography’s concern with understanding spatial interaction. Spatial interaction means the movement of peoples, ideas, and commodities within and between areas. The Hauns were engaging in spatial interaction (Figure 3.1). International trade, the movement of semitrailers on the expressways, radio broadcasts, and business or personal telephone calls are more familiar examples. Such movements and exchanges are designed to achieve effective integration between different points of human activity. Movement of whatever nature satisfies some felt need or desire. It represents the attempt to smooth out the spatially differing availability of required resources, commodities, information, or opportunities. Whatever the particular purpose of a movement, there is inevitably some manner of trade-off balancing the benefit of the interaction with the costs that are incurred in overcoming spatial separation. Because commodity movements represent simple demonstrations of the principles underlying all spatial interactions, let us turn to them first.

Figure 3.1

1From

Catherine Haun, “A Woman’s Trip Across the Plains in 1849,” in Lillian Schlissel, Women’s Diaries of the Westward Journey. (New York: Schocken Books, 1982).

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Cross-country movement was slow, arduous, and dangerous early in the 19th century, and the price of long-distance spatial interaction was far higher in time and risks than a comparable journey today.

Complementarity

Bases for Interaction

For two places to interact, one place must have a supply of an item for which there is an effective demand in the other, as evidenced by desire for the item, purchasing power to acquire it, and means to transport it. The word describing this circumstance is complementarity. Effective supply and demand are important considerations; mere differences from place to place in commodity surplus or deficit are not enough to initiate exchange. Greenland and the Amazon basin are notably unlike in their natural resources and economies, but their amount of interaction is minimal. Supply and market must come together, as they do in the flow of seasonal fruits and vegetables from California’s Imperial Valley to the urban markets of the American Midwest and East or in the movement of manganese from Ukraine to the steel mills of Western Europe. The massive movement of crude and refined petroleum between spatially separated effective supplies and markets clearly demonstrates complementarity in international trade (Figure 3.2). More generalized patterns of complementarity underlie the exchanges of the raw materials and agricultural goods of less developed countries for the industrial commodities of the developed states.

Neither the world’s resources nor the products of people’s efforts are uniformly distributed. Commodity flows are responses to these differences; they are links between points of supply and locales of demand. Such response may not be immediate or even direct. Matters of awareness of supplies or markets, the presence or absence of transportation connections, costs of movement, ability to pay for things wanted and needed—all and more are factors in the structure of trade. Underlying even these, however, is a set of controlling principles governing spatial interaction.

A Summarizing Model The conviction that spatial interaction reflects areal differences led the geographer Edward Ullman (1912–1976) to speculate on the essential conditions affecting such interactions and to propose an explanatory model. He observed that spatial interaction is effectively controlled by three flow-determining factors that he called complementarity, transferability, and intervening opportunity. Although Ullman’s model deals with commodity flows, it has—as we shall see—applicability to informational transfers and patterns of human movements as well.

Major trade movements Trade flows worldwide (million tons) 120.7 22.7

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34.7 USA Canada Mexico S. & Cent. America Europe Former Soviet Union Middle East Africa Asia Pacific

20.3

20.6

40.1

Figure 3.2

Interregional trade in oil. Complementarity is so basic in initiating interaction that even relatively low-value bulk commodities such as coal, fertilizer, and grain move in trade over long distances. For many years, despite fluctuating prices, petroleum has been the most important commodity in international trade, moving long distances in response to effective supply and demand considerations. Source: The BP Amoco Statistical Review of World Energy. Used with permission.

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Transferability

pull of opportunities offered by a distant destination (Figure 3.3). Patterns of spatial interaction are dynamic, reflecting the changeable structure of apparent opportunity.

Even when complementarity exists, spatial interaction occurs only when conditions of transferability—acceptable costs of an exchange—are met. Spatial movement responds not just to availability and demand but to considerations of time and cost. Transferability is an expression of the mobility of a commodity, and is a function of three interrelated conditions: (1) the characteristics and value of the product; (2) the distance, measured in time and money penalties, over which it must be moved; and (3) the ability of the commodity to bear the costs of movement. If the time and money costs of traversing a distance are too great, exchange does not occur. That is, mobility is not just a physical matter but an economic one as well. If a given commodity is not affordable upon delivery to an otherwise willing buyer, it will not move in trade, and the potential buyer must seek a substitute or go without. Transferability is not a constant condition. It differs between places, over time, and in relation to what is being transferred and how it is to be moved. The opening of a logging road will connect a sawmill with stands of timber formerly inaccessible (nontransferable). An increasing scarcity of high-quality ores will enhance the transferability of lower-quality mine outputs by increasing their value. Low-cost bulk commodities not economically moved by air may be fully transferable by rail or water. Poorly developed and costly transportation may inhibit exchanges even at short distance between otherwise willing traders. In short, transferability expresses the changing relationships between the costs of transportation and the value of the product to be shipped.

Complementarity, transferability, and intervening opportunity—the controlling conditions of commodity movement—help us understand all forms of spatial interaction, including the placing of long-distance phone calls, the residential locational decisions of commuters, and the oncein-a-lifetime transcontinental adventure of the Hauns. Interaction of whatever nature between places is not, of course, meaningfully described by the movement of a single commodity, by the habits of an individual commuter, or the once-only decision of a migrant. The discovery of an Inuit (Eskimo) ivory carving in a Miami gift shop does not establish significant interaction between the Arctic coast and a Florida resort. The study of unique events is suggestive but not particularly informative. We seek general principles that govern the frequency and intensity of interaction both to validate the three preconditions of spatial exchange and to establish the probability that any given potential interaction will actually occur. Our interest is similar to that of the physical scientist investigating, for example, the response of a gas to variations in temperature and pressure. The concern there is with all of the gas molecules and the probability of their collective reactions; the responses of any particular molecule are of little interest. Similarly, we are concerned here with the probability of aggregate, not individual, behavior.

Intervening Opportunity

Distance Decay

Complementarity can be effective only in the absence of more attractive alternative sources of supply or demand closer at hand or cheaper. Intervening opportunities serve to reduce supply/demand interactions that otherwise might develop between distant complementary areas. A supply of Saharan sand is not enough to assure its flow to sand-deficient Manhattan Island because supplies of sand are more easily and cheaply available within the New York metropolitan region. For reasons of cost and convenience, a purchaser is unlikely to buy identical commodities at a distance when a suitable nearby supply is available. When it is, the intervening opportunity demonstrates complementarity at a shorter distance. Similarly, markets and destinations are sought, if possible, close at hand. Growing metropolitan demand in California reduces the importance of midwestern markets for western fruit growers. The intervening opportunities offered by Chicago or Philadelphia reduce the number of job seekers from Iowa searching for employment in New York City. People from New England are more likely to take winter vacations in Florida, which is relatively near and accessible, than in Southern California, which is not. That is, opportunities that are discerned closer at hand reduce the

In all manner of ways, our lives and activities are influenced by the friction of distance. That phrase reminds us that distance has a retarding effect on human interaction

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Measuring Interaction

Figure 3.3

(a) The volume of expected flow of a good between centers L and M, based solely on their complementarity and distance apart, may be (b) materially reduced if an alternate supplier is introduced as an intervening opportunity nearer to the market.

because there are increasing penalties in time and cost associated with longer-distance, more expensive interchanges. We visit nearby friends more often than distant relatives; we go more frequently to the neighborhood convenience store cluster than to the farther regional shopping center. Telephone calls or mail deliveries between nearby towns are greater in volume than those to more distant locations. Our common experience, clearly supported by maps and statistics tracing all kinds of flows, is that most interactions occur over short distances. That is, interchange decreases as distance increases, a reflection of the fact that transferability costs increase with distance. More generally stated, distance decay describes the decline of an activity or function with increasing distance from its point of origin. As the examples in Figure 3.4 demonstrate, near destinations have a disproportionate pull over more distant points in commodity movements. However, it is also evident that the rate of distance decay varies with the type of activity. Study of all manner of spatial interconnections has led to the very general conclusion that interaction between places is inversely related to the square of the distance separating them. That is, volume of flow between two points 80 kilometers (50 miles) apart would probably be only one-quarter of that between centers at 40 kilometers (25 miles) separation. Such a rigid inverse-square relationship is well documented in the physical sciences. For social, cultural, and economic relations, however, it is at best a useful approximation. In human interaction, linear distance is only one aspect of transferability; cost and time are often more meaningful measures of separation.

When the friction of distance is reduced by lowered costs or increased ease of flow, the slope of the distance decay curve is flattened and more total area is effectively united than when those costs are high. When telephone calls are charged by uniform area rates rather than strictly by distance, more calls are placed to the outer margins of the rate area than expected. Expressways extend commuting travel ranges to central cities and expand the total area conveniently accessible for weekend recreation. Figure 3.4 shows that shipping distances for high-cost truck transport are, on the average, shorter than for lower-cost rail hauls.

The Gravity Concept Interaction decisions are not based on distance or distance/cost considerations alone. The large regional shopping center attracts customers from a wide radius because of the variety of shops and goods its very size promises. We go to distant big cities “to seek our fortune” rather than to the nearer small town. We are, that is, attracted by the expectation of opportunity that we associate with larger rather than smaller places. That expectation is summarized by another model of spatial interaction, the gravity model, also drawn from the physical sciences. In the 1850s, Henry C. Carey (1793–1879), in his Principles of Social Science, observed that the law of “molecular gravitation” is an essential condition in human existence and that the attractive force existing between areas is akin to the force of gravity. According to Carey, the

Percent of trips 28 (c) LIGHT TRUCK TRIP LENGTH, CHICAGO AREA, 1970

24 22

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20 40

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Trips greater than 20 miles: 3.8%

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Figure 3.4

The shape of distance decay. The geographer W. Tobler summarized the concept of distance decay in proposing his “first law of geography: everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.” Distance decay curves vary with the type of flow. (a) is a generalized statement of distance decay, (b) summarizes United States data for a single year, and (c) suggests the primary use of light trucks as short haul pickup and delivery vehicles. Source: (c) Data from Chicago Area Transportation Study, A Summary of Travel Characteristics, 1977.

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physical laws of gravity and motion developed by Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) have applicability to the aggregate actions of humans. Newton’s law of universal gravitation states that any two objects attract each other with a force that is proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. Thus, the force of attraction, F, between two masses Mi and Mj separated by distance, d, is F = g

Mi M j dij 2

where g is the “gravitational constant.” Carey’s interests were in the interaction between urban centers and in the observation that a large city is more likely to attract an individual than is a small hamlet. His first interest could be quickly satisfied by simple analogy. The expected interaction (I) between two places, i and j, can be calculated by converting physical mass in the gravity model to population size (P), so that I ij =

Pi Pj Dij

Exchanges between any set of two cities, A and B, can therefore be quickly estimated: I AB =

population of A × population of B (distance between A and B)2

In social—rather than physical—science applications of the gravity model, distance may be calculated by travel time or travel cost modifications rather than by straight line separation. Whatever the unit of measure, however, the model assures us that although spatial interaction always tends to decrease with increasing distance between places, at a given distance it tends to expand with increases in their size. Carey’s second observation—that large cities have greater drawing power for individuals than small ones— was subsequently addressed by the law of retail gravitation, proposed by William J. Reilly (1899–1970) in 1931. Using the population and distance inputs of the gravity model, Reilly concluded that the breaking point (BP) or boundary marking the outer edge of either of the cities’ trade area could be located by the expression: BP =

other of them according to that resident’s position relative to the calculated breaking point. Since the breaking point between cities of unequal size will lie farther from the larger of the two, its spatially greater drawing power is assured (Figure 3.5). Later studies in location theory, city systems, trade area analysis, and other social topics all suggest that the gravity model can be used to account for a wide variety of flow patterns in human geography, including population migration, commodity flows, journeys to work or to shop, telephone call volumes, and the like. Each such flow pattern suggests that size as well as distance influences spatial interaction. Carey’s observation made nearly 150 years ago initiated a type of analysis that has continuing relevance. In modified form it is used today for a variety of practical studies that help us better understand the “friction of distance.”

Interaction Potential Spatial interaction models of distance decay and gravitational pull deal with only two places at a time. The world of reality is rather more complex. All cities, not just city pairs, within a regional system of cities have the possibility of interacting with each other. Indeed, the more specialized the goods produced in each separate center—that is, the greater their collective complementarity—the more likely is it that such multiple interactions will occur. A potential model, also based on Newtonian physics, provides an estimate of the interaction opportunities available to a center in such a multicentered network. It tells us the relative position of each point in relation to all other places within a region. It does so by summing the size and distance relationships between all points of potential interaction within an area. The concept of potential is applicable whenever the measurement of the intensity of spatial interaction is of concern—as it is in studies of marketing, land values, broadcasting, commuting patterns, and the like.

d ij 1+

P2 P1

where BP = distance from city 1 to the breaking point (or boundary) dij = distance between city 1 and city 2 P1 = population of city 1 P2 = population of city 2 Any farm or small town resident located between the two cities would be inclined to shop in one or the

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Figure 3.5

The law of retail gravitation provides a quick determination of the trade boundary (or breaking point) between two cities. In the diagram, cities 1 and 2 are 201 kilometers (125 mi) apart. Reilly’s law tells us that the breaking point between them lies 81.6 kilometers (50.7 mi) distant from City 1. A potential customer located at M, midway (100.5 km or 62.5 mi) between the cities, would lie well within the trade zone of City 2. A series of such calculations would define the “trade area” of any single city.

Movement Biases Distance decay and the gravity and potential models help us understand the bases for interaction in an idealized area without natural or cultural barriers to movement or restrictions on routes followed, and in which only rational interaction decisions are made. Even under those model conditions, the pattern of spatial interaction that develops for whatever reason inevitably affects the conditions under which future interactions will occur. An initial structure of centers and connecting flows will tend to freeze into the landscape a mutually reinforcing continuation of that same pattern. The predictable flows of shoppers to existing shopping centers make those centers attractive to other merchants. New store openings increase customer flow; increased flow strengthens the developed pattern of spatial interaction. And increased road traffic calls for the highway improvement that encourages additional traffic volume. Such an aggregate regularity of flow is called a movement bias. We have already noted a distance bias favoring short movements over long. There is also direction bias, in which of all possible directions of movement, actual flows are restricted to only one or a few. Direction bias is simply a statement that from a given origin, flows are not random (Figure 3.6); rather, certain places have a

greater attraction than do others. The movement patterns from an isolated farmstead are likely oriented to a favored shopping town. On a larger scale, in North America or Siberia long-distance freight movements are directionally biased in favor of east-west flows. Direction bias reflects not just the orientation but also the intensity of flow. Movements from a single point—from Novosibirsk in Siberia, for example, or from Winnipeg, Canada, or Kansas City in the United States—may occur in all directions; they are in reality more intense along the east-west axis. Such directional biases are in part a reflection of network bias, a shorthand way of saying that the presence or absence of connecting channels strongly affects the likelihood that spatial interaction will occur. A set of routes and the set of places that they connect are collectively called a network. Flows cannot occur between all points if not all points are linked. In Figure 3.6a, the interchange between A and X, though not necessarily impossible, is unlikely because the routeway between them is indirect and circuitous. In information flows, a worker on the assembly line is less likely to know of company production plans than is a secretary in the executive offices; these two workers are tied into quite different information networks. A recognition of movement biases helps to refine the coarser generalizations of spatial interaction based solely on complementarity, transferability, and intervening opportunity. Other modifying statements have been developed, but each further refinement moves us away from aggregate behavior toward less predictable individual movements and responses. The spatial interaction questions we ask and the degree of refinement of the answers we require determine the modifications we must introduce into the models we employ.

Human Spatial Behavior

Figure 3.6

Direction bias. (a) When direction bias is absent, movements tend to be almost random, occurring in all possible directions, but less likely between points, such as A and X, not directly connected. (b) Direction bias indicating predominantly north-south movements. Direction bias implies greatest intensity of movement within a restricted number of directions.

Humans are not commodities and individually do not necessarily respond predictably to the impersonal dictates of spatial interaction constraints. Yet, to survive, people must be mobile and collectively do react to distance, time, and cost considerations of movement in space and to the implications of complementarity, transferability, and intervening opportunity. Indeed, an exciting line of geographic inquiry involves how individuals make spatial behavioral decisions and how those separate decisions may be summarized by models and generalizations to explain collective actions. Mobility is the general term applied to all types of human territorial movement. Two aspects of that mobility behavior concern us. The first is the daily or temporary use of space—the journeys to stores, to work, or to school, or for longer periods on vacation or college students’ relocation between home and school dormitory. These types of mobility are often designated as circulation and have in common a lack of intended permanent relocation of residence (Figure 3.7). The second type of mobility is the Spatial Interaction and Spatial Behavior

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Equator

Figure 3.7

Fulani movement paths. Nomadic people have regular routes of movement that involve near-continuous mobility in response to the needs of their herds or flocks. Their moves are always temporary and involves a circuit, not a one-way flow. The groups of Fulani families herd their cattle within the savanna of West Africa. On their southward trek during the dry season, the groups separate; when returning north during the wet season, they reunite. Movement circuits may be changed annually in response to the availability of pasture and the location of areas free of the tsetse fly, the transmitter of “sleeping sickness.”

Source: Map courtesy of Clyde Surveys Ltd, Berkshire, England.

longer-term commitment related to decisions to permanently leave the home territory and find residence in a new location. This second form of spatial behavior is termed migration. Both aspects imply a time dimension. Humans’ spatial actions are not instantaneous. They operate over time, frequently imparting a rhythm to individual and group activity patterns and imposing choices among timeconsuming behaviors. Elements of both aspects of human spatial behavior are also embodied in how individuals perceive space and act within it and how they respond to information affecting their space-behavioral decisions. The nature of those perceptions and responses affect us all in our daily movements. The more permanent movement embodied in migration involves additional and less common decisions and behaviors, as we shall see later in this chapter.

Individual Activity Space One of the realities of life is that groups and countries draw boundaries around themselves and divide space into territories that are, if necessary, defended. Some see the concept of territoriality—the emotional attachment to and the defense of home ground—as a root explanation

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of much of human action and response. It is true that some individual and collective activity appears to be governed by territorial defense responses: the conflict between street groups in claiming and protecting their “turf” (and their fear for their lives when venturing beyond it) and the sometimes violent rejection by ethnic urban neighborhoods of an advancing black, Hispanic, or other population group. On a more individualized basis, each of us claims as personal space the zone of privacy and separation from others our culture or our physical circumstances require or permit. Anglo Americans demand greater face-to-face separation in conversations than do Latin Americans. Personal space on a crowded beach or in a department store is acceptably more limited than it is in our homes or when we are studying in a library (Figure 3.8) For most of us, our personal sense of territoriality is a tempered one. We regard our homes and property as defensible private domains but open them to innocent visitors, known and unknown, or to those on private or official business. Nor do we confine our activities so exclusively within controlled home territories as street-gang members do within theirs. Rather, we have a more or less extended home range, an activity space or area within which we move freely on our rounds of regular activity, sharing that space with others who are also about their daily affairs. Figure 3.9 suggests probable activity spaces for a suburban family of five for a day. Note that the activity space is different and for the mapped day rather limited for each individual, even though two members of the family use automobiles. If one week’s activity were shown, more paths would be added to the map, and in a year’s time, one or more long trips would probably have to be noted. The types of trips that individuals make and thus the extent of their activity space depend on at least three interrelated variables: their stage in life course; the means of mobility at their command; and the demands or opportunities implicit in their daily activities. The first variable, stage in life course, refers to membership in specific age groups. School-age children usually travel short distances to lower schools and longer distances to upper-level schools. After-school activities tend to be limited to walking or bicycle trips to nearby locations. Greater mobility is characteristic of high school students. Adults responsible for household duties make shopping trips and trips related to child care as well as journeys away from home for social, cultural, or recreational purposes. Wage-earning adults usually travel farther from home than other family members. Elderly people may, through infirmity or interests, have less extensive activity spaces. The second variable that affects the extent of activity space is mobility, or the ability to travel. An informal consideration of the cost and effort required to overcome the friction of distance is implicit. Where incomes are high, automobiles are available, and the cost of fuel is reckoned minor in the family budget, mobility may be

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.8

Our demanded personal space is not necessarily uniform in shape or constant in size. We tolerate strangers closer to our sides than directly in front of us; we accept more crowding in an elevator than in a store. We accept the press of the crowd on a popular beach—as do these vacationers along the Costa Blanca in Spain (a), but tend to distance ourselves from others in a library (b).

To recreational activity

P2

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Figure 3.9

Activity space for each member of one author’s family of five for a typical weekday. Routes of regular movement and areas recurrently visited help to foster a sense of territoriality and to color one’s perceptions of space.

great and individual activity space large. In societies or neighborhoods where cars are not a standard means of conveyance, the daily nonemergency activity space may be limited to walking, bicycling, or taking infrequent trips on public transportation. Wealthy suburbanites are far more mobile than are residents of inner-city slums, a circumstance that affects ability to learn about, seek, or retain work and to have access to medical care, educational facilities, and social services.

A third factor limiting activity space is the individual assessment of the existence of possible activities or opportunities. In premodern societies where the needs of daily life are satisfied at home, the impetus for journeys away from home is minimal. Without stores, schools, factories, or even roads, expectations and opportunities are limited. Not only are activities spatially restricted, but awareness space—knowledge of opportunity locations beyond normal activity space—is minimal, distorted, or absent. In Spatial Interaction and Spatial Behavior

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low-income neighborhoods of modern cities in any country, poverty and isolation restrict access to information about opportunities and therefore reinforce other limitations on activity space (Figure 1.28).

The Tyranny of Time The daily activities of humans—eating, sleeping, traveling between home and destination, working or attending classes—all consume time as well as involve space. An individual’s spatial reach is restricted because one cannot be in two different places at the same moment or engage simultaneously in activities that are spatially separate. Further, since there is a finite amount of time within a day and each of us is biologically bound to a daily rhythm of day and night, sleeping and eating, time tyrannically limits the spatial choices we can make and the activity space we can command. Our daily space-time constraints—our timegeography—may be represented by a space-time prism, the volume of space and length of time within which our activities must be confined. Its size and shape are determined by our mobility; its boundaries define what we can or cannot accomplish spatially or temporally (Figure 3.10). If our circumstances demand that we walk to work or school (Figure 3.10b), the sides of our prism are steep and the space available for our activities is narrow. We cannot

Home Midnight (24h) Evening

use time spent in transit for other activities, and the area reasonably accessible to the pedestrian is limited. The space-time prism for the driver (Figure 3.10c) has angled sides and the individual’s spatial range is wide. The dimensions of the prism determine what spatially defined activities are possible, for no activity can exceed the bounds of the prism (see “Space, Time, and Women”). Since most activities have their own time constraints, the choices of things you can do and the places you can do them are strictly limited. Defined class hours, travel time from residence to campus, and dining hall location and opening and closing hours, for example, may be the constraints on your space-time path (Figure 3.11). If you also need part-time work, your choice of jobs is restricted by their respective locations and work hours, for the job, too, must fit within your daily space-time prism.

Distance and Human Interaction People make many more short-distance trips than long ones, a statement in human behavioral terms of the concept of distance decay. If we drew a boundary line around our activity space, it would be evident that trips to the boundary are taken much less often than short-distance trips around the home. The tendency is for the frequency of trips to fall off very rapidly beyond an individual’s critical distance—

Home

Home

Time

6 P.M. (18h)

Noon (12h)

6 A.M. (6h)

Morning Midnight (0h)

Figure 3.10

(a)

(c)

(b) Distance

The space-time prism. An individual’s daily prism has both geographical limits and totally surrounding space-time walls. The time (vertical axis) involved in movement affects the space that is accessible, along with the time and space available for other than travel purposes. (a) When collecting firewood for household use may take an entire day, as it does in some deforested developing countries, no time or space is left for other activities, and the gatherer’s space-time prism may be represented by a straight line. (b) Walking to and from work or school and spending the required number of hours there leave little time to broaden one’s area of activity. (c) The automobile permits an extension of the geographical boundaries of the driver’s space-time prism; the range of activity possibilities and locations is expanded for the highly mobile.

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the distance beyond which cost, effort, and means strongly influence our willingness to travel. Figure 3.12 illustrates the point with regard to journeys from the homesite. Regular movements defining our individual activity space are undertaken for different purposes and are differently influenced by time and distance considerations. The kinds of activities individuals engage in can be classified according to type of trip: journeys to work, to school, to shop, for recreation, and so on. People in nearly all parts of the world make these same types of journeys, though the spatially variable requirements of culture, economy, and personal circumstance dictate their frequency, duration, and significance to an individual (Figure 3.13). A small child, for example, will make many trips up and

down the block but is inhibited by parental admonitions from crossing the street. Different but equally effective distance constraints control adult behavior. The journey to work plays a decisive role in defining the activity space of most adults. Formerly restricted by walking distance or by the routes and schedules of mass transit systems, the critical distances of work trips have steadily increased in European and Anglo American cities as the private automobile figures more importantly in the movement of workers (Figure 3.14). Daily or weekly shopping may be within the critical distance of an individual, and little thought may be given to the cost or the effort involved. That same individual, however, may relegate shopping for special goods to infrequent trips

Space, Time, and Women

F

rom a time-geographic perspective it is apparent that many of the limitations women face in their choices of employment or other activities outside the home reflect the restrictions that women’s time budgets and travel paths place on their individual daily activity mixes. Consider the case* of the unmarried working woman with one or more children of preschool age. The location and operating hours of available child-care facilities may have more of an influence on her choice of jobs than do her labor skills or the relative merits of alternative employment opportunities. From the diagram we see that the woman cannot leave her home base, A, before a given hour because the only available full-day child-care service, D, is not open earlier. She must return at the specified child pickup time and arrive home to prepare food at a reasonable (for the child) dinner time. Her travel mode and speed determine the outer limits of her daily space-time prism. Both of two solid job offers, W1 and W2, have the same working hours and fall within her space-time prism. The preferred, better paying job is W2, but she cannot accept it because dropoff time at the child-care center would

make her late for work, and work hours would make her miss the center’s closing time. On the other hand, although W 1 is acceptable from a child-care standpoint, it leaves no time (or store options) for shopping or errands except during the lunch hour (indicated by the small subprism). Job choice and shopping opportunities are thus determined not by the woman’s labor skills or awareness of store price comparisons but by her time-geographic constraints. Other women in other job skill, parenthood, locational, or mobility circumstances experience different but comparable space-path restrictions. Mobility is a key to activity mix, time-budget, and space-path configurations. Again, research indicates that women are frequently disadvantaged. Because of their multiple work, childcare, and home maintenance tasks, women on average make more—

though shorter—trips than men, leaving less time for alternate activities. Although the automobile reduces those time demands, women have less access to cars than do males, in part because in many cities they are less likely to have a driver’s license and because they typically cede use of a single family car to husbands. The lower income level of many single women with or without children limits their ability to own cars and leads them to use public transit disproportionately to their numbers—to the detriment of both their money and time-space budgets. They are, it has been observed, “transportation deprived and transit dependent.” *Suggested by Risa Palm and Allan Pred, A TimeGeographic Perspective on Problems of Inequality for Women. Institute of Urban and Regional Development, Working Paper no. 236. University of California, Berkeley, 1974

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Midnight (24h)

and carefully consider their cost and effort. The majority of our social contacts tend to be at short distance within our own neighborhoods or with friends who live relatively close at hand; longer social trips to visit relatives are less frequent. In all such trips, however, the distance decay function is clearly at work (Figure 3.15).

Home

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Spatial Interaction and the Accumulation of Information

6 P.M. (18h) Work

Time

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6 A.M (6h) .

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Midnight (0h)

Figure 3.11

Distance

School-day space-time path for a hypothetical

college student.

Figure 3.12

Critical distance. This general diagram indicates how most people observe distance. For each activity, there is a distance beyond which the intensity of contact declines. This is called the critical distance if distance alone is being considered, or the critical isochrone (from Greek isos, “equal,” and chronos, “time”) if time is the measuring rod. The distance up to the critical distance is identified as a frictionless zone, in which time or distance considerations do not effectively figure in the trip decision.

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Critical distances, even for the same activity, are different for each person. The variables of life course stage, mobility, and opportunity, together with an individual’s interests and demands, help define how often and how far a person will travel. On the basis of these variables, we can make inferences about the amount of information a person is likely to acquire about his or her activity space and the area beyond. The accumulation of information about the opportunities and rewards of spatial interaction helps increase and justify movement decisions. For information flows, however, space has a different meaning than it does for the movement of commodities. Communication, for example, does not necessarily imply the time-consuming physical relocations of freight transportation (though in the case of letters and print media it usually does). Indeed, in modern telecommunications, the process of information flow may be instantaneous regardless of distance. The result is space-time convergence to the point of the obliteration of space. A Bell System report tells us that in 1920, putting through a transcontinental telephone call took 14 minutes and eight operators. By 1940, the call completion time was reduced to less than 1 1/2 minutes. In the 1960s, direct distance dialing allowed a transcontinental connection in less than 30 seconds, and electronic switching has now reduced the completion time to that involved in dialing a number and answering a phone. The Internet and communication satellites have made worldwide personal and mass communication immediate and data transfers instantaneous. The same technologies that have led to communication space-time convergence have tended toward a space-cost convergence (Figure 3.16). Domestic mail, which once charged a distance-based postage, is now carried nationwide or across town for the same price. In the modern world, transferability is no longer a consideration in information flows. A speculative view of the future suggests that as distance ceases to be a determinant of the cost or speed of communication, the spatial structure of economic and social decision making may be fundamentally altered. Determinations about where people live and work, the role of cities and other existing command centers, flows of domestic and international trade, constraints on human mobility, and even the concepts and impacts of national boundaries may fundamentally change with new and unanticipated consequences for patterns of spatial interaction.

Boundary of sample area

Trip origin Destination Regional capital City Town Village Hamlet (a)

5 miles

(b)

5 km

Figure 3.13

Travel patterns for purchases of clothing and yard goods of (a) rural cash-economy Canadians and (b) Canadians of the Old Order Mennonite sect. These strikingly different travel behaviors mapped many years ago in nidwestern Canada demonstrate the great differences that may exist in the action spaces of different culture groups occupying the same territory. At that time, “modern” rural Canadians, owning cars and wishing to take advantage of the variety of goods offered in the more distant regional capital, were willing and able to travel longer distances than were neighboring people of a traditionalist culture who had different mobility and whose different demands in clothing and other consumer goods were by preference or necessity satisfied in nearby small settlements.

Source: Robert A. Murdie, “Cultural Differences in Consumer Travel,” Economic Geography 41, no. 3 (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University, 1965). Redrawn by permission.

Figure 3.14

The frequency distribution of work and nonwork trip lengths in minutes in Toronto. More recent studies in different metropolitan areas support the conclusions documented by this graph: work trips are usually longer than other recurring journeys. In the United States in the early 1990s, the average work trip covered 17.1 kilometers (10.6 mi) and half of all trips to work took under 22 minutes; for suburbanites commuting to the central business district, the journey to work involved between 30 and 45 minutes. By 2000, increasing sprawl had lengthened average commuting distances and, because of growing traffic congestion, had increased the average work trip commuting time to 24.3 minutes. In western Canada in the 1990s, average work trip length in Calgary and Edmonton, Alberta, was 11 kilometers (6.8 mi) and took 18 minutes. The situation is similar elsewhere; in the middle 1990s, the average British commuting distance was 12.5 kilometers. Most nonwork trips in all countries are relatively short.

Source: Maurice Yeates, Metropolitan Toronto and Region Transportation Study, figure 42, The Queen’s Printer, Toronto: 1966.

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Information Flows Spatially significant information flows are of two types: individual (person-to-person) exchanges and mass (sourceto-area) communication. A further subdivision into formal and informal interchange recognizes, in the former, the

Figure 3.15

Social interaction as a function of distance. Visits with neighbors on the same street are frequent; they are less common with neighbors around the corner and diminish quickly to the vanishing point after a residential relocation. Friends exert a greater spatial pull, though the distance decay factor is clearly evident. Visits with relatives offer the greatest incentive for longer distance (though relatively infrequent) journeys.

need for an interposed channel (radio, press, postal service, or telephone, for example) to convey messages. Informal communication requires no such institutionalized message carrier. Short-range informal individual communication is as old as humankind itself. Contacts and exchanges between individuals and within small groups tend to increase as the complexity of social organization increases, as the size and importance of the population center grow, and as the range of interests and associations of the communicating person expands. Each individual develops a personal communication field, the informational counterpart of that person’s activity space. Its size and shape are defined by the individual’s contacts in work, recreation, shopping, school, or other regular activities. Those activities, as we have seen, are functions of the age, sex, education, employment, income, and so on of each person. An idealized personal communication field is suggested in Figure 3.17. Each interpersonal exchange constitutes a link in the individual’s personal communication field. Each person, in turn, is a node in the communication field of those with whom he or she makes or maintains contact. The total number of such separate informal networks equals the total count of people alive. Despite the number of those networks, all people, in theory, are interconnected by multiple shared nodes (Figure 3.18). Experimentation has demonstrated that through such interconnections no person in the United States is more than five links removed from any other person, no matter where located or how unlikely the association.

Source: Frederick P. Stutz, “Distance and Network Effects on Urban Social Travel Fields,” Economic Geography 49, no. 2 (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University, 1973), p. 139. Redrawn by permission.

Figure 3.17

A personal communication field is determined by individual spatial patterns of communication related to work, shopping, business trips, social visits, and so on.

Figure 3.16

Space-cost convergence in telephone tolls between New York and San Francisco, 1915–2000. The rates shown are a smooth-curve summary of frequently adjusted charges for station-to-station daytime 3-minute calls over telephone lines. The cost of long-distance conversation essentially disappeared with the advent of voice communication over the Internet in the late 1990s.

Data from Historical Statistics of the United States, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, and AT&T.

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Figure 3.18

Separate population sets are interconnected by the links between individuals. If link A–B exists, everyone in the two sets is linked.

Mass communication is the formal, structured transmission of information in essentially a one-way flow between single points of origin and broad areas of reception. There are few transmitters and many receivers. The mass media are by nature “space filling.” From single origin points they address their messages by print, radio, or television to potential receivers within a defined area. The number and location of disseminating points, therefore, are related to their spatial coverage characteristics, to the minimum size of area and population necessary for their support, and to the capability of the potential audiences to receive their message. The coverage area is determined both by the nature of the medium and by the corporate intent of the agency. There are no inherent spatial restrictions on the dissemination of printed materials. In the United States, much book and national magazine publishing has localized in metropolitan New York City, as have the services supplying news and features for sale to the print media located there and elsewhere in the country. Paris, Buenos Aires, Moscow, London—indeed, the major metropolises and/or capital cities of other countries—show the same spatial concentration. Regional journals emanate from regional capitals, and major metropolitan newspapers, though serving primarily their home markets, are distributed over (or produce special editions for distribution within) tributary areas whose size and shape depend on the intensity of competition from other metropolises. A spatial information hierarchy has thus emerged. Hierarchies are also reflected in the market-size requirements for different levels of media offerings. National and international organizations are required to expedite information flows (and, perhaps, to control their content), but market demand is heavily weighted in favor of regional and local coverage. In the electronic media, the result has been national networks with local

affiliates acting as the gatekeepers of network offerings and adding to them locally originating programs and news content. A similar market subdivision is represented by the regional editions of national newspapers and magazines. At a different scale, the spatial distribution of newspapers in Kansas (Figure 3.19) shows their hierarchical pattern. The technological ability to fill space with messages from different mass media is unavailing if receiving audiences do not exist. In illiterate societies, publications cannot inform or influence. Unless the appropriate receivers are widely available, television and radio broadcasts are a waste of resources. Perhaps no invention in history has done more to weld isolated individuals and purely person-to-person communicators into national societies exposed to centralized information flows than has the low-cost transistor radio. Its battery-powered transportability converts the remotest village and the most isolated individual into a receiving node of entertainment, information, and political messages. The direct satellite broadcast of television programs to community antennae or communal sets brings that mass medium to remote areas of Arctic Canada, India, Indonesia, and other world areas able to invest in the technology but as yet unserved by ground stations.

Information and Perception Human spatial interaction, as we have seen, is conditioned by a number of factors. Complementarity, transferability, and intervening opportunities help pattern the movement of commodities and peoples. Flows between points and over area are influenced by distance decay and partially explained by gravity and potential models. Individuals in their daily affairs operate in activity spaces that are partly determined by stage in life course, mobility, and a variety of socioeconomic characteristics. In every

Figure 3.19

The hierarchy of newspaper coverage in Kansas in the 1970s. The counties in sparsely populated western Kansas had only weekly papers. The more populous eastern part of the state had daily and Sunday papers, with wide-area distribution. Source: Reproduced by permission of Waveland Press, Inc. from John A. Jakle, Stanley Brunn, and Curtis C. Roseman, Human Spatial Behavior: A Social Geography, p. 130 (Copyright © 1976), reissued 1985 by Waveland Press, Inc., Prospect Heights, Ill.

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instance of spatial interaction, however, decisions are based on information about opportunity or feasibility of movement, exchange, or want satisfaction. More precisely, actions and decisions are based on place perception—the awareness we have, as individuals, of home and distant places and the beliefs we hold about them. Place perception involves our feelings and understandings, reasoned or irrational, about the natural and cultural characteristics of an area and about its opportunity structure. Whether our view accords with that of others or truly reflects the “real” world seen in abstract descriptive terms is not the major concern. Our perceptions are the important thing, for the decisions people make about the use of their lives or about their actions in space are based not necessarily on reality but on their assumptions and impressions of reality.

Perception of Environment Psychologists and geographers are interested in determining how we arrive at our perceptions of place and environment both within and beyond our normal activity space. The images we form firsthand of our home territory have been in part reviewed in the discussion of mental maps in Chapter 1. The perceptions we have of more distant places are less directly derived (Figure 3.20). In technologically advanced societies, television and radio, magazines and newspapers, books and lectures, travel brochures and hearsay all combine to help us develop a mental picture of unfamiliar places and of the interaction opportunities they may contain. Again, however, the most

Figure 3.20

effectively transmitted information seems to come from word-of-mouth reports. These may be in the form of letters or visits from relatives, friends, and associates who supply information that helps us develop lines of attachment to relatively unknown areas. There are, of course, barriers to the flow of information, including that of distance decay. Our knowledge of close places is greater than our knowledge of distant points; our contacts with nearby persons theoretically yield more information than we receive from afar. Yet in crowded areas with maximum interaction potential, people commonly set psychological barriers around themselves so that only a limited number of those possible interactions and information exchanges actually occur. We raise barriers against information overload and to preserve a sense of privacy that permits the filtering out of information that does not directly affect us. There are obvious barriers to long-distance information flows as well, such as time and money costs, mountains, oceans, rivers, and differing religions, languages, ideologies, and political systems. Barriers to information flow give rise to what we earlier (page 71) called direction bias. In the present usage, this implies a tendency to have greater knowledge of places in some directions than in others. Not having friends or relatives in one part of a country may represent a barrier to individuals, so that interest in and knowledge of the area beyond the “unknown” region are low. In the United States, both northerners and southerners tend to be less well informed about each other’s areas than about the

A Palestinian student’s view of the world. The map was drawn by a Palestinian high school student from Gaza. The map reflects the instruction and classroom impressions the student has received. The Gaza curriculum conforms to the Egyptian national standards and thus is influenced by the importance of the Nile River and pan-Arabism. Al Sham is the old, but still used, name for the area including Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. The map would be quite different in emphasis if the Gaza school curriculum were designed by Palestinians or if it had been drawn by an Israeli student.

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western part of the country. Traditional communication lines in the United States follow an east-west rather than a north-south direction, the result of early migration patterns, business connections, and the pattern of the development of major cities. In Russia, directional bias favors a north-south information flow within the European part of the country and less familiarity with areas far to the east. Within Siberia, however, east-west flows dominate. When information about a place is sketchy, blurred pictures develop. These influence the impression—the perception—we have of places and cannot be discounted. Many important decisions are made on the basis of incomplete information or biased reports, such as decisions to visit or not, to migrate or not, to hate or not, even to make war or not. Awareness of places is usually accompanied

by opinions about them, but there is no necessary relationship between the depth of knowledge and the perceptions held. In general, the more familiar we are with a locale, the more sound the factual basis of our mental image of it will be. But individuals form firm impressions of places totally unknown to them personally, and these may color interaction decisions. One way to determine how individuals envisage home or distant places is to ask them what they think of different locales. For instance, they may be asked to rate places according to desirability—perhaps residential desirability—or to make a list of the 10 best and the 10 worst cities in their country of residence. Certain regularities appear in such inquiries. Figure 3.21 presents some residential desirability data elicited from college students in three provinces of

Figure 3.21

Residential preferences of Canadians. Each of these maps shows the residential preference of a sampled group of Canadians from the Provinces of British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, respectively. Note that each group of respondents prefers its own area, but all like the Canadian and U.S. west coasts.

Source: Herbert A. Whitney, “Preferred Locations in North America: Canadians, Clues, and Conjectures,” Journal of Geography 83, no. 5, p. 222. (Indiana, Pa.: National Council for Geographic Education, 1984). Redrawn by permission.

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Canada. These and comparable mental maps derived from studies conducted by researchers in many countries suggest that near places are preferred to far places unless much information is available about the far places. Places of similar culture are favored, as are places with high standards of living. Individuals tend to be indifferent to unfamiliar places and areas and to dislike those that have competing interests (such as distasteful political and military activities or conflicting economic concerns) or a physical environment perceived to be unpleasant. On the other hand, places perceived to have superior climates or landscape amenities are rated highly in mental map studies and favored in tourism and migration decisions. The southern and southwestern coast of England is attractive to citizens of generally wet and cloudy Britain, and holiday tours to Spain, the south of France, and the Mediterranean islands are heavily booked by the English. A U.S. Census Bureau study indicates that “climate” is, after work and family proximity, the most often reported

Figure 3.22

reason for interstate moves by adults of all ages. International studies reveal a similar migration motivation based not only on climate but also on concepts of natural beauty and amenities.

Perception of Natural Hazards Less certain is the negative impact on spatial interaction or relocation decisions of assessments of natural hazards, processes or events in the physical environment that are not caused by humans but that have consequences harmful to them. Distinction is made between chronic, low-level hazards (health-affecting mineral content of drinking water, for example) and high-consequence/low-probability events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, landslides, and the like. Remedial low-level hazards do not appear to create negative space perceptions, though highly publicized chronic natural conditions, such as suspected cancerrelated radon emissions (Figure 3.22) may be an exception. Space perception studies do reveal, however, a small but

Areas with potentially high radon levels. The radon “scare” began in 1984 with the discovery that a Pennsylvania family was being exposed in its home to the equivalent of 455,000 chest X rays per year. With the estimate that as many as 20% of the nation’s annual lung cancer deaths may be attributable to radon, homeowners and seekers were made aware of a presumed new but localized environmental hazard. More recent re-assessments suggest the earlier warnings of radon danger were partially or largely unwarranted. Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, August 1987.

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measurable adverse assessment of locales deemed “dangerous,” no matter what the statistical probability of the hazard occurring. Mental images of home areas do not generally include as an overriding concern an acknowledgment of potential natural dangers. The cyclone that struck the delta area of Bangladesh on November 12, 1970, left at least 500,000 people dead, yet after the disaster the movement of people into the area swelled population above precyclone levels—a resettlement repeated after other, more recent cyclones. The July 28, 1976, earthquake in the Tangshan area of China devastated a major urban industrial complex, with casualties estimated at about a quartermillion, and between 50,000 and 100,000 city dwellers and villagers reportedly perished during and after the January, 2001 quake in Gujarat state of western India. In both cases, rebuilding began almost immediately, as it usually does following earthquake damage (Figure 3.23). The human response to even such major and exceptional natural hazards is duplicated by a general tendency to discount dangers from more common hazard occurrences. Johnstown, Pennsylvania, has suffered recurrent floods, and yet its residents rebuild; violent storms strike the Gulf and East coasts of the United States, and people remain or return. Californians may be concerned about Kansas tornadoes if contemplating a move there but be unconcerned about earthquake dangers at home.

Why do people choose to settle in areas of highconsequence hazards in spite of the potential threat to their lives and property? Why do hundreds of thousands of people live along the San Andreas fault in California, build houses in Pacific coastal areas known to experience severe erosion during storms, return to flood-prone river valleys in Europe or Asia, or avalanche-threatened Andean valleys? What is it that makes the risk worth taking? Ignorance of natural hazard danger is not necessarily a consideration. People in seismically active regions of the United States and Europe, at least, do believe that damaging earthquakes are a possibility in their districts but, research indicates, are reluctant to do anything about the risk. Similar awareness and reticence accompanies other low-incidence/high-consequence natural dangers. Less than one-tenth of 1% of respondents to a federal survey gave “natural disaster” as the reason for their interstate residential move. There are many reasons why natural hazard risk does not deter settlement or adversely affect space-behavioral decisions. Of importance, of course, is the persistent belief that the likelihood of an earthquake or a flood or other natural calamity is sufficiently remote so that it is not reasonable or pressing to modify behavior because of it. People are influenced by their innate optimism and the predictive uncertainty about timing or severity of a calamitous event and by their past experiences in high-hazard areas. If they

Figure 3.23

Destruction from the San Francisco earthquake and fire. The first shock struck San Francisco early on the morning of April 18, 1906, damaging the city’s water system. Fire broke out and raged for three days. It was finally stopped by dynamiting buildings in its path. When is was over, some 700 people were dead or missing, and 25,000 buildings had been destroyed. Locally, the event is usually referred to as the Great Fire of 1906, suggesting a denial of the natural hazard in favor of assigning blame to correctable human error. Post-destruction reconstruction began at once. Rebuilding following earthquake damage is the rule, though the immediate return of population to northern Italian areas after a major quake in 1976 was followed by an abrupt longer-term exodus after a subsequent, much weaker shock.

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have not suffered much damage in the past, they may be optimistic about the future. If, on the other hand, past damage has been great, they may think that the probability of repetition in the future is low (Table 3.1). Perception of place as attractive or desirable may be quite divorced from any understanding of its hazard potential. Attachment to locale or region may be an expression of emotion and economic or cultural attraction, not just a rational assessment of risk. The culture hearths of antiquity discussed in Chapter 2 and shown on Figure 2.15 were for the most part sited in flood-prone river valleys; their enduring attraction was undiminished by that potential danger. The home area, whatever disadvantages an outside observer may discern, exerts a force not easily dismissed or ignored. Indeed, high-hazard areas are often sought out because they possess desirable topography or scenic views, as do, for instance, coastal areas subject to storm damage. Once people have purchased property in a known hazard area, they may be unable to sell it for a reasonable price even if they so desire. They think that they have no choice but to remain and protect their investment. The cultural hazard—loss of livelihood and investment—appears more serious than whatever natural hazards there may be. Carried further, it has been observed that spatial adjustment to perceived natural hazards is a luxury not affordable to impoverished people in general or to the urban and rural poor of Third World countries in particular. Forced by population growth and economic necessity to exert ever-greater pressures upon fragile environments or to occupy at higher densities hazardous hillside and floodplain slums, their margin of safety in the face of both chronic and low-probability hazards is minimal to nonexistent (Figure 3.24).

TABLE 3.1

Common Responses to the Uncertainty of Natural Hazards

Eliminate the Hazard Deny or Denigrate Its Existence

Deny or Denigrate Its Recurrence

“We have no floods here, only high water.”

“Lightning never strikes twice in the same place.”

“It can’t happen here.”

“It’s a freak of nature.”

Eliminate the Uncertainty Make It Determinate and Knowable

Transfer Uncertainty to a Higher Power

“Seven years of great plenty. . . . After them seven years of famine.”

“It’s in the hands of God.”

“Floods come every five years.”

“The government is taking care of it.”

Burton and Kates, The Perception of Natural Hazards in Resource Management, 3 Natural Resources Journal 435 (1964). Used by permission of the University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, N. M.

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Figure 3.24

Many of the poor of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, occupy steep hillside locations above the reach of sewer, water, and power lines that hold the more affluent at lower elevations. Frequent heavy rains cause mudflows from the saturated hillsides that wipe away the shacks and shelters that insecurely cling to them, and deposit the homes and hopes of the poor in richer neighborhoods below.

Migration When continental glaciers began their retreat some 11,000 years ago, the activity space and awareness space of Stone Age humans were limited. As a result of pressures of numbers, need for food, changes in climate, and other inducements, those spaces were collectively enlarged to encompass the world. Migration—the permanent relocation of residential place and activity space—has been one of the enduring themes of human history. It has contributed to the evolution of separate cultures, to the diffusion of those cultures and their components by interchange and communication, and to the frequently complex mix of peoples and cultures found in different areas of the world. Massive movements of people within countries, across national borders, and between continents have emerged as a pressing concern of recent decades. They affect national economic structures, determine population density and distribution patterns, alter traditional ethnic, linguistic, and religious mixtures, and inflame national debates and international tensions. Because migration patterns and conflicts touch so many aspects of social and economic relations and have become so important a part of current human geographic realities, their specific impact is a significant aspect of several of our topical concerns. Portions of the story of migration have been touched on already in Chapter 2; other elements of it are part of later discussions of population (Chapter 4), ethnicity (Chapter 6), economic development (Chapter 10), urbanization (Chapter 11), and

international political relations (Chapter 12). Because migration is above all the result of individual and family decisions, our interest here is with migration as an unmistakable, recurring, and near-universal expression of human spatial behavior. Reviewing that behavioral basis of migration now will give us common ground for understanding its impacts in other contexts later. Migration embodies all the principles of spatial interaction and space relations we have already discussed. Complementarity, transferability, and intervening opportunities and barriers all play a role. Space information and perception are important, as are the sociocultural and economic characteristics of the migrants and the distance relationships between their original and prospective locations of settlement. In less abstract terms, mass and individual migration decisions may express real-life responses to poverty, rapid population growth, environmental deterioration, or international and civil conflict or war. In its current troubling dimensions, migration may be as much a strategy for survival as an unforced but reasoned response to economic and social opportunity. Naturally, the length of a specific move and its degree of disruption of established activity space patterns raise distinctions important in the study of migration. A change of residence from the central city to the suburbs certainly changes both residence and activity space of schoolchildren and of adults in many of their nonworking activities, but the working adults may still retain the city—indeed, the same place of employment there—as an action space. On the other hand, immigration from Europe to the United States and the massive farm-to-city movements of rural Americans late in the 19th and early in the 20th centuries clearly meant a total change of all aspects of behavioral patterns.

Intracontinental and interregional migrations involve movements between countries and within countries, most commonly in response to individual and group assessments of improved economic prospects, but often reflecting flight from difficult or dangerous environmental, military, economic, or political conditions. The millions of refugees leaving their homelands following the dissolution of Eastern European communist states, including the former USSR and Yugoslavia, exemplify that kind of flight. Between 1980 and 2000, Europe received some 20 million newcomers, often refugees, who joined the 15 million labor migrants (“guest workers”) already in West European countries by the early 1990s (Figure 3.25). North America has its counterparts in the hundreds of thousands of immigrants coming (many illegally) to the United States each year from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean region. The Hauns, whose westward trek opened this chapter, were part of a massive 19thcentury regional shift of Americans that continues today (Figure 3.26). Russia experienced a similar, though eastward, flow of people in the 20th century. Some 120 million people—nearly 2% of world population—lived in a country other than the country of their birth in the late 1990s, and migration had become a world social, economic, and political issue of first priority. In the 20th century, nearly all countries experienced a great movement of peoples from agricultural areas to the cities, continuing a pattern of rural-to-urban migration that first became prominent during the 18thand 19th-century Industrial Revolution in advanced economies and now is even more massive than international migrant flows. Rapid increases in impoverished

Principal Migration Patterns Migration flows may be discussed at different scales, from massive intercontinental torrents to individual decisions to move to a new house or apartment within the same metropolitan area. At each level, although the underlying controls on spatial behavior remain constant, the immediate motivating factors influencing the spatial interaction are different, with differing impacts on population patterns and cultural landscapes. At the broadest scale, intercontinental movements range from the earliest peopling of the habitable world to the most recent flight of Asian or African refugees to countries of Europe or the Western Hemisphere. The population structure of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, and other South American countries—as Chapter 4 suggests—is a reflection and result of massive intercontinental flows of immigrants that began as a trickle during the 16th and 17th centuries and reached a flood during the 19th and early 20th (Figure 4.21). Later in the 20th century, World War II (1939–1945) and its immediate aftermath involved more than 25 million permanent population relocations, all of them international but not all intercontinental.

Figure 3.25

International “guest worker” flows to Western Europe. Labor shortages in expanding Western European economies beginning in the 1960s offered job opportunities to workers immigrating under labor contract from Eastern and Southern Europe and North Africa. Economic stagnation and domestic unemployment halted foreign worker contracting in Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland in the later 1980s and 1990s, but continuing immigration raised the share of foreign workers in the labor force to 20% in Switzerland, 10% in Austria, and 9.5% in Germany by 2000.

Source: Data from Gunther Glebe and John O’Loughlin, eds., “Foreign Minorities in Continental European Cities,” Erdkundliches Wissen 84 (Wiesbaden, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987).

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19 90

2000

Figure 3.26

Westward shift of population, 1790–2000. More than 200 years of western migration and population growth are recorded by the changing U.S. center of population. (The “center of population” is that point at which a rigid map of the United States would balance, reflecting the identical weights of all residents in their location on the census date.) The westward movement was rapid for the first 100 years of census history and slowed between 1890 and 1950. Some of the post-1950 acceleration reflects population growth in the “Sunbelt.” However, the two different locations for the population center in 1950 and the symbol change indicate the geographic pull on the center of population exerted by the admission of Alaska and Hawaii to statehood.

rural populations of developing countries put increasing and unsustainable pressures on land, fuel, and water in the countryside. Landlessness and hunger as well as the loss of social cohesion that growing competition for declining resources induces helps force migration to cities. As a result, while the rate of urban growth is decreasing in the more developed countries, urbanization in the developing world continues apace, as will be discussed more fully in Chapter 11.

Types of Migration Migrations may be forced or voluntary or, in many instances, reluctant relocations imposed on the migrants by circumstances. In forced migrations, the relocation decision is made solely by people other than the migrants themselves (Figure 3.27). Perhaps 10 to 12 million Africans were forcibly transferred as slaves to the Western Hemisphere from the late 16th to early 19th centuries. Half or more were destined for the Caribbean and most of the remainder for Central and South America, though nearly a million arrived in the United States. Australia owed its earliest European settlement to convicts transported after the 1780s to the British penal colony established in southeastern Australia (New South Wales). More recent involuntary migrants include millions of Soviet citizens forcibly relocated from countryside to cities and from the western areas to labor camps in Siberia and the Russian Far East beginning in the late 1920s. During the 1980s and 90s, many refugee destination countries in Africa, Europe, and Asia expelled immigrants or encouraged or forced the repatriation of foreign nationals within their borders.

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Less than fully voluntary migration—reluctant relocation—of some 8 million Indonesians has taken place under an aggressive governmental campaign begun in 1969 to move people from densely settled Java (roughly 775 per square kilometer or 2000 people per square mile) to other islands and territories of the country in what has been called the “biggest colonization program in history.” International refugees from war and political turmoil or repression numbered 14 million at the start of 2000, according to the World Refugee Survey—down from some 15 million in 1990, but still one out of every 440 people on the planet. In the past, refugees sought asylum mainly in Europe and other developed areas. More recently, the flight of people is primarily from developing countries to other developing regions, and many countries with the largest refugee populations are among the world’s poorest. Sub-Saharan Africa alone housed over 3.5 million refugees (Figure 3.28). Worldwide, an additional 21 million persons were “internally displaced,” effectively internal refugees within their own countries. In a search for security or sustenance, they have left their home areas but not crossed an international boundary. The great majority of migratory movements, however, are voluntary (volitional), representing individual response to the factors influencing all spatial interaction decisions. At root, migrations take place because the migrants believe that their opportunities and life circumstances will be better at their destination than they are at their present location. Poverty is the great motivator. Some 30% of the world’s population—nearly 2 billion persons—have less than $1.00 per day income. Many additionally are victims

Figure 3.27

Forced migrations: The Five Civilized Tribes. Between 1825 and 1840, some 100,000 southeastern Amerindians were removed from their homelands and transferred by the Army across the Mississippi River to “Indian Territory” in present-day Oklahoma. By far the largest number were members of the Five Civilized Tribes of the South: Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles. Settled, Christianized, literate small-farmers, their forced eviction and arduous journey—particularly along what the Cherokees named their “Trail of Tears” in the harsh winter of 1837–1838—resulted in much suffering and death.

Figure 3.28

Rwandan refugees near the border of Rwanda and Tanzania. More than 1 million Rwandans fled into neighboring Zaire (now, the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi in 1994 to escape civil war in their home country. At the end of the 20th century, nearly 14 million Africans remained uprooted (that is, internally displaced and refugees combined). Fleeing war, repression, and famine, millions of people in developing nations have become reluctant migrants from their homelands.

of drought, floods, other natural catastrophes or of wars and terrorism. Poverty in developing countries is greatest in the countryside; rural areas are home to around 750 million of the world’s poorest people. Of these, some 20 to 30 million move each year to towns and cities, many as “environmental refugees” abandoning land so eroded or exhausted it can no longer support them. In the cities they join the 40% or more of the labor force that is unemployed or underemployed in their home country and seek legal or illegal entry into more promising economies of the developed world. All, rural or urban, respond to the same basic forces—the push of poverty and the pull of perceived or hoped-for opportunity.

Controls on Migration Economic considerations crystallize most migration decisions, though nomads fleeing the famine and spreading deserts of the Sahel obviously are impelled by different economic imperatives than is the executive considering a job transfer to Montreal or the resident of Appalachia seeking factory employment in the city. Among the aging, affluent populations of highly developed countries, retirement Spatial Interaction and Spatial Behavior

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amenities figure importantly in perceptions of residential attractiveness of areas. Educational opportunities, changes in life cycle, and environmental attractions or repulsions are but a few other possible migration motivations. Migration theorists attribute international economic migrations to a series of often overlapping mechanisms. Differentials in wages and job opportunities between home and destination countries are perhaps the major driving force in such individual migration decisions. Those differentials are in part rooted in a built-in demand for workers at the bottom of the labor hierarchy in more prosperous developed countries whose own workers disdain lowincome, menial jobs. Migrants are available to fill those jobs, some argue, because advanced economies make industrial investment in developing or colonial economies to take advantage of lower labor costs there. New factories inevitably disturb existing peasant economies, employ primarily short-term female workers, and leave a residue of unemployed males available and prone to migrate in search of opportunity. If successful, international economic migrants, male or female, help diversify sources of family income through their remittances from abroad, a form of household security that in itself helps motivate some international economic migration. Negative home conditions that impel the decision to migrate are called push factors. They might include loss of job, lack of professional opportunity, overcrowding or slum clearance, or a variety of other influences including poverty, war, and famine. The presumed positive attractions of the migration destination are known as pull factors. They include all the attractive attributes perceived to exist at the new location—safety and food, perhaps, or job opportunities, better climate, lower taxes, more room, and so forth. Very often migration is a result of both perceived push and pull factors. It is perception of the areal pattern of opportunities and want satisfaction that is important here, whether or not perceptions are supported by objective reality. In China, for example, a “floating” population of more than 100 million surplus workers has flooded into cities from the countryside, seeking urban employment that exists primarily in their anticipation. The concept of place utility helps us to understand the decision-making process that potential voluntary migrants undergo. Place utility is the measure of an individual’s satisfaction with a given residential location. The decision to migrate is a reflection of the appraisal—the perception—by the prospective migrant of the current homesite as opposed to other sites of which something is known or hoped for. In the evaluation of comparative place utility, the decision maker considers not only perceived value of the present location, but also expected place utility of potential destinations. Those evaluations are matched with the individual’s aspiration level, that is, the level of accomplishment or ambition that the person sees for herself or himself. Aspirations tend to be adjusted to what one considers attainable. If one finds present circumstances satisfactory, then

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spatial search behavior—the process by which locational alternatives are evaluated—is not initiated. If, on the other hand, dissatisfaction with the home location is felt, then a utility is assigned to each of the possible migration locations. The utility is based on past or expected future rewards at various sites. Because new places are unfamiliar to the searcher, the information received about them acts as a substitute for the personal experience of the homesite. Decision makers can do no more than sample information about place alternatives and, of course, there may be errors in both information and interpretation. Ultimately, they depend on their image—perhaps a mental map—of the place being considered and on the motivations that impel them to consider long distance migration or even local area relocation of residence. In the latter instance, of course, the spatial search usually involves actual site visits in evaluating the potential move (Figure 3.29). One goal of the potential migrant is to avoid physically dangerous or economically unprofitable outcomes in the final migration decision. Place utility evaluation, therefore, requires assessments not only of hoped-for pull factors of new sites but also of the potentially negative economic and social reception the migrant might experience at those sites. An example of that observation can be seen in the case of the large numbers of young Mexicans and Central Americans who have migrated both legally and illegally to the United States. Faced with poverty and overpopulation at home, they regard the place utility in Mexico as minimal. With a willingness to work, they learn from friends and relatives of job opportunities north of the border and, hoping for success or even wealth, quickly place high utility on relocation to the United States. Many know that dangerous risks are involved in entering the country illegally, but even legal immigrants face legal restrictions or rejections that are advocated or designed to reduce the pull attractions of the United States (see “Backlash”). Another migrant goal is to reduce uncertainty. That objective may be achieved either through a series of transitional relocation stages or when the migrant follows the example of known predecessors. Step migration involves the place transition from, for example, rural to central city residence through a series of less extreme locational changes—from farm to small town to suburb and, finally, to the major central city itself. Chain migration assures that the mover is part of an established migrant flow from a common origin to a prepared destination. An advance group of migrants, having established itself in a new home area, is followed by second and subsequent migrations originating in the same home district and frequently united by kinship or friendship ties. Public and private services for legal migrants and informal service networks for undocumented or illegal migrants become established and contribute to the continuation or expansion of the chain migration flow. Ethnic and foreign-born enclaves in major cities and rural areas in a number of countries are the immediate result, as we shall see more fully in Chapter 6.

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Figure 3.29

An example of a residential spatial search. The dots represent the house vacancies in the price range of a sample family. Note (1) the relationship of the new house location to the workplaces of the married couple; (2) the relationship of the old house location to the chosen new home site; and (3) the limited total area of the spatial search. This example from the San Fernando Valley area of Los Angeles is typical of intraurban moves. Redrawn by permission from J. O. Huff, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 76, pp. 217–221. Association of American Geographers, 1986.

Sometimes the chain migration is specific to occupational groups. For example, nearly all newspaper vendors in New Delhi, in the north of India, come from one small district in Tamil Nadu, in the south of India. Most construction workers in New Delhi come either from Orissa, in the east of India, or Rajasthan, in the northwest. The diamond trade of Bombay, India, is dominated by a network of about 250 related families who come from a small town several hundred miles to the north. Certainly, not all immigrants stay permanently at their first destination. Of the some 80 million newcomers to the United States between 1900 and 1980, some 10 million returned to their homelands or moved to another country. Estimates for Canada indicate that perhaps 40 of each 100 immigrants eventually leave, and about 25% of newcomers to Australia also depart permanently. A corollary of all out-migration flows is, therefore, counter (or return) migration, the likelihood that as many as 25% of all migrants will return to their place of origin (Figure 3.30). Within the United States, return migration—defined as moving back to one’s state of birth—makes up about 20% of all domestic moves. That figure varies dramatically between states. More than a third of in-migrants to West Virginia, for example, were returnees—as were over 25% of those moving to Pennsylvania, Alabama, Iowa and a few other states. Such widely different states as New Hampshire, Maryland, California, Florida, Wyoming, and Alaska were among the several that found returnees were fewer than 10% of their in-migrants. Interviews suggest that states deemed attractive draw new migrants in large

Figure 3.30

Intended return migration of Yugoslavs from Germany. As the length of stay in Germany increased, the proportion of Yugoslavs intending to return decreased, but even after 10 years abroad more than half intended to leave.

Source: Brigitte Waldorf, “Determinants of International Return Migration Intentions.” Professional Geographer 47, no. 2 (1995), Fig. 2, page 132.

numbers, while those with high proportions of returnees in the migrant stream are not perceived as desirable destinations by other than former residents. Once established, origin and destination pairs of places tend to persist. Areas that dominate a locale’s inand out-migration patterns make up the migration fields Spatial Interaction and Spatial Behavior

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Geography and Public Policy Backlash Migrants can enter a country legally—with a passport, visa, work permit, or other authorization—or illegally. Some aliens initially enter a country legally but on a temporary basis (as a student or tourist, for example), but then remain after their departure date. Others may arrive claiming the right of political asylum but actually seeking economic opportunity. Recent years have seen a rising tide of emotion against the estimated 4 to 5 million people who reside illegally in the United States, a sentiment that has been reflected in a number of actions. • Greater efforts are being made to deter illegal crossings along the Mexican border by both increasing the number of Border Patrol agents and by building steel fences near El Paso, Texas, Nogales, Arizona, and San Ysidro, California. • Four states—Florida, Texas, Arizona, and California—are suing the federal government to win reimbursement for their costs of illegal immigration. • The U.S.–Mexico Border Counties Coalition, composed of representatives from the 24 counties in the United States that abut Mexico, is demanding that the federal government reimburse local administrations for money spent on legal and medical services for undocumented aliens. These services include the detention, prosecution, and defense of immigrants, emergency medical care, ambulance

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service, even autopsies and burials for those who die while trying to cross the border. • The governor of California, which is home to an estimated 2 million illegal immigrants, proposed an amendment to the Constitution to deny citizenship to children born on American soil if their parents are not legal residents of the United States. • Finally, and most dramatically, California voters over a period of years approved a trio of ballot initiatives aimed at curbing what their proponents see as unwarranted privileges for immigrants. The first was Proposition 187, passed in November 1994, prohibiting state and local government agencies from providing publicly funded education, nonemergency health care, welfare benefits, and social services to any person they could not verify as either a U.S. citizen or a person legally admitted to the country. The measure also required state and local agencies to report suspected illegal immigrants to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and to certain state officials. Proponents of Proposition 187 argued that California could no longer support the burden of high levels of immigration, especially if the immigrants cannot enter the more skilled professions. They contended that welfare, medical, and educational benefits are magnets that draw illegal aliens into the state. These unauthorized immigrants were estimated to cost California taxpayers

more than $3.5 billion per year and result in overcrowded schools and public health clinics, and the reduction of services to legal residents. Why should the latter pay for benefits for people who are breaking the law, 187-supporters asked. Those opposed to 187 contended that projected savings would be illusory because the proposition collided with federal laws that guarantee access to public education for all children in the United States. It also, they said, violated federal Medicaid laws, so California would be in danger of losing all regular Medicaid funding. Forcing an estimated 300,000 children out of school and onto the streets would increase the risk of juvenile crime. Forbidding doctors from giving immunizations or basic medical care to anyone suspected of being an illegal immigrant would encourage the spread of communicable diseases throughout the state, putting everyone at risk. Educators, doctors, and other public service officials would be turned into immigration officers, a task for which they are ill-suited. Finally, opponents argued that the proposition would not stop the flow of illegal aliens because it did nothing to increase enforcement at the border or to punish employers who hire undocumented workers. A week after the passage of Proposition 187, a federal judge issued a temporary restraining order blocking enforcement of most of its provisions pending the resolution of legal issues. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. District Court struck down portions of

regular classrooms. Instead, students would receive one year of instruction in English. While opponents of the measure called it immigrant-bashing, its supporters argued that bilingual education has been a failure; few children graduate into English-speaking classes each year, and many leave school unable to speak, read, or write well in the language of their adopted country. Whatever the final fate of these or other state initiatives, the immigration backlash they express remains as a local and national issue.

Questions to Consider:

the proposition, declaring them unconstitutional. “The state is powerless to enact its own scheme to regulate immigration or to devise immigration regulations,” the court wrote. Ultimately, five years after its passage, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1999 permanently voided the core provisions of Proposition 187, including those that prevented illegal immigrants from attending public schools and receiving social services and health care. It also voided the requirement that local lawenforcement authorities, school administrators, and social and medical workers turn in suspected illegal immigrants to federal and state authorities. “Today’s announcement is the final shovel of dirt on the grave of Proposition 187,” said the director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California. “Hopefully, it brings to a close what has been a very ugly chapter in California politics,” added a spokesman for the state Attorney General’s office. The original

sponsors of Proposition 187, however, warned that “the will of the people has been frustrated,” and predicted that “the battle may not be over.” California voters also approved Proposition 209 in November 1996 banning state and local government preferences based on race and gender in hiring and school admissions. No “positive” discrimination for racial minorities is allowed, and affirmative action programs are to be discontinued. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1997 allowed the ban on racial and gender preferences to stand. Finally, in November 1998, California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 227, characterized by a spokesman for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund as the third in a row of antiLatino measures. The proposition scraps the system of bilingual education, in which non–English-speaking children were taught in their native language until they learned English well enough to be mainstreamed into

1. What do you think are the magnets that draw immigrants across the border: jobs or benefits? Would a denial of services likely lessen the perceived place utility of the United States and thus reduce illegal immigration? 2. People who believe that states should receive full federal payment for all costs associated with illegal immigrants argue that “State taxpayers should not bear the burden of the federal government’s failure to control the border.” Do you believe the federal government has an obligation to fully or partially reimburse states for the costs of education, medical care, and incarceration for unauthorized immigrants? Why or why not? 3. Should the United States require citizens to have a national identification card? Why or why not? 4. If you had been able to vote on Proposition 187, how would you have voted? Why? 5. Is it good policy not to educate or give basic medical care to any persons, even those not legally in the country? If so, under what circumstance?

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of the place in question. As we would expect, areas near the point of origin comprise the largest part of the migration field (Figure 3.31), though larger cities more distantly located may also be prominent as the ultimate destination of hierarchical step migration. Some migration fields reveal a distinctly channelized pattern of flow. The channels link areas that are in some way tied to one another by past migrations, by economic trade considerations, or some other affinity. The flow along them is greater than otherwise would be the case but does not necessarily involve individuals with personal or family ties. The former streams of southern blacks and whites to northern cities, of Scandinavians to Minnesota and Wisconsin, and of U.S. retirees to Florida and Arizona or their European counterparts to Iberia or the Mediterranean coast are all examples of channelized migration. Voluntary migration is responsive to other controls that influence all forms of spatial interaction. Push-pull factors may be equated with complementarity; costs (emotional and financial) of a residence relocation are expressions of transferability. Other things being equal, large cities exert a stronger migrant pull than do small towns, a reflection of the impact of the gravity model. The distance

decay effect has often been noted in migration studies (Figure 3.32). Movers seek to minimize the friction of distance. In selecting between two potential destinations of equal merit, a migrant tends to choose the nearer as involving less effort and expense. And since information about distant areas is less complete and satisfying than awareness of nearer localities, short moves are favored over long ones. Research indicates that determined migrants with specific destinations in mind are unlikely to be deterred by distance considerations. However, groups for whom push factors are more determining than specific destination pulls are likely to limit their migration distance in response to encountered apparent opportunities. For them, intervening opportunity affects locational decisions. Observations such as these were summarized in the 1870s and 1880s as a series of “laws of migration” by E. G. Ravenstein (1834–1913). Among those that remain relevant are the following: 1. 2. 3.

Most migrants go only a short distance. Longer-distance migration favors big city destinations. Most migration proceeds step-by-step.

Figure 3.31

The migration fields of Florida and California in 1980. (a) For Florida, nearby southern states received most out-migrants, but in-migrants, especially retirees, originated from much of the eastern United States. (b) For California, the out-migration areas were the western states; the in-migration origins included both western and heavily populated northeastern states. Source: Kavita Pandit, “Differentiating Between Subsystems and Typologies in the Analysis of Migration Regions: A U.S. Example.” Professional Geographer 46, no. 3 (1994), figures 5 and 6, pp. 342–343.

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4. 5. 6. 7.

Most migration is rural to urban. Each migration flow produces a counterflow. Most migrants are adults; families are less likely to make international moves. Most international migrants are young males.

The latter two “laws” introduce the role of personal attributes (and attitudes) of migrants: their age, sex, education, and economic status. Migrants do not represent a cross section of the populace from which they come. Selectivity of movers is evident, and the selection shows some regional differences. In most societies, young adults are the most mobile (Figure 3.33). In the United States mobility peaks among those in their twenties, especially the later twenties, and tends to decline thereafter. Among West African cross-border migrants, a World Bank study reveals, the age group 15–39 predominated. Ravenstein’s conclusion that young adult males are dominant in economically-pushed international movement is less valid today than when first proposed. In reality, women and girls now comprise 40% to 60% of all international migrants worldwide (see “Gender and Migration”). It is true that legal and illegal migrants to the United States from Mexico and Central America are primarily young men, as were first generation “guest workers” in European cities. But population projections for West European countries suggest that women will shortly make up the largest part of their foreign-born population, and in one-third of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including Burkina Faso, Swaziland, and Togo, the female share of foreign-born populations was as large as the male. Further, among rural to urban migrants in Latin America since the 1960s, women have been in the majority. Female migrants are motivated primarily by economic pushes and pulls. Surveys of women migrants in southeast Asia and Latin America indicate that 50% to 70% moved in search of employment and commonly first moved while in

their teens. The proportion of young, single women is particularly high in rural-to-urban migration flows, reflecting their limited opportunities in increasingly overcrowded agricultural areas. To the push and pull factors normally associated with migration decisions are sometimes added family pressures that encourage young women with few employment opportunities to migrate as part of a household’s survival strategy. In Latin America, the Philippines, and parts of Asia, emigration of young girls from large, landless families is more common than from smaller families or those with land rights. Their remittances of foreign earnings help maintain their parents and siblings at home. For modern Americans, the decisions to migrate are more ordinary but individually just as compelling. They appear to involve (1) changes in life course (e.g., getting married, having children, getting a divorce); (2) changes in the career course (getting a first job or a promotion, receiving a career transfer, seeking work in a new location, retiring); (3) changes of residence associated with individual personality. Work-related relocations are most important in U.S. interstate migrations (Figure 3.33), and in both intra- and interstate relocations in the 1990s more migrants moved down the urban hierarchy—that is, from larger to smaller centers—than vice versa. Some observers suggest that

Percent 20

15 Different Residence, Same County 10

5

Different Residence, Different County

5– 9 10 –1 15 4 –1 9 20 –2 25 4 –2 30 9 –3 4 35 –3 40 9 –4 45 4 –4 50 9 –5 55 4 –5 60 9 –6 65 4 –6 70 9 –7 4 75 +

Age cohort

Figure 3.33

Figure 3.32

Distance between old and new residences in the Asby area of Sweden. Notice how the number of movers decreased with increasing distance.

Source: T. Hagerstrand, Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process. Copyright © 1967 The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.

Percentage of 1999 population over 5 years of age with a different residence than in 1998. Young adults figure most prominently in both short- and long-distance moves in the United States, an age-related pattern of mobility that has remained constant over time. For the sample year shown, 32% of people in their 20s moved while fewer than 5% of those 65 and older did so. Short distance moves predominate; 63% of the 41 million U.S. movers between March, 1999 and March, 2000, relocated within the same county and another 20% moved to another county in the same state. Some two-thirds of intracounty (mobility) moves were made for housing-related reasons; long distance moves (migration), a Census Bureau survey reveals, are more likely to be made for work-related reasons.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

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Gender and Migration

G

ender is involved in migration at every level. In a household or family, women and men are likely to play different roles regarding decisions or responsibilities for activities such as child care. These differences, and the inequalities that underlie them, help determine who decides whether the household moves, which household members migrate, and the destination for the move. Outside the household, societal norms about women’s mobility and independence often restrict their ability to migrate. The economies of sending and receiving areas play a role as well. If jobs are available for women in the receiving area, women have an incentive to migrate, and families are more likely to encourage the migration of women as necessary and beneficial. Thousands of women from East and Southeast Asia have migrated to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, for example, to take service jobs. The impact of migration is also likely to be different for women and men. Moving to a new economic or social setting can affect the regular relationships and processes that occur within a household or family. In some cases, women might remain subordinate to the men in their families. A study of Greek-Cypriot immigrant

women in London and of Turkish immigrant women in the Netherlands found that although these women were working for wages in their new societies, these new economic roles did not affect their subordinate standing in the family in any fundamental way. In other situations, however, migration can give women more power in the family. In Zaire [now the Democratic Republic of the Congo], women in rural areas move to towns to take advantage of job opportunities there, and gain independence from men in the process. One of the keys to understanding the role of gender in migration is to disentangle household decisionmaking processes. Many researchers see migration as a family decision or strategy, but some members will benefit more than others from those decisions. For many years, men predominated in the migration streams flowing from Mexico to the United States. Women played an important role in this migration stream, even when they remained in Mexico. Mexican women influenced the migration decisions of other family members; they married migrants to gain the benefits from and opportunity for migration; and they resisted or accepted the new roles in their families that migration created.

pattern of deconcentration reflects modern transportation and communication technologies, more and younger retirees, and the attractions of amenity-rich smaller places. Some people, of course, simply seem to move often for no discernible reason, whereas others, stayers, settle into a community permanently. For other developed countries, a different set of summary migration factors may be present.

Summary Spatial interaction is the dynamic evidence of the areal differentiation of the earth’s surface and of the interdependence between geographic locations. The term refers to

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In the 1980s, Mexican women began to migrate to the United States in increasing numbers. Economic crises in Mexico and an increase in the number of jobs available for women in the United States, especially in factories, domestic service, and service industries, have changed the backdrop of individual migration decisions. Now, women often initiate family moves or resettlement efforts. Mexican women have begun to build their own migration networks, which are key to successful migration and resettlement in the United States. Networks provide migrants with information about jobs and places to live and have enabled many Mexican women to make independent decisions about migrating. In immigrant communities in the United States, women are often the vital links to social institution services and to other immigrants. Thus, women have been instrumental in the way that Mexican immigrants have settled and become integrated into new communities.

Reprinted with permission from Nancy E. Riley, “Gender, Power, and Population Change.” Population Bulletin, vol. 52, No. 1, May 1997, pp. 32–33. Copyright © by the Population Reference Bureau, Inc.

the movement of goods, information, people, ideas— indeed, of every facet of economy and society—between one place and another. It includes the daily spatial activities of individuals and the collective patterns of their shortand long-distance behavior in space. The principles and constraints that unite, define, and control spatial behavior in this sense constitute an essential organizing focus for the study of human geographic patterns of the earth. We have seen that whatever the type of spatial behavior or flow, a limited number of recurring mechanisms of guidance and control are encountered. Three underlying bases for spatial interaction are: complementarity, which encourages flows between areas by balancing supply with demand or satisfying need with opportunity;

Spatial Interaction and Spatial Behavior Forced and voluntary migrations and refugee flights are both clear expressions of human spatial behavior and among the pressing concerns of human geography. Websites dealing with the issues of these forms of human spatial interaction include international and national governmental agencies, nongovernmental and charitable organizations, and academic programs. Most have links to other related sites of potential interest. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ home page leads to subsidiary UNHCR pages that include countryspecific information about refugees, press releases, a topicspecific guide to special issues, tabular information about refugees, and access to hundreds of documents: www.unhcr.ch/ Nongovernmental sites well worth exploring, many with statistical or descriptive data by subject or country, and nearly all with links to other sites and agencies, include the following: Refugees International claims to be “a voice for humanitarian action” and to serve “refugees, displaced persons, and other dispossessed people around the world.” Its website gives access to RI’s Media Center and to regional and refugee issues and documents: www.refintl.org/ The International Organization for Migration, with the motto “. . .orderly migration benefits migrants and society,” provides access through its home page at www.iom.int/ to its useful Migration Web and its various journals and newsletters, many with pdf availability. The Center for Migration Studies of New York studies the “demographic, historical, economic, political, legislative and pastoral aspects of human migration and refugee movements.” Its home page gives access to its publications list,

transferability, which affects movement decisions by introducing cost, effort, and time considerations; and intervening opportunities, which suggests that costs of overcoming distance may be reduced by finding closer alternate points where needs can be satisfied. The flows of commodities, ideas, or people governed by these interaction factors are interdependent and additive. Flows of commodities establish and reinforce traffic patterns, for example, and also channelize the movement of information and people. Those flows and interactions may further be understood by the application of uniform models to all forms of spatial interaction from interregional commodity exchanges to an individual’s daily pattern of movement. Distance decay tells us of the inevitable decline of interaction with increasing distance. The gravity model suggests that major centers of activity can exert interaction pulls that partly compensate for distance decay. Recognition of movement biases explains why spatial interaction in the objective world may deviate from that proposed by abstract models.

library and archives, and research program information, and to the individual international Federation of Centers for Migration Studies. See it at http://cmsny.org/index.htm. InterAction—American Council for Voluntary International Action—is a coalition of 165 or more nonprofit organizations involved in worldwide assistance to those in need, including development aid, refugee support, disaster response, and advocacy actions. Subordinate sites linked to its home page at www.interaction.org/ include “Sustainable Development,” “Disaster Response,” “Commission on Advancement of Women,” “Publications,” and “Interaction Initiatives.” The Refugee Studies Programme of Oxford University at www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/rsp may be of some interest, particularly through access to abstracts and summaries of the Programme’s “Research Reports” and of articles in its “Journal of Refugee Studies.” An exhaustive list of references to on-line migration resources is contained in the World-Wide Web Virtual Library of Migration and Ethnic Relation at: www.ercomer.org/wwwvl. Many sites deal with natural hazards of various kinds. One of the best, and one with multiple links to many others, is the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado, Boulder. It claims to be “a clearinghouse for information on natural hazards and human adjustments [to them].” View it at www.colorado.edu/hazards/. Also check the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration websites through the NOAA home page at www.noaa.gov. Finally, don’t forget to check our own textbook’s home page at www.mhhe.com/fellmann7e/ for websites added or corrected by the publisher or contributed by helpful users.

Humans in their individual and collective short- and long-distance movements are responsive to these impersonal spatial controls. Their spatial behaviors are also influenced by their separate circumstances. Each has an activity and awareness space reflective of individual socioeconomic and life-cycle conditions. Each differs in mobility. Each has unique wants and needs and perceptions of their satisfaction. Human response to distance decay is expressed in a controlling critical distance beyond which the frequency of interaction quickly declines. That decline is partly conditioned by unfamiliarity with distant points outside normal activity space. Perceptions of home and distant territory therefore color interaction flows and space evaluations. In turn, those perceptions, well or poorly based, underlie travel and migration decisions, part of the continuing spatial diffusion and interaction of people. It is to people and their patterns of distribution and regional growth and change that we turn our attention in the following chapter. Spatial Interaction and Spatial Behavior

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Key Words activity space

72

awareness space

intervening opportunity 73

chain migration

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complementarity

67

counter migration critical distance

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89

74

distance decay

89 71

71

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place perception place utility

70

88 88

return migration

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space-time prism

74

spatial interaction

personal space 68

push factor

71

movement bias network

potential model pull factor

personal communication field

69

friction of distance

mobility

68

84

migration field

channelized migration

gravity model

migration

78

72 80

88

spatial search step migration territoriality transferability

66

88 88

72 68

For Review 1.

2.

What is meant by spatial interaction? What are the three fundamental conditions governing all forms of spatial interaction? What is the distinctive impact or importance of each of the conditions? What variations in distance decay curves might you expect if you were to plot shipments of readymixed concrete, potato chips, and computer parts? What do these respective curves tell us about transferability?

3.

What is activity space? What factors affect the areal extent of an individual’s activity space?

4.

On a piece of paper, and following the model of Figure 3.11, plot your space-time

path for your movements on a typical class day. What alterations in your established movement habits might be necessary (or become possible) if: (a) instead of walking, you rode a bike? (b) instead of biking, you drove a car? (c) instead of driving, you had to use the bus or go by bike or afoot? 5.

What does the thought that transportation and communication are space-adjusting imply? In what ways has technology affected the “space adjustment” in commodity flows? In information flows?

6.

Recall the places you have visited in the past week. In your movements, were the rules of

distance decay and critical distance operative? What variables affect your critical distances? 7.

What considerations appear to influence the decision to migrate? How do perceptions of place utility induce or inhibit migration?

8.

What is a migration field? Some migration fields show a channelized flow of people. Select a particular channelized migration flow (such as the movement of Scandinavians to Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, or people from the Great Plains to California, or southern blacks to the North) and speculate why a channelized flow developed.

Focus Follow-up 1.

Spatial interaction reflects areal differences and is controlled by three “flow-determining” factors. Complementarity implies a local supply of an item for which effective demand exists elsewhere. Transferability expresses the costs of movement from source of supply to locale of demand. An intervening opportunity serves to reduce

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flows of goods between two points by presenting nearer or cheaper sources.

What are the three bases for all spatial interaction? pp. 66–68.

Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

2.

model tells us that distance decay can in part be overcome by the enhanced attraction of larger centers of activity; and movement bias helps explain interaction flows contrary to model predictions.

How is spatial interaction probability measured? pp. 68–71. The probability of aggregate spatial movements and interactions may be assessed by the application of established models. Distance decay reports the decline of interaction with increase in separation; the gravity

3.

What are the special forms, attributes, and controls of human spatial behavior? pp. 71–76. While humans react to distance, time, and cost considerations of

possess, and their degree of attractiveness. Those perceptions may not be based on reality or supported by balanced information. Distant places are less known than nearby ones, for example, and real natural hazards of areas may be mentally minimized through familiarity or rationalization.

spatial movement, their spatial behavior is also affected by separate conditions of activity and awareness space, of individual economic and life-cycle circumstances, by degree of mobility, and by unique perceptions of wants and needs. 4.

What roles do information and perception play in conditioning human spatial actions? pp. 76–84. Humans base decisions about the opportunity or feasibility of spatial movements, exchanges, or want satisfactions on place perceptions. These condition the feelings we have about physical and cultural characteristics of areas, the opportunities they

5.

What kinds of migration movements can be recognized and what influences their occurrence? pp. 84–94. Migration means the permanent relocation of residence and activity space. It is subject to all the principles of spatial interaction and behavior and represents both a survival

strategy for threatened people and a reasoned response to perceptions of opportunity. Migration has been enduring throughout human history and occurs at separate scales from intercontinental to regional, and includes flights of refugees and relocations of retirees. Negative home conditions (push factors) coupled with perceived positive destination attractions (pull factors) are important, as are age and sex of migrants and the spatial search they conduct. Step and chain migration and return migratory flows all affect patterns and volume of flows.

Selected References Boyle, Paul, and Keith Halfacre, eds. Migration and Gender in the Developed World. New York: Routledge, 1999. Brown, Lawrence A. Innovation Diffusion: A New Perspective. New York: Methuen, 1981. Brunn, Stanley, and Thomas Leinbach. Collapsing Space and Time: Geographic Aspects of Communication and Information. Winchester Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1991. Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: Guilford Publications, 1993. Clark, W. A. V. Human Migration. Vol. 7, Scientific Geography Series. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1986. Cohen, Robin, ed. The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Gober, Patricia. “Americans on the Move.” Population Bulletin 48, no. 3. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1993. Golledge, Reginald G., and Robert J. Stimson. Spatial Behavior: A Geographic Perspective. New York: Guilford Publications, 1996.

Hägerstrand, Torsten. Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Hanson, Susan, and Geraldine Pratt. “Geographic Perspectives on the Occupational Segregation of Women.” National Geographic Research 6, no. 4 (1990): 376–399. Harner, John P. “Continuity Amidst Change: Undocumented Mexican Migration to Arizona.” Professional Geographer 47, no. 4 (1994): 399–411. Hay, Alan. “The Geographical Explanation of Commodity Flow.” Progress in Human Geography 3 (1979): 1–12. Kane, Hal. The Hour of Departure: Forces that Create Refugees and Migrants. Worldwatch Paper 125. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1995.

Manson, Gary A., and Richard E. Groop. “U.S. Intercounty Migration in the 1990s: People and Income Move Down the Urban Hierarchy.” Professional Geographer 52, no. 3 (2000): 493–504. Martin, Philip, and Jonas Widgren. “International Migration: A Global Challenge.” Population Bulletin 51, no. 1. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1996. Massey, Douglas S., et al. “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal.” Population and Development Review 19, no. 3 (1993): 431–466. Michelson, William. From Sun to Sun: Daily Obligations and Community Structure in the Lives of Employed Women and Their Families. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985.

Kellerman, Aharon. Telecommunications and Geography. New York: Halsted, 1993.

Newbold, K. Bruce. “Race and Primary, Return, and Onward Interstate Migration.” Professional Geographer 49, no. 1 (1997): 1–14.

King, Russell, ed. The New Geography of European Migrations. New York: Belhaven Press, 1993.

Palm, Risa. Natural Hazards. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.

Lenntorp, Bo. Paths in Space-time Environments. Lund Studies in Geography. Series B. Human Geography, no. 44, Lund, Sweden: Lund University, 1976.

Plane, David A. “Age-Composition Change and the Geographical Dynamics of Interregional Migration in the U.S.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82, no. 1 (1992): 64–85.

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Ravenstein, E. G. “The Laws of Migration.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 48 (1885): 167–227; 52 (1889): 241–301.

Stouffer, Samuel. “Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance.” American Sociological Review 5 (1940): 845–867.

Rogers, Andrei and Stuart Sweeney. “Measuring the Spatial Focus of Migration Patterns.” Professional Geographer 50, no. 2 (1998): 232–242.

Stutz, Frederick P. Social Aspects of Interaction and Transportation. Association of American Geographers, Commission on College Geography. Resource Paper no. 76-2. Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1976.

Roseman, Curtis C. “Channelization of Migration Flows from the Rural South to the Industrial Midwest.” Proceedings of the Association of American Geographers 3 (1971): 140–146. Simon, Rita James, and Caroline B. Brettell, eds. International Migration: The Female Experience. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1986.

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Tocalis, Thomas R. “Changing Theoretical Foundations of the Gravity Concept of Human Interaction.” In The Nature of Change in Geographical Ideas, edited by Brian J.L. Berry, pp. 66–124. Perspectives in Geography 3. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1978.

Ullman, Edward L. “The Role of Transportation and the Basis for Interaction.” In Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, edited by William E. Thomas, Jr., pp. 862–880. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. United Nations. High Commissioner for Refugees. The State of the World’s Refugees. New York: Oxford University Press, annual. Waldorf, Brigitte. “Determinants of International Return Migration Intentions.” Professional Geographer 47, no. 2 (1995): 125–136. Wood, William B. “Forced Migration: Local Conflicts and International Dilemmas.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84, no. 4 (1994): 607–634.

C

H

A

P

T

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Population: World Patterns, Regional Trends

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Serb refugees fleeing Bosnian occupation of their town during the 1990s exemplify the “involuntary migration” of peoples throughout the world when caught in domestic and international conflicts.

Focus Preview 1. Data and measures used by population geographers: the meaning and purpose of population cohorts, rates, and other measurements, pp. 100–116. 2. What we are told by the demographic transition model and the demographic equation, pp. 116–123.

3. World population distributions, densities, and urban components, pp. 123–128. 4. Population projections, controls, and prospects: estimating the future, pp. 128–133.

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Z

ero, possibly even negative [population] growth” was the 1972 slogan proposed by the prime minister of Singapore, an island country in Southeast Asia. His nation’s population, which stood at 1 million at the end of World War II (1945), had doubled by the mid-1960s. To avoid the overpopulation he foresaw, the government decreed “Boy or girl, two is enough” and refused maternity leaves and access to health insurance for third or subsequent births. Abortion and sterilization were legalized, and children born fourth or later in a family were to be discriminated against in school admissions policy. In response, birth rates by the mid-1980s fell to below the level necessary to replace the population, and abortions were terminating more than one-third of all pregnancies. “At least two. Better three. Four if you can afford it” was the national slogan proposed by that same prime minister in 1986, reflecting fears that the stringencies of the earlier campaign had gone too far. From concern that overpopulation would doom the country to perpetual Third World poverty, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was moved to worry that population limitation would deprive it of the growth potential and national strength implicit in a youthful, educated workforce adequate to replace and support the present aging population. His 1990 national budget provided for sizable long-term tax rebates for second children born to mothers under 28. Not certain that financial inducements alone would suffice to increase population, the Singapore government annually renewed its offer to take 100,000 Hong Kong Chinese who might choose to leave when China took over that territory in 1997.

The policy reversal in Singapore reflects an inflexible population reality: The structure of the present controls the content of the future. The size, characteristics, growth trends, and migrations of today’s populations help shape the wellbeing of peoples yet unborn but whose numbers and distributions are now being determined. The numbers, age, and sex distribution of people; patterns and trends in their fertility and mortality; their density of settlement and rate of growth all affect and are affected by the social, political, and economic organization of a society. Through them, we begin to understand how the people in a given area live, how they may interact with one another, how they use the land, what pressure on resources exists, and what the future may bring. Population geography provides the background tools and understandings of those interests. It focuses on the number, composition, and distribution of human be-

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ings in relation to variations in the conditions of earth space. It differs from demography, the statistical study of human population, in its concern with spatial analysis— the relationship of numbers to area. Regional circumstances of resource base, type of economic development, level of living, food supply, and conditions of health and well-being are basic to geography’s population concerns. They are, as well, fundamental expressions of the human–environmental relationships that are the substance of all human geographic inquiry.

Population Growth Sometime early in 2001, a human birth raised the earth’s population to 6.1 billion people. In 1988 the count was 5.1 billion. That is, over the 13 years between those two dates, the world’s population grew on average by about 77 million people annually, or some 211,000 per day. Global fertility and growth rates have been declining in recent years. Before 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau reported, worldwide growth exceeded 80 million yearly; its more recent estimates of future population numbers have been reduced. Yet the United Nations still projects that the world will likely contain some 9 billion inhabitants in 2050; in 1950 it had 2.5 billion. Although there is disagreement among them on details, many demographers assume that world population will stabilize near 10 billion around the year 2100. Others, however, foresee an earlier and lower population peak followed by numerical decline, not stability. All do agree, however, that essentially all of any future growth will occur in countries now considered “developing” (Figure 4.1). We will return to these projections and to the difficulties and disagreements inherent in making them later in this chapter. Just what is implied by numbers in the millions and billions? With what can we equate the 2001 population of Gabon in Africa (about 1.3 million) or of China (about 1.3 billion)? Unless we have some grasp of their scale and meaning, our understanding of the data and data manipulations of the population geographer can at best be superficial. It is difficult to appreciate a number as vast as 1 million or 1 billion, and the great distinction between them. Some examples offered by the Population Reference Bureau may help in visualizing their immensity and implications. • A 2.5-centimeter (1-inch) stack of U.S. paper currency contains 233 bills. If you had a million dollars in thousand-dollar bills, the stack would be 11 centimeters (4.3 inches) high. If you had a billion dollars in thousand-dollar bills, your pile of money would reach 109 meters (358 feet)—about the length of a football field. • You had lived a million seconds when you were 11.6 days old. You won’t be a billion seconds old until you are 31.7 years of age.

Billions 12 11 10 9 Population Growth 1750-2100 (absolute size)

8 7

World Total

6

Less Developed Regions

5 4 3 2 1

More Developed Regions

0 1750

1800

1850

1900

1950

2000

2050

2100

(a) Less Developed Regions Share of World Population, 2000 Latin America 8% Other Asia/ Oceania 17%

Near East/ North Africa 6%

Share of World Population, 2050 Latin America 9%

SubSaharan Africa 11%

China 21%

India 17%

SubSaharan Africa 18%

Other Asia/ Oceania 20%

Near East/ North Africa 8%

China 15%

India 18%

(b)

Figure 4.1

World population numbers and projections. (a) After two centuries of slow growth, world population began explosive expansion after World War II. United Nations demographers project a global population of around 9 billion in 2050. The total may rise to about 10 billion by the end of the 21st century. UN projections anticipate the more developed regions will reach a peak population of 1.6 billion in 2020 and then decline by 2050 to below their 2000 level. In contrast, the populations of the less developed regions are expected to increase by over 60% between 2000 and 2050. (b) While only a little more than 80% of world population was found in regions considered “less developed” in 2000 (left diagram), nearly 9 out of 10 will be located there in 2050 (right diagram). Numbers in more developed regions at mid-century will be lower than at its start thanks to anticipated population loss in Europe. Continuing large volume immigration into Europe and other more developed areas could alter those population decline projections. Sources: (a) Estimates from Population Reference Bureau and United Nations Population Fund; (b) Based on United Nations and U.S. Bureau of the Census projections.

• The supersonic airplane, the Concorde, could theoretically circle the globe in only 18.5 hours at its cruising speed of 2150 kilometers (1336 mi) per hour. It would take 31 days for a passenger to journey a million miles on the Concorde, while a trip of a billion miles would last 85 years. The implications of the present numbers and the potential increases in population are of vital current social, political, and ecological concern. Population numbers were much smaller some 12,000 years ago when continental glaciers began their retreat, people spread to formerly

unoccupied portions of the globe, and human experimentation with food sources initiated the Agricultural Revolution. The 5 or 10 million people who then constituted all of humanity obviously had considerable potential to expand their numbers. In retrospect, we see that the natural resource base of the earth had a population-supporting capacity far in excess of the pressures exerted on it by early hunting and gathering groups. Some observers maintain that despite present numbers or even those we can reasonably anticipate for the future, the adaptive and exploitive ingenuity of humans is

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in no danger of being taxed. Others, however, compare the earth to a self-contained spaceship and declare with chilling conviction that a finite vessel cannot bear an everincreasing number of passengers. They point to recurring problems of malnutrition and starvation (though these are realistically more a matter of failures of distribution than of inability to produce enough foodstuffs worldwide). They cite dangerous conditions of air and water pollution, the loss of forest and farmland, the apparent nearing exhaustion of many minerals and fossil fuels, and other evidences of strains on world resources as foretelling the discernible outer limits of population growth. On a worldwide basis, populations grow only one way: The number of births in a given period exceeds the number of deaths. Ignoring for the moment regional population changes resulting from migration, we can conclude that observed and projected increases in population must result from the failure of natural controls to limit the number of births or to increase the number of deaths, or from the success of human ingenuity in circumventing such controls when they exist. The implications of these observations will become clearer after we define some terms important in the study of world population and explore their significance.

Some Population Definitions Demographers employ a wide range of measures of population composition and trends, though all their calculations start with a count of events: of individuals in the

Figure 4.2

population, of births, deaths, marriages, and so on. To those basic counts, demographers bring refinements that make the figures more meaningful and useful in population analysis. Among them are rates and cohort measures. Rates simply record the frequency of occurrence of an event during a given time frame for a designated population—for example, the marriage rate as the number of marriages performed per 1000 population in the United States last year. Cohort measures refer data to a population group unified by a specified common characteristic— the age cohort of 1–5 years, perhaps, or the college class of 2005 (Figure 4.2). Basic numbers and rates useful in the analysis of world population and population trends have been reprinted with the permission of the Population Reference Bureau as Appendix B to this book. Examination of them will document the discussion that follows.

Birth Rates The crude birth rate (CBR), often referred to simply as the birth rate, is the annual number of live births per 1000 population. It is “crude” because it relates births to total population without regard to the age or sex composition of that population. A country with a population of 2 million and with 40,000 births a year would have a crude birth rate of 20 per 1000. 40 000 = 20 per 1000 2 000 000

The birth rate of a country is, of course, strongly influenced by the age and sex structure of its population, by the customs and family size expectations of its inhabitants,

Whatever their differences may be by race, sex, or ethnicity, these babies will forever be clustered demographically into a single birth cohort.

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and by its adopted population policies. Because these conditions vary widely, recorded national birth rates vary—at the start of the 21st century, from a high of 50 or more in Liberia and Niger in West Africa to the low of 8 or 9 per 1000 in 12 or more European countries. Although birth rates of 30 or above per 1000 are considered high, one-sixth of the world’s people live in countries with rates that are that high or higher (Figure 4.3). In these countries, the population is prominently agricultural and rural, and a high proportion of the female population is young. They are found chiefly in Africa, western and southern Asia, and Latin America. In many of these states birth rates may be significantly higher than official records indicate. Available data suggests that every year around 40 million births go unregistered and therefore uncounted. Birth rates of less than 18 per 1000 are reckoned low and are characteristic of industrialized, urbanized countries. All European countries including Russia, as well as Anglo America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have low rates as, importantly, do an increasing number of developing states such as China (see “China’s Way—and Others”) that have adopted effective family planning programs. Transitional birth rates (between 18 and 30 per 1000) characterize some, mainly smaller, “developing” countries, though giant India entered that group in 1994.

As the recent population histories of Singapore and China indicate, birth rates are subject to change. The decline to current low birth rates of European countries and of some of the areas that they colonized is usually ascribed to industrialization, urbanization, and in recent years, maturing populations. While restrictive family planning policies in China rapidly reduced the birth rate from over 33 per 1000 in 1970 to 18 per 1000 in 1986, industrializing Japan experienced a comparable 15-point decline in the decade 1948–1958 with little governmental intervention. Indeed, the stage of economic development appears closely related to variations in birth rates among countries, although rigorous testing of this relationship proves it to be imperfect (Figure 4.3). As a group, the more developed states of the world showed a crude birth rate of 11 per 1000 at the start of the 21st century; less developed countries (excluding China) registered almost 30 per 1000. Religious and political beliefs can also affect birth rates. The convictions of many Roman Catholics and Muslims that their religion forbids the use of artificial birth control techniques often lead to high birth rates among believers. However, dominantly Catholic Italy has nearly the world’s lowest birth rate, and Islam itself does not prohibit contraception. Similarly, some European

Live Births Per 1000 Population 12 or less 13–22 23–32 33– 42 43 or more

Figure 4.3

Crude birth rates. The map suggests a degree of precision that is misleading in the absence of reliable, universal registration of births. The pattern shown serves, however, as a generally useful summary of comparative reproduction patterns if class divisions are not taken too literally. Reported or estimated population data vary annually, so this and other population maps may not agree in all details with the figures recorded in Appendix B. Source: Data from Population Reference Bureau.

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China’s Way—and Others

A

n ever larger population is “a good thing,” Chairman Mao announced in 1965 when China’s birth rate was 37 per 1000 and population totaled 540 million. At Mao’s death in 1976, numbers reached 852 million, though the birth rate then had dropped to 25. During the 1970s, when it became evident that population growth was consuming more than half of the annual increase in the country’s gross domestic product, China introduced a well-publicized campaign advocating the “two-child family” and providing services, including abortions, supporting that program. In response, China’s birth rate dropped to 19.5 per 1000 by the late 1970s. “One couple, one child” became the slogan of a new and more vigorous population control drive launched in 1979, backed by both incentives and penalties to assure its success in China’s tightly controlled society. Late marriages were encouraged; free contraceptives, cash awards, abortions, and sterilizations were provided to families limited to a

single child. Penalties, including steep fines, were levied for second births. At the campaign’s height in 1983, the government ordered the sterilization of either husband or wife for couples with more than one child. Infanticide—particularly the exposure or murder of female babies—was a reported means both of conforming

governments—concerned about birth rates too low to sustain present population levels—subsidize births in an attempt to raise those rates. Regional variations in projected percentage contributions to world population growth are summarized in Figure 4.4.

Fertility Rates Crude birth rates may display such regional variability because of differences in age and sex composition or disparities in births among the reproductive-age, rather than total, population. Total fertility rate (TFR) is a more accurate statement than the birth rate in showing the amount of reproduction in the population (Figure 4.5). The TFR tells us the average number of children that would be born to each woman if, during her childbearing years, she bore children at the current year’s rate for women that age. The fertility rate minimizes the effects of

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to a one-child limit and of increasing the chances that the one child would be male. By 1986, China’s officiallyreported crude birth rate had fallen to 18 per 1000, far below 37 per 1000 then registered among the rest of the world’s less developed countries. Unofficially, it is reported that the onechild policy was effectively dropped

fluctuation in the population structure and is thus a more reliable figure for regional comparative and predictive purposes than the crude birth rate. A total fertility rate of 2.1 is necessary just to replace present population. On a worldwide basis, the TFR in 2001 was 2.8; 15 years earlier it was 3.7. The more developed countries recorded a 1.5 rate at the start of the 21st century, down from 2.0 in 1985, while less developed states (excluding China) had a collective TFR of 3.6, down from 5.0 in the mid-1980s. Indeed, the fertility rates for so many less developed countries have dropped so dramatically since the early 1960s (Figure 4.6) that earlier widely believed world population projections anticipating 11 billion or more within two centuries are now generally rejected. China’s decrease from a TFR of 5.9 births per woman in the period 1960–1965 to (officially) about 1.8 in 2000 and comparable drops in TFRs of Bangladesh, Brazil,

in 1984 to permit two-child limits in rural areas where 70% of Chinese population still resides. In 1996, President Jiang spoke of “reestablishing” the one-child restriction following documentation of extensive underreporting of rural births. In early 2000 he urged party officials to “establish an attitude of protracted war” to fight illegal births despite Chinese demographers’ warnings that if the onechild policy continues for another generation it will eventually create a society in which there won’t be enough adult children in a family to care for their aging parents. Concerned with their own growing numbers, many developing countries have introduced their own less extreme programs of family planning stressing access to contraception and sterilization. International agencies have encouraged these programs, buoyed by such presumed success as the 21% fall in fertility rates in Bangladesh from 1970 to 1990 as the proportion of married women of reproductive age using contraceptives rose from 3% to 40%

under intensive family planning encouragement and frequent adviser visits. The costs per birth averted, however, were reckoned at more than the country’s $160 per capita gross domestic product. Research suggests that fertility falls because women decide they want smaller families, not because they have unmet needs for contraceptive advice and devices. Nineteenthcentury northern Europeans without the aid of science had lower fertility rates than their counterparts today in middle-income countries. With some convincing evidence, improved women’s education has been proposed as a surer way to reduce births than either encouraged contraception or China’s coercive efforts. Studies from individual countries indicate that one year of female schooling can reduce the fertility rate by between 5% and 10%. Yet the fertility rate of uneducated Thai women is only twothirds that of Ugandan women with secondary education. Obviously, the demand for children is not absolutely related to educational levels.

Instead, that demand seems closely tied to the use value placed on children by poor families in some parts of the developing world. Where those families share in such communal resources as firewood, animal fodder, grazing land, fish, and the like, the more of those collective resources that can be converted to private family property and use, the better off is the family. Indeed, the more communal resources that are available for “capture,” the greater are the incentives for a household to have more children to appropriate them. Some population economists conclude that only when population numbers increase to the point of total conversion of communal resources to private property—and children have to be supported and educated rather than employed—will poor families in developing countries want fewer children. If so, coercion, contraception, and education may be less effective as checks on births than the economic consequence of population increase itself.

Figure 4.4

India 18.2%

Other Asia 28.8%

Africa 33.6%

Latin America 10.0% China 4.9%

Anglo America 4.0%

Oceania 0.5%

Projected percentage contributions to world population growth, by region, 2000–2050. Birth rate changes recorded by differently sized regional populations with differing age structures are altering the world pattern of population increase. Africa, containing 13% of world population in 2000, will probably account for more than one-third of total world increase between 2000 and 2050. Between 1965 and 1975, China’s contribution to world growth was 2.5 times that of Africa; between 2000 and 2050, Africa’s numerical growth will be 7 times that of China. India, which reached the 1 billion level in 2000, is projected to grow by more than 50% over the first half of the 21st century and have by far the world’s largest population. China added 65 million more people to world population than did India between 1970 and 1980. Between 2000 and 2050, India will add more than 400 million more people than China. In contrast to the growth within the world regions shown, Europe’s population is projected to decrease by 70 million over the same halfcentury period. Source: Projections based on World Bank and United Nations figures.

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Total Fertility Rate Less than 2.1 2.1–2.5 (replacement level) 2.6–4.0 4.1– 6.4 More than 6.4

Figure 4.5

Total fertility rate (TFR) indicates the average number of children that would be born to each woman if, during her childbearing years, she bore children at the same rate as women of those ages actually did in a given year. Since the TFR is age-adjusted, two countries with identical birth rates may have quite different fertility rates and therefore different prospects for growth. Depending on mortality conditions, a TFR of 2.1 to 2.5 children per woman is considered the “replacement level,” at which a population will eventually stop growing. Source: Data from Population Reference Bureau

Fertility declines, 1960s to 2000 Early 1960s Developed countries

2.7

2000

1.5

Developing countries

6.0 3.2

Sub-Saharan Africa

6.7 5.8 6.1

South Asia

3.6 6.0

Latin America

2.8 5.9

East Asia

1.8 1

2

5 3 4 Total fertility rate

6

7

Figure 4.6

8

Differential fertility declines. Fertility has declined most rapidly in Latin America and Asia and much more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa. Developed countries as a group now have belowreplacement-level fertility. Europe was far below with a 2001 TFR of 1.4; the United States, however, showed births at just the replacement point of 2.1 at the start of the century.

Sources: Population Reference Bureau and United Nations Population Fund.

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Mozambique, and other states demonstrate that fertility reflects cultural values, not biological imperatives. If those values now favor fewer children than formerly, population projections based on earlier, higher TFR rates must be adjusted. Nothing in logic or history requires population stability at any level. In 2000, 44% of the world’s population lived in countries with fertility rates below 2.1 with more countries joining their ranks each year. Should the world TFR drop below the replacement level, population would not just stop growing as the UN projects; it would inevitably decline (see “A Population Implosion?”). Should cultural values change to again favor children, growth would resume. Different TFR estimates imply conflicting population projections and vastly different regional and world population concerns. Individual country projections based on current fertility rates, it should be noted, may not accurately anticipate population levels even in the near future. As we saw in Chapter 3, massive international population movements are occurring in response to political instabilities and, particularly, to differentials in perceived economic opportunities. Resulting migration flows may cause otherwise declining national populations to grow. The European Union in recent years has had a negative rate of natural increase,

A Population Implosion?

F

or much of the last half of the 20th century, demographers and economists focused on a “population explosion” and its implied threat of a world with too many people and too few resources of food and minerals to sustain them. By the end of the century, those fears for some observers were being replaced by a new prediction of a world with too few rather than too many people. That possibility was suggested by two related trends. The first became apparent by 1970 when it was noted that the total fertility rates (TFRs) of 19 countries, almost all of them in Europe, had fallen below the replacement level—the level of fertility at which populations replace themselves—of 2.1. Simultaneously, Europe’s population pyramid began to become noticeably distorted, with a smaller proportion of young and a growing share of middle-aged and retirement-age inhabitants. The decrease in native working-age cohorts had already, by 1970, encouraged the influx of non-European “guest workers” whose labor was needed to maintain economic growth and to sustain the generous security provisions guaranteed to what was becoming the oldest population of any continent. Many countries of Western and Eastern Europe sought to reverse their birth rate declines by adopting pronatalist policies. The communist states of the East rewarded pregnancies and births with generous family allowances, free medical and hospital care, extended maternity leaves, and child care. France, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, and others gave similar bonuses or awards for first, second, and later births. Despite those inducements, however, reproduction rates continued to fall in Western states and, after the dissolution of communism in the East, to plummet there, too. The

populations of Spain and Italy, for example, are projected to shrink by a quarter between 2000 and 2050. “In demographic terms,” France’s prime minister remarked, “Europe is vanishing.” Europe’s experience soon was echoed in other societies of advanced economic development on all continents. By 1995, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and other older and newly industrializing countries (NICs) registered fertility rates below the replacement level. As they have for Europe, simple projections foretold their aging and declining population. Japan’s numbers, for example, will begin to decline in 2006 when its population will be older than Europe’s; Taiwan forecasts negative growth by 2035. The second trend indicating to many that world population numbers should stabilize and even decline during the lifetimes of today’s college cohort is a simple extension of the first: TFRs are being reduced to or below the replacement levels in countries at all stages of economic development in all parts of the world. While only 18% of total world population in 1975 lived in countries with a fertility rate below replacement level, nearly 45% did so by the end of the century. By 2015, demographers estimate, nearly half the world’s countries and about two-thirds of its population will show TFRs below 2.1 children per woman. Exceptions to the trend are and still will be found in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, and in some areas of South, Central, and West Asia; but even in those regions fertility rates have been decreasing in recent years. “Powerful globalizing forces [are] at work pushing toward fertility reduction everywhere,” was a 1997 observation from the French National Institute of Demographic Studies.

That conclusion is plausibly supported by assumptions of the United Nations 1998 “low-variant” world population projection. Noting that total fertility rates for more developed regions had already fallen to about 1.6 from 2.0 at the start of the 1990s, the UN conjectured a further drop to about 1.4 by 2006. For the less developed regions, the rate dropped from 4.0 to 3.2 during the 1990s alone; the low-variant model projects it will decline below 2.1 about 2010 and to around 1.6 in 2045. Should those lowvariant assumptions prove valid, global depopulation could commence before midcentury. Between 2040 and 2050, the projection indicates, world population would fall by about 85 million (roughly the amount of its annual growth during much of the 1990s) and shrink further by about 25% with each successive generation. If the UN low-variant scenario is realized in whole or in part—it is currently rejected by most demographers—a much different worldwide demographic and economic future is promised than that prophesied so recently by “population explosion” forecasts. Declining rather than increasing pressure on world food and mineral resources would be in our future along with shrinking rather than expanding world, regional, and national economies. Even the achievement of zero population growth (ZPG), a condition for individual countries when births plus immigration equal deaths plus emigration, has social and economic consequences not always perceived by its advocates. These inevitably include an increasing proportion of older citizens, fewer young people, a rise in the median age of the population, and a growing oldage dependency ratio with everincreasing pension and social services costs borne by a shrinking labor force.

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yet experienced a population growth of 0.3% or nearly one million people in 1999, solely because of immigrant influx from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. In the same year, the United States through immigration increased its population by 1%, nearly twice its rate of natural increase. World regional and national fertility rates reported in Appendix B and other sources are summaries that conceal significant variations between population groups. The Caribbean region, for example, showed a total fertility rate of 2.6 in 2000, but the TFRs of individual states ranged from a low of 1.6 in Cuba to a high of 4.7 in Haiti. The United States national average fertility rate of 2.1 did not reveal that the TFR for Hispanics was about 3.0 or about 2.2 for African Americans or for Asian and Pacific Islanders only 1.9%.

Death Rates The crude death rate (CDR), also called the mortality rate, is calculated in the same way as the crude birth rate: the annual number of events per 1000 population. In the past, a valid generalization was that the death rate, like the birth rate, varied with national levels of development. Characteristically, highest rates (over 20 per 1000) were found in the less developed countries of Africa, Asia, and

Latin America; lowest rates (less than 10) were associated with developed states of Europe and Anglo America. That correlation became decreasingly valid as dramatic reductions in death rates occurred in developing countries in the years following World War II. Infant mortality rates and life expectancies improved as antibiotics, vaccinations, and pesticides to treat diseases and control disease carriers were made available in almost all parts of the world and as increased attention was paid to funding improvements in urban and rural sanitary facilities and safe water supplies. Distinctions between more developed and less developed countries in mortality (Figure 4.7), indeed, have been so reduced that by 1994 death rates for less developed countries as a group actually dropped below those for the more developed states. Notably, that reduction did not extend to maternal mortality rates (see “The Risks of Motherhood”). Like crude birth rates, death rates are meaningful for comparative purposes only when we study identically structured populations. Countries with a high proportion of elderly people, such as Denmark and Sweden, would be expected to have higher death rates than those with a high proportion of young people, such as Iceland, assuming equality in other national conditions affecting health and longevity. The pronounced youthfulness of populations in

Deaths Per 1000 Population 6 or less 7–10 11–15 16–19 20 or more

Figure 4.7

Crude death rates show less worldwide variability than do the birth rates displayed in Figure 4.3, the result of widespread availability of at least minimal health protection measures and a generally youthful population in the developing countries, where death rates are frequently lower than in “old age” Europe.

Source: Data from Population Reference Bureau.

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Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

developing countries, as much as improvements in sanitary and health conditions, is an important factor in the recently reduced mortality rates of those areas. To overcome that lack of comparability, death rates can be calculated for specific age groups. The infant mortality rate, for example, is the ratio of deaths of infants aged 1 year or under per 1000 live births: deaths age 1 year or less 1000 live births

Infant mortality rates are significant because it is at these ages that the greatest declines in mortality have occurred, largely as a result of the increased availability of health services. The drop in infant mortality accounts for a large part of the decline in the general death rate in the last few decades, for mortality during the first year of life is usually greater than in any other year. Two centuries ago, it was not uncommon for 200–300 infants per 1000 to die in their first year. Even today, despite significant declines in those rates over the last 60 years in many countries (Figure 4.8), striking world regional and national variations remain. For all of Africa, infant mortality rates are near 90 per 1000, and individual African states (for example, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone) showed rates above 130 at the start of the century. Nor are rates uniform within single countries. The former Soviet Union reported a national infant

mortality rate of 23 (1991), but it registered above 110 in parts of its Central Asian region. In contrast, infant mortality rates in Anglo America and Western and Northern Europe are more uniformly in the 4–7 range. Modern medicine and sanitation have increased life expectancy and altered age-old relationships between birth and death rates. In the early 1950s, only five countries, all in northern Europe, had life expectancies at birth of over 70 years. By the end of the 20th century, some 60 countries outside of Europe and North America— though none in sub-Saharan Africa—were on that list. The availability and employment of modern methods of health and sanitation have varied regionally, and the least developed countries have least benefited from them. In such underdeveloped and impoverished areas as much of sub-Saharan Africa, the chief causes of death other than HIV/AIDS are those no longer of immediate concern in more developed lands: diseases such as malaria, intestinal infections, typhoid, cholera, and especially among infants and children, malnutrition and dehydration from diarrhea. HIV/AIDS is the tragic and, among developing regions particularly, widespread exception to observed global improvements in life expectancies and reductions in adult death rates and infant and childhood mortalities. AIDS has become the fourth most common cause of death worldwide. Conservative estimates report over 36 million people

Infant deaths per 1000 live births 240

200

1932 2000 160

120

80

40

Chile

Egypt

India

Japan

Italy

Nicaragua

France

United States

Figure 4.8

Infant mortality rates for selected countries. Dramatic declines in the rate have occurred in all countries, a result of international programs of health care delivery aimed at infants and children in developing states. Nevertheless, the decreases have been proportionately greatest in the urbanized, industrialized countries, where sanitation, safe water, and quality health care are more widely available. Source: Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census and Population Reference Bureau.

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The Risks of Motherhood

T

he worldwide leveling of crude death rates does not apply to pregnancy-related deaths. In fact, the maternal mortality ratio—maternal deaths per 100,000 live births—is the single greatest health disparity between developed and developing countries. According to the World Health Organization, approximately 500,000 women die each year from causes related to pregnancy and childbirth; 99% of them live in less developed states where, as a group, the maternal mortality ratio is some 40 times greater than in the more developed countries. Complications of pregnancy, childbirth, and unsafe abortions are the leading slayers of women of reproductive age throughout the developing world, though the incidence of maternal mortality is by no means uniform, as the charts indicate. In Africa, the risk is around 1 death in 16 pregnancies compared with 1 in 65 in Asia and 1 in 1400 in Europe. Countrylevel differences are even more striking: in Ethiopia, for example, 1 out of every 9 women dies from pregnancyrelated complications compared to 1 in 8700 in Switzerland. Excluding China, less developed countries as a group in the 1990s had a maternal mortality ratio of 580 and 10% of all deaths were due to perinatal and maternal causes. While 55% of all maternal deaths occurred in Asia (which accounts for about 61% of the world’s births), sub-Saharan African women, burdened with 37% of world maternal mortality, were at greatest statistical risk. There, maternal death rates reach above 1600 in Guinea and Somalia, and 1 in 13 women in subSaharan Africa dies of maternal causes. In contrast, the maternal mortality rate in developed countries as a group is 10, and in some—Belgium and Ireland, for example—it is as low as 4 or fewer (it was 5 in Canada and 8 in the United States in the mid-1990s). The vast majority of maternal deaths in the developing world are

Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa Middle East & North Africa Latin America & Caribbean East Asia & Pacific Developed Countries 0

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Maternal deaths per 100,000 live births Regional Ratios of Maternal Deaths

(a) Latin America 4%

Africa 40%

More developed countries 1%

Asia 55%

Regional Shares of Maternal Deaths (b) Sources: Graph data from UNICEF, WHO, and Population Reference Bureau.

preventable. Most result from causes rooted in the social, cultural, and economic barriers confronting females in their home environment throughout their lifetimes: malnutrition, anemia, lack of access to timely basic maternal health care, physical immaturity due to stunted growth, and unavailability of adequate prenatal care or trained medical assistance at birth. Part of the problem is that women are considered expendable in societies where their status is low, although the correlation

between women’s status and maternal mortality is not exact. In those cultures, little attention is given to women’s health or their nutrition, and pregnancy, although a major cause of death, is simply considered a normal condition warranting no special consideration or management. To alter that perception and increase awareness of the affordable measures available to reduce maternal mortality, 1998 was designated “The Year of Safe Motherhood” by a United Nations interagency group.

HIV positive at the start of the 21st century. Some 95% of those infected live in developing countries, and more than two-thirds reside in sub-Saharan Africa. In that hardest-hit region, as much as one-fourth of the adult population in some countries is HIV positive, and in the 29 most affected African states life expectancy at birth is far less than it otherwise would be. Indeed, total population by 2015 is now projected to be 60 million less than it would have been in the absence of AIDS. Nonetheless, because of their high fertility rates, populations in all sub-Saharan countries are still expected to grow significantly up to 2050. Elsewhere, year 2000 warnings of the rapid spread of the epidemic in South and East Asia, and particularly in China and India, raise new global demographic concerns even as more hopeful reports of declining infection and mortality rates in some African countries are appearing.

Population Pyramids Another means of comparing populations is through the population pyramid, a graphic device that represents a population’s age and sex composition. The term pyramid describes the diagram’s shape for many countries in the 1800s, when the display was created: a broad base of younger age groups and a progressive narrowing toward the apex as older populations were thinned by death. Now many different shapes are formed, each reflecting a different population history (Figure 4.9). By grouping several generations of people, the pyramids highlight the impact of “baby booms,” population-reducing wars, birth rate reductions, and external migrations.

A rapidly growing country such as Kenya has most people in the lowest age cohorts; the percentage in older age groups declines successively, yielding a pyramid with markedly sloping sides. Typically, female life expectancy is reduced in older cohorts of less developed countries, so that for Kenya the proportion of females in older age groups is lower than in, for example, Sweden. Female life expectancy and mortality rates may also be affected by cultural rather than economic developmental causes (see “100 Million Women Are Missing”). In Sweden, a wealthy country with a very slow rate of growth, the population is nearly equally divided among the age groups, giving a “pyramid” with almost vertical sides. Among older cohorts, as Austria shows, there may be an imbalance between men and women because of the greater life expectancy of the latter. The impacts of war, as Russia’s pyramid vividly shows, are evident in that country’s depleted age cohorts and male-female disparities. The sharp contrasts between the composite pyramids of sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe summarize the differing population concerns of the developing and developed regions of the world; the projection for Botswana suggests the degree to which accepted pyramid shapes can quickly change (Figure 4.10). The population pyramid provides a quickly visualized demographic picture of immediate practical and predictive value. For example, the percentage of a country’s population in each age group strongly influences demand for goods and services within that national economy. A country with a high proportion of young has a high

Figure 4.9

Four patterns of population structure. These diagrams show that population “pyramids” assume many shapes. The age distribution of national populations reflects the past, records the present, and foretells the future. In countries like Kenya, social costs related to the young are important and economic expansion is vital to provide employment for new entrants in the labor force. Austria’s negative growth means a future with fewer workers to support a growing demand for social services for the elderly. The 1992 pyramid for Russia reported the sharp decline in births during World War II as a “pinching” of the 45–49 cohort, and showed in the large deficits of men above age 65 the heavy male mortality of both World Wars and late-Soviet period sharp reductions in Russian male longevity. Sources: The World Bank; the United Nations; Population Reference Bureau; and Carl Haub, “Population Change in the Former Soviet Republics,” Population Bulletin 49, no. 4 (1994).

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100 Million Women Are Missing

orldwide, some 100 million females are missing, victims of nothing more than their sex. In China, India, Pakistan, New Guinea, and many other developing countries a traditional preference for boys has meant neglect and death for girls, millions of whom are killed at birth, deprived of adequate food, or denied the medical attention afforded to favored sons. In both China and India ultrasound and amniocentesis tests are employed, often against government directives, to determine the sex of a fetus so that it can be aborted if it is a female. The evidence for the missing women starts with one fact: About 106 males are conceived and born for every 100 females. Normally, girls are hardier and more resistant to disease than boys, and in populations where the sexes are treated equally in matters of nutrition and health care, there are about 105 to 106 females for every 100 males. However, the 2001 census of

India found just 93.2 females for every 100 males while in China according to the latest census, nearly 10% of all girls of the 1990s birth cohorts are “missing” and in 2000 there were 120 boys under five for every 100 girls. Ratio deviations are most striking for second and subsequent births. In China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, for example, the most recent figures for first-child sex ratios are near normal, but rise to 121 boys per 100 girls for a second Chinese child, and to 185 per 100 for a third Korean child. On that evidence, the problem of missing females is getting worse. Conservative calculations suggest there are more than 60 million females missing in China alone, almost 5% of the national population and more than are unaccounted for in any other country. The problem is seen elsewhere. In much of South and West Asia and North Africa there are only some

(a) Western Europe

MALES

6

4

Years of Age 80+ 75–79 70–74 65 or Over FEMALES 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 15–64 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 Under 5–9 15 0–4 0 2 4 2 6 10 8 6 Percent of Population

94 females for every 100 males, a shortfall of about 12% of normal (Western) expectations. A 2000 United Nations report on South Asia suggests the “100 million” world total of missing females is a gross understatement. It declares that abortions of female fetuses along with infanticide and the food favoritism shown boys have meant that 79 million lost females are attributable to discrimination in South Asia alone. But not all poor countries show the same disparities. In sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty and disease are perhaps more prevalent than on any other continent, there are 102 females for every 100 males and in Latin America and the Caribbean there are equal numbers of males and females. Cultural norms and practices, not poverty or underdevelopment, seem to determine the fate and swell the numbers of the world’s 100 million missing women.

(c) Botswana in 2020

(b) Sub-Saharan Africa

MALES

4

FEMALES

2 0 2 Percent of Population

4

Age in years

W

6

8

10

80 75 70 65 60 55 MALES 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 140 120 100 80 60

With AIDS Without AIDS

FEMALES

40 20 0 20 40 Population (thousands)

60

80 100 120 140

Figure 4.10

Summary population pyramids. The mid-1990s pyramids for (a) Europe and (b) sub-Saharan Africa show the sharp contrasts in the age structure of older developed regions with their characteristic lowered birth and total fertility rates and that of the much more youthful developing sub-Saharan states. Even in 2000, about 44% of the sub-Saharan population was below age 15. That percentage, however, was smaller than it had been just 5 years earlier and hinted at more dramatic declines possible in years to come. Part of the projected decline will come as a result of economic development and changing family size decisions, but for some countries (c) tremendous pyramid distortions will result from the demographic impact of AIDS. By 2020, the otherwise expected “normal” pyramid of Botswana may well be distorted into a “population chimney” in which there would be more adults in their 60s and 70s than adults in their 40s and 50s.

Sources: (a) and (b) Lori S. Ashford, “New Perspectives on Population: Lessons from Cairo,” Population Bulletin 50, no. 1 (1995), Figure 3; (c) U.S. Bureau of the Census, World Population Profile 2000.

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Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

demand for educational facilities and certain types of health delivery services. In addition, of course, a large portion of the population is too young to be employed (Figures 4.10 and 4.11). On the other hand, a population with a high percentage of elderly people also requires medical goods and services specific to that age group (Figure 4.12), and these people must be supported by a smaller proportion of workers. The dependency ratio is a simple measure of the number of dependents, old or young, that each 100 people in the productive years (usually, 15–64) must support. Population pyramids give quick visual evidence of that ratio. They also foretell future problems resulting from present population policies or practices. The strict family-size rules and widespread preferences for sons in China, for example, skews the pyramid in favor of males. On current evidence, about 1 million excess males a year will enter an imbalanced marriage market in China beginning about 2010. Even now, the Chinese population pyramid shows never-married men ages 20–44 outnumber their female counterparts by nearly 2 to 1. Millions of bachelors, unconnected to society by wives and children, may pose threats to social order and, perhaps, national stability not foreseen or planned when family control programs were put in place, but clearly suggested when made evident by population pyramid distortions.

Figure 4.12

As these Dutch senior citizens exemplify, Europe is an aging continent with an ever-growing proportion of the elderly dependent on the financial support of a reduced working-age population. Rapidly growing developing countries, in contrast, face increasing costs for the needs of the very young.

Percent Under 15 Years 24 or less 25–30 31–37 38–44 45 or more

Figure 4.11

Percentage of population under 15 years of age. A high proportion of a country’s population under 15 increases the dependency ratio of that state and promises future population growth as the youthful cohorts enter childbearing years. Source: Data from Population Reference Bureau.

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113

Natural Increase Knowledge of a country’s sex and age distributions also enables demographers to forecast its future population levels, though the reliability of projections decreases with increasing length of forecast (Figure 4.13). Thus, a country with a high proportion of young people will experience a high rate of natural increase unless there is a very high mortality rate among infants and juveniles or fertility and birth rates change materially. The rate of natural increase of a population is derived by subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate. Natural means that increases or decreases due to migration are not included. If a country had a birth rate of 22 per 1000 and a death rate of 12 per 1000 for a given year, the rate of natural increase would be 10 per 1000. This rate is usually expressed as a percentage, that is, as a rate per 100 rather than per 1000. In the example given, the annual increase would be 1%.

Doubling Times The rate of increase can be related to the time it takes for a population to double, that is, the doubling time. Table 4.1 shows that it would take 70 years for a population with a rate of increase of 1% (approximately the rate of growth of Thailand or Argentina at the turn of the century) to double. A 2% rate of increase—recorded in 1999 by the developing world (excluding China)—means that the population will double in only 35 years. (Population doubling time can be estimated by dividing the growth rate into the number 70. Thus, 70 ÷ 2 = 35 years.) How could adding only 20 people per 1000 cause a population to grow so quickly? The principle is the same as that used to compound interest in a bank. Table 4.2 shows the number yielded by a 2% rate of increase at the end of successive five-year periods.

TABLE 4.1

Annual Percentage Increase

Doubling Time (Years)

0.5

140

1.0

70

2.0

35

3.0

24

4.0

17

5.0

14

10.0

7

TABLE 4.2

Population Growth Yielded by a 2% Rate of Increase Year

Population

1000

5

1104

10

1219

15

1345

20

1485

25

1640

30

1810

35

2000

Population in millions 450

Population in millions 450 Series I

400

Doubling Time in Years at Different Rates of Increase

400

Projection of 2000

350

350 Series III 300

300

250

250

Projection of 1988

Series II 200

200 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

(a)

Figure 4.13

0 1990

2010

2030

2050

(b)

Possible population futures for the United States. As these population projections to 2050 illustrate, expected future numbers vary greatly because the birth and death rate and immigration flow assumptions they are based on are different. (a) Depending on the assumptions, 1985 Census Bureau projections of U.S. population in 2050 ranged from 231 million (low series) to 429 million (high series). (b) The Bureau’s revised 1988 middle series projection was again adjusted in late 1996, reflecting actual population counts and new assumptions about fertility, immigration, and racial and ethnic differentials in births and deaths. Those counts and assumption revisions increased the earlier (1988) A.D. 2050 projection by 32%. Further revisions in the Census Bureau’s middle series in 2000 called for 403.7 million Americans in 2050; its “highest series” guess was for 552.7 million. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

114

Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

For the world as a whole, the rates of increase have risen over the span of human history. Therefore, the doubling time has decreased. Note in Table 4.3 how the population of the world has doubled in successively shorter periods of time. It will rise to about 9 billion by the middle of the 21st century if the present rate of growth continues (Figure 4.1). In countries with high rates of increase (Figure 4.14), the doubling time is less than the 54 years projected for the world as a whole (at first-of-century growth rates). Should world fertility rates decline (as they have in recent years), population doubling time will correspondingly increase, as it has since 1990 (Figure 4.15). Here, then, lies the answer to the question posed earlier. Even small annual additions accumulate to large total increments because we are dealing with geometric or exponential (1, 2, 4, 8) rather than arithmetic (1, 2, 3, 4) growth. The ever-increasing base population has reached such a size that each additional doubling results in an astronomical increase in the total. A simple mental exercise suggests the inevitable consequences of such doubling, or J-curve, growth. Take a very large sheet of the thinnest paper you can find and fold it in half. Fold it in half again.

TABLE 4.3 Year

Population Growth and Approximate Doubling Times Since A.D. 1

Estimated Population

Doubling Time (Years)

1

250 million

1650

500 million

1804

1 billion

154

1927

2 billion

123

1974

4 billion

47

1650

World population may reach: 2030

8 billion

56a

aThe final estimate of doubling time reflects assumptions of decreasing and stabilizing fertility rates. No current projections contemplate a further doubling to 16 billion people.

Source: United Nations.

Annual Rates of Natural Increase Very high (3% or more) High (2–2.9%) Moderate (1–1.9%) Low (0.9% or less) 0 or decrease

Figure 4.14

Annual rates of natural increase. The world’s 2001 rate of natural increase (1.3%) would mean a doubling of population in 54 years. Since demographers now anticipate world population—currently above 6 billion—will stabilize at around 10 billion (in about A.D. 2100), the “doubling” implication and time frame of current rates of increase reflect mathematical, not realistic, projections. Many individual continents and countries, of course, deviate widely from the global average rate of growth and have vastly different doubling times. Africa as a whole has the highest rates of increase, followed by Central America and Western Asia. Anglo America is prominent among the low-growth areas, and Europe as a whole (including Russia) had negative growth at the start of the 21st century, with some individual countries showing increases so small that their doubling times must be measured in millennia. For regions and countries, rates of increase and doubling time projections have more valid implications than do those for the world as a whole. Source: Data from Population Reference Bureau.

Population: World Patterns, Regional Trends

115

After seven or eight folds the sheet will have become as thick as a book—too thick for further folding by hand. If you could make 20 folds, the stack would be nearly as high as a football field is long. From then on, the results of further doubling are astounding. At 40 folds, the stack would be well on the way to the moon and at 70 it would

reach twice as far as the distance to the nearest star. After 100 folds, our paper would be more than ten billion light years across and span the known universe. Rounding the bend on the J-curve, which world population has done (Figure 4.16), poses problems and has implications for human occupance of the earth of a vastly greater order of magnitude than ever faced before.

The Demographic Transition

Figure 4.15

The “doubling time” calculation illustrates the long-range statistical effect of current year growth rates on future population numbers. It should never be used to suggest a realistic prediction of future population size, for population growth reflects not just birth rates, but death rates, age structure, collective family size decisions, and migration. Demographers generally recognize that high recent growth rates of developing countries will continue to be gradually reduced. Therefore, should their collective population double, it will take longer to do so than is suggested by a “doubling time” based solely on current rates.

Source: Population Reference Bureau, 1989 World Population Data Sheet.

Millions

The theoretical consequence of exponential population growth cannot be realized. Some form of braking mechanism must necessarily operate to control totally unregulated population growth. If voluntary population limitation is not undertaken, involuntary controls of an unpleasant nature may be set in motion. One attempt to summarize an observed voluntary relationship between population growth and economic development is the demographic transition model. It traces the changing levels of human fertility and mortality presumably associated with industrialization and urbanization. Over time, the model assumes, high birth and death rates will gradually be replaced by low rates (Figure 4.17). The first stage of that replacement process—and of the demographic transition model—is characterized by high birth and high but fluctuating death rates. As long as births only slightly exceed deaths, even when the rates of both are high, the population will grow only slowly. This was the case for most of human history until about A.D. 1750. Demographers think that it took from approximately A.D. 1 to A.D. 1650 for the population to increase from 250 million to 500 million, a doubling time of more than a millennium and a half. Growth was

6000

Millions 7000

5000

6000

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4000 Medical Revolution begins Colonial Industrial Columbus period Revolution discovers begins begins America

5000

3000

4000

2000 3000 1000 2000

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

0 2000

1000 500 0

8000

116

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000 2000 Years

Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

1000

B.C. A.D.

1000

2000

Figure 4.16

World population growth 8000 B.C. to A.D. 2000. Notice that the bend in the J-curve begins in about the mid-1700s when industrialization started to provide new means to support the population growth made possible by revolutionary changes in agriculture and food supply. Improvements in medical science and nutrition served to reduce death rates near the opening of the 20th century in the industrializing countries.

Figure 4.17

Stages in the demographic transition. During the first stage, birth and death rates are both high, and population grows slowly. When the death rate drops and the birth rate remains high, there is a rapid increase in numbers. During the third stage, birth rates decline and population growth is less rapid. The fourth stage is marked by low birth and death rates and, consequently, by a low rate of natural increase or even by decrease if death rates should exceed those of births. Indeed, the negative growth rates of many European countries have suggested to some that a fifth stage, one of population decline, is regionally—and ultimately worldwide—a logical extension of the transition model.

not steady, of course. There were periods of regional expansion that were usually offset by sometimes catastrophic decline. Wars, famine, and other disasters took heavy tolls. For example, the bubonic plague (the Black Death), which swept across Europe in the 14th century, is estimated to have killed over one-third of the population of that continent, and epidemic diseases brought by Europeans to the Western Hemisphere are believed to have reduced New World native populations by 95% within a century or two of first contact. The first stage of the demographic transition model is no longer found in any country. By the end of the 20th century, few countries— even in poorer regions of Africa and Asia—had death rates as high as 20 per 1000. However, in several states on those same continents birth rates approached or were above 50 per 1000.

The Western Experience The demographic transition model was developed to explain the population history of Western Europe. That area entered a second stage with the industrialization that began about 1750. Its effects—declining death rates accompanied by continuing high birth rates—have been dispersed worldwide even without universal conversion to an industrial economy. Rapidly rising population during the second demographic stage results from dramatic increases in life expectancy. That, in turn, reflects falling death rates due to advances in medical and sanitation practices, improved foodstuff storage and distribution, a rising per capita income, and the urbanization that provides the environment in which sanitary, medical, and food distributional improvements are concentrated (Figure 4.18). Birth

Figure 4.18

Paris, France, in the late 19th century. A modernizing Europe experienced improved living conditions and declining death rates during that century of progress.

rates do not fall as soon as death rates; ingrained cultural patterns change more slowly than technologies. In many agrarian societies, large families are considered advantageous. Children contribute to the family by starting to work at an early age and by supporting their parents in old age. Many countries in Latin America and southern and southwestern Asia display the characteristics of this second stage in the population model. Saudi Arabia, with a birth rate of 35 and a death rate of 5, and Nicaragua, with respective rates of 36 and 6 (2000 estimates), are typical. The annual rates of increase of such countries are near or above 30 per 1000, and their populations will double in about 20 to 25 years. Such rates, of course, do not mean that the full impact of the Industrial Revolution has been worldwide; they do mean that the underdeveloped societies have been beneficiaries of the life preservation techniques associated with it. The third stage follows when birth rates decline as people begin to control family size. The advantages of having many children in an agrarian society are not so evident in urbanized, industrialized cultures. In fact, such cultures may view children as economic liabilities rather than assets. When the birth rate falls and the death rate remains low, the population size begins to level off. Many countries are now displaying the low death rates and transitional birth rates of the third stage. The classic demographic transition model ends with a fourth and final stage characterized by very low birth and death rates. This stage yields at best only very slight percentage increases in population and doubling times stretch to a thousand years or more. In a few countries, death rates have begun to equal or exceed birth rates and populations are actually declining. This extension of the fourth stage into a fifth of population decrease has so far been largely confined to the rich, industrialized world— notably Europe and Japan—but increasingly promises to affect much of the rest of the world as well. Even now the Population: World Patterns, Regional Trends

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dramatic decline in fertility recorded in almost all countries since the 1980s suggests that by 2010 at the latest a majority of the world’s population will reside in areas where the only significant population growth will result from demographic momentum (see p. 133), not from second stage expansion. The original transition model was devised to described the experience of northwest European countries as they went from rural-agrarian societies to urban-industrial ones. It may not fully reflect the prospects of all developing countries. In Europe, church and municipal records, some dating from the 16th century, show that people tended to marry late or not at all. In England before the Industrial Revolution, as many as half of all women in the 15–50 age cohort were unmarried. Infant mortality was high, life expectancy low. With the coming of industrialization in the 18th and 19th centuries, immediate factory wages instead of long apprenticeship programs permitted earlier marriage and more children. Since improvements in sanitation and health came only slowly, death rates remained high. Around 1800, 25% of Swedish infants died before their first birthday. Population growth rates remained below 1% per year in France throughout the 19th century. Beginning about 1860, first death rates and then birth rates began their significant, though gradual, decline. This “mortality revolution” came first, as an epidemiologic transition echoed the demographic transition with which it is associated. Many formerly fatal epidemic diseases became endemic, that is, essentially continual within a population. As people developed partial immunities, mortalities associated with them declined. Improvements in animal husbandry, crop rotation and other agricultural practices, and new foodstuffs (the potato was an early example) from overseas colonies raised the level of health of the European population in general. At the same time, sewage systems and sanitary water supplies became common in larger cities, and general levels of hygiene improved everywhere (Figure 4.19). Deaths due to infectious, parasitic, and respiratory diseases and to malnutrition declined, while those related to chronic illnesses associated with a maturing and aging population increased. Western Europe passed from a first stage “Age of Pestilence and Famine” to a presumed ultimate “Age of Degenerative and Human-Origin Diseases.” However, recent increases in drug- and antibiotic-resistant diseases, pesticide resistance of disease-carrying insects, and such new scourges of both the less developed and more developed countries as AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) cast doubt on the finality of that “ultimate” stage (see “Our Delicate State of Health”). Nevertheless, even the resurgence of old and emergence of new scourges such as malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS (which together have caused an estimated 150 million deaths between 1945 and 2000) are unlikely to have decisive demographic consequences.

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Figure 4.19

Pure piped water replacing individual or neighborhood wells, and sewers and waste treatment plants instead of privies, became increasingly common in urban Europe and North America during the 19th century. Their modern successors, such as the Windsor, Ontario, treatment plant shown here, helped complete the epidemiologic transition in developed countries.

In Europe, the striking reduction in death rates was echoed by similar declines in birth rates as societies began to alter their traditional concepts of ideal family size. In cities, child labor laws and mandatory schooling meant that children became a burden, not a contribution, to family economies. As “poor-relief” legislation and other forms of public welfare substituted for family support structures, the insurance value of children declined. Family consumption patterns altered as the Industrial Revolution made more widely available goods that served consumption desires, not just basic living needs. Children hindered rather than aided the achievement of the age’s promise of social mobility and lifestyle improvement. Perhaps most important, and by some measures preceding and independent of the implications of the Industrial Revolution, were changes in the status of women and in their spreading conviction that control over childbearing was within their power and to their benefit.

A Divided World Converging The demographic transition model described the presumed inevitable course of population events from the high birth and death rates of premodern (underdeveloped) societies to the low and stable rates of advanced (developed) countries. The model failed to anticipate, however, that the population history of Europe was apparently not relevant to all developing countries of the middle and late 20th century. Many developing societies seemingly remained locked in the second stage of the model, unable to realize the economic gains and social changes necessary to progress to the third stage of falling birth rates. The introduction of Western technologies of medicine and public health, including antibiotics, insecticides, sanitation, immunization, infant and child health care, and eradication of smallpox, quickly and dramatically increased life expectancies in developing countries. Such imported technologies and treatments

Our Delicate State of Health

D

eath rates have plummeted and the benefits of modern medicines, antibiotics, and sanitary practices have enhanced both the quality and expectancy of life in the developed and much of the developing world. Far from being won, however, the struggle against infectious and parasitic diseases is growing in intensity and is, perhaps, unwinnable. More than a half century after the discovery of antibiotics, the diseases they were to eradicate are on the rise and both old and new disease-causing microorganisms are emerging and spreading all over the world. Infectious and parasitic diseases kill between 17 and 20 million people each year; they officially account for onethird of global mortality and, because of poor diagnosis, certainly are responsible for far more. And their global incidence is rising. The five leading infectious killers are acute respiratory infections such as pneumonia, diarrheal diseases, tuberculosis, malaria, and measles. In addition, AIDS was killing 2.6 million persons yearly at century’s end, far more than measles and as many as malaria. The incidence of infection, of course, is far greater than the occurrence of deaths. More than a third of the world’s people—some 1.8 billion— for example, are infected with the bacterium that causes tuberculosis, but

only 3.3 million are killed by the disease each year. More than 500 million people are infected with such tropical diseases as malaria, sleeping sickness, schistosomiasis, and river blindness, with perhaps 3 million annual deaths. Newer pathogens are constantly appearing, such as those causing Lassa fever, Rift Valley fever, Ebola, Hanta, and Hepatitis C, incapacitating and endangering far more than they kill. In fact, at least 30 new infectious diseases have appeared since the mid-1970s. The spread and virulence of infectious diseases are linked to the dramatic changes so rapidly occurring in the earth’s physical and social environments. Deforestation, water contamination, climatic change, wetland drainage, and other human-induced alterations to the physical environment disturb ecosystems and simultaneously disrupt the natural system of controls that keep infectious diseases in check. Rapid population growth and explosive urbanization, increasing global tourism, population-dislocating wars and migrations, and expanding world trade all increase interpersonal disease-transmitting contacts and the mobility and range of disease-causing microbes, including those brought from previously isolated areas by newly opened road systems and air routes. Add in poorly planned or executed public

accomplished in a few years what it took Europe 50 to 100 years to experience. Sri Lanka, for example, sprayed extensively with DDT to combat malaria; life expectancy jumped from 44 years in 1946 to 60 only eight years later. With similar public health programs, India also experienced a steady reduction in its death rate after 1947. Simultaneously, with international sponsorship, food aid cut the death toll of developing states during drought and other disasters. The dramatic decline in mortality that had emerged only gradually throughout the European world occurred with startling speed in developing countries after 1950.

health programs, inadequate investment in sanitary infrastructures, and inefficient distribution of medical personnel and facilities, and the causative role of humans in many of the current disease epidemics is clearly visible. In response, a worldwide Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED) was established in 1993 and developed a global on-line infectious disease network linking health workers and scientists in more than 100 countries to battle what has been called a growing “epidemic of epidemics.” The most effective weapons in that battle are already known. They include improved health education; disease prevention and surveillance; research on disease vectors and incidence areas (including GIS and other mapping of habitats conducive to specific diseases); careful monitoring of drug therapy; mosquito control programs; provision of clean water supplies; and distribution of such simple and cheap remedies and preventatives as childhood immunizations, oral rehydration therapy, and vitamin A supplementation. All, however, require expanded investment and attention to those spreading infectious diseases—many with newly developed antibiotic-resistant strains—so recently thought to be no longer of concern.

Corresponding reductions in birth rates did not immediately follow and world population totals soared: from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 3 billion by 1960 and 5 billion by the middle 1980s. Alarms about the “population explosion” and its predicted devastating impact on global food and mineral resources were frequent and strident. In demographic terms, the world was viewed by many as permanently divided between developed regions that had made the demographic transition to stable population numbers and the underdeveloped, endlessly expanding ones that had not. Population: World Patterns, Regional Trends

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Birth rate levels, of course, unlike life expectancy improvements depend less on supplied technology and assistance than they do on social acceptance of the idea of fewer children and smaller families (Figure 4.20). That acceptance began to grow broadly but unevenly worldwide even as regional and world population growth seemed uncontrollable. In 1984 only 18% of world population lived in countries with fertility rates at or below replacement levels (that is, countries that had achieved the demographic transition). By 2000, however, 44% lived in such countries and early in the 21st century it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between developed and developing societies on the basis of their fertility rates. Those rates in many separate Indian states (Kerala and Tamil Nadu, for example) and in such countries as Sri Lanka, Thailand, South Korea, and China are below those of the United States. Significant decreases to near the replacement level have also occurred in the space of a single generation in many other Asian and Latin American states with high recent rates of economic growth. Increasingly, it appears, low fertility is becoming a feature of both rich and poor, developed and developing states. Despite this general substantial convergence in fertility, there still remains a significant minority share of the developing world with birth rates averaging 1.5 to 2 times or more above the

replacement level. Indeed, early in the 21st century almost 1.4 billion persons live in countries or regions where total fertility is still 3.5 or greater (a level not considered high, of course, in the early 1950s when only a quarter of the world’s population had a TFR below that mark). For the most part, these current high fertility countries and areas are in sub-Saharan Africa and the northern parts of the Indian subcontinent. Although accounting for less than a quarter of world population, high TFR regions collectively, United Nations demographers predict, will provide the majority of world population growth to at least 2050. The established patterns of both high and low fertility regions tend to be self-reinforcing. Low growth permits the expansion of personal income and accumulation of capital that enhance the quality and security of life and make large families less attractive or essential. In contrast, in high birth rate regions, population growth consumes in social services and assistance the investment capital that might promote economic expansion. Increasing populations place ever greater demands on limited soil, forest, water, grassland, and cropland resources. As the environmental base deteriorates, productivity declines and population-supporting capacities are so diminished as to make difficult or impossible the economic progress on which the demographic transition depends, an apparent equation of increasing international concern (see “The Cairo Plan”). Rate per 1000 50

Rate per 1000 50

Developing Countries

Developed Countries Birth Rate

40

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30

30

Death Rate

Death Rate

20

20

10

10

0 1790

Birth Rate

Natural Increase

Natural Increase

1825

1875 1900 1925 Years

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0 1790

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Figure 4.20

World birth and death rates. The “population explosion” after World War II (1939–1945) reflected the effects of drastically reduced death rates in developing countries without simultaneous and compensating reductions in births. By the end of the century, however, three interrelated trends had appeared in many developing world countries: (1) fertility had overall dropped further and faster than had been predicted 25 years earlier, (2) contraceptive acceptance and use had increased markedly, and (3) age at marriage was rising. In consequence, the demographic transition had been compressed from a century to a generation in some developing states. In others, fertility decline began to slacken in the mid-1970s, but continued to reflect the average number of children—four or more—still desired in many societies. Source: Revised and redrawn from Elaine M. Murphy, World Population: Toward the Next Century, revised ed. (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1989).

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Geography and Public Policy The Cairo Plan After a sometimes rancorous nine-day meeting in Cairo in September 1994, the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development endorsed a strategy for stabilizing the world’s population at 7.27 billion by no later than 2015. The 20-year “program of action” accepted by over 150 signatory countries sought to avoid the environmental consequences of excessive population growth. Its proposals were therefore linked to discussions and decisions of the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The Cairo plan abandoned several decades of policies that promoted “population control” (a phrase avoided by the conference) based on targets and quotas and, instead, embraced for the first time policies giving women greater control over their lives, greater economic equality and opportunity, and a greater voice in reproduction decisions. It recognized that limiting population growth depends on programs that lead women to want fewer children and make them partners in economic development. In that recognition, the Conference accepted the documented link between increased educational access and economic opportunity for women and falling birth rates and smaller families. Earlier population conferences—1974 in Bucharest and 1984 in Mexico City—did not fully address these issues of equality, opportunity, education, and political rights; their adopted goals failed to achieve hoped-for changes in births in large part because women in many traditional societies had no power to enforce contraception and feared their other alternative, sterilization. The earlier conferences carefully avoided or specifically excluded abortion as an acceptable family planning method. It was the more open discussion of abortion in Cairo that elicited much of the spirited debate that

registered religious objections by the Vatican and many Muslim and Latin American states to the inclusion of legal abortion as part of health care, and to language suggesting approval of sexual relations outside of marriage. Although the final text of the conference declaration did not promote any universal right to abortion and excluded it as a means of family planning, some delegations still registered reservations to its wording on both sex and abortion. At conference close, however, the Vatican endorsed the declaration’s underlying principles, including the family as “the basic unit of society,” the need to stimulate economic growth, and to promote “gender equality, equity, and the empowerment of women.” Reservations on abortion were matched by even broader complaints that demands for action on population growth continued to fall on the poor. The objectors held that the richer industrialized states are, in reality, the greater danger to world environment and development because of their production of pollution and disproportionate demands on natural resources. Although registered, those observations were not seriously addressed. The Cairo plan agreed on a significant increase in the world amount spent on population stabilization, from about $5 billion in 1994 to $17 billion by 2000 and $22 billion by 2015 (all in 1994 dollars). Developing countries were to pay two-thirds and industrial countries the remainder. A special United Nations “Cairo + 5” session in 1999 recommended some adjustments in the earlier agreements. It urged emphasis on measures ensuring safe and accessible abortion in countries where it is legal, called for school children at all levels to be instructed in sexual and reproductive health issues, and told governments to provide special family planning and health services for sexually active adolescents, with particular stress on reducing their vulnerability to AIDS.

Funding pledges to achieve Cairo’s goals have not been met. Although developing countries fulfilled 70% of their two-thirds share commitment needed by 2000, developed countries had provided only 35% of their one-third portion. The U.S. Congress has regularly failed to meet its agreed annual $1.9 billion contribution, and all donor countries were urged to reverse the decline in their promised contributions.

Questions to Consider: 1. Do you think it is appropriate or useful for international bodies to promote policies affecting such purely personal or national concerns as reproduction and family planning? Why or why not? 2. Do you think that current international concerns over population growth, development, and the environment are sufficiently valid and pressing to risk the loss of longenduring cultural norms and religious practices in many of the world’s traditional societies? Why or why not? 3. Do you think the financial obligations implied for developed, donor countries by the Cairo plan are justified in light of the many other international needs and domestic concerns faced by their governments? Why or why not? 4. Many environmentalists see the world as a finite system unable to support ever-increasing populations; to exceed its limits would cause frightful environmental damage and global misery. Many economists counter that free markets will keep supplies of needed commodities in line with growing demand and that science will, as necessary, supply technological fixes in the form of substitutes or expansion of production. In light of such diametrically opposed views of population growth consequences, is it appropriate or wise to base international programs solely on one of them? Why or why not?

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movements of economic and political refugees across Asian, African, and Latin American boundaries, emigration today provides no comparable relief valve for developing countries. Total population numbers are too great to be much affected by migrations of even millions of people. In only a few countries—Afghanistan, Cuba, El Salvador, and Haiti, for example—have as many as 10% of the population emigrated in recent decades.

The Demographic Equation Births and deaths among a region’s population—natural increases or decreases—tell only part of the story of population change. Migration involves the long-distance movement of people from one residential location to another. When that relocation occurs across political boundaries, it affects the population structure of both the origin and destination jurisdictions. The demographic equation summarizes the contribution made to regional population change over time by the combination of natural change (difference between births and deaths) and net migration (difference between in-migration and out-migration). On a global scale, of course, all population change is accounted for by natural change. The impact of migration on the demographic equation increases as the population size of the areal unit studied decreases.

Immigration Impacts Where cross-border movements are massive enough, migration may have a pronounced impact on the demographic equation and result in significant changes in the population structures of both the origin and destination regions. Past European and African migrations, for example, not only altered but substantially created the population structures of new, sparsely inhabited lands of colonization in the Western Hemisphere and Australasia. In some decades of the late 18th and early 19th centuries 30% to more than 40% of population increase in the United States was accounted for by immigration. Similarly, eastward-moving Slavs colonized underpopulated Siberia and overwhelmed native peoples. Migrants are rarely a representative cross section of the population group they leave, and they add an unbalanced age and sex component to the group they join. A

Population Relocation In the past, emigration proved an important device for relieving the pressures of rapid population growth in at least some European countries (Figure 4.21). For example, in one 90-year span, 45% of the natural increase in the population of the British Isles emigrated, and between 1846 and 1935 some 60 million Europeans of all nationalities left that continent. Despite recent massive

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Emigrants European African (Slaves) Indian Japanese Chinese Majority population descended from immigrants

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60° 180°

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140°

120°

100°

80°

60°

40°

20°

20°

Figure 4.21

40°

60°

80°

100°

120°

140°

160°

180°

Principal migrations of recent centuries. The arrows suggest the major free and forced international population movements since about 1700. The shaded areas on the map are regions whose present population is more than 50% descended from the immigrants of recent centuries. Source: Shaded zones after Daniel Noin, Géographie de la Population (Paris: Masson, 1979), p. 85.

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recurrent research observation is that emigrant groups are heavily skewed in favor of young singles. Whether males or females dominate the outflow varies with circumstances. Although males traditionally far exceeded females in international flow, in recent years females have accounted for between 40% and 60% of all transborder migrants. At the least, then, the receiving country will have its population structure altered by an outside increase in its younger age and, probably, unmarried cohorts. The results are both immediate in a modified population pyramid, and potential in future impact on reproduction rates and excess of births over deaths. The origin area will have lost a portion of its young, active members of childbearing years. It perhaps will have suffered distortion in its young adult sex ratios, and it certainly will have recorded a statistical aging of its population. The destination society will likely experience increases in births associated with the youthful newcomers and, in general, have its average age reduced.

and still others contain dense agglomerations of people. More than half of the world’s people are found—unevenly concentrated, to be sure—in rural areas. Some 45% are urbanites, however, and a constantly growing proportion are residents of very large cities of 1 million or more. Earth regions of apparently very similar physical makeup show quite different population numbers and densities, perhaps the result of differently timed settlement or of settlement by different cultural groups. Had North America been settled by Chinese instead of Europeans, for example, it is likely that its western sections would be far more densely settled than they now are. Northern and Western Europe, inhabited thousands of years before North America, contain more people than the United States on 70% less land. We can draw certain generalizing conclusions from the uneven, but far from irrational distribution of population shown in Figure 4.22. First, almost 90% of all people live north of the equator and two-thirds of the total dwell in the midlatitudes between 20° and 60° North (Figure 4.23). Second, a large majority of the world’s inhabitants occupy only a small part of its land surface. More than half the people live on about 5% of the land, two-thirds on 10%, and almost nine-tenths on less than 20%. Third, people congregate in lowland areas; their numbers decrease sharply with increases in elevation. Temperature, length of growing season, slope and erosion problems, even oxygen reductions at very high altitudes, all appear to limit the habitability of higher

World Population Distribution The millions and billions of people of our discussion are not uniformly distributed over the earth. The most striking feature of the world population distribution map (Figure 4.22) is the very unevenness of the pattern. Some land areas are nearly uninhabited, others are sparsely settled,

80°

60°

40°

20°

Persons per square mile 500 or more 125–500 25–125 2–25 1–2 Sparsely populated

20°

40°

60° 180°

Figure 4.22

Persons per square kilometer 200 or more 50–200 10–50 2–10 1–2 Sparsely populated

Urbanized area of more than 1,000,000

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100°

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60°

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World population density.

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123

80°

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0.4%

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6.4%

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40° 30°

15.6% 22.4% 23.2%

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10°

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Percentage of World Total Population

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2.3% 1.2%

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0.1% 50° 60° 180°

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Figure 4.23

The population dominance of the Northern Hemisphere is strikingly evident from this bar chart. Only one out of nine people lives south of the equator—not because the Southern Hemisphere is underpopulated, but because it is mainly water.

elevations. One estimate is that between 50% and 60% of all people live below 200 meters (650 ft), a zone containing less than 30% of total land area. Nearly 80% reside below 500 meters (1650 ft). Fourth, although low-lying areas are preferred settlement locations, not all such areas are equally favored. Continental margins have attracted the densest settlement. About two-thirds of world population is concentrated within 500 kilometers (300 mi) of the ocean, much of it on alluvial lowlands and river valleys. Latitude, aridity, and elevation, however, limit the attractiveness of many seafront locations. Low temperatures and infertile soils of the extensive Arctic coastal lowlands of the Northern Hemisphere have restricted settlement there. Mountainous or desert coasts are sparsely occupied at any latitude, and some tropical lowlands and river valleys that are marshy, forested, and disease-infested are unevenly settled. Within the sections of the world generally conducive to settlement, four areas contain great clusters of population: East Asia, South Asia, Europe, and northeastern United States/southeastern Canada. The East Asia zone, which includes Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea, is the largest cluster in both area and numbers. The four countries forming it contain nearly 25% of all people on earth; China alone accounts for one in five of the world’s inhabitants. The South Asia cluster is composed primarily of countries associated with the Indian subcontinent—

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Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the island state of Sri Lanka—though some might add to it the Southeast Asian countries of Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand. The four core countries alone account for another one-fifth, 21%, of the world’s inhabitants. The South and the East Asian concentrations are thus home to nearly one-half the world’s people. Europe—southern, western, and eastern through Ukraine and much of European Russia—is the third extensive world population concentration, with another 13% of its inhabitants. Much smaller in extent and total numbers is the cluster in northeastern United States/southeastern Canada. Other smaller but pronounced concentrations are found around the globe: on the island of Java in Indonesia, along the Nile River in Egypt, and in discontinuous pockets in Africa and Latin America. The term ecumene is applied to permanently inhabited areas of the earth’s surface. The ancient Greeks used the word, derived from their verb “to inhabit,” to describe their known world between what they believed to be the unpopulated, searing southern equatorial lands and the permanently frozen northern polar reaches of the earth. Clearly, natural conditions are less restrictive than Greek geographers believed. Both ancient and modern technologies have rendered habitable areas that natural conditions make forbidding. Irrigation, terracing, diking, and draining are among the methods devised to extend the ecumene locally (Figure 4.24).

Figure 4.24

Terracing of hillsides is one device to extend a naturally limited productive area. The technique is effectively used here at the Malegcong rice terraces on densely settled Luzon Island of the Philippines.

At the world scale, the ancient observation of habitability appears remarkably astute. The nonecumene, or anecumene, the uninhabited or very sparsely occupied zone, does include the permanent ice caps of the Far North and Antarctica and large segments of the tundra and coniferous forest of northern Asia and North America. But the nonecumene is not continuous, as the ancients supposed. It is discontinuously encountered in all portions of the globe and includes parts of the tropical rain forests of equatorial zones, midlatitude deserts of both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, and high mountain areas. Even parts of these unoccupied or sparsely occupied districts have localized dense settlement nodes or zones based on irrigation agriculture, mining and industrial activities, and the like. Perhaps the most anomalous case of settlement in the nonecumene world is that of the dense population in the Andes Mountains of South America and the plateau of Mexico. Here Native Americans found temperate conditions away from the dry coast regions and the hot, wet Amazon basin. The fertile high basins have served a large population for more than a thousand years. Even with these locally important exceptions, the nonecumene portion of the earth is extensive. Some 35–40% of all the world’s land surface is inhospitable and without significant settlement. This is, admittedly, a smaller proportion of the earth than would have qualified as uninhabitable in ancient times or even during the 19th century. Since the end of the Ice Age some 11,000 to 12,000 years ago, humans have steadily expanded their areas of settlement.

Population Density Margins of habitation could only be extended, of course, as humans learned to support themselves from the resources of new settlement areas. The numbers that could be sustained in old or new habitation zones were and are related to the resource potential of those areas and the cultural levels and technologies possessed by the occupying populations. The term population density expresses the relationship between number of inhabitants and the area they occupy. Density figures are useful, if sometimes misleading, representations of regional variations of human distribution. The crude density or arithmetic density of population is the most common and least satisfying expression of that variation. It is the calculation of the number of people per unit area of land, usually within the boundaries of a political entity. It is an easily reckoned figure. All that is required is information on total population and total area, both commonly available for national or other political units. The figure can, however, be misleading and may obscure more of reality than it reveals. The calculation is an average, and a country may contain extensive regions that are only sparsely populated or largely undevelopable (Figure 4.25) along with intensively settled and developed districts. A national average density figure reveals nothing about either class of territory. In general, the larger the political unit for which crude or arithmetic population density is calculated, the less useful is the figure.

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Figure 4.25

Tundra vegetation and landscape, Ruby Range, Northwest Territories, Canada. Extensive areas of northern North America and Eurasia are part of the one-third or more of the world’s land area considered as nonecumene, sparsely populated portions of total national territory that affects calculations of arithmetic density.

Various modifications may be made to refine density as a meaningful abstraction of distribution. Its descriptive precision is improved if the area in question can be subdivided into comparable regions or units. Thus it is more revealing to know that in 2000, New Jersey had a density of 438 and Wyoming of 3.5 persons per square kilometer (1134 and 9 per sq mi) of land area than to know only that the figure for the conterminous United States (48 states) was 36 per square kilometer (94 per sq mi). If Hawaii and large, sparsely populated Alaska are added, the U.S. density figure drops to 31 per square kilometer (80 per sq mi). The calculation may also be modified to provide density distinctions between classes of population—rural versus urban, for example. Rural densities in the United States rarely exceed 115 per square kilometer (300 per sq mi), while portions of major cities can have thousands of people in equivalent space. Another revealing refinement of crude density relates population not simply to total national territory but to that area of a country that is or may be cultivated, that is, to arable land. When total population is divided by arable land area alone, the resulting figure is the physiological density which is, in a sense, an expression of population pressure exerted on agricultural land. Table 4.4 makes evident that countries differ in physiological density and that the contrasts between crude and physiological densities of countries point up actual settlement pressures that are not revealed by arithmetic densities alone. The calculation of physiological density, however, depends on uncertain definitions of arable and cultivated land, assumes that all arable land is equally productive and comparably used, and includes only one part of a country’s resource base.

Overpopulation It is an easy and common step from concepts of population density to assumptions about overpopulation or overcrowding. It is wise to remember that overpopulation is

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TABLE 4.4 Country

Comparative Densities for Selected Countries Crude Density sq mi km2

Physiological Densitya sq mi km2

Argentina

35

14

352

Australia

6

2

105

41

2305

890

3814

1472

Bangladesh Canada

136

8

3

175

68

China

344

132

3419

1320

Egypt

177

68

5418

2092

India

789

304

1529

591

Iran

107

41

944

364

Japan

870

336

7433

2870

Nigeria

346

134

977

377

United Kingdom

632

244

2603

1005

80

31

380

147

United States

Sources: UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Production Yearbook and Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheet. aIncludes

arable land and land in permanent crops.

a value judgment reflecting an observation or conviction that an environment or territory is unable to support its present population. (A related but opposite concept of underpopulation refers to the circumstance of too few people to sufficiently develop the resources of a country or region to improve the level of living of its inhabitants.) Overpopulation is not the necessary and inevitable consequence of high density of population. Tiny Monaco, a principality in southern Europe about half the size of

New York’s Central Park, has a crude density of some 17,500 people per square kilometer (45,000 per sq mi). Mongolia, a sizable state of 1,565,000 square kilometers (604,000 sq mi) between China and Siberian Russia, has 1.6 persons per square kilometer (4.1 per sq mi); Iran, only slightly larger, has 41 per square kilometer (107 per sq mi). Macao, a former island possession of Portugal off the coast of China, has more than 22,000 persons per square kilometer (58,000 per sq mi); the Falkland Islands off the Atlantic coast of Argentina count at most 1 person for every 5 square kilometers (2 sq mi) of territory. No conclusions about conditions of life, levels of income, adequacy of food, or prospects for prosperity can be drawn from these density comparisons. Overcrowding is a reflection not of numbers per unit area but of the carrying capacity of land—the number of people an area can support on a sustained basis given the prevailing technology. A region devoted to efficient, energy-intensive commercial agriculture that makes heavy use of irrigation, fertilizers, and biocides can support more people at a higher level of living than one engaged in the slash-and-burn agriculture described in Chapter 8. An industrial society that takes advantage of resources such as coal and iron ore and has access to imported food will not feel population pressure at the same density levels as a country with rudimentary technology. Since carrying capacity is related to the level of economic development, maps such as Figure 4.22, displaying present patterns of population distribution and density, do not suggest a correlation with conditions of life. Many industrialized, urbanized countries have lower densities and higher levels of living than do less developed ones. Densities in the United States, where there is a great deal of unused and unsettled land, are considerably lower than those in Bangladesh, where essentially all land is arable and which, with nearly 900 people per square kilometer (over 2300 per sq mi), is the most densely populated nonisland state in the world. At the same time, many African countries have low population densities and low levels of living, whereas Japan combines both high densities and wealth. Overpopulation can be equated with levels of living or conditions of life that reflect a continuing imbalance between numbers of people and carrying capacity of the land. One measure of that imbalance might be the unavailability of food supplies sufficient in caloric content to meet individual daily energy requirements or so balanced as to satisfy normal nutritional needs. Unfortunately, dietary insufficiencies—with long-term adverse implications for life expectancy, physical vigor, and mental development—are most likely to be encountered in the developing countries, where much of the population is in the younger age cohorts (Figure 4.11). If those developing countries simultaneously have rapidly increasing population numbers dependent on domestically produced foodstuffs, the prospects must be

for continuing undernourishment and overpopulation. Much of sub-Saharan Africa finds itself in this circumstance. Its per capita food production decreased during the 1990s, with continuing decline predicted over the following quarter century as the population-food gap widens (Figure 4.26). The countries of North Africa are similarly strained. Egypt already must import well over half the food it consumes. Africa is not alone. The international Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that in 2000, at least 65 separate countries with over 30% of the population of the developing world were unable to feed their inhabitants from their own national territories at the low level of agricultural technology and inputs employed. Even rapidly industrializing China, an exporter of grain until 1994, now in most years is a net grain importer. In the contemporary world, insufficiency of domestic agricultural production to meet national caloric requirements cannot be considered a measure of overcrowding or poverty. Only a few countries are agriculturally self-sufficient. Japan, a leader among the advanced states, is the world’s biggest food importer and supplies from its own production only 40% of the calories its population consumes. Its physiological density is high, as Table 4.4 indicates, but it obviously does not rely on an arable land resource for its present development. Largely lacking in either agricultural or industrial

Figure 4.26

Carrying capacity and potentials in sub-Saharan Africa. The map assumes that (1) all cultivated land is used for growing food; (2) food imports are insignificant; (3) agriculture is conducted by low technology methods.

Sources: World Bank; United Nations Development Programme; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); and Bread for the World Institute.

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Urbanization Pressures on the land resource of countries are increased not just by their growing populations but by the reduction of arable land caused by such growth. More and more of world population increase must be accommodated not in rural areas, but in cities that hold the promise of jobs and access to health, welfare, and other public services. As a result, the urbanization (transformation from rural to urban status) of population in developing countries is increasing dramatically. Since the 1950s, cities have grown faster than rural areas in nearly all developing states. Although Latin America, for example, has experienced substantial overall population increase, the size of its rural population is actually declining. Indeed, on UN projections, some 97% of all world population increase between 2000 and 2030 will be in urban areas and almost entirely within the developing regions and countries, continuing a pattern established by 1950 (Figure 4.27). In those areas collectively, cities are growing on average by over 3% a year, and the poorest regions are experiencing the fastest growth. By 2020, the UN anticipates, a majority of the population of less developed countries will live in urban areas. In East, West, and Central Africa, for example, cities are expanding by 5% a year, a pace that can double their population every 14 years. Global urban population, just 750 million in 1950, grew to nearly 2.75 billion by century’s end and is projected to rise to 5.1 billion by 2030. The uneven results of past urbanization are summarized in Figure 4.28. The sheer growth of those cities in people and territory has increased pressures on arable land and adjusted upward both arithmetic and physiological densities. Urbanization consumes millions of hectares of cropland each year. In Egypt, for example, urban expansion and new development between 1965 and 1985 took out of production as much fertile soil as the massive Aswan dam on the Nile River made newly available through irrigation with the water it impounds. By themselves, some of these developing world cities, often surrounded by concentrations of people living in uncontrolled settlements, slums, and shantytowns (Figure 11.42), are among the most densely populated areas in the world. They face massive problems in trying to provide housing, jobs, education, and adequate health and social services for their residents. These and other matters of urban geography are the topics of Chapter 11.

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Urban and rural population growth, 1950–2030 10

8 Population in billions

resources, it nonetheless ranks well on all indicators of national well-being and prosperity. For countries such as Japan, a sudden cessation of the international trade that permits the exchange of industrial products for imported food and raw materials would be disastrous. Domestic food production could not maintain the dietary levels now enjoyed by their populations and they, more starkly than many underdeveloped countries, would be “overpopulated.”

Urban, less developed countries Urban, developed countries Rural

6

4

2

0 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

Figure 4.27

Past and projected urban and rural population growth. According to UN projections, some 65% of the world’s total population may be urbanized by 2030. Redrawn from Population Bulletin vol. 53, no.1, Figure 3, page 12 (Population Reference Bureau, 1998).

Population Data and Projections Population geographers, demographers, planners, governmental officials, and a host of others rely on detailed population data to make their assessments of present national and world population patterns and to estimate future conditions. Birth rates and death rates, rates of fertility and of natural increase, age and sex composition of the population, and other items are all necessary ingredients for their work.

Population Data The data that students of population employ come primarily from the United Nations Statistical Office, the World Bank, the Population Reference Bureau, and ultimately, from national censuses and sample surveys. Unfortunately, the data as reported may on occasion be more misleading than informative. For much of the developing world, a national census is a massive undertaking. Isolation and poor transportation, insufficiency of funds and trained census personnel, high rates of illiteracy limiting the type of questions that can be asked, and populations suspicious of all things governmental serve to restrict the frequency, coverage, and accuracy of population reports. However derived, detailed data are published by the major reporting agencies for all national units even when those figures are poorly based on fact or are essentially fictitious. For years, data on the total population, birth and death rates, and other vital statistics for Somalia were regularly reported and annually revised. The fact was,

Percent Urban 25 or less 26–44 45–64 65–79 80 or more

Figure 4.28

Percentage of national population that is classified as urban. Urbanization has been particularly rapid in the developing continents. In 1950, only 17% of Asians and 15% of Africans were urban; at the start of the 21st century, some one-third of both Asians and Africans were city dwellers and collectively the less-developed areas contained two-thirds of the world’s city population.

Source: Data from Population Reference Bureau.

however, that Somalia had never had a census and had no system whatsoever for recording births. Seemingly precise data were regularly reported as well for Ethiopia. When that country had its first-ever census in 1985, at least one data source had to drop its estimate of the country’s birth rate by 15% and increase its figure for Ethiopia’s total population by more than 20%. And a disputed 1992 census of Nigeria officially reported a population of 88.5 million, still the largest in Africa but far below the generally accepted and widely cited estimates of between 105 and 115 million Nigerians. Fortunately, census coverage on a world basis is improving. Almost every country has now had at least one census of its population, and most have been subjected to periodic sample surveys (Figure 4.29). However, only about 10% of the developing world’s population live in countries with anything approaching complete systems for registering births and deaths. Estimates are that 40% or less of live births in Indonesia, Pakistan, India, or the Philippines are officially recorded. Apparently, deaths are even less completely reported than births throughout Asia. And whatever the deficiencies of Asian states, African statistics are still less complete and reliable. It is, of course, on just these basic birth and death data that projections about population growth and composition are founded.

Even the age structure reported for national populations, so essential to many areas of population analysis, must be viewed with suspicion. In many societies, birthdays are not noted, nor are years recorded by the Western calendar. Non-Western ways of counting age also confuse the record. The Chinese, for example, consider a person to be 1 year old at birth and increase that age by 1 year each (Chinese) New Year’s Day. Bias and error arise from the common tendency of people after middle age to report their ages in round numbers ending in 0. Also evident is a bias toward claiming an age ending in the number 5 or as an even number of years. Inaccuracy and noncomparability of reckoning added to incompleteness of survey and response conspire to cloud national comparisons in which age or the implications of age are important ingredients.

Population Projections For all their inadequacies and imprecisions, current data reported for country units form the basis of population projections, estimates of future population size, age, and sex composition based on current data. Projections are not forecasts, and demographers are not the social science equivalent of meteorologists. Weather forecasters work with a myriad of accurate observations applied against a known, tested model of the atmosphere. The

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Figure 4.29

Taking the census in rural China. The sign identifies the “Third Population Census. Mobile Registration Station.” A Fourth Population Census was undertaken on July 1, 1990 and the Fifth Census, involving 6 million census workers, was conducted during November, 2000.

demographer, in contrast, works with sparse, imprecise, out-of-date, and missing data applied to human actions that will be unpredictably responsive to stimuli not yet evident. Population projections, therefore, are based on assumptions for the future applied to current data that are, themselves, frequently suspect. Since projections are not predictions, they can never be wrong. They are simply the inevitable result of calculations about fertility, mortality, and migration rates applied to each age cohort of a population now living, and the making of birth rate, survival, and migration assumptions about cohorts yet unborn. Of course, the perfectly valid projections of future population size and structure resulting from those calculations may be dead wrong as predictions. Since those projections are invariably treated as scientific expectations by a public that ignores their underlying qualifying assumptions, agencies such as the UN that estimate the population of, say, Africa in the year 2025, do so by not one but by three or more projections: high, medium, and low, for example (see “World Population Projections”). For areas as large as Africa, a medium projection is assumed to benefit from compensating errors and statistically predictable behaviors of very large populations. For individual African countries and smaller populations, the medium projection may be much less satisfying. The usual tendency in projections is to assume that something like current conditions will be applicable in the future. Obviously, the more distant

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the future, the less likely is that assumption to remain true. The resulting observation should be that the further into the future the population structure of small areas is projected, the greater is the implicit and inevitable error (see Figure 4.13).

Population Controls All population projections include an assumption that at some point in time population growth will cease and plateau at the replacement level. Without that assumption, future numbers become unthinkably large. For the world at unchecked present growth rates, there would be 1 trillion people three centuries from now, 4 trillion four centuries in the future, and so on. Although there is reasonable debate about whether the world is now overpopulated and about what either its optimum or maximum sustainable population should be, totals in the trillions are beyond any reasonable expectation. Population pressures do not come from the amount of space humans occupy. It has been calculated, for example, that the entire human race could easily be accommodated within the boundaries of the state of Delaware. The problems stem from the food, energy, and other resources necessary to support the population and from the impact on the environment of the increasing demands and the technologies required to meet

World Population Projections

W

hile the need for population projections is obvious, demographers face difficult decisions regarding the assumptions they use in preparing them. Assumptions must be made about the future course of birth and death rates and, in some cases, about migration. Demographers must consider many factors when projecting a country’s population. What is the present level of the birth rate, of literacy, and of education? Does the government have a policy to influence population growth? What is the status of women? What might be the impact of, for example, HIV/AIDS on life expectancies? Along with these questions must be weighed the likelihood of socioeconomic change, for it is generally assumed that as a country “develops,” a preference for smaller families will cause fertility to fall to the replacement level of about two children per woman. But when can one expect this to happen in less developed coun-

tries? And for the majority of more developed countries with fertility currently below replacement level, can one assume that fertility will rise to avert eventual disappearance of the population and, if so, when? Predicting the pace of fertility decline is most important, as illustrated by one earlier set of United Nations long-range projections for Africa. As with many projections, these were issued in a “series” to show the effects of different assumptions. The “low” projection for Africa assumed that replacement level fertility would be reached in 2030, which would put the continent’s population at 1.4 billion in 2100. If attainment of replacement-level fertility were delayed to 2065, the population would reach 4.4 billion in 2100. That difference of 3 billion should serve as a warning that using population projections requires caution and consideration of all the possibilities. Unfortunately, demographers usually cast their projections in an environmental vacuum, ignoring the

them. Rates of growth currently prevailing in many countries make it nearly impossible for them to achieve the kind of social and economic development they would like. Clearly, at some point population will have to stop increasing as fast as it has been. That is, either the self-induced limitations on expansion implicit in the demographic transition will be adopted or an equilibrium between population and resources will be established in more dramatic fashion. Recognition of this eventuality is not new. “[P]estilence, and famine, and wars, and earthquakes have to be regarded as a remedy for nations, as the means of pruning the luxuriance of the human race,” was the opinion of the theologian Tertullian during the 2nd century A.D. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834), an English economist and demographer, put the problem succinctly in a treatise published in 1798: All biological populations have a potential for increase that exceeds the actual rate of increase, and the resources for the support of increase are limited. In later publications, Malthus amplified his thesis by noting the following:

1. 2.

3.

realities of soils, vegetation, water supplies, and climate that ultimately determine feasible or possible levels of population support. Inevitably, different analysts present different assessments of the absolute carrying capacity of the earth. At an unrealistically low level, the World Hunger Project calculated that the world’s ecosystem could, with present agricultural technologies and with equal distribution of food supplies, support on a sustained basis no more than 5.5 billion people, a number already far exceeded. Many agricultural economists, in contrast—citing present trends and prospective increases in crop yields, fertilizer efficiencies, and intensification of production methods—are confident that the earth can readily feed 10 billion or more on a sustained basis. Nearly all observers, however, agree that physical environmental realities make unrealistic purely demographically-based projections of a world population three or four times its present size.

Population is inevitably limited by the means of subsistence. Populations invariably increase with increase in the means of subsistence unless prevented by powerful checks. The checks that inhibit the reproductive capacity of populations and keep it in balance with means of subsistence are either “private” (moral restraint, celibacy, and chastity) or “destructive” (war, poverty, pestilence, and famine).

The deadly consequences of Malthus’s dictum that unchecked population increases geometrically while food production can increase only arithmetically1 have been reported throughout human history, as they are today. Starvation, the ultimate expression of resource depletion,

1”Within a hundred years or so, the population can increase from fivefold to twentyfold, while the means of subsistence . . . can increase only from three to five times,” was the observation of Hung Liangchi of China, a spatially distant early 19th-century contemporary of Malthus.

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is no stranger to the past or present. By conservative estimate, some 100 people worldwide will starve to death during the two minutes it takes you to read this page; half will be children under five. They will, of course, be more than replaced numerically by new births during the same 2 minutes. Losses are always recouped. All battlefield casualties, perhaps 60 million, in all of humankind’s wars over the last 300 years equal less than a nine-month replacement period at present rates of natural increase. Yet, inevitably—following the logic of Malthus, the apparent evidence of history, and our observations of animal populations—equilibrium must be achieved between numbers and support resources. When overpopulation of any species occurs, a population dieback is inevitable. The madly ascending leg of the J-curve is bent to the horizontal, and the J-curve is converted to an S-curve. It has happened before in human history, as Figure 4.30 summarizes. The top of the S-curve represents a population size consistent with and supportable by the exploitable resource base. When the population is equivalent to the carrying capacity of the occupied area, it is said to have reached a homeostatic plateau. In animals, overcrowding and environmental stress apparently release an automatic physiological suppressant of fertility. Although famine and chronic malnutrition may reduce fertility in humans, population limitation usually must be either forced or self-imposed. The demographic transition to low birth rates matching reduced death rates is cited as evidence that Malthus’s first assumption was wrong: Human populations do not inevitably grow geometrically. Fertility behavior, it was observed, is conditioned by social determinants, not solely by biological or resource imperatives. Although Malthus’s ideas were discarded as deficient by the end of the 19th century in light of the European population experience, the concerns he expressed were revived during the 1950s. Observations of population growth in underdeveloped countries and the strain that growth placed on their resources inspired the viewpoint that improvements in living standards could be achieved only by raising investment per worker. Rapid population growth was seen as a serious diversion of scarce resources away from capital investment and into unending social welfare programs. In order to lift living standards, the existing national efforts to lower mortality rates had to be balanced by governmental programs to reduce birth rates. Neo-Malthusianism, as this viewpoint became known, has been the underpinning of national and international programs of population limitation primarily through birth control and family planning (Figure 4.31). Neo-Malthusianism has had a mixed reception. Asian countries, led by China and India, have in general—though with differing successes—adopted family planning programs and policies. In some instances, success has been declared complete. Singapore established its Population and Family Planning Board in 1965, when its fertility rate was 4.9 lifetime births per woman. By 1986, that rate had

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Figure 4.30

The steadily higher homeostatic plateaus (states of equilibrium) achieved by humans are evidence of their ability to increase the carrying capacity of the land through technological advance. Each new plateau represents the conversion of the J-curve into an S-curve.

declined to 1.7, well below the 2.1 replacement level for developed countries, and the board was abolished as no longer necessary. Caribbean and South American countries, except the poorest and most agrarian, have also experienced declining fertility rates, though often these reductions have been achieved despite pronatalist views of governments influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. Africa and the Middle East have generally been less responsive to the neo-Malthusian arguments because of ingrained cultural convictions among people, if not in all governmental circles, that large families—6 or 7 children— are desirable. Although total fertility rates have begun to decline in several sub-Saharan African states, they still remain nearly everywhere far above replacement levels. Islamic fundamentalism opposed to birth restrictions also is a cultural factor in the Near East and North Africa. However, the Muslim theocracy of Iran has endorsed a range of contraceptive procedures and developed one of the world’s more aggressive family planning programs. Other barriers to fertility control exist. When first proposed by Western states, neo-Malthusian arguments that family planning was necessary for development were rejected by many less developed countries. Reflecting both nationalistic and Marxist concepts, they maintained that remnant colonial-era social, economic, and class structures rather than population increase hindered development. Some government leaders think there is a correlation between population size and power and pursue pronatalist policies, as did Mao’s China during the 1950s and early 1960s. And a number of American economists called cornucopians expressed the view, beginning in the 1980s, that population growth is a stimulus, not a deterrent, to development and that human minds and skills are the world’s ultimate resource base. Since the time of Malthus, they observe, world population has grown from 900 million to over 6 billion without the predicted dire consequences—proof that Malthus failed to recognize the importance of technology in raising the carrying capacity of the earth. Still higher population numbers, they suggest, are sustainable, perhaps even with improved standards of living for all.

Figure 4.31

A Bombay, India, sign promoting the government’s continuing program to reduce the country’s high fertility rate. Sterilization is a major contraception practice in India.

A third view, modifying cornucopian optimism, admits that products of human ingenuity such as the Green Revolution (see page 282) increases in food production have managed to keep pace with rapid population growth since 1970. But its advocates argue that scientific and technical ingenuity to enhance food production do not automatically appear; both complacency and inadequate research support have hindered continuing progress in recent years. And even if further advances are made, they observe, not all countries or regions have the social and political will or capacity to take advantage of them. Those that do not, third-view advocates warn, will fail to keep pace with the needs of their populace and will sink into varying degrees of poverty and environmental decay, creating national and regional—though not necessarily global—crises.

Population Prospects Regardless of population philosophies, theories, or cultural norms, the fact remains that in many parts of the world developing countries are showing significantly declining population growth rates. Global fertility and birth rates appear to be falling to an extent not anticipated by pessimistic Malthusians and at a pace that suggests a peaking of world population numbers sooner—and at lower totals—than previously projected (see “A Population Implosion?”, p. 107). In all world regions, steady and continuous fertility declines have been recorded over the past quarter century, reducing fertility from global 5.0children-per-woman levels in the early 1950s to less than 3 per woman at the end of the century.

But reducing fertility levels even to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman does not mean an immediate end to population growth. Because of the age composition of many societies, numbers of births will continue to grow even as fertility rates per woman decline. The reason is to be found in demographic (or population) momentum, and the key to that is the age structure of a country’s population. When a high proportion of the population is young, the product of past high fertility rates, larger and larger numbers enter the childbearing age each year; that is the case for major parts of the world at the start of the 21st century. The populations of developing countries are far younger than those of the established industrially developed regions (Figure 4.11), with about one-third (in Asia and Latin America) to almost one-half (in Africa) below the age of 15. The consequences of the fertility of these young people are yet to be realized. A population with a greater number of young people tends to grow rapidly regardless of the level of childbearing. The results will continue to be felt until the now-youthful groups mature and work their way through the population pyramid. Inevitably, while this is happening, even the most stringent national policies limiting growth cannot stop it entirely. A country with a large present population base will experience large numerical increases despite declining birth rates. Indeed, the higher fertility was to begin with and the sharper its drop to low levels, the greater will be the role of momentum even after rates drop below replacement. A simple comparison of South Korea and the United Kingdom may serve to demonstrate the point. The two countries had (in 1998) the same level of fertility, with women averaging about 1.7 children each. Between that year and 2025, the population of the U.K. (without considering immigration or the births associated with newcomers) was projected to decline by 2 million persons while much more youthful South Korea was expected to continue growing, adding 6 million people. Eventually, of course, young populations grow older, and even the youthful developing countries are beginning to face the consequences of that reality. The problems of a rapidly aging population that already confront the industrialized economies are now being realized in the developing world as well. Globally, there will be more than 1 billion persons 60 years of age and older by 2025 and nearly 2 billion by 2050. Three-fourths of those elderly folk will live in the less developed world, for the growth rate of older people is three times as high in developing countries as in the developed ones. The largest percentage increases of the elderly will occur in the world’s poorest developing states that generally lack health, income, housing, and social service support systems adequate to the needs of their older citizens. To the social and economic implications of their present population momentum, therefore, developing countries must add the aging consequences of past patterns and rates of growth (Figure 4.32). Population: World Patterns, Regional Trends

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Summary

Figure 4.32

These senior citizens exercising in Beijing, China, are part of the rapidly aging population of many developing countries. Worldwide, the over-60 cohort will number some 22% of total population by 2050 and be larger than the number of children less than 15 years of age. But by 2020, a third of Singapore citizens will be 55 or older and China will have as large a share of its population over 60—about one in four—as will Europe. Already, the numbers of old people in the world’s poorer countries are beginning to dwarf those in the rich world. At the start of the 21st century there were nearly twice as many persons over 60 in developing countries as in the advanced ones, but most are without the old-age assistance and welfare programs developed countries have put in place.

Birth, death, fertility, and growth rates are important in understanding the numbers, composition, distribution, and spatial trends of population. Recent “explosive” increases in human numbers and the prospects of continuing population expansion may be traced to sharp reductions in death rates, increases in longevity, and the impact of demographic momentum on a youthful population largely concentrated in the developing world. Control of population numbers historically was accomplished through a demographic transition first experienced in European societies that adjusted their fertility rates downward as death rates fell and life expectancies increased. The introduction of advanced technologies of preventive and curative medicine, pesticides, and famine relief have reduced mortality rates in developing countries without, until recently, always a compensating reduction in birth rates. Recent fertility declines in many developing regions suggest the demographic transition is no longer limited to the advanced industrial countries and promise world population stability earlier and at lower numbers than envisioned just a few years ago. Even with the advent of more widespread fertility declines, the 6 billion human beings present at the end of the 1990s will still likely grow to about 9 billion by the middle of the 21st century. That growth will largely reflect increases unavoidable because of the size and youth of populations in developing countries. Eventually, a new balance between population numbers and carrying capacity of the world will be reached, as it has always been following past periods of rapid population increase. People are unevenly distributed over the earth. The ecumene, or permanently inhabited portion of the globe, is discontinuous and marked by pronounced differences in population concentrations and numbers. East Asia,

Population Geography Steadily increasing numbers of population-related websites, with constantly changing and expanding information content, are becoming available. We’ve listed here only a few of the more useful home pages from governmental and nongovernmental agencies, including universities and international organizations. An efficient way of starting a search for population materials is to use a subject resource guide. Perhaps the most extensive is the World Wide Web Virtual Library—Demography and Population Studies catalog at http://demography.anu.edu.au/ VirtualLibrary/ Leading sources for U.S. population data include: (1) The Census Bureau Home Page, a primary source for official social, economic, and demographic statistics of the U.S. population

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indexed by subject. It is as well a source of Census Bureau data maps and is linked to other population websites. Selected tables from the latest Statistical Abstract and County and City Data Book are included or linked. Some lengthy reports need Adobe Acrobat Reader. Find it at www.census.gov/. (2) The Census Bureau’s State Census Data Centers home pages provide population estimates, employment reports, economic indicators, and other data at state, county, and city levels. Existing state data center websites may be accessed from the single source: www.census.gov/sdc/www/. (3) Ameristat, a “one-stop source for U.S. population data,” is sponsored by the Population Reference Bureau and the Social Science Data Analysis Network and provides a whole range of topically organized U.S. census information. View it at www.ameristat.org/.

Most recent Canadian census data may be found through Statistics Canada at www.statcan.ca/english/census96/list.htm. Be sure to check the Nation Series of reports or go directly to demographic information at www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/ People/popula.htm#pop. World population information is found at a number of sites. United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN) reports world, regional, and country-level demographic trends, and is a good source for historical world population growth, urbanization, child mortality estimates, AIDS impact, etc. Full-text regional reports and newsletters are also available, including Country Health Profiles of the Pan American Health Organization. The site is linked to many other population home pages and includes a worldwide directory of population organizations and institutions. It is well worth visiting at www.undp.org/popin/. The United Nations Population Fund assists developing countries in reproductive health and family planning services. Its website provides on-line access to its current “State of World Population” annual report, to various technical reports and general interest publications, and links to related UN and nongovernmental organization home pages: www.unfpa.org/. The Population Reference Bureau, a principal source of demographic data used in this book and in many newspaper and journal reports, gives current-year demographic statistics for more than 190 countries in its World Population Data Sheet available on its website as well as a “top hits” list of PRB publications and a changing set of discussions on current population concerns: www.prb.org/. PopNet, also maintained by the Population Reference Bureau, is dedicated to providing comprehensive data on global population issues. Dubbing itself “the source for global population information,” it presents data on such topics as demographic statistics, education, environment, economics, gender, and reproductive health; in addition, it has multiple links to websites of governmental and nongovernmental domestic and international organizations and university centers. PopNet can be reached through the Population Reference Bureau website (above) or directly at its own address:www.popnet.org. The Statistics Division of the United Nations maintains a page for Social Indicators, minimum data sets covering a number of subjects of interest: www.un.org/Depts/unsd/ social/main2.htm. Unicef has a more extensive international view through its Information: Statistics page. National statistical data can be accessed by a country’s map location or name; world maps present some data graphically: www.unicef.org/statis/index.html. The International Data Base of the U.S. Census Bureau at www.census.gov/ipc/www/ idbnew.html provides extensive demographic and socioeconomic data, including population pyramids, and projections for 227 countries and user-selected regions from 1950 to 2050. Health and disease topics have their own set of useful home pages. The National Center for Health Statistics website provides information on access to reports and statistics about births, deaths, marriages, fertility rates, etc., at www.cdc.gov/nchs/.

Demographic and Health Surveys is a primary information source on matters of fertility, maternal and child health, and household living conditions in developing countries: www.measuredhs.com/. The World Health Organization’s website reflects its global perspective, with overviews of health threats from disease, environment, and lifestyle sources at www.who.int/home-page. The WHO’s Statistical Information System (WHOSIS) website provides access to statistical data and information available from the WHO and links to other sources of health information elsewhere in electronic and other forms; view it at www.who.int/whosis/. AEGIS, the website of the AIDS Education Global Information System and self-described “world’s largest AIDS database,” permits resource searches through books, journals, AIDS websites, and government databases at www.aegis.org/. A valuable source of comparative international population reports and statistics exists in the International Programs Center (IPC) of the U.S. Bureau of the Census; it provides a wealth of comparative statistics for all world countries, including population, life tables, migration, ethnicity, language, religion, vital statistics, labor force and economic data, and more. View it at www.census.gov/ftp/pub/ipc/www. Useful text and statistical supplements to the population appendix in this book are to be found in the CIA World Factbook of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The site contains demographic, economic, and social information for more than 260 countries, including data on population, vital statistics, ethnic composition, religions, languages, net migration, and more. Find it at www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. Population associations and information source guides may help you gain access to other useful databases, bibliographies, and agencies. Following are a few of potential interest: The Population Association of America reports its activities in its full-text newsletter at www.pop.psu.edu/general/pubs/ PAA_Affairs. Internet Resources for Demographers is a collection of demographic Internet sites categorized under “North American Demography,” “International Demography,” “General Demography,” etc.a View it at www.chrr.ohio-state.edu/∼gryn/ demog.html. Also useful are: the Social Science Information Gateway (SOSIG)—Demography at www.sosig.ac.uk/roads/ subject-listing/World-cat/demog.html and the Johns Hopkins University Population Information Program Popline, a searchable bibliographies database of over 250,000 records covering worldwide literature on population, family planning, and health issues: www.jhuccp.org/popline/. The About.com geography pages are always useful and revealing. For population geography in general, go to http://geography.about.com/science/ geography/cs/populationgeo/index.htm and try About.com’s World Population and Demographic Data site at http://geography.about.com/msub24.htm for a variety of useful and interesting data and discussion sources. Finally, don’t forget to check our own textbook’s home page at www.mhhe.com/fellmann7e/ for additional websites added by the publisher or contributed by helpful users. aThe site is an extension of an exhaustive printed document, “Internet Resources for Demographers,” by Thomas A. Gryn that appears in Population Index 20, no. 2 (Summer, 1997): 189–204.

The guidance of the Population Reference Bureau in the preparation of this listing is gratefully acknowledged.

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South Asia, Europe, and northeastern United States/southeastern Canada represent the world’s greatest population clusters, though smaller areas of great density are found in other regions and continents. Since growth rates are highest and population doubling times generally shorter in world regions outside these four present main concentrations, new patterns of population localization and dominance are taking form. A respected geographer once commented that “population is the point of reference from which all other elements [of geography] are observed.” Certainly,

population geography is the essential starting point of the human component of the human–environment concerns of geography. But human populations are not merely collections of numerical units; nor are they to be understood solely through statistical analysis. Societies are distinguished not just by the abstract data of their numbers, rates, and trends, but by experiences, beliefs, understandings, and aspirations that collectively constitute that human spatial and behavioral variable called culture. It is to that fundamental human diversity that we next turn our attention.

Key Words arithmetic density carrying capacity cohort

125

dependency ratio

127

doubling time

102

ecumene

crude birth rate (CBR) crude death rate (CDR) crude density

102 108

125

demographic equation

J-curve

124

131

demographic transition

nonecumene

116

population projection

rates

114

neo-Malthusianism overpopulation

100 129 111

rate of natural increase 108

natural increase

100

132

population pyramid

demographic (population) momentum 133 demography

126

125

population geography

115

mortality rate

physiological density population density

homeostatic plateau Malthus

122

113

114

132

125 126

114

102

replacement level S-curve

107

132

total fertility rate (TFR)

104

zero population growth (ZPG)

107

For Review 1.

2.

How is the crude death rate calculated? What factors account for the worldwide decline in death rates since 1945?

3.

How is a population pyramid constructed? What shape of “pyramid” reflects the structure of a rapidly growing country? Of a population with a slow rate of growth? What can we tell about future population numbers from those shapes?

4.

136

How do the crude birth rate and the fertility rate differ? Which measure is the more accurate statement of the amount of reproduction occurring in a population?

What variations do we discern in the spatial pattern of the rate of natural increase and,

Themes and Fundamentals of Human Geography

consequently, of population growth? What rate of natural increase would double population in 35 years? 5.

How are population numbers projected from present conditions? Are projections the same as predictions? If not, in what ways do they differ?

6.

Describe the stages in the demographic transition. Where has the final stage of the transition been achieved? Why do some analysts doubt the applicability of the demographic transition to all parts of the world?

7.

Contrast crude population density and physiological density. For what differing purposes might

each be useful? How is carrying capacity related to the concept of density? 8.

What was Malthus’s underlying assumption concerning the relationship between population growth and food supply? In what ways do the arguments of neoMalthusians differ from the original doctrine? What governmental policies are implicit in neo-Malthusianism?

9.

Why is demographic momentum a matter of interest in population projections? In which world areas are the implications of demographic momentum most serious in calculating population growth, stability, or decline?

Focus Follow-up 1.

A cohort is a population group, usually an age group, treated as a unit. Rates record the frequency of occurrence of an event over a given unit of time. Rates are used to trace a wide range of population features and trends: births, deaths, fertility, infant or maternal mortality, natural increase, and others. Those rates tell us both the present circumstances and likely prospects for national, country group, or world population structures. Population pyramids give visual evidence of the current age and sex cohort structure of countries or country groupings. 2.

for some aging societies. The transition model has been observed to be not fully applicable to all developing states. The demographic equation attempts to incorporate cross-border population migration into projections of national population trends.

What are some basic terms and measures used by population geographers? pp. 100–116.

What are meant and measured by the demographic transition model and the demographic equation? pp. 116–123. The demographic transition model traces the presumed relationship between population growth and economic development. In Western countries, the transition model historically displayed four stages: (a) high birth and death rates; (b) high birth and declining death rates; (c) declining births and reduced growth rates; and (d) low birth and death rates. A fifth stage of population decline is observed

3.

What descriptive generalizations can be made about world population distributions and densities? pp. 123–128. World population is primarily concentrated north of the equator, in lower (below 200 meters) elevations, along continental margins. Major world population clusters include East Asia with 25% of the total, South Asia with over 20%, Europe, and Northeastern United States/ southeastern Canada with significant but lesser shares of world population. Other smaller but pronounced concentrations are found discontinuously on all continents. Within the permanently inhabited areas—the “ecumene”—population densities vary greatly. Highest densities are found in cities; almost one-half of the world’s people are urban residents now and the vast majority of world population growth over the first quarter of the 21st century will occur in cities of the developing world.

4.

What are population projections and how are they affected by various controls on population growth? pp. 128–133. Population projections are merely calculations of the future size, age, and sex composition of regional, national, or world populations; they are based on current data and manipulated by varying assumptions about the future. As simple calculations, projections cannot be wrong. They may, however, totally misrepresent what actually will occur because of faulty current data or erroneous assumptions used in their calculation. They may also be invalid because of unanticipated self-imposed or external brakes on population growth, such as changing family size desires or limits on areal carrying capacity that slow or halt current growth trends. Even with such growth limitations, however, population prospects are always influenced greatly by demographic momentum, the inevitable growth in numbers promised by the high proportion of younger cohorts yet to enter childbearing years in the developing world.

Selected References Ashford, Lori S. “New Perspectives on Population: Lessons from Cairo.” Population Bulletin 50, no. 1. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1995. Bongaarts, John. “Population Pressure and the Food Supply System in the Developing World.” Population and Development Review 22, no. 3 (1996): 483–503.

Brewer, Cynthia, and Trudy Suchan. Mapping Census 2000: The Geography of U.S. Diversity. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001. Brown, Lester R., Gary Gardner, and Brian Halweil. Beyond Malthus: Nineteen Dimensions of the Population Challenge. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Caldwell, John C., I. O. Orbulove, and Pat Caldwell. “Fertility Decline in

Africa: A New Type of Transition?” Population and Development Review 19, no. 2 (1992): 211–242. Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. 2d ed. New York: Guilford Press, 1998. Cohen, Joel E. How Many People Can the Earth Support? New York: W. W. Norton, 1995.

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Daugherty, Helen Ginn, and Kenneth C. W. Kammeyer. An Introduction to Population. 2d ed. New York: Guilford Publications, 1995. Gelbard, Alene, Carl Haub, and Mary M. Kent. “World Population Beyond Six Billion.” Population Bulletin 54, no. 1. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1999. Gould, Peter. The Slow Plague: A Geography of the AIDS Pandemic. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993. Haub, Carl. “Understanding Population Projections.” Population Bulletin 42, no. 4. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1987. Haupt, Arthur, and Thomas Kane. Population Handbook. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1997. Hirschman, Charles, and Philip Guest. “The Emerging Demographic Transitions of Southeast Asia.” Population and Development Review 16, no. 1 (March 1990): 121–152. Hornby, William F., and Melvyn Jones. An Introduction to Population Geography. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Kent, Mary M., et al. “First Glimpses from the 2000 U.S. Census.” Population Bulletin 56, no. 2. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 2001. Keyfitz, Nathan, and Wilhelm Flinger. World Population Growth and Aging: Demographic Trends in the Late 20th Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. King, Russell, ed. Mass Migrations in Europe: The Legacy and the Future. London and New York: Belhaven Press and John Wiley & Sons, 1995.

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Lee, James, and Feng Wang. One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Reality 1700–2000. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. Martin, Philip, and Jonas Widgren. “International Migration: A Global Challenge.” Population Bulletin 51, no. 1. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1996. McFalls, Joseph A., Jr. “Population: A Lively Introduction.” 3d. ed. Population Bulletin 53, no. 3. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1998. Olshansky, S. Jay, Bruce Carnes, Richard G. Rogers, and Len Smith. “Infectious Diseases—New and Ancient Threats to World Health.” Population Bulletin 52, no. 2. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1997. Omran, Abdel R. “The Epidemiologic Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change.” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 49 (1971): 509–538. Omran, Abdel R., and Farzaneh Roudi. “The Middle East Population Puzzle.” Population Bulletin 48, no. 1. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1993. O’Neill, Brian, and Deborah Balk. “World Population Futures.” Population Bulletin 56, no. 3. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 2001. Peters, Gary L., and Robert P. Larkin. Population Geography: Problems, Concepts, and Prospects. Dubuque, Ia.: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1993. “Population.” National Geographic (October 1998).

Pritchett, Lant H. “Desired Fertility and the Impact of Population Policies.” Population and Development Review 20, no. 1 (March 1994): 1–55. Riley, Nancy E. “Gender, Power, and Population Change.” Population Bulletin 52, no. 1. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1997. Robey, Bryant, Shea O. Rutstein, and Leo Morris. “The Fertility Decline in Developing Countries.” Scientific American 269 (December 1993): 30–37. Simon, Julian. The Ultimate Resource 2. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Smil, Vaclav. Feeding the World: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000. United Nations. Population and Women. New York: United Nations, 1996. United Nations Population Fund. Food for the Future: Women, Population and Food Security. New York: United Nations, 1996. United Nations Population Fund. The State of World Population. New York: United Nations, annual. Visaria, Leela, and Pravin Visaria. “India’s Population in Transition.” Population Bulletin 50, no. 3. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1995. World Health Organization. The World Health Report. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, annual. Xizhe Peng, and Guo Zhigang, eds. The Changing Population of China. Oxford, England: Blackwell, 2000.

C

H

A

P

T

E

R

Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

5

Jewish men gathering to pray at the 2500-yearold Western Wall, old Jerusalem’s remnant of the holy Second Temple.

Focus Preview Language 1. The classification, spread, and distribution of the world’s languages; the nature of language change, pp. 142–152. 2. Language standards and variants, from dialects to official tongues, pp. 152–160. 3. Language as cultural identity and landscape relic, pp. 160–163.

Religion 4. The cultural significance and role of religion, pp. 163–165. 5. How world religions are classified and distributed, pp. 165–167. 6. The origins, nature, and diffusions of principal world religions, pp. 167–181.

141

W

hen God saw [humans become arrogant], he thought of something to bring confusion to their heads: he gave the people a very heavy sleep. They slept for a very, very long time. They slept for so long that they forgot the language they had used to speak. When they eventually woke up from their sleep, each man went his own way, speaking his own tongue. None of them could understand the language of the other any more. That is how people dispersed all over the world. Each man would walk his way and speak his own language and another would go his way and speak in his own language. . . . God has forbidden me to speak Arabic. I asked God, “Why don’t I speak Arabic?” and He said, “If you speak Arabic, you will turn into a bad man.” I said, “There is something good in Arabic!” And He said, “No, there is nothing good in it! . . .” Here, I slaughter a bull and I call [the Muslim] to share my meat. I say, “Let us share our meat.” But he refuses the meat I slaughter because he says it is not slaughtered in a Muslim way. If he cannot accept the way I slaughter my meat, how can we be relatives? Why does he despise our food? So, let us eat our meat alone. . . . Why, they insult us, they combine contempt for our black skin with pride in their religion. As for us, we have our own ancestors and our own spirits; the spirits of the Rek, the spirits of the Twic, we have not combined our spirits with their spirits. The spirit of the black man is different. Our spirit has not combined with theirs.1

language and religion are fundamental strands in the complex web of culture, serving to shape and to distinguish people and groups. They are ever-changing strands, for languages and religions in their present-day structure and spatial patterns are simply the temporary latest phase in a continuing progression of culture change. Languages evolve in place, responding to the dynamics of human thought, experience, and expression and to the exchanges and borrowings ever more common in a closely integrated world. They disperse in space, carried by streams of migrants, colonizers, and conquerors. They may be rigorously defended and preserved as essential elements of cultural identity, or abandoned in the search for acceptance into a new society. To trace their diffusions, adoptions, and disappearances is to understand part of the evolving course of historical cultural geography. Religions, too, are dynamic, sweeping across national, linguistic, and cultural boundaries by conversion, conviction, and conquest. Their broad spatial patterns—distinctive culture regions in their own right— are also fundamental in defining the culture realms outlined in Figure 2.4, while at a different scale religious differences may contribute to the cultural diversity and richness within the countries of the world (Figure 5.1).

Language and religion are basic components of cultures, the learned ways of life of different human communities. They help identify who and what we are and clearly place us within larger communities of persons with similar characteristics. At the same time, as the words of Chief Makuei suggest, they separate and divide peoples of different tongues and faiths. In the terminology introduced in Chapter 2, language and religion are mentifacts, components of the ideological subsystem of culture that help shape the belief system of a society and transmit it to succeeding generations. Both within and between cultures,

1The words of Chief Makuei Bilkuei of the Dinka, a Nilotic people of the southern Sudan. His comments are directed at the attempts to unite into a single people the Arabic Muslims of the north of the Republic of the Sudan with his and other black, Luo-speaking animist and Christian people of the country’s southern areas. Recorded by Francis Mading Deng, Africans of Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan. Copyright © 1978 Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Reprinted by permission of the author.

142

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

Figure 5.1 United States.

Advertised evidence of religious diversity in the

The Geography of Language Forever changing and evolving, language in spoken or written form makes possible the cooperative efforts, the group understandings, and shared behavior patterns that distinguish culture groups. Language is the most important medium by which culture is transmitted. It is what enables parents to teach their children what the world they live in is like and what they must do to become functioning members of society. Some argue that the language of a society structures the perceptions of its speakers. By the words that it contains and the concepts that it can formulate, language is said to determine the attitudes, the understandings, and the responses of the society to which it belongs. If that conclusion be true, one aspect of cultural heterogeneity may be easily understood. The more than 6 billion people on earth speak many thousands of different languages. Knowing that as many as 1500 languages and language variants are spoken in sub-Saharan Africa gives us a clearer appreciation of the political and social divisions in that continent. Europe alone has more than 100 languages and dialects. Language is a hallmark of cultural diversity, an often fiercely defended symbol of cultural identity helping to distinguish the world’s diverse social groups.

Classification of Languages On a clear, dark night the unaided eye can distinguish between 4000 and 6000 stars, a number comparable to some estimates of the probable total number of the world’s languages. In reality, no precise figure is possible, for even today in Africa, Latin America, New Guinea, and elsewhere, linguists are still in the process of identifying and classifying the tongues spoken by isolated peoples. Even when they are well known, languages cannot always be easily or unmistakably recognized as distinctly separate entities. In the broadest sense, language is any systematic method of communicating ideas, attitudes, or intent through the use of mutually understood signs, sounds, or gestures. For our geographic purposes, we may define language as an organized system of spoken words by which people communicate with each other with mutual comprehension. But such a definition fails to recognize the gradations among and between languages or to grasp the varying degrees of mutual comprehension between two or more of them. The language commonly called “Chinese,” for example, is more properly seen as a group of related languages—Mandarin, Cantonese, Hakka, and others—that are as different from each other as are such comparably related European languages as Spanish, Italian, French, and

Romanian. “Chinese” has uniformity only in the fact that all of the varied Chinese languages are written alike. No matter how it is pronounced, the same symbol for ‘house’ or for ‘rice’, for example, is recognized by all literate speakers of any Chinese language variant (Figure 5.2). Again, the language known as “Arabic” represents a number of related but distinct tongues, so that Arabic spoken in Morocco differs from Palestinian Arabic roughly as Portuguese differs from Italian. Languages differ greatly in their relative importance, if “importance” can be taken to mean the number of people using them. More than half of the world’s inhabitants are speakers of just eight of its thousands of tongues. That restricted language dominance reflects the reality that the world’s linguistic diversity is rapidly shrinking. In prehistory, humans probably spoke between 10,000 and 15,000 tongues. Of the at most 6000 still remaining, between 20% and 50% are no longer being learned by children and are effectively dead. One estimate anticipates that no more than 600 of the world’s languages will still be in existence in A.D. 2100. Table 5.1 lists those languages currently spoken as a native or second tongue by 40 million or more people, a list that includes four-fifths of the world’s population. At the other end of the scale are a number of rapidly declining languages whose speakers number in the hundreds or, at most, the few thousands. The diversity of languages is simplified when we recognize among them related families. A language family is a group of languages descended from a single, earlier tongue. By varying estimates, from at least 30 to perhaps 100 such families of languages are found worldwide. The families, in turn, may be subdivided into subfamilies, branches, or groups of more closely related tongues. Some 2000 years ago, Latin was the common language spoken throughout the Roman Empire. The fall of the empire in the 5th century A.D. broke the unity of Europe, and regional variants of Latin began to develop in isolation. In the course of the next several centuries, these Latin derivatives, changing and developing as all languages do, emerged as the individual Romance languages—Italian, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and

Figure 5.2

All literate Chinese, no matter which of the many languages of China they speak, recognize the same ideographs for house, rice, and tree.

Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

143

TABLE 5.1

Languages Spoken by More than 40 Million People, 2001

Language

Millions of Speakers (native plus nonnative)

English

1,500

Mandarin (China)

1,076

Hindia (India, Pakistan)

497

Spanish

423

Russian

271

Arabic

257

Bengali (Bangladesh, India)

216

Portuguese

195

Malay-Indonesian

176

French

127

German

127

Japanese

126

Urdua (Pakistan, India)

107

Punjabi (India, Pakistan)

96

Korean (Korea, China, Japan)

78

Telugu (India)

76

Tamil (India, Sri Lanka)

75

Marathi (India)

72

Cantonese (China)

72

Wu (China)

71

Vietnamese

69

Javanese

64

Italian

63

Turkish

62

Tagalog (Philippines)

57

Thai

53

Min (China)

51

Swahili (East Africa)

50

Ukrainian

48

Kannada (India)

47

Gujarati (India, Pakistan)

45

Polish

45

Hausa (West Africa)

40

aHindi and Urdu are basically the same language: Hindustani. Written in the Devangari script, it is called Hindi, the official language of India; in the Arabic script it is called Urdu, the official language of Pakistan.

Romanian—of modern Europe and of the world colonized by their speakers. Catalan, Sardinian, Provençal, and a few other spatially restricted tongues are also part of the Romance language group. Family relationship between languages can be recognized through similarities in their vocabulary and

144

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

grammar. By tracing regularities of sound changes in different languages back through time, linguists are able to reconstruct earlier forms of words and, eventually, determine a word’s original form before it underwent alteration and divergence. Such a reconstructed earlier form is said to belong to a protolanguage. In the case of the Romance languages, of course, the well-known ancestral language was Latin, which needs no such reconstruction. Its root relationship to the Romance languages is suggested by modern variants of panis, the Latin word for “bread”: pane (Italian), pain (French), pan (Spanish), pão (Portuguese), pîine (Romanian). In other language families similar word relationships are less confidently traced to their protolanguage roots. For example, the Germanic languages, including English, German, Dutch, and the Scandinavian tongues, are related descendants of a less well-known proto-Germanic language spoken by peoples who lived in southern Scandinavia and along the North Sea and Baltic coasts from the Netherlands to western Poland. The classification of languages by origin and historical relationship is called a genetic classification. Further tracing of language roots tells us that the Romance and the Germanic languages are individual branches of an even more extensive family of related languages derived from proto-Indo-European or simply IndoEuropean. Of the principal recognized language clusters of the world, the Indo-European family is the largest, embracing most of the languages of Europe and a large part of Asia, and the introduced—not the native—languages of the Americas (Figure 5.3). All told, languages in the IndoEuropean family are spoken by about half the world’s peoples. By recognizing similar words in most Indo-European tongues, linguists deduce that the Indo-European people—originally hunters and fishers but later becoming pastoralists and learning to grow crops—developed somewhere in eastern Europe or the Ukrainian steppes about 5000 years ago (though some conclude that central Turkey was the more likely site of origin). About 2500 B.C. their society apparently fragmented; they left the homeland, carrying segments of the parent culture in different directions. Some migrated into Greece, others settled in Italy, still others crossed central and western Europe, ultimately reaching the British Isles. Another group headed into the Russian forest lands, and still another branch crossed Iran and Afghanistan, eventually to reach India. Wherever this remarkable people settled, they appear to have dominated local populations and imposed their language on them. For example, the word for sheep is “avis” in Lithuanian, “ovis” in Latin, “avis” in Sanskrit (the language of ancient India), and “hawi” in the tongue used in Homer’s Troy. Modern English retains its version in “ewe.” All, linguists infer, derive from an ancestral word “owis” in Indo-European. Similar relationships and histories can be traced for other protolanguages.

INDO-EUROPEAN Indian

Armenian

Iranian

Avestan Sanskrit

Germanic

Old Persian

Italic

Hellenic

Latin

Greek

Persian

Middle Indian Bengali, Hindustani, and other Modern Indian languages

Albanian

BaltoSlavic

Old Slavic

Baltic

Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, etc.

Lithuanian, Lettish

Breton

Welsh Irish

North Germanic

Celtic

East Germanic

West Germanic

Gaelic

Portuguese Romanian French Italian Provencal Spanish Catalan

Gothic

Figure 5.3

East Norse

West Norse

High German

Danish, Gothlandic, Swedish

Faroese, Icelandic, Norwegian

German Yiddish

Low German

Old Frisian

Anglo-Saxon (Old English)

Old Saxon

Low Franconian

Frisian

Middle English

Middle Low German

Middle Dutch

Modern English

Plattdeutsch

Dutch, Flemish

The Indo-European linguistic family tree.

World Pattern of Languages The present world distribution of major language families (Figure 5.4) records not only the migrations and conquests of our linguistic ancestors but also the continuing dynamic pattern of human movements, settlements, and colonizations of more recent centuries. Indo-European languages have been carried far beyond their Eurasian homelands from the 16th century onwards by western European colonizers in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australasia. In the process of linguistic imposition and adoption, innumerable indigenous languages and language groups in areas of colonization have been modified or totally lost. Most of the estimated 1000 to 2000 Amerindian tongues of the Western Hemisphere disappeared in the face of European conquest and settlement (Figure 5.5). The Slavic expansion eastward across Siberia beginning in the 16th century obliterated most of the PaleoAsiatic languages there. Similar loss occurred in Eskimo and Aleut language areas. Large linguistically distinctive areas comprise the northern reaches of both Asia and

America (Figure 5.4). Their sparse populations are losing the mapped languages as the indigenous people adopt the tongues of the majority cultures of which they have been forcibly made a part. In the Southern Hemisphere, the several hundred original Australian languages also loom large spatially on the map but have at most 50,000 speakers, exclusively Australian aborigines. Numerically and effectively, English dominates that continent. Examples of linguistic conquest by non-Europeans also abound. In Southeast Asia, formerly extensive areas identified with different members of the Austro-Asiatic language family have been reduced through conquest and absorption by Sino-Tibetan (Chinese, Thai, Burmese, and Lao, principally) expansion. Arabic—originally a minor Afro-Asiatic language of the Arabian Peninsula—was dispersed through much of North Africa and southwestern Asia, where it largely replaced a host of other locally variant tongues and became the official or the dominant language of more than 20 countries and over 250 million people. The more than 300 Bantu languages found south of the “Bantu line” in sub-Saharan Africa are variants of a

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Figure 5.5

Amerindian language families of North America. As many as 300 different North American and more than 70 Meso-American tongues were spoken at the time of first European contact. The map summarizes the traditional view that these were grouped into 9 or 10 language families in North America, as many as 5 in Meso-America, and another 10 or so in South America. More recent research, however, suggests close genetic relationships between Native American tongues, clustering them into just 3 families: Eskimo-Aleut in the extreme north and Greenland; Na-Dené in Canada and the U.S. Southwest, and Amerind elsewhere in the hemisphere. Because each family has closer affinities with Asian language groups than with one another, it is suggested that each corresponds to a separate wave of Asian migration to the Americas: the first giving rise to the Amerind family, the second to the Na-Dené, and the last to the Eskimo-Aleut. Many Amerindian tongues have become extinct; others are still known only to very small groups of mostly elderly speakers.

Data from various sources, including C. F. and F. M. Voegelin, Map of North American Indian Languages (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986) and Joseph H. Greenberg, Languages in the Americas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

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majority population—but by the gradual abandonment of their former languages by native populations brought under the influence and control of the Roman Empire. Adoption rather than eviction of language was the rule followed in perhaps the majority of historical and contemporary instances of language spread. Knowledge and use of the language of a dominating culture may be seen as a necessity when that language is the medium of commerce, law, civilization, and personal prestige. It was on that basis, not through numerical superiority, that Indo-European tongues were dispersed throughout Europe and to distant India, Iran, and Armenia. Likewise, Arabic became widespread in western Asia and North Africa not through massive population relocations but through conquest, religious conversion, and superiority of culture. That is, languages may spread because they acquire new speakers. Either form of language spread—dispersion of speakers or acquisition of speakers—represents one of the spatial diffusion processes introduced in Chapter 2. Massive

Language Spread Language spread as a geographical event represents the increase or relocation through time in the area over which a language is spoken. The Bantu of Africa or the Englishspeaking settlers of North America displaced preexisting populations and replaced as well the languages previously spoken in the areas of penetration. Therefore, we find one explanation of the spread of language families to new areas of occurrence in massive population relocations such as those accompanying the colonization of the Americas or of Australia. That is, languages may spread because their speakers occupy new territories. Latin, however, replaced earlier Celtic languages in western Europe not by force of numbers—Roman legionnaires, administrators, and settlers never represented a

"Bantu Line" Original boundary of BushmenHottentots and Pygmies Bantu advance A.D. 1— 1000 Khoisan retreat

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Bantu advance, Khoisan retreat in Africa. Linguistic evidence suggests that proto-Bantu speakers originated in the region of the Cameroon-Nigeria border, spread eastward across the southern Sudan, then turned southward to Central Africa. From there they dispersed slowly eastward, westward, and against slight resistance, southward. The earlier Khoisan-speaking occupants of sub-Saharan Africa were no match against the advancing metal-using Bantu agriculturalists. Pygmies, adopting a Bantu tongue, retreated deep into the forests; Bushmen and Hottentots retained their distinctive Khoisan “click” language but were forced out of forests and grasslands into the dry steppes and deserts of the southwest.

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population relocation in which culture is transported to and made dominant in a new territory is a specialized example of relocation diffusion. When the advantages of a new language are discerned and it is adopted by native speakers of another tongue, a form of expansion diffusion has occurred along with partial or total acculturation of the adopting population. Usually, those who are in or aspire to positions of importance are the first to adopt the new language of control and prestige. Later, through schooling, daily contact, and business or social necessity, other, lower social strata of society may gradually be absorbed into the expanding pool of language adopters. Such hierarchical diffusion of an official or prestigious language has occurred in many societies. In India during the 19th century, the English established an administrative and judicial system that put a very high premium on their language as the sole medium of education, administration, trade, and commerce. Proficiency in it was the hallmark of the cultured and educated person (as knowledge of Sanskrit and Persian had been in earlier periods under other conquerors of India). English, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and other languages introduced during the acquisition of empire retain a position of prestige and even status as the official language in multilingual societies, even after independence has been achieved by former colonial territories. In Uganda and other former British possessions in Africa, a stranger may be addressed in English by one who wishes to display his or her education and social status, though standard Swahili, a second language for many different culture groups, may be chosen if certainty of communication is more important than pride. As a diffusion process, language spread may be impeded by barriers or promoted by their absence. Cultural barriers may retard or prevent language adoption. Speakers of Greek resisted centuries of Turkish rule of their homeland and the language remained a focus of cultural identity under foreign domination. Breton, Catalan, Gaelic and other localized languages of Europe remain symbols of ethnic separateness from surrounding dominant national cultures and controls. Physical barriers to language spread have also left their mark (Figure 5.4). Migrants or invaders follow paths of least topographic resistance and disperse most widely where access is easiest. Once past the barrier of the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush mountains, Indo-European tongues spread rapidly through the Indus and Ganges river lowlands of the Indian subcontinent but made no headway in the mountainous northern and eastern border zones. The Pyrenees Mountains serve as a linguistic barrier separating France and Spain. They also house the Basques who speak the only language—Euskara in their tongue—in southwestern Europe that survives from preIndo-European times (Figure 5.7). Similarly, the Caucasus Mountains between the Black and Caspian Seas separate the Slavic speakers to the north and the areas of UralAltaic languages to the south. At the same time, in their rugged topography they contain an extraordinary mixture

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Figure 5.7

In their mountainous homeland, the Basques have maintained a linguistic uniqueness despite more than 2000 years of encirclement by dominant lowland speakers of Latin or Romance languages. This sign of friendly farewell gives its message in both Spanish and the Basque language, Euskara.

of languages, many unique to single valleys or villages, lumped together spatially if not genetically into a separate Caucasian language family.

Language Change Migration, segregation, and isolation give rise to separate, mutually unintelligible languages because the society speaking the parent protolanguage no longer remains unitary. Comparable changes occur normally and naturally within a single language in word meaning, pronunciation, vocabulary, and syntax (the way words are put together in phrases and sentences). Because they are gradual, minor, and made part of group use and understanding, such changes tend to go unremarked. Yet, cumulatively, they can result in language change so great that in the course of centuries an essentially new language has been created. The English of 17th-century Shakespearean writings or the King James Bible (1611) sounds stilted to our ears. Few of us can easily read Chaucer’s 14th-century Canterbury Tales, and 8th-century Beowulf is practically unintelligible. Change may be gradual and cumulative, with each generation deviating in small degree from the speech patterns and vocabulary of its parents, or it may be massive and abrupt. English gained about 10,000 new words from the Norman conquerors of the 11th century. In some 70 years (1558–1625) of literary and linguistic creativity during the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I, an estimated 12,000 words—based on borrowings from Latin, Greek, and other languages—were introduced.

Discovery and colonization of new lands and continents in the 16th and 17th centuries greatly and necessarily expanded English as new foods, vegetation, animals, and artifacts were encountered and adopted along with their existing aboriginal American, Australian, or African names. The Indian languages of the Americas alone brought more than 200 relatively common daily words to English, 80 or more from the North American native tongues and the rest from Caribbean, Central, and South American. More than two thousand more specialized or localized words were also added. Moose, raccoon, skunk, maize, squash, succotash, igloo, toboggan, hurricane, blizzard, hickory, pecan, and a host of other names were taken directly into English; others were adopted second hand from Spanish variants of South American native words: cigar, potato, chocolate, tomato, tobacco, hammock. More recently, and within a short span of years, new scientific and technological developments have enriched and expanded the vocabularies not only of English but of all languages spoken by modern societies by adding many words of Greek and Latin derivation.

The Story of English English itself is a product of change, an offspring of protoGermanic (Figure 5.3) descending through the dialects brought to England in the 5th and 6th centuries by conquering Danish and North German Frisians, Jutes, Angles, and Saxons. Earlier Celtic-speaking inhabitants found refuge in the north and west of Britain and in the rugged uplands of what are now Scotland and Wales. Each of the

transplanted tongues established its own area of dominance, but the West Saxon dialect of southern England emerged in the 9th and 10th centuries as Standard Old English (Figure 5.8) on the strength of its literary richness. It lost its supremacy after the Norman Conquest of 1066, as the center of learning and culture shifted northeastward from Winchester to London, and French rather than English became the language of the nobility and the government. When the tie between France and England was severed after the loss of Normandy (1204), French fell into disfavor and English again became the dominant tongue, although now as the French-enriched Middle English used by Geoffrey Chaucer and mandated as the official language of the law courts by the Statute of Pleading (1362). During the 15th and 16th centuries English as spoken in London emerged as the basic form of Early Modern English. During the 18th century, attempts to standardize and codify the rules of English were unsuccessful. But the Dictionary of Samuel Johnson (published 1755)—based on cultured language of contemporary London and the examples of major authors—helped establish norms of proper form and usage. A worldwide diffusion of the language resulted as English colonists carried it as settlers to the Western Hemisphere and Australasia; through merchants, conquest, or territorial claim it established footholds in Africa and Asia. In that spatial diffusion, English was further enriched by its contacts with other languages. By becoming the accepted language of commerce and science, it contributed in turn to the common vocabularies of other tongues (see “Language Exchange”).

Figure 5.8

Old English dialect regions. In structure and vocabulary, Old English brought by the Frisians, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes was purely Germanic, with many similarities to modern German. It owed practically nothing to the Celtic it displaced, though it had borrowings from Latin. Much of Old English vocabulary was lost after the Norman conquest. English today has twice as many words derived from Latin and French as from the Germanic.

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nglish has a happily eclectic vocabulary. Its foundations are AngloSaxon (was, that, eat, cow) reinforced by Norse (sky, get, bath, husband, skill); its superstructure is NormanFrench (soldier, Parliament, prayer, beef). The Norman aristocracy used their words for the food, but the Saxon serfs kept theirs for the animals. The language’s decor comes from Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe: 16th-century France yielded etiquette, naive, reprimand and police. Italy provided umbrella, duet, bandit and dilettante; Holland gave cruise, yacht, trigger, landscape, and decoy. Its elaborations come from Latin and Greek: misanthrope, meditate, and

parenthesis all first appeared during the 1560s. In the 20th century, English adopted penicillin from Latin, polystyrene from Greek, and sociology and television from both. And English’s ornaments come from all round the world: slogan and spree from Gaelic, hammock and hurricane from Caribbean languages, caviar and kiosk from Turkish, dinghy and dungarees from Hindi, caravan and candy from Persian, mattress and masquerade from Arabic. Redressing the balance of trade, English is sharply stepping up its linguistic exports. Not just the necessary imotokali (motor car) and izingilazi (glasses) to Zulu; or motokaa and

Within some 400 years, English has developed from a localized language of 7 million islanders off the European coast to a truly international language with some 375 million native speakers, perhaps the same number who use it as a second language, and another 750 million who have reasonable competence in English as a foreign language. With roughly 1.5 billion speakers worldwide, English also serves as an official language of more than 60 countries (Figure 5.9), far exceeding in that role French (27), Arabic (21), or Spanish (20), the other leading current international languages. No other language in history has assumed so important a role on the world scene.

Standard and Variant Languages People who speak a common language such as English are members of a speech community, but membership does not necessarily imply linguistic uniformity. A speech community usually possesses both a standard language—comprising the accepted community norms of syntax, vocabulary, and pronunciation—and a number of more or less distinctive dialects reflecting the ordinary speech of areal, social, professional, or other subdivisions of the general population.

Standard Language A dialect may become the standard language through identity with the speech of the most prestigious, highestranking, and most powerful members of the larger speech

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shillingi (shilling) to Swahili; but also der Bestseller, der Kommunikations Manager, das Teeshirt and der Babysitter to German; and, to Italian, la pop art, il popcorn and la spray. In some Spanish-speaking countries you might wear un sueter to el beisbol, or witness un nocaut at el boxeo. And in Russia, biznesmen prepare a press rilis on the lep-top kompyuter and print it by lazerny printer. Indeed, a sort of global English word list can be drawn up: airport, passport, hotel, telephone; bar, soda, cigarette; sport, golf, tennis; stop, OK, and increasingly, weekend, jeans, know-how, sex-appeal, and no problem. Excerpted by permission from The Economist, London, December 20, 1986, p. 131.

community. A rich literary tradition may help establish its primacy, and its adoption as the accepted written and spoken norm in administration, economic life, and education will solidify its position, minimizing linguistic variation and working toward the elimination of deviant, nonstandard forms. The dialect that emerges as the basis of a country’s standard language is often the one identified with its capital or center of power at the time of national development. Standard French is based on the dialect of the Paris region, a variant that assumed dominance in the latter half of the 12th century and was made the only official language in 1539. Castilian Spanish became the standard after 1492 with the Castile-led reconquest of Spain from the Moors and the export of the dialect to the Americas during the 16th century. Its present form, however, is a modified version associated not with Castile but with Madrid, the modern capital of Spain. Standard Russian is identified with the speech patterns of the former capital, St. Petersburg, and Moscow, the current capital. Modern Standard Chinese is based on the Mandarin dialect of Beijing. In England, British Received Pronunciation—“Oxford English,” the speech of educated people of London and southeastern England and used by the British Broadcasting System—is the accepted standard. Other forces than the political may affect language standardization. In its spoken form, Standard German is based on norms established and accepted in the theater, the universities, public speeches, and radio and television. The Classical or Literary Arabic of the Koran became the established norm from the Indian to the Atlantic Ocean.

Figure 5.9

International English. In worldwide diffusion and acceptance, English has no past or present rivals. Along with French, it is one of the two working languages of the United Nations; some two-thirds of all scientific papers are published in it, making it the first language of scientific discourse, and the accepted language of international air traffic control. English is the sole or joint official language of more nations and territories, some too small to be shown here, than any other tongue. It also serves as the effective unofficial language of administration in other multilingual countries with different formal official languages. “English as a second language” is indicated for countries with nearuniversal or mandatory English instruction in public schools. The full extent of English penetration of Continental Europe, where over 80% of secondary school students study it as a second language, is not evident on this map.

Standard Italian was derived from the Florentine dialect of the 13th and 14th centuries, which became widespread as the language of literature and economy. In many societies, the official or unofficial standard language is not the dialect of home or daily life, and populations in effect have two languages. One is their regional dialect they employ with friends, at home, and in local community contacts; the other is the standard language used in more formal situations. In some cases, the contrast is great; regional variants of Arabic may be mutually unintelligible. Most Italians encounter Standard Italian for the first time in primary school. In India, the several totally distinct official regional languages are used in writing and taught in school but have no direct relationship to local speech; citizens must be bilingual to communicate with government officials who know only the regional language but not the local dialect.

Dialects Just as no two individuals talk exactly the same, all but the smallest and most closely-knit speech communities display recognizable speech variants called dialects. Vocabulary, pronunciation, rhythm, and the speed at which the language is spoken may set groups of speakers apart

from one another and, to a trained observer, clearly mark the origin of the speaker. In George Bernard Shaw’s play Pygmalion, on which the musical My Fair Lady was based, Henry Higgins—a professor of phonetics—is able to identify the London neighborhood of origin of a flower girl by listening to her vocabulary and accent. In many instances such variants are totally acceptable modifications of the standard language; in others, they mark the speaker as a social, cultural, or regional “outsider” or “inferior.” Professor Higgins makes a lady out of the uneducated flower girl simply by teaching her upper-class pronunciation. Shaw’s play tells us dialects may coexist in space. Cockney and cultured English share the streets of London; black English and Standard American are heard in the same school yards throughout the United States. In many societies, social dialects denote social class and educational level. Speakers of higher socioeconomic status or educational achievement are most likely to follow the norms of their standard language; less-educated or lower-status persons or groups consciously distinguishing themselves from the mainstream culture are more likely to use the vernacular—nonstandard language or dialect native to the locale or adopted by the social group. Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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Different dialects may be part of the speech patterns of the same person. Professionals discussing, for example, medical, legal, financial, or scientific matters with their peers employ vocabularies and formal modes of address and sentence structure that are quickly changed to informal colloquial speech when the conversation shifts to sports, vacations, or personal anecdotes. Even sex may be the basis for linguistic differences added to other determinants of social dialects (see “Male and Female Language”). More commonly, we think of dialects in spatial terms. Speech is a geographic variable; each locale is apt to have its own, perhaps slight, language differences from neighboring places. Such differences in pronunciation, vocabulary, word meanings, and other language characteristics tend to accumulate with distance from a given starting point. When they are mapped, they help define the linguistic geography— the study of the character and spatial pattern of dialects and languages—of a generalized speech community. Every dialect feature has a territorial extent. The outer limit of its occurrence is a boundary line called an isogloss (the term isophone is used if the areal variant is marked by difference in sound rather than word choice), as shown in Figure 5.10. Each isogloss is a distinct entity, but taken together isoglosses give clear map evidence of dialect regions that in their turn may reflect topographic barriers and corridors, long-established political borders, or past migration flows and diffusions of word choice and pronunciation.

Figure 5.10

Dialect boundaries. Descriptive words or terms for common items are frequently employed indicators of dialect difference. The limit of their areas of use is marked by an isogloss, such as that shown here for a term describing a coarse sack. Usually such boundary lines appear in clusters or bundles; together, they help define the frontier of the dialect under study.

Source: Adapted from Gordon R. Wood, Vocabulary Change: A Study of Variation in Regional Words in Eight of the Southern States (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), Map 81, p. 357. Used by permission of the publisher.

Geographic or regional dialects may be recognized at different scales. On the world scene, for example, British, American, Indian, and Australian English are all acknowledged distinctive dialects of the same language. Regionally, in Britain alone, one can recognize Southern British English, Northern British English, and Scottish

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ex differentiation in language seems to be universal, appearing in some more or less prominent form among all language families. Most of the observed differences have to do with vocabulary choice and with grammatical devices peculiar to individual cultures, though sociolinguistics—the study of the relationship between language and society—explores a number of ways in which males and females everywhere obviously or subtly use language differently. They may, for example, pronounce the same words differently or produce some sounds—either consonants or vowels or both—with consistent sex-related differences, as do (or did) the Gros Ventre Amerindians of Montana, the Koasati of southwestern Louisiana, or the Yana speakers in

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California. Similar consistent sound changes have been noted elsewhere— among, for example, the Cham in Vietnam, Bengali speakers of India, or in the Chukchi language of Siberia. Grammatical differences also occur. Speakers of Kurukh, a Dravidian language of northern India, construct verbs differently depending on who is speaking and who is listening. Male to male, male to female, female to female, and female to male conversations all involve possible variants in verb forms in both singular and plural persons and in different tenses. Vocabularies themselves may differ. Among the Caribs of the Caribbean, the Zulu of Africa, and elsewhere, men have words that women through custom or taboo are not permitted to use, and “The women have words and

phrases which the men never use, or they would be laughed to scorn,” one informant reports. Evidence from both English and such unrelated languages as Koasati indicates that, apparently as a rule, female speakers use forms considered to be “better” or “more correct” than males of the same social class. They tend to be more “conservative” and less “innovative” in the words and phrases they employ. Presumably these and other linguistic sex varieties arise because language is a social phenomenon closely related to social attitudes. The greater and more inflexible the difference in the social roles of men and women in a particular culture, the greater and more rigid the linguistic differences between the sexes.

English, each containing several more localized variants. Italy contains the Gallo-Italian and Venetan dialect groups of the north, the Tuscan dialects of the center, and a collection of southern Italian dialects. Japanese has three recognized dialect groups. Indeed, all long-established speech communities show their own structure of geographic dialects whose number and diversity tend to increase in areas longest settled and most fragmented and isolated. For example, the local speech of Newfoundland—isolated off the Atlantic coast of mainland Canada—retains much of the 17th-century flavor of the four West Counties of England from which the overwhelming majority of its settlers came. Yet the isolation and lack of cultural mixing of the islanders have not led to a general Newfoundland “dialect”; settlement was coastal and in the form of isolated villages in each of the many bays and indentations. There

developed from that isolation and the passage of time nearly as many dialects as there are bay settlements, with each dialect separately differing from Standard English in accent, vocabulary, sounds, and syntax. Isolation has led to comparable linguistic variation among the 47,000 inhabitants of the 18 Faeroe Islands between Iceland and Scotland; their Faeroese tongue has 10 dialects.

Dialects in America Mainland North America had a more diversified colonization than did Newfoundland, and its more mobile settlers mixed and carried linguistic influences away from the coast into the continental interior. Nonetheless, as early as the 18th century, three distinctive dialect regions had emerged along the Atlantic coast of the United States (Figure 5.11) and are evident in the linguistic geography of North America to the present day.

Figure 5.11

Dialect areas of the eastern United States. The Northern dialect and its subdivisions are found in New England and adjacent Canada (the international boundary has little effect on dialect borders in Anglo America), extending southward to a secondary dialect area centered on New York City. Midland speech is found along the Atlantic Coast only from central New Jersey southward to central Delaware, but spreads much more extensively across the interior of the United States and Canada. The Southern dialect dominates the East Coast from Chesapeake Bay south. Source: Redrawn by permission from Hans Kurath, A Word Geography of the Eastern United States (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1949).

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With the extension of settlement after the Revolutionary War, each of the dialect regions expanded inland. Speakers of the Northern dialect moved along the Erie Canal and the Great Lakes. Midland speakers from Pennsylvania traveled down the Ohio River, and the related Upland Southern dialect moved through the mountain gaps into Kentucky and Tennessee. The Coastal Southern dialect was less mobile, held to the east by plantation prosperity and the long resistance to displacement exerted by the Cherokees and the other Civilized Tribes (Figure 5.12). Once across the Appalachian barrier, the diffusion paths of the Northern dialect were fragmented and blocked by the time they reached the Upper Mississippi. Upland Southern speakers spread out rapidly: northward into the old Northwest Territory, west into Arkansas and Missouri, and south into the Gulf Coast states. But the Civil War and its aftermath halted further major westward

movements of the southern dialects. The Midland dialect, apparently so restricted along the eastern seaboard became, almost by default, the basic form for much of the interior and West of the United States. It was altered and enriched there by contact with the Northern and Southern dialects, by additions from Native American languages, by contact with Spanish culture in the Southwest, and by contributions from the great non-English immigrations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Naturally, dialect subregions are found in the West, but their boundary lines—so clear in the eastern interior—become less distinct from the Plains States to the Pacific. The immigrant contributions of the last centuries are still continuing and growing. In areas with strong infusions of recently arrived Hispanic, Asian, and other immigrant groups, language mixing tends to accelerate language change as more and different non-English words enter the general vocabulary of all Americans. In

Figure 5.12

Speech regions and dialect diffusion in the United States. This generalized map is most accurate for the eastern seaboard and the easternmost diffusion pathways where most detailed linguistic study has been concentrated. West of the Mississippi River the Midland dialect becomes dominant, though altered through modifications reflecting intermingling of peoples and speech patterns. Northern speech characteristics are still clearly evident in the San Francisco Bay area, brought there in the middle of the 19th century by migrants coming by sea around Cape Horn. Northerners were also prominent among the travelers of the Oregon Trail. Source: Based on Raven I. McDavid, Jr. “The Dialects of American English,” in W. Nelson Francis, The Structure of American English (New York: Ronald Press, 1958); “Regional Dialects in the United States,” Webster’s New World Dictionary, 2d College Edition (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); and Gordon R. Wood, Vocabulary Change (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), Map 83, p. 358.

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many cases, those infusions create or perpetuate pockets of linguistically unassimilated peoples whose urban neighborhoods in shops, signage, and common speech bear little resemblance to the majority Anglo communities of the larger metropolitan area. Even as immigrant groups learn and adopt English, there is an inevitable retention of familiar words and phrases and, for many, the unstructured intermixture of old and new tongues into such hybrids as “espanglish.” Local dialects and accents do not display predictable patterns of consistency or change. In ethnically and regionally complex United States, for example, mixed conclusions concerning local speech patterns have been drawn by researchers examining the linguistic results of an increasingly transient population, immigration from other countries and cultures, and the pervasive and presumed leveling effects of the mass media. The distinct evidence of increasing contrasts between the speech patterns and accents of Chicago, New York, Birmingham, St. Louis, and other cities is countered by reports of decreasing local dialect pronunciations in such centers as Dallas and Atlanta that have experienced major influxes of Northerners. And other studies find that some regional accents are fading in small towns and rural areas, presumably because mass media standardization is more influential than local dialect reinforcement as areal populations decline.

Pidgins and Creoles Language is rarely a total barrier in communication between peoples, even those whose native tongues are mutually incomprehensible. Bilingualism or multilingualism may permit skilled linguists to communicate in a jointly understood third language, but long-term contact between less able populations may require the creation of new language—a pidgin—learned by both parties. A pidgin is an amalgamation of languages, usually a simplified form of one, such as English or French, with borrowings from another, perhaps non-European local language. In its original form, a pidgin is not the mother tongue of any of its speakers; it is a second language for everyone who uses it, a language generally restricted to such specific functions as commerce, administration, or work supervision. For example, such is the variety of languages spoken among the some 270 ethnic groups of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that a special tongue called Lingala, a hybrid of Congolese dialects and French, was created to permit, among other things, issuance of orders to army recruits drawn from all parts of the country. Pidgins are initially characterized by a highly simplified grammatical structure and a sharply reduced vocabulary, adequate to express basic ideas but not complex concepts. If a pidgin becomes the first language of a group of speakers—who may have lost their former native tongue through disuse—a creole has evolved. In their development, creoles invariably acquire a more complex grammatical structure and enhanced vocabulary.

Creole languages have proved useful integrative tools in linguistically diverse areas; several have become symbols of nationhood. Swahili, a pidgin formed from a number of Bantu dialects, originated in the coastal areas of East Africa and spread by trade during the period of English and German colonial rules. When Kenya and Tanzania gained independence, they made Swahili the national language of administration and education. Other examples of creolization are Afrikaans (a pidginized form of 17th-century Dutch used in the Republic of South Africa); Haitian Creole (the language of Haiti, derived from the pidginized French used in the slave trade); and Bazaar Malay (a pidginized form of the Malay language, a version of which is the official national language of Indonesia).

Lingua Franca A lingua franca is an established language used habitually for communication by people whose native tongues are mutually incomprehensible. For them it is a second language, one learned in addition to the native tongue. Lingua franca, literally “Frankish tongue,” was named from the dialect of France adopted as their common tongue by the Crusaders assaulting the Muslims of the Holy Land. Later, it endured as a language of trade and travel in the eastern Mediterranean, useful as a single tongue shared in a linguistically diverse region. Between 300 B.C . and A.D. 500, the Mediterranean world was unified by Common Greek. Later, Latin became a lingua franca, the language of empire and, until replaced by the vernacular European tongues, of the Church, government, scholarship, and the law. Outside the European sphere, Aramaic served the role from the 5th century B.C. to the 4th century A.D. in the Near East and Egypt; Arabic followed Muslim conquest as the unifying language of that international religion after the 7th century. Mandarin Chinese and Hindi in India both formerly and today have a lingua franca role in their linguistically diverse countries. The immense linguistic diversity of Africa has made regional lingua francas there necessary and inevitable (Figure 5.13).

Official Languages Governments may designate a single tongue as a country’s official language, the required language of instruction in the schools and universities, government business, the courts, and other official and semiofficial public and private activities. In societies in which two or more languages are in common use (multilingualism) such an official language may serve as the approved national lingua franca, guaranteeing communication among all citizens of differing native tongues. In many immigrant societies, such as the United States, only one of the many spoken languages may have implicit or official government sanction (see “An Official U.S. Language?”). Nearly every country in linguistically complex subSaharan Africa has selected a European language—usually that of their former colonial governors—as an official Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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Lingua francas of Africa. The importance and extent of competing lingua francas in sub-Saharan Africa change over time, reflecting the spread of populations and the relative economic or political stature of speakers of different languages. In many areas, an individual may employ different lingua francas, depending on activity: dealing with officials, trading in the marketplace, conversing with strangers. Among the elite in all areas, the preferred lingua franca is apt to be a European language. Throughout northern Africa, Arabic is the usual lingua franca for all purposes. Source: Adapted from Bernd Heine, Status and Use of African Lingua Francas (Munich, Germany: Weltforum Verlag; and New York: Humanities Press, 1970).

Geography and Public Policy An Official U.S. Language? Within recent years in Lowell, Massachusetts, public school courses have been offered in Spanish, Khmer, Lao, Portuguese, and Vietnamese, and all messages from schools to parents have been translated into five languages. Polyglot New York City has

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given bilingual programs in Spanish, Chinese, Haitian Creole, Russian, Korean, Vietnamese, French, Greek, Arabic, and Bengali. In most states, it is possible to get a high-schoolequivalency diploma without knowing English because tests are offered in French and Spanish. In at least 39 states, driving tests have been available in foreign languages; California has provided 39 varieties, New York 23,

and Michigan 20, including Arabic and Finnish. And the 1965 federal Voting Rights Act required multilingual ballots in 375 electoral jurisdictions. These, and innumerable other evidences of governmentally sanctioned linguistic diversity, may come as a surprise to those many Americans who assume that English is the official language of the United States. It isn’t; nowhere does the Constitution

provide for an official language, and no federal law specifies one. The country was built by a great diversity of cultural and linguistic immigrants who nonetheless shared an eagerness to enter mainstream American life. At the start of the 21st century, a reported 18% of all U.S. residents speak a language other than English in the home. In California public schools, 1 out of 3 students uses a non-English tongue within the family. In Washington, D.C. schools, students speak 127 languages and dialects, a linguistic diversity duplicated in other major city school systems. Nationwide bilingual teaching began as an offshoot of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, was encouraged by a Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, and has been actively promoted by the U.S. Department of Education under the Bilingual Education Act of 1974 as an obligation of local school boards. Its purpose has been to teach subject matter to minority-language children in the language in which they think while introducing them to English, with the hope of achieving English proficiency in two or three years. Disappointment with the results achieved led to a successful 1998 California anti-bilingual education initiative, Proposition 227, to abolish the program. Similar rejection elsewhere has followed California’s lead. Opponents of the implications of governmentally encouraged multilingual education, bilingual ballots, and ethnic separatism argue that a common language is the unifying glue of the United States and all countries; without that glue, they fear, the process of “Americanization” and acculturation—the adoption by immigrants of the values, attitudes, ways of behavior, and speech of the receiving society—will be undermined. Convinced that early immersion and quick proficiency in English is the only sure way for minority newcomers to gain necessary access to jobs, higher education, and full integration into the economic

and social life of the country, proponents of “English only” use in public education, voting, and state and local governmental agencies, successfully passed Official English laws or constitutional amendments in 23 states during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although the amendments were supported by sizeable majorities of the voting population, resistance to them—and to their political and cultural implications—has been in every instance strong and persistent. Ethnic groups, particularly Hispanics, who are the largest of the linguistic groups affected, charged that they were evidence of blatant Anglocentric racism, discriminatory and repressive in all regards. Some educators argued persuasively that all evidence proved that while immigrant children eventually acquire English proficiency in any event, they do so with less harm to their self-esteem and subject matter acquisition when initially taught in their own language. Business people with strong minority labor and customer ties and political leaders—often themselves members of ethnic communities or with sizable minority constituencies— argued against “discriminatory” language restrictions. And historians noted that it had all been unsuccessfully tried before. The anti-Chinese Workingmen’s Party in 1870s California led the fight for English-only laws in that state. The influx of immigrants from central and southeastern Europe at the turn of the century led Congress to make oral English a requirement for naturalization, and anti-German sentiment during and after World War I led some states to ban any use of German. The Supreme Court struck down those laws in 1923, ruling that the “protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on their tongue.” Following suit, some of the recent state language amendments have also been voided by state or federal courts. In ruling its state’s English-only law

unconstitutional, Arizona’s Supreme Court in 1998 noted it “chills First Amendment rights.” To counter those judicial restraints and the possibility of an eventual multilingual, multicultural United States in which English and, likely, Spanish would have co-equal status and recognition, U.S. English— an organization dedicated to the belief that “English is, and ever must remain, the only official language of the people of the United States”— actively supports the proposed U.S. Constitutional amendment first introduced in Congress by former Senator S. I. Hayakawa in 1981, and resubmitted by him and others in subsequent years. The proposed amendment would simply establish English as the official national language but would impose no duty on people to learn English and would not infringe on any right to use other languages. Whether or not these modern attempts to designate an official U.S. language eventually succeed, they represent a divisive subject of public debate affecting all sectors of American society.

Questions to Consider: 1. Do you think multiple languages and ethnic separatism represent a threat to U.S. cultural unity that can be avoided only by viewing English as a necessary unifying force? Or do you think making English the official language might divide its citizens and damage its legacy of tolerance and diversity? Why or why not? 2. Do you feel that immigrant children would learn English faster if bilingual classes were reduced and immersion in English was more complete? Or do you think that a slower pace of English acquisition is acceptable if subject matter comprehension and cultural self-esteem are enhanced? Why or why not? 3. Do you think Official English laws serve to inflame prejudice against immigrants or to provide all newcomers with a common standard of admission to the country’s political and cultural mainstream?

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language (Figure 5.14), only rarely designating a native language or creole as an alternate official tongue. Indeed, less than 10% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa live in countries with any indigenous African tongue given official status. Nigeria has some 350 clearly different languages and is dominated by three of them: Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo. For no Nigerian is English a native tongue, yet throughout the country English is the sole language of instruction and the sole official language. Effectively, all Nigerians must learn a foreign language before they can enter the mainstream of national life. Most Pacific Ocean countries, including the Philippines (with between 80 and 110 Malayo-Polynesian languages) and Papua New Guinea (with over 850 distinct Papuan tongues), have a European language as at least one of their official tongues. In some countries, multilingualism has official recognition through designation of more than a single state language. Canada and Finland, for example, have two official languages (bilingualism), reflecting rough equality in numbers or influence of separate linguistic populations comprising a single country. In a few multilingual countries, more than two official languages have been designated. Bolivia and Belgium have three official tongues and Singapore has four. South Africa’s constitution designates 11 official languages, and India gives official status to 15 languages at the regional, though not at the national, level. Multilingualism may reflect significant cultural and spatial divisions within a country. In Canada, the Official Languages Act of 1969 accorded French and English equal status as official languages of the Parliament and of government throughout the nation. French-speakers are concentrated in the Province of Quebec, however, and constitute a culturally distinct population sharply divergent from the English-speaking majority of other parts of Canada (Figure 5.15). Within sections of Canada, even greater linguistic diversity is recognized; the legislature of the Northwest Territories, for example, has eight official languages—six native, plus English and French. Few countries remain purely monolingual, with only a single language of communication for all purposes among all citizens, though most are officially so. Past and recent movements of peoples as colonists, refugees, or migrants have assured that most of the world’s countries contain linguistically mixed populations. Maintenance of native languages among such populations is not assured, of course. Where numbers are small or pressures for integration into an economically and socially dominant culture are strong, immigrant and aboriginal (native) linguistic minorities tend to adopt the majority or official language for all purposes. On the other hand, isolation and relatively large numbers of speakers may serve to preserve native tongues. In Canada, for example, aboriginal languages with large populations of speakers— Cree, Ojibwe, and Inuktitut—are well maintained in their areas of concentration (respectively, northern Quebec, the northern prairies, and Nunavut). In contrast, much

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Figure 5.14

Europe in Africa through official languages. Both the linguistic complexity of sub-Saharan Africa and the colonial histories of its present political units are implicit in the designation of a European language as the sole or joint “official” language of the different countries.

smaller language groups in southern and coastal British Columbia have a much lower ratio of retention among native speakers.

Language, Territoriality, and Identity The designation of more than one official language does not always satisfy the ambitions of linguistically distinct groups for recognition and autonomy. Language is an inseparable part of group identity and a defining characteristic of ethnic and cultural distinction. The view that cultural heritage is rooted in language is well-established and found throughout the world, as is the feeling that losing linguistic identity is the worst and final evidence of discrimination and subjugation. Language has often been the focus of separatist movements, especially of spatially distinct linguistic groups outside the economic heartlands of the strongly centralized countries to which they are attached. In Europe, highly centralized France, Spain, Britain—and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union before their dismemberment—experienced such language “revolts” and acknowledged, sometimes belatedly, the local concerns they express. Until 1970, when the ban on teaching regional tongues was dropped, the spoken regional languages and dialects of France were ignored and denied recognition by the state. Since the late 1970s Spain not only has relaxed its earlier total rejection of Basque and

Figure 5.15

Bilingualism and diversity in Canada. The map shows areas of Canada which have a minimum of 5000 inhabitants and include a minority population identified with an official language.

Source: Commissioner of Official Languages, Government of Canada.

Catalan as regional languages and given state support to instruction in them, but also has recognized Catalan as a co-official language in its home region in northeastern Spain. In Britain, parliamentary debates concerning greater regional autonomy in the United Kingdom have resulted in bilingual road and informational signs in Wales, a publicly supported Welsh-language television channel, and compulsory teaching of Welsh in all schools in Wales. In fact, throughout Europe beginning in the 1980s, nonofficial native regional languages have increasingly not only been tolerated but encouraged—in Western Europe,

particularly, as a buffer against the loss of regional institutions and traditions threatened by a multinational “superstate” under the European Union. The Council of Europe, a 41-nation organization promoting democracy and human rights, has adopted a charter pledging encouragement of the use of indigenous languages in schools, the media and public life. That pledge recognizes the enduring reality that of some 500 million people in Eastern and Western Europe (not including immigrants and excluding the former USSR), more than 50 million speak a local language that is not the official tongue of their country. The language charter acknowledges that cultural diversity is part Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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of Europe’s wealth and heritage and that its retention strengthens, not weakens, the separate states of the continent and the larger European culture realm as a whole. Many other world regions, less permissive than Europe is becoming, have continuing linguistically-based conflict. Language has long been a divisive issue in South Asia, for example, leading to wars in Pakistan and Sri Lanka and periodic demands for secession from India by southern states such as Tamil Nadu, where the Dravidian Tamil language is defended as an ancient tongue as worthy of respect as the Indo-European official language, Hindi. In Russia and several other successor states of the former USSR (which housed some 200 languages and dialects) linguistic diversity forms part of the justification for local separatist movements, as it did in the division of Czechoslovakia into Czech- and Slovak-speaking successor states and in the violent dismemberment of former Yugoslavia.

Language on the Landscape: Toponymy Toponyms—place names—are language on the land, the record of past inhabitants whose namings endure, perhaps corrupted and disguised, as reminders of their existence and their passing. Toponymy is the study of place names, a special interest of linguistic geography. It is also a revealing tool of historical cultural geography, for place names become a part of the cultural landscape that remains long after the name givers have passed from the scene. In England, for example, place names ending in chester (as in Winchester and Manchester) evolved from the Latin castra, meaning “camp.” Common Anglo-Saxon suffixes for tribal and family settlements were ing (people or family) and ham (hamlet or, perhaps, meadow) as in Birmingham or Gillingham. Norse and Danish settlers contributed place names ending in thwaite (“meadow”) and others denoting such landscape features as fell (an uncultivated hill) and beck (a small brook). The Celts, present in Europe for more than 1000 years before Roman times, left their tribal names in corrupted form on territories and settlements taken over by their successors. The Arabs, sweeping out from Arabia across North Africa and into Iberia, left their imprint in place names to mark their conquest and control. Cairo means “victorious,” Sudan is “the land of the blacks,” and Sahara is “wasteland” or “wilderness.” In Spain, a corrupted version of the Arabic wadi, “watercourse,” is found in Guadalajara and Guadalquivir. In the New World, not one people but many placed names on landscape features and new settlements. In doing so they remembered their homes and homelands, honored their monarchs and heroes, borrowed and mispronounced from rivals, followed fads, recalled the Bible, and adopted and distorted Amerindian names. Homelands were recalled in New England, New France, or New

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Holland; settlers’ hometown memories brought Boston, New Bern, New Rochelle, and Cardiff from England, Switzerland, France, and Wales. Monarchs were remembered in Virginia for the Virgin Queen Elizabeth, Carolina for one English king, Georgia for another, and Louisiana for a king of France. Washington, D.C.; Jackson, Mississippi and Michigan; Austin, Texas; and Lincoln, Illinois memorialized heroes and leaders. Names given by the Dutch in New York were often distorted by the English; Breukelyn, Vlissingen, and Haarlem became Brooklyn, Flushing, and Harlem. French names underwent similar twisting or translation, and Spanish names were adopted, altered, or, later, put into such bilingual combinations as Hermosa Beach. Amerindian tribal names—the Yenrish, Maha, Kansa—were modified, first by French and later by English speakers—to Erie, Omaha, and Kansas. A faddish “Classical Revival” after the Revolution gave us Troy, Athens, Rome, Sparta, and other ancient town names and later spread them across the country (see Figure 7.31). Bethlehem, Ephrata, Nazareth, and Salem came from the Bible. Names adopted were transported as settlement moved westward across the United States (Figure 5.16). Place names, whatever their language of origin, frequently consist of two parts: generic (classifying) and specific (modifying or particular). Big River in English is found as Rio Grande in Spanish, Mississippi in Algonquin, and Ta Ho in Chinese. The order of generic and specific, however, may alter between languages and give a clue to the group originally bestowing the place name. In English, the specific usually comes first: Hudson River, Bunker Hill, Long Island. When, in the United States, we find River Rouge or Isle Royale we also find evidence of French settlement—the French reverse the naming order. Some generic names can be used to trace the migration paths across the United States of the three Eastern dialect groups (Figure 5.11). Northern dialect settlers tended to carry with them their habit of naming a community and calling its later neighbors by the same name modified by direction—Lansing and East Lansing, for example. Brook is found in the New England settlement area, run is from the Midland dialect, bayou and branch are from the Southern area. European colonists and their descendants gave place names to a physical landscape already adequately named by indigenous peoples. Those names were sometimes adopted, but often shortened, altered, or—certainly— mispronounced. The vast territory that local Amerindians called “Mesconsing,” meaning “the long river,” was recorded by Lewis and Clark as “Quisconsing,” later to be further distorted into “Wisconsin.” Milwaukee and Winnipeg, Potomac and Niagara; the names of 27 of the 50 United States; and the present identity of thousands of North American places and features, large and small, had their origin in Native American languages. In the Northwest Territories of Canada, Indian and Inuit (Eskimo) place names are returning. The town of Frobisher Bay has reverted to its Eskimo name Iqaluit (“place of the fish”); Resolute Bay becomes Kaujuitok

Figure 5.16

Migrant Andover. Place names in a new land tend to be transportable, carried to new locales by migrating town founders. They are a reminder of the cultural origins and diffusion paths of settlers. Andover, a town name from England, was brought to New England in 1646 and later carried westward.

Source: With kind permission of the American Name Society.

(“place where the sun never rises”) in Inuktitut, the lingua franca of the Canadian Eskimos; the Jean Marie River returns to Tthedzehk’edeli (“river that flows over clay”), its earlier Slavey name. These and other official name changes reflect the decision of the territory’s Executive Council that community preference will be the standard for all place names, no matter how entrenched might be European versions. It was a decision that recognized the importance of language as a powerful unifying thread in the culture complex of peoples. In India, for example, the changing of various long-accepted municipal place names—Mumbai

instead of Bombay, Chennai but not Madras, or Thiruvananthapuram replacing Trivandrum—demonstrates post-colonial pride. Language may serve as a fundamental evidence of ethnicity and be the fiercely defended symbol of the history and individuality of a distinctive social group. Spanish Americans demand the right of instruction in their own language, and Basques wage civil war to achieve a linguistically based separatism. Indian states were adjusted to coincide with language boundaries, and the Polish National Catholic Church was created in America, not Poland, to preserve Polish language and culture in an alien environment.

Patterns of Religion Religion, like language, is a symbol of group identity and a cultural rallying point. Religious enmity forced the partition of the Indian subcontinent between Muslims and Hindus after the departure of the British in 1947. French Catholics and French Huguenots (Protestants) freely slaughtered each other in the name of religion in the 16th century. English Roman Catholics were hounded from their country after the establishment of the Anglican Church. Religion has continued to be a root cause of many local and regional conflicts throughout the world during

the 20th and into the 21st century, as Chief Makuei’s words opening this chapter suggest, including confrontations between Catholic and Protestant Christian groups in Northern Ireland; Muslim sects in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and Algeria; Muslims and Jews in Palestine; Christians and Muslims in the Philippines and Lebanon; and Buddhists and Hindus in Sri Lanka. More peacefully, in the name of their beliefs American Amish, Hutterite, Shaker, and other religious communities have isolated themselves from the secular world and pursued their own ways of life. Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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Religion and Culture Unlike language, which is an attribute of all people, religion varies in its cultural role—dominating among some societies, unimportant or denied totally in others. All societies have value systems—common beliefs, understandings, expectations, and controls—that unite their members and set them off from other, different culture groups. Such a value system is termed a religion when it involves systems of formal or informal worship and faith in the sacred and divine. Religion may intimately affect all facets of a culture. Religious belief is by definition an element of the ideological subsystem; formalized and organized religion is an institutional expression of the sociological subsystem. And religious beliefs strongly influence attitudes toward the tools and rewards of the technological subsystem. Nonreligious value systems can exist—humanism or Marxism, for example—that are just as binding on the societies that espouse them as are more traditional religious beliefs. Even societies that largely reject religion—that are officially atheistic or secular—are strongly influenced by traditional values and customs set by predecessor religions in days of work and rest, for example, or in legal principles. Since religions are formalized views about the relation of the individual to this world and to the hereafter,

each carries a distinct conception of the meaning and value of this life, and most contain strictures about what must be done to achieve salvation. These rules become interwoven with the traditions of a culture. For Muslims the observance of the sharia (law) is a necessary part of Islam, submission to Allah (see Figure 5.27). In classical Judaism, the keeping of the Torah, the Law of Moses, involved ritual and moral rules of holy living. For Hindus, the dharma, or teaching, includes the complex laws enunciated in the ancient book of Manu. Ethics of conduct and humane relations rather than religious rituals are central to the Confucian tradition of China, while the Sikh khalsa, or holy community, is defined by various rules of observance, such as prohibiting the cutting of one’s hair. Economic patterns may be intertwined with past or present religious beliefs. Traditional restrictions on food and drink may affect the kinds of animals that are raised or avoided (Figure 5.17), the crops that are grown, and the importance of those crops in the daily diet. Occupational assignment in the Hindu caste system is in part religiously supported. In many countries, there is a state religion—that is, religious and political structures are intertwined. Buddhism, for example, has been the state religion in Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. By their official names, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic

Figure 5.17

Pattern of swine production. Religious prohibition against the consumption of pork, particularly among those of the Jewish and Muslim faiths, finds spatial expression in the incidence of swine production. Because production figures are national summaries, the map does not faithfully report small-area distributions of either religious affiliation or animal raising. Source: J. F. Simoons, Eat Not This Flesh (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961); United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization.

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Republic of Iran proclaim their identity of religion and government. Despite Indonesia’s overwhelming Muslim majority, that country sought and formerly found domestic harmony by recognizing five official religions and a state ideology—pancasila—whose first tenet is belief in one god. The landscape imprint of religions may be both obvious and subtle. The structures of religious worship—temples, churches, mosques, stupas, or cathedrals—landscape symbols such as shrines or statues, and such associated land uses as monasteries may give an immediately evident and regionally distinctive cultural character to an area. “Landscapes of death” may also be visible regional variables, for different religions and cultures dispose of their dead in different manners. Cemeteries are significant and reserved land uses among Christians, Jews, and Muslims who typically bury their deceased with headstones or other markers and monuments to mark graves. Egyptian pyramids or elaborate mausoleums like the Taj Mahal are more grandiose structures of entombment and remembrance. On the other hand, Hindus and Buddhists have traditionally cremated their dead and scattered their ashes, leaving no landscape evidence or imprint. Some religions may make a subtle cultural stamp on the landscape through recognition of sacred places and spaces not otherwise built or marked. Grottos, lakes, single trees or groves, such rivers as the Ganges or Jordan, or special mountains or hills, such as Mount Ararat or Mount Fuji are examples that are unique to specific religions and express the reciprocal influences of religion and environment.

Classification of Religion Religions are cultural innovations. They may be unique to a single culture group, closely related to the faiths professed in nearby areas, or derived from or identical to belief systems spatially far removed. Although interconnections and derivations among religions can frequently be discerned—as Christianity and Islam can trace descent from Judaism—family groupings are not as useful to us in classifying religions as they were in studying languages. A distinction between monotheism, belief in a single deity, and polytheism, belief in many gods, is frequent, but not particularly spatially relevant. Simple territorial categories have been offered recognizing origin areas of religions: Western versus Eastern, for example, or African, Far Eastern, or Indian. With proper detail such distinctions may inform us where particular religions had their roots but do not reveal their courses of development, paths of diffusion, or current distributions. Our geographic interest in the classification of religions is different from that of, say, theologians or historians. We are not so concerned with the beliefs themselves or with their birthplaces (though both help us understand

their cultural implications and areal arrangements). We are more interested in religions’ patterns and processes of diffusion once they have developed, with the spatial distributions they have achieved, and with the impact of the practices and beliefs of different religious systems on the landscape. To satisfy at least some of those interests, geographers have found it useful to categorize religions as universalizing, ethnic, or tribal (traditional). Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism are the major world universalizing religions, faiths that claim applicability to all humans and that seek to transmit their beliefs through missionary work and conversion. Membership in universalizing religions is open to anyone who chooses to make some sort of symbolic commitment, such as baptism in Christianity. No one is excluded because of nationality, ethnicity, or previous religious belief. Ethnic religions have strong territorial and cultural group identification. One becomes a member of an ethnic religion by birth or by adoption of a complex life-style and cultural identity, not by simple declaration of faith. These religions do not usually proselytize, and their members form distinctive closed communities identified with a particular ethnic group or political unit. An ethnic religion— for example, Judaism, Indian Hinduism, or Japanese Shinto—is an integral element of a specific culture; to be part of the religion is to be immersed in the totality of the culture. Tribal or traditional religions are special forms of ethnic religions distinguished by their small size, their unique identity with localized culture groups not yet fully absorbed into modern society, and their close ties to nature. Animism is the name given to their belief that life exists in all objects, from rocks and trees to lakes and mountains, or that such inanimate objects are the abode of the dead, of spirits, and of gods. Shamanism is a form of tribal religion that involves community acceptance of a shaman, a religious leader, healer, and worker of magic who, through special powers, can intercede with and interpret the spirit world.

Patterns and Flows The nature of the different classes of religions is reflected in their distributions over the world (Figure 5.18) and in their number of adherents. Universalizing religions tend to be expansionary, carrying their message to new peoples and areas. Ethnic religions, unless their adherents are dispersed, tend to be regionally confined or to expand only slowly and over long periods. Tribal religions tend to contract spatially as their adherents are incorporated increasingly into modern society and converted by proselytizing faiths. As we expect in human geography, the map records only the latest stage of a constantly changing cultural reality. While established religious institutions tend to be

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Christianity Mainly Roman Catholic Mainly Protestant Mainly Eastern Orthodox Islam Sunni Shia Judaism Buddhism Hindu Chinese faiths Shinto Tribal religions Secularism

Figure 5.18

Principal world religions. The assignment of individual countries to a single religion category conceals a growing intermixture of faiths in European and other western countries that have experienced recent major immigration flows. In some instances, those influxes are altering the effective, if not the numerical, religious balance. In nominally Christian, Catholic France, for example, low churchgoing rates suggest that now more Muslims than practicing Catholics reside there and, considering birth rate differentials, that someday Islam may be the country’s predominant religion as measured by the number of practicing adherents.

conservative and resistant to change, religion as a culture trait is dynamic. Personal and collective beliefs may alter in response to developing individual and societal needs and challenges. Religions may be imposed by conquest, adopted by conversion, or be defended and preserved in the face of surrounding hostility or indifference.

The World Pattern Figure 5.18 (at this scale) cannot present a full picture of religious affiliation or regionalization. Few societies are homogeneous, and most modern ones contain a variety of different faiths or, at least, variants of the dominant professed religion. Frequently, members of a particular religion show areal concentration within a country. Thus, in urban Northern Ireland, Protestants and Catholics reside in separate areas whose boundaries are clearly understood and respected. The “Green Line” in Beirut, Lebanon, marked a guarded border between the Christian East and the Muslim West sides of the city, while within the country as a whole regional concentrations of adherents of different faiths and sects are clearly recognized (Figure 5.19). Religious diversity within countries may reflect the degree of toleration a majority culture affords minority religions. In dominantly (90%) Muslim Indonesia, Christian Bataks, Hindu Balinese, and Muslim Javanese for many years

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lived in peaceful coexistence. By contrast, the fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran has persecuted and executed those of the Baha’i faith. Data on religious affiliation are not precise. Most nations do not have religious censuses, and different religious groups differently and inconsistently report their membership. When communism was supreme in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, official atheism dissuaded many from openly professing or practicing any religion; in nominally Christian Europe and North America many who claim to be believers are not active church members and others renounce religion altogether. More than half of the world’s population probably adheres to one of the major universalizing religions: Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism. Of these three, Figure 5.18 indicates, Christianity and Islam are most widespread; Buddhism is largely an Asian religion. Hinduism, the largest ethnic faith, is essentially confined to the Indian subcontinent, showing the spatial restriction characteristic of most ethnic and traditional religions even when found outside of their homeland area. Small Hindu emigrant communities in Africa, southeast Asia, England, or the United States, for example, tend to remain isolated even in densely crowded urban areas. Although it is not

adult population attends its Sunday services. Two-thirds of the French describe themselves as Catholic, and less than 5% regularly go to church. Even in devoutly Roman Catholic South American states, low church attendance attests to the rise of at least informal secularism. In Colombia, only 18% of people attend Sunday services; in Chile, the figure is 12%, in Mexico 11%, and Bolivia 5%.

The Principal Religions Each of the major religions has its own unique mix of cultural values and expressions, each has had its own pattern of innovation and spatial diffusion (Figure 5.20), and each has had its own impact on the cultural landscape. Together they contribute importantly to the worldwide pattern of human diversity.

Judaism

Figure 5.19

Religious regions of Lebanon. Religious territoriality and rivalry contributed to a prolonged period of conflict and animosity in this troubled country.

localized, Judaism is also included among the ethnic religions because of its identification with a particular people and cultural tradition. Extensive areas of the world are peopled by those who practice tribal or traditional religions, often in concert with the universalizing religions to which they have been outwardly converted. Tribal religions are found principally among peoples who have not yet been fully absorbed into modern cultures and economies or who are on the margins of more populous and advanced societies. Although the areas assigned to tribal religions in Figure 5.18 are large, the number of adherents is small and declining. One cannot assume that all people within a mapped religious region are adherents of the designated faith, or that membership in a religious community means active participation in its belief system. Secularism, an indifference to or rejection of religion and religious belief, is an increasing part of many modern societies, particularly of the industrialized nations and those now or formerly under communist regimes. The incidence of secularism in a few Asian communist societies is suggested on Figure 5.18 by letter symbol; its widespread occurrence in other, largely Christian, countries should be understood though it is not mapped. In England, for example, the state Church of England claims 20% of the British population as communicants, but only 2% of the

We begin our review of world faiths with Judaism, whose belief in a single God laid the foundation for both Christianity and Islam. Unlike its universalizing offspring, Judaism is closely identified with a single ethnic group and with a complex and restrictive set of beliefs and laws. It emerged some 3000 to 4000 years ago in the Near East, one of the ancient culture hearth regions (see Figure 2.15). Early Near Eastern civilizations, including those of Sumeria, Babylonia, and Assyria, developed writing, codified laws, and formalized polytheistic religions featuring rituals of sacrifice and celebrations of the cycle of seasons. Judaism was different. The Israelites’ conviction that they were a chosen people, bound with God through a covenant of mutual loyalty and guided by complex formal rules of behavior, set them apart from other peoples of the Near East. Theirs became a distinctively ethnic religion, the determining factors of which are descent from Israel (the patriarch Jacob), the Torah (law and scripture), and the traditions of the culture and the faith. Early military success gave the Jews a sense of territorial and political identity to supplement their religious self-awareness. Later conquest by nonbelievers led to their dispersion (diaspora) to much of the Mediterranean world and farther east into Asia by A.D. 500 (Figure 5.21). Alternately tolerated and persecuted in Christian Europe, occasionally expelled from countries, and usually, as outsiders of different faith and custom, isolated in special residential quarters (ghettos), Jews retained their faith and their sense of community even though two separate branches of Judaism developed in Europe during the Middle Ages. The Sephardim were originally based in the Iberian Peninsula and expelled from there in the late 15th century; with ties to North African and Babylonian Jews, they retained their native Judeo-Spanish language (Ladino) and culture. Between the 13th and 16th centuries, the Ashkenazim, seeking refuge from intolerable persecution in western and central Europe, settled in

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Figure 5.20

Innovation areas and diffusion routes of major world religions. The monotheistic (single deity) faiths of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam arose in southwestern Asia, the first two in Palestine in the eastern Mediterranean region and the last in western Arabia near the Red Sea. Hinduism and Buddhism originated within a confined hearth region in the northern part of the Indian subcontinent. Their rates, extent, and directions of diffusions are suggested here and detailed on later maps.

Poland, Lithuania, and Russia (Figure 5.21). It was from eastern Europe that many of the Jewish immigrants to the United States came during the later 19th and early 20th centuries, though German-speaking areas of central Europe were also important source regions. The Ashkenazim constitute perhaps 80% of all Jews in the world and differ from the Sephardim in cultural traditions (for example, their widespread use of Yiddish until the 20th century) and liturgy. Both groups are present in roughly equal numbers in Israel. The mass destruction of Jews in Europe before and during World War II—the Holocaust—drastically reduced their representation among that continent’s total population. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 was a fulfillment of the goal of Zionism, the belief in the need to create an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine. It demonstrated a determination that Jews not lose their identity by absorption into alien cultures and societies. The new state represented a reversal of the preceding 2000-year history of dispersal and relocation diffusion. Israel became largely a country of immigrants, an ancient homeland again identified with a distinctive people and an ethnic religion. Judaism’s imprint on the cultural landscape has been subtle and unobtrusive. The Jewish community reserves space for the practice of communal burial; the

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spread of the cultivated citron in the Mediterranean area during Roman times has been traced to Jewish ritual needs; and the religious use of grape wine assured the cultivation of the vine in their areas of settlement. The synagogue as place of worship has tended to be less elaborate than its Christian counterpart. The essential for religious service is a community of at least 10 adult males, not a specific structure.

Christianity Christianity had its origin in the life and teachings of Jesus, a Jewish preacher of the 1st century of the modern era, whom his followers believed was the messiah promised by God. The new covenant he preached was not a rejection of traditional Judaism but a promise of salvation to all humankind rather than to just a chosen people. Christianity’s mission was conversion. As a universal religion of salvation and hope, it spread quickly among the underclasses of both the eastern and western parts of the Roman Empire, carried to major cities and ports along the excellent system of Roman roads and sea lanes (Figure 5.22). Expansion diffusion followed the establishment of missions and colonies of converts in locations distant from the hearth region. Important among them were the urban areas that became administrative seats of the new religion. For the Western church, Rome was the principal

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Jewish dispersions, A.D. 70–1500. A revolt against Roman rule in A.D. 66 was followed by the destruction of the Jewish Temple four years later and an imperial decision to Romanize the city of Jerusalem. Judaism spread from the hearth region by relocation diffusion, carried by its adherents dispersing from their homeland to Europe, Africa, and eventually in great numbers to the Western Hemisphere. Although Jews established themselves and their religion in new lands, they did not lose their sense of cultural identity and did not seek to attract converts to their faith.

center for dispersal, through hierarchical diffusion, to provincial capitals and smaller Roman settlements of Europe. From those nodes and from monasteries established in pagan rural areas, contagious diffusion disseminated Christianity throughout the continent. The acceptance of Christianity as the state religion of the empire by the Emperor Constantine in A.D. 313 was also an expression of hierarchical diffusion of great importance in establishing the faith throughout the full extent of the Roman world. Finally, and much later, relocation diffusion brought the faith to the New World with European settlers (Figure 5.18). The dissolution of the Roman Empire into a western and an eastern half after the fall of Rome also divided Christianity. The Western Church, based in Rome, was

one of the very few stabilizing and civilizing forces uniting western Europe during the Dark Ages. Its bishops became the civil as well as ecclesiastical authorities over vast areas devoid of other effective government. Parish churches were the focus of rural and urban life, and the cathedrals replaced Roman monuments and temples as the symbols of the social order (Figure 5.23). Everywhere, the Roman Catholic Church and its ecclesiastical hierarchy were dominant. Secular imperial control endured in the eastern empire, whose capital was Constantinople. Thriving under its protection, the Eastern Church expanded into the Balkans, eastern Europe, Russia, and the Near East. The fall of the eastern empire to the Turks in the 15th century Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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Diffusion paths of Christianity, A.D. 100–1500. Routes and dates are for Christianity as a composite faith. No distinction is made between the Western church and the various subdivisions of the Eastern Orthodox denominations.

opened eastern Europe temporarily to Islam, though the Eastern Orthodox Church (the direct descendant of the Byzantine state church) remains, in its various ethnic branches, a major component of Christianity. The Protestant Reformation of the 15th and 16th centuries split the church in the west, leaving Roman Catholicism supreme in southern Europe but installing a variety of Protestant denominations and national churches in western and northern Europe. The split was reflected in the subsequent worldwide dispersion of Christianity. Catholic Spain and Portugal colonized Latin America, taking both their languages and the Roman church to that area (Figure 5.20), as they did to colonial outposts in the Philippines, India, and Africa. Catholic France colonized Quebec in North America. Protestants, many of them fleeing Catholic or repressive Protestant state churches, were primary early settlers of Anglo America, Australia, New Zealand, Oceania, and South Africa. In Africa and Asia, both Protestant and Catholic missions attempted to convert nonbelievers. Both achieved success in sub-Saharan Africa, though traditional religions are shown on Figure 5.18 as dominant through much of that area. Neither was particularly successful in China, Japan, or India, where strong ethnic religious cultural systems were barriers largely impermeable to the diffusion of

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the Christian faith. Although accounting for nearly onethird of the world’s population and territorially the most extensive belief system, Christianity is no longer numerically important in or near its original hearth. Nor is it any longer dominated by Northern Hemisphere adherents. In 1900, two-thirds of all Christians lived in Europe and North America; in 2000, two-thirds of an estimated 2 billion total lived elsewhere—in South America, Africa, and Asia.

Regions and Landscapes of Christianity All of the principal world religions have experienced theological, doctrinal, or political divisions; frequently these have spatial expression. In Christianity, the early split between the Western and Eastern Churches was initially unrelated to dogma but nonetheless resulted in a territorial separation still evident on the world map. The later subdivision of the Western Church into Roman Catholic and Protestant branches gave a more intricate spatial patterning in western Europe that can only be generally suggested at the scale of Figure 5.18. Still more intermixed are the areal segregations and concentrations that have resulted from the denominational subdivisions of Protestantism. In Anglo America, the beliefs and practices of various immigrant groups and the innovations of domestic congregations have created a particularly varied spatial

Figure 5.23

The building of Notre Dame Cathedral of Paris, France, begun in 1163, took more than 100 years to complete. Perhaps the best known of the French Gothic churches, it was part of the great period of cathedral construction in Western Europe during the late 12th and the 13th centuries. Between 1170 and 1270, some 80 cathedrals were constructed in France alone. The cathedrals were located in the center of major cities; their plazas were the sites of markets, public meetings, morality plays, and religious ceremonies. They were the focus of public and private life and the symbol not only of the faith but of the pride and prosperity of the towns and regions that erected them.

patterning (Figure 5.24), though intermingling rather than rigid territorial division is characteristic of the North American, particularly United States, scene (Figure 5.1). While 85% of Canadian Christians belong to one of three denominations (Roman Catholic, Anglican, or United Church of Canada), it takes at least 20 denominations to account for 85% of Americans. Nevertheless, for the United States, one observer has suggested a pattern of “religious regions” of the country (Figure 5.25a) that, he believes, reflects a larger cultural regionalization of the United States. The extent of the underlying areal concentration and domination of at least two U.S. Protestant denominations is demonstrated in Figure 5.25b. Strongly French-, Irish-, and Portuguese-Catholic New England, the Hispanic-Catholic Southwest, and the French-Catholic vicinity of New Orleans (evident on both Figure 5.24a and 5.25a) are commonly recognized regional subdivisions of the United States. Each has a cultural identity that includes, but is not limited to, its dominant religion. The western area of Mormon (more properly, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, or LDS) cultural and religious dominance is prominent and purely American. The Baptist presence in the South and that of the Lutherans in the Upper Midwest (Figure 5.25b) help determine the boundaries of other

distinctive composite regions. The zone of cultural mixing across the center of the country from the Middle Atlantic states to the western LDS region—so evident in the linguistic geography of the United States (Figure 5.12)—is again apparent on both maps. No single church or denomination dominates, a characteristic as well of the Far Western zone. Indeed, in no large section of the United States is there a denominational dominance to equal the overwhelming (over 88%) Roman Catholic presence in Quebec suggested, on Figure 5.24b, by the absence of any “second rank” religious affiliation. The “leading” position of the United Church of Canada in the Canadian West or of the Anglican Church in the Atlantic region of Newfoundland is much less commanding. Much of interior Canada shows a degree of cultural mixing and religious diversity only hinted at by Figure 5.24b, where only the largest church memberships are noted. The mark of Christianity on the cultural landscape has been prominent and enduring. In pre-Reformation Catholic Europe, the parish church formed the center of life for small neighborhoods of every town, and the village church was the centerpiece of every rural community. In York, England, with a population of 11,000 in the 14th century, there were 45 parish churches, one for each 250 inhabitants. In Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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Figure 5.24

(a) Religious affiliation in the conterminous United States. (b) Religious affiliation in Canada. The richness of Canadian religious diversity is obscured by the numerical dominance of a small number of leading Christian denominations.

Sources: (a) Redrawn with permission from “Christian Denominations in the Conterminous United States.” In Historical Atlas of the Religions of the World, ed. Isma’il R. al-Faruqi and David E. Sopher (New York: Macmillan, 1974); (b) Based on Statistics Canada, Population: Religion (Ottawa, 1984); and The National Atlas of Canada.

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(a)

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Figure 5.25

(a) Major religious regions of the United States. (b) Regional concentration of Baptists and Lutherans.

Sources: (a) Redrawn with permission from Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Wilbur Zelinsky, vol. 51, Association of American Geographers, 1961; (b) Based on original maps prepared by Ingolf Vogeler, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire.

addition, the central cathedral served simultaneously as a glorification of God, a symbol of piety, and the focus of religious and secular life. The Spanish Laws of the Indies (1573) perpetuated that landscape dominance in the New World, decreeing that all Spanish American settlements should have a church or cathedral on a central plaza (Figure 5.26a). Protestantism placed less importance on the church as a monument and symbol, although in many communities— in colonial New England, for example—the churches of the principal denominations were at the village center (Figure 5.26b). They were often adjoined by a cemetery, for Christians—in common with Muslims and Jews—practice burial in areas reserved for the dead. In Christian countries in particular, the cemetery—whether connected to the church, separate from it, or unrelated to a specific denomination—has traditionally been a significant land use within urban areas. Frequently, the separate cemetery, originally on the outskirts of the community, becomes with urban expansion a more central land use and often one that distorts or blocks the growth of the city.

Islam Islam—the word means “submission” (to the will of God)—springs from the same Judaic roots as Christianity and embodies many of the same beliefs: There is only one God, who may be revealed to humans through prophets; Adam was the first human; Abraham was one of his descendants. Mohammed is revered as the prophet of Allah (God), succeeding and completing the work of earlier prophets of Judaism and Christianity, including Moses, David, and Jesus. The Koran, the word of Allah revealed to Mohammed, contains not only rules of worship and de-

tails of doctrine but also instructions on the conduct of human affairs. For fundamentalists, it thus becomes the unquestioned guide to matters both religious and secular. Observance of the “five pillars” (Figure 5.27) and surrender to the will of Allah unites the faithful into a brotherhood that has no concern with race, color, or caste. That law of brotherhood served to unify an Arab world sorely divided by tribes, social ranks, and multiple local deities. Mohammed was a resident of Mecca but fled in A.D. 622 to Medina, where the Prophet proclaimed a constitution and announced the universal mission of the Islamic community. That flight—Hegira—marks the starting point of the Islamic (lunar) calendar. By the time of Mohammed’s death in 11 A.H. (anno—the year of—Hegira, or A.D. 632), all of Arabia had joined Islam. The new religion swept quickly by expansion diffusion outward from that source region over most of Central Asia and, at the expense of Hinduism, into northern India (Figure 5.28). The advance westward was particularly rapid and inclusive in North Africa. In western Europe, 700 years of Muslim rule in much of Spain were ended by Christian reconquest in 1492. In eastern Europe, conversions made under an expansionary Ottoman Empire are reflected in Muslim components in Bosnia and Kosovo regions of former Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria, and in the 70% Muslim population of Albania. Later, by relocation diffusion, Islam was dispersed into Indonesia, southern Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. Muslims now form the majority population in 39 countries. Asia has the largest absolute number and Africa the highest proportion of Muslims among its population—more than 42%. Islam, with an estimated 1.25 billion adherents

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Figure 5.27

Worshipers gathered during hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The black structure is the Ka’bab, the symbol of God’s oneness and of the unity of God and humans. Many rules concerning daily life are given in the Koran, the holy book of the Muslims. All Muslims are expected to observe the five pillars of the faith (1) repeated saying of the basic creed; (2) prayers five times daily, facing Mecca; (3) a month of daytime fasting (Ramadan); (4) almsgiving; and (5) if possible; a pilgrimage to Mecca.

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Spread and extent of Islam. Islam predominates in over 35 countries along a band across northern Africa to Central Asia, northwestern China, and the northern part of the Indian subcontinent. Still farther east, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country. Islam’s greatest development is in Asia, where it is second only to Hinduism, and in Africa, where some observers suggest it may be the leading faith. Current Islamic expansion is particularly rapid in the Southern Hemisphere.

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worldwide, is the fastest-growing major religion at the present time and a prominent element in recent and current political affairs. Sectarian hatreds fueled the 1980–1988 war between Iran and Iraq; Afghan mujahedeen—“holy warriors”—found inspiration in their faith to resist Soviet occupation of their country, and Chechens drew strength from their faith in resisting the Russian assaults on their Caucasian homeland during the 1990s and after. Islamic fundamentalism led to the 1979 overthrow of Iran’s shah. Muslim separatism is a recurring theme in Philippine affairs, and militant groups seek establishment of religiously rather than secularly based governments in several Muslim states. Islam initially united a series of separate tribes and groups, but disagreements over the succession of leadership after the Prophet led to a division between two groups, Sunnis and Shi’ites. Sunnis, the majority (80% to 85% of Muslims) recognize the first four caliphs (originally, “successor” and later the title of the religious and civil head of the Muslim state) as Mohammed’s rightful successors. The Shi’ites reject the legitimacy of the first three and believe that Muslim leadership rightly belonged to the fourth caliph, the Prophet’s son-in-law, Ali, and his

Figure 5.29

descendants. At the start of the 21st century, Sunnis constitute the majority of Muslims in all countries except Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and perhaps Yemen. The mosque—place of worship, community club house, meeting hall, and school—is the focal point of Islamic communal life and the primary imprint of the religion on the cultural landscape. Its principal purpose is to accommodate the Friday communal service mandatory for all male Muslims. It is the congregation rather than the structure that is important. Small or poor communities are as well served by a bare whitewashed room as are larger cities by architecturally splendid mosques with domes and minarets. The earliest mosques were modeled on or converted from Christian churches. With time, however, Muslim architects united Roman, Byzantine, and Indian design elements to produce the distinctive mosque architecture found throughout the world of Islam. With its perfectly proportioned, frequently gilded or tiled domes, its graceful, soaring towers and minarets (from which the faithful are called to prayer), and its delicately wrought parapets and cupolas, the carefully tended mosque is frequently the most elaborate and imposing structure of the town (Figure 5.29).

The common architectural features of the mosque make it an unmistakable landscape evidence of the presence of Islam in any local culture. The Badashi Mosque in Lahore, Pakistan, would not be out of place architecturally in Muslim Malaysia or Indonesia.

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Hinduism Hinduism is the world’s oldest major religion. Though it has no datable founding event or initial prophet, some evidence traces its origin back 4000 or more years. Hinduism is not just a religion but an intricate web of religious, philosophical, social, economic, and artistic elements comprising a distinctive Indian civilization. Its estimated 780 million adherents are largely confined to India, where it claims 80% of the population. Hinduism derives its name from its cradle area in the valley of the Indus River. From that district of presentday Pakistan, it spread by contagious diffusion eastward down the Ganges River and southward throughout the subcontinent and adjacent regions by amalgamating, absorbing, and eventually supplanting earlier native religions and customs (Figure 5.20). Its practice eventually spread throughout southeastern Asia, into Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as into neighboring Myanmar (Burma) and Sri Lanka. The largest Hindu temple complex is in Cambodia, not India, and Bali remains a Hindu pocket in dominantly Islamic Indonesia. No common creed, single doctrine, or central ecclesiastical organization defines the Hindu. A Hindu is one born into a caste, a member of a complex social and economic— as well as religious—community. Hinduism accepts and incorporates all forms of belief; adherents may believe in one god or many or none. It emphasizes the divinity of the soul and is based on the concepts of reincarnation and passage from one state of existence to another in an unending cycle of birth and death in which all living things are caught. One’s position in this life is determined by one’s karma, or deeds and conduct in previous lives. Upon that conduct depends the condition and the being—plant, animal, or human—into which a soul, after a stay in heaven or hell, is reborn. All creatures are ranked, with humans at the top of the ladder. But humans themselves are ranked, and the social caste into which an individual is born is an indication of that person’s spiritual status. The goal of existence is to move up the hierarchy, eventually to be liberated from the cycle of rebirth and redeath and to achieve salvation and eternal peace through union with the Brahman, the universal soul. The caste (meaning “birth”) structure of society is an expression of the eternal transmigration of souls. For the Hindu, the primary aim of this life is to conform to prescribed social and ritual duties and to the rules of conduct for the assigned caste and profession. Those requirements comprise that individual’s dharma—law and duties. To violate them upsets the balance of society and nature and yields undesirable consequences. To observe them improves the chance of promotion at the next rebirth. Traditionally, each craft or profession is the property of a particular caste: brahmins (scholar-priests), kshatriyas (warrior-landowners), vaishyas (businessmen, farmers, herdsmen), sudras (servants and laborers). Harijans,

untouchables for whom the most menial and distasteful tasks were reserved and backwoods tribes—together accounting for around one-fifth of India’s population—stand outside the caste system. The castes are subdivided into thousands of jati groups defined by geography and occupation. Caste rules define who you can mingle with, where you can live, what you may wear, eat, and drink, and how you can earn your livelihood. The practice of Hinduism is rich with rites and ceremonies, festivals and feasts, processions and ritual gatherings of literally millions of celebrants. It involves careful observance of food and marriage rules and the performance of duties within the framework of the caste system. Pilgrimages to holy rivers and sacred places are thought to secure deliverance from sin or pollution and to preserve religious worth (Figure 5.30). In what is perhaps the largest periodic gathering of humans in the world, millions of Hindus of all castes, classes, and sects gather about once in 12 years for ritual washing away of sins in the Ganges River near Allahabad. Worship in the temples and shrines that are found in every village and the leaving of offerings to secure merit from the gods are required (see “Religion in Nanpur”). The doctrine of ahimsa—also fundamental in Buddhism—instructs Hindus to refrain from harming any living being. Temples and shrines are everywhere; their construction brings merit to their owners—the villages or individuals who paid for them. Temples must be erected on a site that is beautiful and auspicious, in the neighborhood of water since the gods will not come to other locations. Within them, innumerable icons of gods in various forms are enshrined, the objects of veneration, gifts, and daily care. All temples have a circular spire as a reminder that the sky is the real dwelling place of the god who temporarily resides within the temple (Figure 5.31). The temples, shrines, daily rituals and worship, numerous specially garbed or marked holy men and ascetics, and the everpresent sacred animals mark the cultural landscape of Hindu societies—a landscape infused with religious symbols and sights that are part of a total cultural experience.

Buddhism Numerous reform movements have derived from Hinduism over the centuries, some of which have endured to the present day as major religions on a regional or world scale. Jainism, begun in the 6th century B.C. as a revolt against the authority of the early Hindu doctrines, rejects caste distinctions and modifies concepts of karma and transmigration of souls; it counts perhaps 4 million adherents. Sikhism developed in the Punjab area of northwestern India in the late 15th century A . D ., rejecting the formalism of both Hinduism and Islam and proclaiming a gospel of universal toleration. The great majority of some 20 million Sikhs still live in India, mostly in the Punjab, though others have settled in Malaysia, Singapore, East Africa, the United Kingdom, and North America.

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Figure 5.30

Pilgrims at dawn worship in the Ganges River at Varanasi (Banares), India, one of the seven most sacred Hindu cities and the reputed earthly capital of Siva, Hindu god of destruction and regeneration. Hindus believe that to die in Varanasi means release from the cycle of rebirth and permits entrance into heaven.

Religion in Nanpur

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he villagers of Nanpur are Hindus. They are religious. They believe in God and his many incarnations. For them He is everywhere, in a man, in a tree, in a stone. According to . . . the village Brahmin, God is light and energy, like the electric current. To him there is no difference between the gods of the Hindus, Muslims and Christians. Only the names are different. Every village has a local deity. In Nanpur it is a piece of stone . . . called Mahlia Buddha. He sits under the ancient varuna tree protecting the village. Kanhai Barik, the village barber, is the attendant to the deity. Kanhai, before starting his daily work, washes the deity, decorates it with vermilion and flowers and offers food given by the villagers. Clay animals

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are presented. It is believed that the deity rides them during the night and goes from place to place guarding the village. . . . In the old days Mahlia Buddha had a special power to cure smallpox and cholera. Now, although modern medicines have brought the epidemics under control, the power of the deity has not diminished. People believe in him and worship him for everything, even for modern medicines to be effective. Religious festivals provide entertainment. There is one almost every month. The most enjoyable is the Spring festival of Holi when people throw colored powder and water on each other as an expression of love. As the cuckoo sings, hidden among the mango blossoms, the villagers carry Gopinath (Krishna) in a

palanquin [a chair with carryingpoles] around the village accompanied by musicians. . . . The women in Nanpur worship Satyapir, a Hindu-Muslim god, to bless them with sons. “Satyka” is the Hindu part meaning “truth,” and “pir” in Islam means “prophet.” It was a deliberate attempt to bring the two communities together through religion. There is a large Muslim settlement three kilometers from Nanpur and in a village on the other side of the river a single Muslim family lives surrounded by Brahmins. In spite of Hindu-Muslim tensions in other parts of India, the atmosphere around the village has remained peaceful. Source: Reprinted from the UNESCO Courier, June 1983, Prafulla Mohanti.

Figure 5.31

The Hindu temple complex at Khajraho in central India. The creation of temples and the images they house has been a principal outlet of Indian artistry for more than 3000 years. At the village level, the structure may be simple, containing only the windowless central cell housing the divine image, a surmounting spire, and the temple porch or stoop to protect the doorway of the cell. The great temples, of immense size, are ornate extensions of the same basic design.

The largest and most influential of the dissident movements has been Buddhism, a universalizing faith founded in the 6th century B . C . in northern India by Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha (Enlightened One). The Buddha’s teachings were more a moral philosophy that offered an explanation for evil and human suffering than a formal religion. He viewed the road to enlightenment and salvation to lie in understanding the “four noble truths”: existence involves suffering; suffering is the result of desire; pain ceases when desire is destroyed; the destruction of desire comes through knowledge of correct behavior and correct thoughts. In Buddhism, which retains the Hindu concept of karma, the ultimate objectives of existence are the achievement of nirvana, a condition of perfect enlightenment, and cessation of successive rebirths. The Buddha instructed his followers to carry his message as missionaries of a doctrine open to all castes, for no distinction among people was recognized. In that message all could aspire to ultimate enlightenment, a promise of salvation that raised the Buddha in popular imagination from teacher to savior and Buddhism from philosophy to universalizing religion. Contact or contagious diffusion spread the belief system throughout India, where it was made the state religion in the 3rd century B.C. It was carried elsewhere into Asia by missionaries, monks, and merchants. While expanding abroad, Buddhism began to decline at home as early as the 4th century A.D., slowly but irreversibly reabsorbed into a revived Hinduism. By the 8th century its

dominance in northern India was broken by conversions to Islam; by the 15th century, it had essentially disappeared from all of the subcontinent. Present-day spatial patterns of Buddhist adherence reflect the schools of thought, or vehicles, that were dominant during different periods of dispersion of the basic belief system (Figure 5.32). Earliest, most conservative, and closest to the origins of Buddhism was Theravada (Vehicle of the Elders) Buddhism, which was implanted in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia beginning in the 3rd century B.C. Its emphasis is on personal salvation through the four noble truths; it mandates a portion of life to be spent as monk or nun. Mahayana (Greater Vehicle) was the dominant tradition when Buddhism was accepted into East Asia—China, Korea, and Japan—in the 4th century A.D. and later. Itself subdivided and diversified, Mahayana Buddhism considers the Buddha divine and, along with other deities, a savior for all who are truly devout. It emphasizes meditation (contemplative Zen Buddhism is a variant form), does not require service in monasteries, and tends to be more polytheistic and ritualistic than does Theravada Buddhism. Vajrayana (the Diamond Vehicle) was dominant when the conversion of Tibet and neighboring northern areas began, first in the 7th century and again during the 10th and 11th centuries as a revived Lamaist tradition. That tradition originally stressed self-discipline and conversion through meditation and the study of philosophy, but it later became more formally monastic and ritualistic, elevating the Dalai Lama as the reincarnated Buddha, who became both Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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Figure 5.32

Diffusion paths, times, and “vehicles” of Buddhism.

spiritual and temporal ruler. Before Chinese conquest and the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959, as many as one out of four or five Tibetan males was a monk whose celibacy helped keep population numbers stable. Tibetan Buddhism was further dispersed, beginning in the 14th century, to Mongolia, northern China, and parts of southern Russia. In all of its many variants, Buddhism imprints its presence vividly on the cultural landscape. Buddha images in stylized human form began to appear in the first century A . D . and are common in painting and sculpture throughout the Buddhist world. Equally widespread are the three main types of buildings and monuments: the stupa, a commemorative shrine; the temple or pagoda enshrining an image or relic of the Buddha; and the monastery, some of them the size of small cities (Figure 5.33). Common, too, is the bodhi (or bo) tree, a fig tree of great size and longevity. Buddha is said to have received enlightenment seated under one of them at Bodh Gaya, India, and specimens have been planted and tended as an act of reverence and symbol of the faith throughout Buddhist Asia. Buddhism has suffered greatly in Asian lands that came under communist control: Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet, North Korea, China, and parts of Southeast Asia. Communist governments abolished the traditional rights

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and privileges of the monasteries. In those states monks were no longer prominent in numbers or presence; Buddhist religious buildings were taken over by governments and converted into museums or other secular uses, abandoned, or destroyed. In consequence, the number of adherents of Buddhism can now be only roughly and uncertainly estimated.

East Asian Ethnic Religions When Buddhism reached China from the south some 1500 to 2000 years ago and was carried to Japan from Korea in the 7th century, it encountered and later amalgamated with already well established ethical belief systems. The Far Eastern ethnic religions are syncretisms, combinations of different forms of belief and practice. In China the union was with Confucianism and Taoism, themselves becoming intermingled by the time of Buddhism’s arrival. In Japan it was with Shinto, a polytheistic animism and shamanism. Chinese belief systems address not so much the hereafter as the achievement of the best possible way of life in the present existence. They are more ethical or philosophical than religious in the pure sense. Confucius (K’ung Futzu), a compiler of traditional wisdom who lived about the same time as Gautama Buddha, emphasized the importance

Figure 5.33

The golden stupas of the Swedagon pagoda, Yangon, Myanmar (Rangoon, Burma).

of proper conduct—between ruler and subjects and between family members. The family was extolled as the nucleus of the state, and filial piety was the loftiest of virtues. There are no churches or clergy in Confucianism, though its founder believed in a Heaven seen in naturalistic terms, and the Chinese custom of ancestor worship as a mark of gratitude and respect was encouraged. After his death the custom was expanded to include worship of Confucius himself in temples erected for that purpose. That worship became the official state religion in the 2nd century B.C., and for some 2000 years—until the start of the 20th century A.D.—Confucianism, with its emphasis on ethics and morality rooted in Chinese traditional wisdom, formed the basis of the belief system of China. It was joined by, or blended with, Taoism, an ideology that according to legend was first taught by Lao-tsu in the 6th century B.C. Its central theme is Tao, the Way, a philosophy teaching that eternal happiness lies in total identification with nature and deploring passion, unnecessary invention, unneeded knowledge, and government interference in the simple life of individuals. Beginning in the 1st century A.D. this philosophical naturalism was coupled with a religious Taoism involving deities, spirits, magic, temples and priests. Buddhism, stripped by Chinese pragmatism of much of its Indian otherworldliness and defining a

nirvana achievable in this life, was easily accepted as a companion to these traditional Chinese belief systems. Along with Confucianism and Taoism, Buddhism became one of the honored Three Teachings, and to the average person there was no distinction in meaning or importance between a Confucian temple, Taoist shrine, or Buddhist stupa. Buddhism also joined and influenced Japanese Shinto, the traditional religion of Japan that developed out of nature and ancestor worship. Shinto—The Way of the Gods—is basically a structure of customs and rituals rather than an ethical or moral system. It observes a complex set of deities, including deified emperors, family spirits, and the divinities residing in rivers, trees, certain animals, mountains and, particularly, the sun and moon. Buddhism, at first resisted, was later intertwined with traditional Shinto. Buddhist deities were seen as Japanese gods in a different form, and Buddhist priests formerly but no longer assumed control of most Shinto shrines. More recently, Shinto divested itself of many Buddhist influences and became, under the reign of the Emperor Meiji (1868–1912), the official state religion, emphasizing loyalty to the emperor. The centers of worship are the numerous shrines and temples in which the gods are believed to dwell and which are approached through ceremonial torii, or gateway arches (Figure 5.34). Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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Figure 5.34

A Shinto shrine, Nikko Park, Honshu Island, Japan.

Summary Language and religion are basic threads in the web of culture. They serve to identify and categorize individuals within a single society and to separate peoples and nations of different tongues and faiths. By their pronunciation and choice of words we quickly recognize districts of origin and educational levels of speakers of our own language and easily identify those who originally had different native

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tongues. In some societies, religion may serve as a similar identifier of individuals and groups who observe distinctive modes or rhythms of life dictated by their separate faiths. Both language and religion are mentifacts, parts of the ideological subsystem of culture; both are transmitters of culture as well as its identifiers. Both have distinctive spatial patterns—reflecting past and present processes of spatial interaction and diffusion—that are basic to the recognition of world culture realms.

Language and Religion A great many language and religion websites exist, but relatively few have direct relevance to our spatial, geographic interests. Many of the language pages have linguistics or instructional orientation; theological, philosophical, or denominational interests dominate the very great number of religion sites. We have found the following WWW sites to be among the more geographically pertinent and good starting points for further web browsing. Your own exploration may well reveal sites of greater value to your individual interests.

Language The Summer Institute of Linguistics, connected to the International Linguistics Center in Dallas, Texas, focuses on the study of languages and cultures around the world. Among its rich menu of resources and links is the Ethnologue: Languages of the World, a detailed catalog of more than 6800 of the world’s languages and an exhaustive index of language names, dialects, multilingualism, and more. Available fully in book and CD-ROM formats, some of Ethnologue’s content is also presented in an “Internet Version” at www.sil.org/ethnologue/. Pidgins and creole tongues are discussed there as “Languages of Special Interest,” the world’s top 100 languages (by number of speakers) are identified, and language name and language families indexes are supplied, among other items. The University of California-Davis and its Department of Native American Studies originated Terralingua: Partnerships for Linguistic and Biological Diversity. Its website at www.terralingua.org/ gives access to “Resources,” including on-line bibliographies, publications, and websites and “Indigenous & Minority Peoples’ Views of Language” in the form of descriptive observations and quotations. The Center for Applied Linguistics, a private nonprofit organization, for many years has been conducting research and applying information about language and culture to areas of academic, cultural, and social concern. Its home page provides descriptions about its research projects and publications, with emphasis on educational and public policy issues: www.cal.org/. Foreign Language Resources on the Web at www.itp. berkeley.edu/}thorne/HumanResources.html claims status as “a quality-only index” that is not comprehensive but does include the best of foreign language websites. Arranged by language, each citation contains a brief summary of the website contents and emphasis. It is an excellent starting point for your own Internet language searches. Less useful geographically is Language Links, a listing of multilanguage sites oriented toward language instructors but with significant cultural content: http://polyglot.lss.wisc. edu/lss/lang/langlink.html. If your interests run to dialects and American regional word choices, check the home page of The Dictionary of

Languages may be grouped genetically—by origin and historical development—but the world distribution of language families depends as much on the movement of peoples and histories of conquest and colonization as it does on patterns of linguistic evolution. Linguistic geography

American Regional English at http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/dare/ dare.html and The American Dialect Society website at www.americandialect.org/. The society is a scholarly association studying the English language in North America and other languages or dialects related to it. Although primarily of interest to its members, the Society’s website provides an index to past and current volumes of its journal American Speech and links to linguistic and dialect resources. The Telsur Project of the Linguistics Laboratory of the University of Pennsylvania is the developer of the Atlas of North American English that traces regional dialects and accents. Its web site at www.ling.upenn.edu/phonoatlas/ describes the project, presents regional maps of speech characteristics of northern cities with audible speech samples, and a “National Map of Regional Dialects of American English.” Those particularly interested in toponyms will want to view the Natural Resources Canada website on Origins of Canada’s Geographical Names at http://geonames.nrcan.gc.ca/ english/schoolnet/origin.html. Information about some 2 million physical and cultural geographic features of the United States may be accessed through the Geographic Names Information System (GNIS) developed by the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Board on Geographic Names. GNIS is the official repository of domestic toponymic information. Its homepage may be accessed through http://geonames.usgs.gov/gnishome.html.

Religion Facets of Religion, the Internet Virtual Library– Religion, provides an exhaustive set of links to websites on the world’s principal religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, etc.) and to other religious and related resource lists. The site may be navigated by key word search by activating any of a lengthy series of categories of religions and religious topics: www.bcca.org/}cvoogt/Religion/. The “Religion” page of Academic Info (“Your Gateway to Quality Internet Resources”) is another useful and exhaustive guide to Internet religion sources: www.academicinfo.net/ religindex.html. Estimates on the numbers and growth rates of adherents is offered on the Religions of the World site at www.religioustolerance.org/worldrel.htm. The About.com page of Religion/Spirituality contains a very extensive categories list that should lead you to specific religions and religious topics of interest to you. It is found at http://about.com/religion. And for both language (linguistics) and religion Internet leads, remember the Voice of the Shuttle pages at http://vos.ucsb.edu/. Finally, don’t forget to check our own textbook’s home page at www.mhhe.com/fellmann7e/ for websites added or corrected by the publisher or contributed by helpful users.

studies spatial variations in languages, variations that may be minimized by encouragement of standard and official languages or overcome by pidgins, creoles, and lingua francas. Toponymy, the study of place names, helps document that history of movement. Language and Religion: Mosaics of Culture

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Religion is a less pronounced identifier or conveyer of culture than is language. While language characterizes all peoples, religion varies in its impact and influence on culture groups. Some societies are dominated in all aspects by their controlling religious belief: Hindu India, for example, or Islamic Iran. Where religious beliefs are strongly held, they can unite a society of adherents and divide nations and peoples holding divergent faiths. Although religions do not lend themselves to easy classification, their patterns of distribution are as distinct and revealing as are those of languages. They, too, reflect past and present patterns of migration, conquest, and diffusion, part of the larger picture of dynamic cultural geography. While each is a separate and distinct thread of culture, language and religion are not totally unrelated. Religion can influence the spread of languages to new peoples and areas, as Arabic, the language of the Koran, was spread by conquering armies of Muslims. Religion may conserve as well as disperse language. Yiddish remains the language of religion in Hasidic Jewish communities; church services in German or Swedish, and school instruction in them, characterize some Lutheran

congregations in Anglo America. Until the 1960s, Latin was the language of liturgy in the Roman Catholic Church and Sanskrit remains the language of the Vedas, sacred in Hinduism. Sacred texts may demand the introduction of an alphabet to nonliterate societies: the Roman alphabet follows Christian missionaries, Arabic script accompanies Islam. The Cyrillic alphabet of eastern Europe was developed by missionaries. The tie between language and religion is not inevitable. The French imposed their language but not their religion on Algeria; Spanish Catholicism but not the Spanish language became dominant in the Philippines. Language and religion are important and evident components of spatial cultural variation. They are, however, only part of the total complex of cultural identities that set off different social groups. Prominent among those identities is that of ethnicity, a conviction of members of a social group that they have distinctive characteristics in common that significantly distinguish and isolate them from the larger population among which they reside. Our attention turns in the next chapter to the concept and patterns of ethnicity, a distinctive piece in the mosaic of human culture.

Key Words animism 165 Buddhism 177 caste 177 Christianity 168 Confucianism 181 creole 157 dialect 153 ethnic religion 165 geographic (regional) dialect Hinduism 177 Islam 174 isogloss 154 Judaism 167

154

language 143 language family 143 lingua franca 157 linguistic geography 154 monotheism 165 multilingualism 157 official language 157 pidgin 157 polytheism 165 protolanguage 144 religion 164 secularism 167 shamanism 165

Shinto 181 social dialect 153 speech community 152 standard language 152 syncretism 180 Taoism 181 toponym 162 toponymy 162 tribal (traditional) religion 165 universalizing religion 165 vernacular 153

For Review 1.

2.

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Why might one consider language the dominant differentiating element of culture separating societies? In what way may religion affect other cultural traits of a society? In what cultures or societies does religion appear to be a growing

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

3.

influence? What might be the broader social or economic consequences of that growth? In what way does the concept of protolanguage help us in linguistic classification? What is meant by language family? Is genetic

4.

classification of language an unfailing guide to spatial patterns of languages? Why or why not? What spatial diffusion processes may be seen in the prehistoric and historic spread of languages? What have been the

5.

consequences of language spread on world linguistic diversity? In what ways do isoglosses and the study of linguistic geography help us understand other human geographic patterns?

6.

Cite examples that indicate the significance of religion as a cultural dominant in the internal and foreign relations of nations.

7.

How does the classification of religions as universalizing, ethnic, or tribal help us to understand their patterns of distribution and spatial diffusion?

Focus Follow-up exchange between speakers of different tongues. When evolved into a complex native language of a people, the pidgin has become a creole. Governments may designate one or more official state languages (including, perhaps, a creole such as Swahili).

Language 1.

How are the world’s languages classified and distributed? pp. 142–152. The some 6000 languages spoken today may be grouped within a limited number of language families that trace their origins to common protolanguages. The present distribution of tongues reflects the current stage of continuing past and recent dispersion of their speakers and their adoption by new users. Languages change through isolation, migration, and the passage of time.

2.

3.

All speakers of a given language are members of its speech community, but not all use the language uniformly. The standard language is that form of speech that has received official sanction or acceptance as the “proper” form of grammar and pronunciation. Dialects, regional and social, represent nonstandard or vernacular variants of the common tongue. A pidgin is a created, composite, simple language designed to promote

Religion 4.

5.

How does language serve as a cultural identifier and landscape artifact? pp. 160–163. Language is a mentifact, a part of the ideological subsystem of culture. It is, therefore, inseparable from group identity and self-awareness. Language may also be divisive, creating rifts within multilingual societies when linguistic minorities seek recognition or separatism. Toponyms (place names) record the order past and present occupants have tried to place on areas they inhabit or transit. Toponymy in tracing that record becomes a valuable tool of historical cultural geography.

What are standard languages and what kinds of variants from them can be observed? pp. 152–160.

alienate different groups within and between societies. Past and present belief systems of a culture may influence its legal norms, dietary customs, economic patterns, and landscape imprints.

What is the cultural role of religion? pp. 163–165. Like language, religion is a basic identifying component of culture, a mentifact that serves as a cultural rallying point. Frequently, religious beliefs and adherence divide and

How are religions classified and distributed? pp. 165–167. As variable cultural innovations, religions do not lend themselves to easy clustering or classification. Distinctions among universalizing, ethnic, and traditional religions have some geographic significance, but geographers are more interested in religions’ spatial patterns and diffusion processes and landscape impacts than in their theologies. Those patterns reflect their origin areas, the migrations and conquests achieved by their past adherents, and the converts they have attracted in home and distant areas.

6.

What are the principal world religions and how are they distinguished in patterns of innovation, diffusion, and landscape imprint? pp. 167–181. The text briefly traces those differing origins, spreads, and cultural landscape impacts of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and certain East Asian ethnic religions.

Selected References Beinart, Haim. Atlas of Medieval Jewish History. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Bryson, Bill. The Mother Tongue: English and How It Got That Way. New York: Morrow, 1990.

Burnaby, Barbara, and Roderic Beaujot. The Use of Aboriginal Languages in Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987.

Caldarola, Carlo, ed. Religions and Societies: Asia and the Middle East. Berlin and New York: Mouton Publishers, 1982. Cartwright, Don. “Expansion of French Language Rights in Ontario,

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1968–1993.” The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe canadien 40, no. 3 (1996): 238–257. Carver, Craig. American Regional Dialects: A Word Geography. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987. Chadwick, Henry, and G. R. Evans, eds. Atlas of the Christian Church. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1987. Chambers, J. K., ed. The Languages of Canada. Montreal: Didier, 1979. Cooper, Robert L., ed. Language Spread: Studies in Diffusion and Social Change. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. Crystal, David, ed. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the English Language. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Crystal, David. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language. 2d ed. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Crystal, David. “Vanishing Languages.” Civilization. February/March 1997: 40–45. Dutt, Ashok K., and Satish Davgun. “Patterns of Religious Diversity.” In India: Cultural Patterns and Processes, edited by Allen G. Noble and Ashok K. Dutt, pp. 221–246. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Earhart, H. Byron. Japanese Religion: Unity and Diversity. 3d ed. Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson, 1982. Edwards, Viv. Language in a Black Community. San Diego, Calif.: College-Hill Press, 1986. Encyclopedia of World Religions. Wendy Doniger, consulting editor. Springfield, Mass.: MerriamWebster, Inc., 1999. al-Faruqi, Isma’il R., and Lois L. alFaruqi. The Cultural Atlas of Islam. New York: Macmillan, 1986. al-Faruqi, Isma’il R., and David E. Sopher, eds. Historical Atlas of the Religions of the World. New York: Macmillan, 1974. “Focus: Geography and Names.” The Professional Geographer 49, no. 4 (1997): 465–500. Gamkrelidze, Thomas V., and V. V. Ivanov. “The Early History of IndoEuropean Languages.” Scientific American 262 (March 1990): 110–116. Greenberg, Joseph H., and Merritt Ruhlen. “Linguistic Origins of Native Americans.” Scientific American 267, no. 5 (November 1992): 94–99.

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Hall, Robert A., Jr. Pidgin and Creole Languages. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. Halvorson, Peter L., and William M. Newman. Atlas of Religious Change in America, 1952–1990. Atlanta, Ga.: Glenmary Research Center, 1994. Hill, Samuel S. “Religion and Region in America.” Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science 480 (July 1985): 132–141. Journal of Cultural Geography (Popular Culture Association and The American Cultural Association) 7, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 1986). Special issue devoted to geography and religion. Kaplan, David H. “Population and Politics in a Plural Society: The Changing Geography of Canada’s Linguistic Groups.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84, no. 1 (March 1994): 46–67. Katzner, Kenneth. The Languages of the World. Rev. ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. Key, Mary Ritchie. Male/Female Language. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1975. King, Noel Q. African Cosmos: An Introduction to Religion in Africa. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986. Krindatch, Alexei D. Geography of Religions in Russia. Decatur, Ga.: Glenmary Research Center, 1996. Lind, Ivan. “Geography and Place Names.” In Readings in Cultural Geography, edited by Philip L. Wagner and Marvin Mikesell, pp. 118–128. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. McCrum, Robert, William Cran, and Robert MacNeil. The Story of English. New York: Elizabeth Sifton Books/Viking, 1986. Moseley, Christopher, and R. E. Asher, eds. Atlas of the World’s Languages. London, England, and New York: Routledge, 1994. “Native American Geographic Names.” Special issue of Names, vol. 44, no. 4 (Dec. 1996). Nielsen, Niels C., Jr., et al. Religions of the World. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983. Numrich, Paul D. “Recent Immigrant Religions in a Restructuring Metropolis: New Religious Landscapes in Chicago.” Journal of Cultural Geography 17, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 1997): 55–76.

Park, Chris. Sacred Worlds: An Introduction to Geography and Religion. New York: Routledge, 1994. Rayburn, Alan. Naming Canada: Stories about Place Names from Canadian Geographic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994. Renfrew, Colin. “World Linguistic Diversity.” Scientific American 270, no. 1 (January 1994): 116–123. Scott, Jamie, and Paul SimpsonHousley, eds. Sacred Places and Profane Spaces: Essays in the Geographics of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. Shortridge, James R. “Patterns of Religion in the United States.” Geographical Review 66 (1976): 420–434. Simoons, Frederick J. Eat Not This Flesh: Food Avoidances from Prehistory to the Present. 2d ed. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994. Sloane, David Charles. The Last Great Necessity: Cemeteries in American History. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. Sopher, David E. The Geography of Religions. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967. Stewart, George R. Names on the Globe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. Stewart, George R. Names on the Land. 4th ed. San Francisco: Lexikos, 1982. Trudgill, Peter. On Dialect: Social and Geographical Perspectives. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1983. Upton, Clive, and J. D. A. Widdowson. Atlas of English Dialects. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1996. Weatherford, Jack. Native Roots: How the Indians Enriched America. New York: Ballantine Books, 1991. Williams, Peter W. Houses of God: Region, Religion, and Architecture in the United States. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997. Williamson, Juanita V., and Virginia M. Burke, eds. A Various Language: Perspectives on American Dialects. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Zelinsky, Wilbur. “Some Problems in the Distribution of Generic Terms in the Place-Names of the Northeastern United States.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 45 (1955): 319–349.

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Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

6

A proud declaration of ethnic diversity in Miami, Florida.

Focus Preview 1. Ethnicity, ethnic diversity, and the changing immigration streams to multiethnic Anglo America, pp. 188–195. 2. Acculturation and the persistence of ethnic clusters and identities in Anglo America and elsewhere, pp. 195–207.

3. Anglo American and world urban ethnic diversity and patterns of segregation, pp. 207–215. 4. The landscape impacts and residues of ethnic diversity, pp. 215–221.

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W

e must not forget that these men and women who file through the narrow gates at Ellis Island, hopeful, confused, with bundles of misconceptions as heavy as the great sacks upon their backs—we must not forget that these simple, rough-handed people are the ancestors of our descendants, the fathers and mothers of our children. So it has been from the beginning. For a century a swelling human stream has poured across the ocean, fleeing from poverty in Europe to a chance in America. Englishman, Welshman, Scotchman, Irishman; German, Swede, Norwegian, Dane; Jew, Italian, Bohemian, Serb; Syrian, Hungarian, Pole, Greek—one race after another has knocked at our doors, been given admittance, has married us and begot our children. We could not have told by looking at them whether they were to be good or bad progenitors, for racially the cabin is not above the steerage, and dirt, like poverty and ignorance, is but skin-deep. A few hours, and the stain of travel has left the immigrant’s cheek; a few years, and he loses the odor of alien soils; a generation or two, and these outlanders are irrevocably our race, our nation, our stock.1

The United States is a cultural composite—as increasingly are most of the countries of the world. North America’s peoples include aborigine and immigrant, native born and new arrival. Had this chapter’s introductory passage been written in 2002 rather than nearly 90 years earlier, the list of foreign origins would have been lengthened to include many Latin American, African, and Asian countries as well as the European sources formerly most common. The majority of the world’s societies, even those outwardly seemingly most homogeneous, house distinctive ethnic groups, populations that feel themselves bound together by a common origin and set off from other groups by ties of culture, race, religion, language, or nationality. Ethnic diversity is a near-universal part of human geographic patterns; the current some 200 or so independent countries are home to at least 5000 ethnic groups. European states house increasing numbers of African and Asian immigrants and guest workers from outside their borders (Figure 6.1) and have effectively become multiethnic societies. Refugees and jobseekers are found in alien lands throughout both hemispheres. Cross-

1From Walter E. Weyl, “The New Americans,” Harper’s Magazine 129 (1914):615. Copyright © 1914 Harper’s Magazine Foundation, New York, N.Y.

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Figure 6.1

“Guest workers”—frequently called by their German name, Gastarbeiter—have substantially altered the ethnic mix in formerly unicultural cities of Western Europe. The restaurant shown here is in an Algerian neighborhood of Paris, France. On average, foreigners comprise nearly 10% of Western Europe’s labor force. They form the majority of the work force in many Middle Eastern countries; between 60% and 90% of the workers of the Persian Gulf countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are foreigners.

border movements and resettlements in Southeast Asia and Africa are well-reported current events. European colonialism created pluralistic societies in tropical lands through introduction of both ruling elites and frequently, nonindigenous laboring groups. Polyethnic Russia, Afghanistan, China, India, and most African countries have native—rather than immigrant—populations more characterized by racial and cultural diversity than by uniformity. Tricultural Belgium has a nearly split personality in matters political and social. The idea of an ethnically pure nation-state is no longer realistic. Like linguistic and religious differences within societies, such population interminglings are masked by the “culture realms” shown in Figure 2.4 but are, at a larger scale, important threads in the cultural-geographic web of our complex world. The multiple movements, diffusions, migrations, and mixings of peoples of different origins making up that world are the subject of ethnic geography. Its concerns are those of spatial distributions and interactions of ethnic groups however defined, and of the cultural characteristics and influences underlying them. Ethnicity is always based on a firm understanding by members of a group that they are in some fundamental ways different from others who do not share their distinguishing characteristics or cultural heritage. Ethnicity is, at root, a spatial concept. Ethnic groups are associated with clearly recognized territories—either larger homeland districts or smaller rural or urban enclaves—in which they

are primary or exclusive occupants and upon which they have placed distinctive cultural marks. Since territory and ethnicity are inseparable concepts, ethnicity becomes an important concern in the cultural patterning of space and clearly an item of human geographic interest. Further, since ethnicity is often identified with language or religious practices setting a minority group off from a surrounding majority culture, consideration of ethnicity flows logically from the discussions of language and religion in Chapter 5. Our examination of ethnic patterns will concentrate on Anglo America, an area originally occupied by a multitude of territorially, culturally, and linguistically distinctive Native American people who were overwhelmed and displaced by immigrants—and their descendants— representing a wide spectrum of the Old World’s ethnic groups. While Anglo America lacks the homelands that gave territorial identity to immigrant ethnics in their countries of origin, it has provided a case study of how distinctive culture groups partition space and place their claims and imprints on it. It shows, as well, the durability of the idea of ethnic distinction even under conditions and national myths that emphasize intermixing and homogenization of population as the accepted norm. Examples drawn from other countries and environments will serve to highlight ways in which American-based generalizations may be applied more broadly or in which the North American experience reflects a larger world scene.

Ethnic Diversity and Separatism Each year on a weekend in May, New York City has celebrated its cultural diversity and vitality by closing off to all but pedestrian traffic a 1-mile stretch of street to conduct the Ninth Avenue International Festival. Along the reserved route from 37th to 57th streets, a million or more New Yorkers have come together to sample the foods, view the crafts, and hear the music of the great number of the world’s cultures represented among the citizens of the city. As a resident of the largest United States metropolis, each of the merchants and artists contributing one of the several hundred separate storefront, stall, or card-table displays of the festival became a member of the Anglo American culture realm. Each, however, preserved a distinctive small-group identity within that larger collective “realm” (Figure 6.2). The threads of diversity exhibited in the festival are expressions of ethnicity, a term derived from the Greek word ethnos, meaning a “people” or “nation.” Intuitively we recognize that the literal translation is incomplete. Ethnic groups are composed of individuals who share some prominent traits or characteristics, some evident physical or social identifications setting them apart both from the majority population and from other distinctive minorities among whom they may live.

Figure 6.2

The annual Ninth Avenue International Fair in New York City became one of the largest of its kind. Similar festivals celebrating America’s ethnic diversity are found in cities and small towns across the country.

No single trait denotes ethnicity. Group recognition may be based on language, religion, national origin, unique customs, or an ill-defined concept of “race” (see “The Matter of Race”). Whatever may establish the identity of a group, the common unifying bonds of ethnicity are a shared ancestry and cultural heritage, the retention of a set of distinctive traditions, and the maintenance of in-group interactions and relationships. The principal racial and ethnic groups of the United States are identified in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 and of Canada in Table 6.4. Ethnocentrism is the term describing a tendency to evaluate other cultures against the standards of one’s own. It implies the feeling that one’s own ethnic group is superior. Ethnocentrism can divide multiethnic societies by establishing rivalries and provoking social and spatial discord and isolation. It can, as well, be a sustaining and identifying emotion, giving familiar values and support to the individual in the face of the complexities of life. The ethnic group maintains familiar cultural institutions and shares traditional food and music. More often than not, it provides the friends, spouses, business opportunities, and political identification of ethnic group members. Territorial isolation is a strong and supporting trait of ethnic separatism and assists individual groups to retain their identification. In Europe, Asia, and Africa, ethnicity and territorial identity are inseparable. Ethnic minorities are first and foremost associated with homelands. This is true of the Welsh, Bretons, and Basques of

Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

189

The Matter of Race

H

uman populations may be differentiated from one another on any number of bases: gender, nationality, stage of economic development, and so on. One common form of differentiation is based on recognizable inherent physical characteristics, or race. A race is usually understood to be a population subset whose members have in common some hereditary biological characteristics that set them apart physically from other human groups. The spread of human beings over the earth and their occupation of different environments was accompanied by the development of physical variations in skin pigmentation, hair texture, facial characteristics, blood composition, and other traits largely related to soft tissue. Some subtle skeletal differences among peoples also exist. Such differences formed the basis for the segregation, by some anthropologists, of humanity into different racial groups, although recent research indicates that the greatest genetic variation between any racial groups ever identified is far less than the variation within any single population. Caucasoid, Negroid, Mongoloid, Amerindian, Australoid and other races have been recognized in a process of arbitrary classification invention, modification, and refinement that began at least two centuries ago. Racial differentiation as commonly understood—based largely on surface appearance—is old and can reasonably be dated at least to the Paleolithic (100,000 to about 11,000 years ago) spread and isolation of population groups.

Although racial classifications vary by author, most are derived from recognized geographical variations of populations. Thus, Mongoloids are associated with northern and eastern Asia; Australoids are the aboriginal people of Australasia; Amerindians developed in the Americas, and so on. If all of humankind belongs to a single species that can freely interbreed and produce fertile offspring, how did this areal differentiation by race occur? Why is it that despite millennia of mixing and migration, people with distinct combinations of physical traits appear to be clustered in particular areas of the world? Two causative forces appear to be most important. First, through evolutionary natural selection or adaptation, characteristics are transmitted that enable people to adapt to particular environment conditions, such as climate. Studies have suggested some plausible relationship between, for example, solar radiation and skin color, and between temperature and body size. In tropical climates, for example, it persumably is advantageous to be short since that means a greater bodily surface area for sweat to evaporate. In frigid Arctic regions, it is suggested, Inuits and other native populations developed round heads and bodies with increased bodily volume and decreased evaporative surface area. The second force, genetic drift, refers to a heritable trait (such as flatness of face) that appears by chance in one group and becomes

Western Europe; the Slovenes, Croatians, or Bosnians of Eastern Europe; the non-Slavic “nationalities” of Russia; and the immense number of ethnic communities of South and Southeast Asia. These minorities have specific spatial identity even though they may not have political independence.

190

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

accentuated through inbreeding. If two populations are too separated spatially for much interaction to occur (isolation), a trait may develop in one but not in the other. Unlike natural selection, genetic drift differentiates populations in nonadaptive ways. Natural selection and genetic drift promote racial differentiation. Countering them is gene flow via interbreeding (also called admixture), which acts to homogenize neighboring populations. Genetically, it has been observed, there is no such thing as a “pure” race since people breed freely outside their local group. Opportunities for interbreeding, always part of the spread and intermingling of human populations, have accelerated with the growing mobility and migrations of people in the past few centuries. While we may have an urge to group humans “racially,” we cannot use biology to justify it, and anthropologists have largely abandoned— and geneticists dismissed—the idea of race as a scientific concept. Nor does race have meaningful application to any human characteristics that are culturally acquired. That is, race is not equivalent to ethnicity or nationality and has no bearing on differences in religion or language. There is no “Irish” or “Hispanic” race, for example. Such groupings are based on culture, not genes. Culture summarizes the way of life of a group of people, and members of the group may adopt it irrespective of their individual genetic heritage, or race.

Where ethnic groups are intermixed and territorial boundaries imprecise—former Yugoslavia is an example—or where a single state contains disparate, rival populations— the case of many African and Asian countries—conflict between groups can be serious if peaceful relations or central governmental control break down. “Ethnic cleansing,” a

TABLE 6.1

TABLE 6.2

U.S. Resident Population by Race and Hispanic Origin, 2000 Number (millions)

Percent of U.S. Population

One race

274.6

97.6

White

211.5

75.1

Black or African American

34.7

12.3

Asian

10.2

American Indian and Alaska Native Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander

Race

Some other race

Number (000)

Percentage of Total Population

German

57,947

23.3

Irish

38,736

15.6

English

32,682

13.1

3.6

African American

23,777

9.6

Italian

14,665

5.9

2.5

0.9

Mexican

11,589

4.7

0.4

0.1

15.4

5.5

Two or more races

6.8

2.4

Total Population

281.4

100.0

Hispanic or Latinoa

35.3

12.5

Note: Race as reported reflects the self-identification of respondents. aPersons

Leading Ethnic Affiliations Claimed by U.S. Census Respondents, 1990

Ancestry

French

10,321

4.1

Polish

9,366

3.8

American Indian

8,708

3.5

Note: More than 12 million persons listed “American” for ancestry. The tabulation is based on self-identification of respondents, not on objective criteria. Many persons reported their ancestry in two or three ethnic groups and were tabulated by the Census Bureau under each claimed ancestry. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

polite term with grisly implications, has become a past or present justification and objective for civil conflict in parts of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and in several African and southeast Asian countries. Its outcome is not only an alteration of the ethnic composition of states, but of the ethnic mix in, usually, adjacent countries to which displaced populations have fled as refugees. Few identifiable homelands exist within the North American cultural mix. However, the “Chinatowns” and “Little Italys” as created enclaves within North American cities have provided both the spatial refuge and the support systems essential to new arrivals in an alien culture realm. Asian and West Indian immigrants in London and other English cities and foreign guest workers—originally migrant and temporary laborers, usually male—that reside in Continental European communities assume similar spatial separation. While serving a support function, this segregation is as much the consequence of the housing market and of public and private restriction as it is simply of self-selection. In Southeast Asia, Chinese communities remain aloof from the majority culture not as a transitional phase to incorporation with it but as a permanent chosen isolation. By retaining what is familiar of the old in a new land, ethnic enclaves have reduced cultural shock and have paved the way for the gradual process of adaptation that prepares both individuals and groups to operate effectively in the new, larger host society. The traditional ideal of the United States “melting pot,” in which ethnic identity

and division would be lost and full amalgamation of all minorities into a blended, composite majority culture would occur, was the expectation voiced in the chapter-opening quotation. For many even long-resident ethnic groups, however, that ideal has not become a reality. Recent decades have seen a resurgence of cultural pluralism and an increasing demand for ethnic autonomy not only in North America but also in multiethnic societies around the world (see “Nations of Immigrants,” p. 192). At least, recognition is sought for ethnicity as a justifiable basis for special treatment in the allocation of political power, the structure of the educational system, the toleration or encouragement of minority linguistic rights, and other evidences of group self-awareness and promotion. In some multiethnic societies, second- and third-generation descendants of immigrants, now seeking “roots” and identity, embrace the ethnicity that their forebears sought to deny.

Immigration Streams The ethnic diversity found on the Anglo American scene today is the product of continuous flows of immigrants— some 70 million of them by the start of the 21st century— representing, at different periods, movements to this continent of members of nearly all of the cultures and races of the world (Figure 6.3). For the United States, that movement took the form of three distinct immigrant waves, all of which, of course, followed much earlier Amerindian arrivals. Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

191

Figure 6.3

Although it was not opened until 1892, New York harbor’s Ellis Island—the country’s first federal immigration facility—quickly became the symbol of all the migrant streams to the United States. By the time it was closed in late 1954, it had processed 17 million immigrants. Today their descendants number over 100 million Americans. A major renovation project was launched in 1984 to restore Ellis Island as a national monument.

Geography and Public Policy Nations of Immigrants Americans, steeped in the country’s “melting pot” myth and heritage, are inclined to forget that many other countries are also “nations of immigrants” and that their numbers are dramatically increasing. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, early European colonists and, later, immigrants from other continents overwhelmed indigenous populations. In each, immigration has continued, contributing not only to national ethnic mixes but maintaining or enlarging the proportion of the population that is foreign born. In Australia, as one example, that proportion now equals 25%; for Canada it is some 18%. In Latin America, foreign population domination of native peoples

192

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

was and is less complete and uniform than in Anglo America. While in nearly all South and Central American states, European and other nonnative ethnic groups dominate the social and economic hierarchy, in many they constitute only a minority of the total population. In Paraguay, for example, the vast majority of inhabitants are native Paraguayans who pride themselves on their Native American descent, and Amerindians comprise nearly half the population of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. But European ethnics make up over 90% of the population of Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and southern Chile, and about 50% of the inhabitants of Brazil. The original homelands of those immigrant groups are themselves increasingly becoming multi-ethnic,

and several European countries are now home to as many or more of the foreign-born proportionately than is the United States. Some 20% of Switzerland’s population, 13% of France’s, 10% of Sweden’s, and over 9% of Germany’s are of foreign birth, compared with America’s 11%. Many came as immigrants and refugees fleeing unrest or poverty in post-communist Eastern Europe. Many are “guest workers” and their families who were earlier recruited in Turkey and North Africa; or they are immigrants from former colonial or overseas territories in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. More than 7% of Germany’s inhabitants come from outside the European Union, as do over 3% of Holland’s and Belgium’s. The trend of ethnic mixing is certain to continue and accelerate.

Cross-border movements of migrants and refugees in Africa, Asia, the Americas, as well as in Europe, are continuing common occurrences, reflecting growing incidences of ethnic strife, civil wars, famines, and economic hardships. But of even greater long-term influence are the growing disparities in population numbers and economic wealth between the older developed states and the developing world. The population of the world’s poorer countries is growing twice as fast as Europe’s of the late 19th century, when that continent fed the massive immigration streams across the Atlantic. The current rich world, whose population is projected to stabilize well below 1.5 billion, will increasingly be a magnet for those from poorer countries where numbers will rise from some 4 billion to more than 6.5 billion by A . D . 2025 and to nearly 8 billion in a half-century. The economic and population pressures building in the developing world insure greater international and intercontinental migration and a rapid expansion in the numbers of “nations of immigrants.” Many of those developed host countries are beginning to resist that flow. Although the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights declares individuals are to be free to move within or to leave their own countries, no right of admittance to any other country is conceded. Political asylum is often—but not necessarily— granted; refugees or migrants seeking economic opportunity or fleeing civil strife or starvation have no claims for acceptance. Increasingly, they are being turned away. The Interior Minister of France advocates “zero immigration”; Germany’s government closed its doors in 1993 by increasing border controls and changing its constitutional right to asylum; Britain in 1994 tightened immigration rules even for foreign students and casual workers. And all European Union countries except Ireland have measures for turning back refugees who come via another EU country. In 1995, the EU’s members materially narrowed the definition of who may qualify for asylum. Additional individual and collective restrictions have been enforced during the later 1990s and into the 21st century. Nor is Europe alone. Hong Kong ejects Vietnamese refugees; Congo orders Rwandans to return to their own country; India tries to stem the influx of Bangladeshis; the United States

The first wave, lasting from pioneer settlement to about 1870, was made up of two different groups. One comprised white arrivals from western and northern Europe, with Britain and Germany best represented. Together with the Scots and Scotch-Irish, they established a majority society controlled by Protestant Anglo-Saxons and allied groups. The Europeans dominated numerically the second group of first-wave immigrants, blacks brought involuntarily to the New World, who made up nearly 20% of U.S. population in 1790. The mass immigration that occurred beginning after the middle of the 19th century began to reduce both the northwest European dominance of American society and the percentage of blacks within the growing total population. That second immigrant wave, from 1870 to 1921, was heavily weighted in favor of eastern and southern Europeans, who comprised more than 50% of new arrivals by the end of the 19th century. The second period ended with congressional adoption of a quota system regulating both the numbers of individuals who would be ac-

rejects “economic refugees” from Haiti. Algerians are increasingly resented in France as their numbers and cultural presence increase. Turks feel the enmity of a small but violent group of Germans, and East Indians and Africans find growing resistance among the Dutch. In many countries, policies of exclusion or restriction appear motivated by unacceptable influxes of specific racial, ethnic, or national groups.

Questions to Consider: 1. Do you think all people everywhere should have a universal right of admittance to a country of choice equivalent to their declared right to depart their homelands? Why or why not? 2. Do you think it appropriate that destination states make a distinction between political and economic refugees? Why or why not? 3. Do you think it legitimate for countries to establish immigration quotas based on national origin, or to classify certain potential immigrants as unacceptable or undesirable on the grounds that their national, racial, or religious origins are incompatible with the culture of the prospective host country? Why or why not?

cepted and the countries from which they could come. That system, plus a world depression and World War II (1939–1945), greatly slowed immigration until a thirdwave migration was launched during the 1960s. At that time the old national quota system of immigrant regulation was replaced by one more liberal in its admission of Latin Americans. Along with more recent Asian arrivals, they became the largest segment of new arrivals. The changing source areas of the newcomers are traced in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4. Canada experienced three quite different immigration streams. Until 1760, most settlers came from France. After that date, the pattern abruptly altered as a flood of United Kingdom (English, Irish, and Scottish) immigrants arrived. Many came by way of the United States, fleeing, as Loyalists, to Canada during and after the American Revolutionary War. Others came directly from overseas. Another pronounced shift in arrival pattern occurred during the 20th century as the bulk of new immigrants began originating in Continental Europe and, Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

193

more recently, in other continents. By 1996, 17.4% of all Canadians had been born outside of the country; the national ethnic mix in that year is reported in Table 6.4. The United States’ cultural diversity has increased as its immigration source regions have changed from the traditional European areas to Latin America and Asia. The dominant European ethnic groups had completed their major periods of arrival in the United States by the 1920s, and immigration essentially halted until after World War II. Except for a spurt of legal and illegal immigration from Eastern Europe and Russia after 1990, the modest postwar

TABLE 6.3

Time Period

Blacks

1650s–1800

Irish

1840s and 1850s

Canadian Population by Selected Ethnic Origins, 1996

Ethnic Groupa

Total (000)

Percent (of total)

Single Origina

18,315.0

64.2

British Islesb

4,874.0

17.1

French

2,696.3

9.5

Chinese

800.5

2.8

Italian

729.5

2.6

German

726.1

2.5

South Asian

590.1

2.1

Native Peoples

477.6

1.7

Ukrainian

331.7

1.2

Dutch (Netherlands)

313.9

1.1

Numbers in Millions (approximate)

Polish

265.9

0.9

Portuguese

252.6

0.9

1

Filipino

198.4

0.7

1.75

Greek

144.9

0.5

128.6

0.4

Immigrants to the United States: Major Flows by Origin

Ethnic Groups

TABLE 6.4

Germans

1840s–1880s

4

Jamaican

Scandinavians

1870s–1900s

1.5

Multiple Originsc

10,224.5

35.8

Poles

1880s–1920s

1.25

Total Population

28,528.1

100.0

East European Jews

1880s–1920s

2.5

Austro-Hungarians

1880s–1920s

4

Italians

1880s–1920s

4.75

Mexicans

1950s–2000

10.5

Cubans

1960s–2000

1.3

of Aboriginal, British Isles, French, and other European origins were more likely to report multiple origins than were more recently arrived Asian, Hispanic, African, or Arab groups.

Asians

1960s–2000

6.5

Source: Statistics Canada.

a”Canadian”

ethnicity was claimed by more than 5.3 million (18.7%) of respondents.

bIncludes

singly or in combination: English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and other British Isles origins. cPersons

North and West Europe

Other

4%

4% 10% 2%

34%

Asia

46%

South and East Europe North America

Latin America

Figure 6.4

Legal immigrants admitted to the United States by region of origin, 1820–1999. The diagrams clearly reflect the dramatic change in geographic origins of immigrants. After 1965 immigration restrictions based on national origin were shifted to priorities based on family reunification and needed skills and professions. Those priorities underwent Congressional reconsideration in 1995 and 1996. What is not shown is the dramatic increase in the numbers of legal and illegal entrants to the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, years that witnessed the highest legal and illegal immigrant and refugee numbers in the nation’s history. Data from Leon F. Bouvier and Robert W. Gardner, “Immigration to the United States: The Unfinished Story,” Population Bulletin 41, no. 4 (Washington D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1986); and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

194

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

revival of inflow from Europe went largely unnoticed as the new entrants affiliated with already assimilated groups of the same cultural background. More recent expanded immigration from new source regions has increased the number of visible and vocal ethnic communities and the regions of the country housing significant minority populations. Simultaneously, the proportion of foreign-born residents has increased in the U.S. population mix. In 1920, at the end of the period of the most active European immigration, more than 13% of the American population had been born in another country. That percentage declined each decade until a low of 4.8% foreign born was reported in 1970. So great was the inflow of aliens beginning in the 1970s, however, that by 2000 nearly 11% of the population, or some 30 million people, had been born abroad, and over 30% of total population growth of the country between 1990 and 2000 was accounted for by legal and illegal immigration. Individual cities and counties showed very high concentrations of the foreign born at the end of the century. New York City, for example, received one million immigrants in the 1990s and by 2000 40% of its population had been born abroad. Similar proportionate immigration flows and foreign-born ratios were recorded for Dade County (Miami) Florida, the Silicon Valley, California, counties of San Mateo and Santa Clara, and others. Monterey Park, California, has a population that is 60% Asian, the vast majority recent Chinese immigrants. As had been the case during the 19th century, growing influxes from new immigrant source regions prompted movements to halt the flow and to preserve the ethnic status quo (see “Backlash,” Chapter 3, p. 90).

Acculturation and Assimilation In the United States, at least, the sheer volume of multiple immigration streams makes the concept of “minority” suspect when no single “majority” group exists (see Table 6.2). American society is a composite of unity and diversity, with immigrants both being shaped by and shaping the larger community they joined. The traditional “melting pot” view of ethnic integration has been more formally called amalgamation theory, which rejects the idea of immigrant conformity to a dominating Angloculture norm and views American society as the merger into a composite mainstream of the many traits of all ethnic groups entering it. Nonetheless, as we shall see, all immigrant groups after the first found a controlling culture in place, with accustomed patterns of behavior and response and a dominating language of the workplace and government. The customs and practices familiar and expected among those already in place had to be learned by newcomers if they were to be accepted. The process of acculturation is that of the adoption by the immigrants of the values, attitudes,

ways of behavior, and speech of the receiving society. In the process, the ethnic group loses its separate cultural identity as it accepts over time the culture of the larger host community. Although acculturation most usually involves a minority group adopting the patterns of the dominant population, the process can be reciprocal. That is, the dominant group may also adopt at least some patterns and practices typical of the minority group. Acculturation is a slow process for many immigrant individuals and groups, and the parent tongue may of choice or necessity be retained as an ethnically identifying feature even after fashions of dress, food, and customary behavior have been substantially altered in the new environment. In 2000, some 18% of U.S. census respondents reported speaking a language other than English in the home; for 60% of them, that language was Spanish. In the light of recent immigration trends, we can assume that the number of people speaking a foreign language at home is increasing. The retention of the native tongue is encouraged rather than hindered by American civil rights regulations that give to new immigrants the right to bilingual education and (in some cases) special assistance in voting in their own language (see “An Official U.S. Language?”, p. 158). The language barrier that has made it difficult for foreign-born groups, past and present, to gain quick entrance to the labor force has encouraged their high rate of initiation of or entry into small businesses. The consequence has been a continuing stimulus to the American economy and, through the creation of family-held neighborhood enterprises, the maintenance of the ethnic character of immigrant communities (Figure 6.5). The result has also been the gradual integration of the new arrivals into the economic and cultural mainstream of American society. When that integration is complete, assimilation has occurred. Full assimilation may be seen as a two-part process. Behavioral (or cultural) assimilation is the rough equivalent of acculturation; it implies integration into a common cultural life through shared experience, language, intermarriage, and sense of history. Structural assimilation refers to the fusion of immigrant ethnics with the groups, social systems, and occupations of the host society and the adoption of common attitudes and values. The extent of structural assimilation is frequently measured by the degree of residential segregation that sets off the minority group from the larger general community. Employment segregation and intermarriage rates are also indicative. For most of the “old” (pre-1921 European) immigrants and their descendants, both forms of assimilation are complete. For most of the “new” (post-1960s) immigrants, acculturation is proceeding or has already occurred, but for many of them and for racial minorities as well, structural assimilation has been elusive. Assimilation does not necessarily mean that ethnic consciousness or awareness of racial and cultural differences is lost. Competition theory, in fact, suggests that as Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

195

FUNCTIONAL VARIATION BY ETHNIC AREAS "ANGLO" AREA

"EAST" AREA Mexican American Prof. Serv.

Professional Services

Personal Services Other Retail

ten percent increments

Personal Services Eat/Drink Other Retail Auto Services Eat/Drink

Vacant

Auto Services Financial Serv. Vacant

Food

Furn. & Appl. Apparel Repair Services Other

Other

N=1353

N=1314

Figure 6.5

Variations in business establishments in Anglo and Mexican American neighborhoods of Los Angeles in the late 1960s. Although the total populations of the two areas were comparable, the Mexican American community had over three times more food stores because of the dominance of corner grocery stores over supermarkets. Bakeries (tortillerías) were a frequent expression of ethnic dietary habits. Neighborhood businesses conducted in Spanish and related to the needs of the community were the rule. Anglo neighborhoods, because of greater affluence, had larger numbers of professional services (doctors, lawyers) available. Source: Redrawn by permission from Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Keith D. Harries, vol. 61, p. 739, Association of American Geographers, 1971.

ethnic minorities begin to achieve success and enter into mainstream social and economic life, awareness of ethnic differences may be heightened. Frequently, ethnic identity may be most clearly experienced and expressed by those who can most successfully assimilate but who choose to promote group awareness and ethnic mobilization movements. That promotion, the theory holds, is a reflection of pressures of American urban life and the realities of increased competition. Those pressures transform formerly isolated groups into recognized, self-assertive ethnic minorities pursuing goals and interests dependent on their position within the larger society. Immigrant minorities, of course, no longer suffer the isolation from their homelands that of necessity hastened their acculturation in the past. The new ease of personal long-distance communication, of cheap and easy international travel that maintains and renews home territory ties, the globalization of print and broadcast news and ready availability of home country newspapers and magazines,

196

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

and a host of other means of retaining close association and continuing identity with original national and cultural origins gives immigrant groups and individuals enhanced capabilities to survive without integration into the majority society of their new homes. Increasingly, it seems, in ethnically mixed societies, multiculturalism rather than assimilation has become common, though not universally welcomed by the majority host cultures. While in the United States it is usually assumed that acculturation and assimilation are self-evidently advantageous, Canada established multiculturalism in the 1970s as the national policy designed to reduce tensions between ethnic and language groups and to recognize that each thriving culture is an important part of the country’s priceless personal resources. Since 1988, multiculturalism has been formalized by act of the Canadian parliament and supervised by a separate government ministry. An example of its practical application can be seen in the way Toronto, Canada’s largest and the world’s most multicultural city, routinely sends out property tax notices in six languages—English, French, Chinese, Italian, Greek, and Portuguese. Nevertheless, Canada—which takes in more immigrants per capita than any other industrialized country—began in 1995 to reduce the number of newcomers it was prepared to admit. Both Canada and the United States seek to incorporate their varied immigrant minorities into composite national societies. In other countries quite different attitudes and circumstances may prevail when indigenous—not immigrant—minorities feel their cultures and territories threatened. The Sinhalese comprise 75% of Sri Lanka’s population, but the minority Tamils have waged years of guerrilla warfare to defend what they see as majority threats to their culture, rights, and property. In India, Kashmiri nationalists fight to separate their largely Muslim valley from the Hindu majority society. And in many multiethnic African countries, single-party governments seek to impose a sense of national unity on populations whose primary and nearly unshakable loyalties are rooted in their tribes and regions and not the state that is composed of many tribes. Across the world, conflicts between ethnic groups within states have proliferated in recent years. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma, Burundi, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Russia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia are others in a long list of countries where ethnic tensions have erupted into civil conflict. Basques and Catalans of Spain and Corsicans, Bretons, and Normans of France have only recently seen their respective central governments relax strict prohibitions on teaching or using the languages that identified those ethnic groups. On the other hand, in Bulgaria, ethnic Turks who unofficially comprise 10% of the total population officially ceased to exist in 1984, when the government obliged Turkish speakers and Muslims to replace their Turkish and Islamic names with Bulgarian and Christian ones. The government also banned their language and strictly limited practice of their religion. The intent was to impose an assimilation not sought by the minority.

Elsewhere, ethnic minorities—including immigrant minorities—have grown into majority groups, posing the question of who will assimilate whom. Ethnic Fijians sought to resolve that issue by staging a coup to retain political power when the majority immigrant ethnic Indians came to power by election in 1987 and another in 2000 after the election of an ethnic-Indian prime minister. As these and innumerable other examples from all continents demonstrate, Anglo American experiences and expectations have limited application to other societies differently constituted and motivated.

Areal Expressions of Ethnicity Throughout much of the world, the close association of territoriality and ethnicity is well recognized, accepted, and often politically disruptive. Indigenous ethnic groups have developed over time in specific locations and, through ties of kinship, language, culture, religion, and shared history, have established themselves in their own and others’ eyes as distinctive peoples with defined homeland areas. The boundaries of most countries of the world encompass a number of racial or ethnic minorities, whose demands for special territorial recognition have increased rather than diminished with advances in economic development, education, and self-awareness (Figure 6.6). The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, for example, not only set free the 14 ethnically-based union republics that formerly had been dominated by Russia and

10 miles

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200

200 300

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2In Canada, a basic tenet of Aboriginal policy since 1993 has been the recognition of the inherent right of self-government under Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution. The new territory of Nunavut, the central and eastern portion of the earlier Northwest Territories, is based largely on Inuit land claims and came into existence as a self-governing district in 1999.

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Russians, but also opened the way for many smaller ethnic groups to seek recognition and greater local control from the majority populations, including Russians, within whose territory their homelands lay. In Asia, the Indian subcontinent was subdivided to create separate countries with primarily religious-territorial affiliations, and the country of India itself has adjusted the boundaries of its constituent states to accommodate linguistic-ethnic realities. Other continents and countries show a similar acceptance of the importance of ethnic territoriality in their administrative structure. In some cases, as in the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, the recognition of ethnically defined homelands was the basis of new country formations (see “The Rising Tide of Nationalism”). With the exceptions of some—largely Canadian— Native American groups and of French Canadians, there is not the coincidence in Anglo America between territorial claim and ethnic-racial distinctiveness so characteristic elsewhere in the world (Figure 6.7). The general absence of such claims is the result of the immigrant nature of American society. Even the Native American “homeland” reservations in the United States are dispersed, noncontiguous, and in large part artificial impositions.2 The spatial pattern of ethnicity that has developed is therefore more

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(a) Ethnicity in former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was formed after World War I (1914–1918) from a patchwork of Balkan states and territories, including the former kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, and Dalmatia. The authoritarian central government created in 1945 began to disintegrate in 1991 as non-Serb minorities voted for regional independence. In response, Serb guerillas backed by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav military engaged in a policy of territorial seizure and “ethnic cleansing” to secure areas claimed as traditional Serb “homelands.” Religious differences between Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim adherents compound the conflicts rooted in nationality. (b) Afghanistan houses Pathan, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnic groups speaking Pashto, Dari Persian, Uzbek, and several minor languages, and split between majority Sunni and minority Shia Moslem believers. Following Soviet military withdrawal in 1989, conflict between various Afghan groups hindered the establishment of a unified state and government.

Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

197

The Rising Tide of Nationalism

T

he end of the 20th and start of the 21st centuries are witness to spreading ethnic self-assertion and demands for national independence and cultural purification of homeland territories. To some, these demands and the conflicts they frequently engender are the expected consequences of the decline of strong central governments and imperial controls. It has happened before. The collapse of the Roman and the Holy Roman Empires were followed by the emergence of the nation-states of medieval and Renaissance Europe. The fall of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I saw the creation of new ethnically based countries in Eastern Europe. The brief decline of post-czarist Russia permitted freedom for Finland, and for 20 years for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The

disintegration of British, French, and Dutch colonial control after World War II resulted in new state formation in Africa, South and East Asia, and Oceania. Few empires have collapsed as rapidly and completely as did that of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the subsequent loss of strong central authority, the ethnic nationalisms that communist governments had for so long tried to suppress asserted themselves in independence movements. At one scale, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia emerged from the former Soviet Union. At a lesser territorial scale, ethnic animosities and assertions led to bloodshed in the Caucasian republics of the former USSR, in

former Yugoslavia (Figure 6.6a), in Moldova, and elsewhere, while Czechs and Slovaks agreed to peacefully go their separate ways at the start of 1993. Democracies, too, at least before legal protections for minorities are firmly in place, risk disintegration or division along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. African states with their multiple ethnic loyalties (Figure 12.5) have frequently used those divisions to justify restricting political freedoms and continuing oneparty rule. However, past and present ethnically inspired civil wars and regional revolts in Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and elsewhere show the fragility of the political structure on that continent.

Figure 6.7

Although all of North America was once theirs alone, Native Americans have become now part of a larger cultural mix. In the United States, their areas of domination have been reduced to reservations found largely in the western half of the country and to the ethnic provinces shown on Figure 6.11. These are often areas to which Amerindian groups were relocated, not necessarily the territories occupied by their ancestors at the time of European colonization. Amerindians were never a single ethnic or cultural group and cannot be compared to a European national immigrant group in homogeneity. Arriving over many thousands of years, from many different origin points, with different languages, physical characteristics, customs, and skills, they are in no way comparable to a culturally uniform Irish or Slovak ethnic group arriving during the 19th century or Salvadorans or Koreans during the 20th. Unlike most other minorities in the American amalgam, Amerindians have generally rejected the goal of full and complete assimilation into the national mainstream culture.

198

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

intricate and shifting than in many other pluralistic societies. It is not based on absolute ethnic dominance but on interplay between a majority culture and, usually, several competing minority groups. It shows the enduring consequences of early settlement and the changing structure of a fluid, responsive, freely mobile North American society.

Charter Cultures Although, with the Canadian French and Native American exceptions noted, no single ethnic minority homeland area exists in present-day Anglo America, a number of separate social and ethnic groups are of sufficient size and regional concentration to have put their impress on particular areas. Part of that imprint results from what the geographer Wilbur Zelinsky termed the “doctrine of first effective settlement.” That principle holds that Whenever an empty territory undergoes settlement, or an earlier population is dislodged by invaders, the specific characteristics of the first group able to effect a viable, selfperpetuating society are of crucial significance for the later social and cultural geography of the area, no matter how tiny the initial band of settlers may have been.3

On the North American stage, the English and their affiliates, although few in number, were the first effective entrants in the eastern United States and shared with the French that role in eastern Canada. Although the French were ousted from parts of Seaboard Canada, they retained their cultural and territorial dominance in Quebec Province, where today their political power and ethnocentricity foster among some the determination to achieve separate nationhood. In the United States, British immigrants (English, Welsh, Scottish, and Scotch-Irish) constituted the main portion of the new settlers in eastern Colonial America and retained their significance in the immigrant stream until after 1870. The English, particularly, became the charter group, the dominant first arrivals establishing the cultural norms and standards against which other immigrant groups were measured. It is understandable, then, in the light of Zelinsky’s “doctrine,” that: English became the national language; English common law became the foundation of the American legal system; British philosophers influenced the considerations and debates leading to the American Constitution; English place names predominate in much of the country; and the influence of English literature and music remains strong. By their early arrival and initial dominance, the British established the majority culture of the Anglo American realm; their enduring ethnic impact is felt even today. 3The

Cultural Geography of the United States. Rev. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 13.

Somewhat comparable to the British domination in the East is the Hispanic influence in the Southwest. Mexican and Spanish explorers established settlements in New Mexico a generation before the Pilgrims arrived at Plymouth Rock. Spanish-speaking El Paso and Santa Fe were prospering before Jamestown, Virginia, was founded in 1607. Although subsequently incorporated into an expanding “Anglo”-controlled cultural realm and dominated by it, the early established Hispanic culture, reinforced by continuing immigration, has proved enduringly effective. From Texas to California, Spanish-derived social, economic, legal, and cultural institutions and traditions remain an integral part of contemporary life—from language, art, folklore, and names on the land through Spanish water law to land ownership patterns reflecting Spanish tenure systems.

Ethnic Clusters Because the British already occupied much of the agricultural land of the East, other, later immigrant streams from Europe were forced to “leapfrog” those areas and seek settlement opportunities in still-available productive lands of the interior and western United States and Canada. The Scandinavians of the North Central states, the Germans in the Appalachian uplands, the upper Middle West, and Texas, various Slavic groups farther west on the Plains, and Italians and Armenians in California are examples of later arrivals occupying, ethnically influencing, and becoming identified with different sections of the United States even as they remained part of a larger cultural realm dominated by British roots. Such areas of ethnic concentration are known as ethnic islands, the dispersed and rural counterparts of urban ethnic neighborhoods (Figure 6.8). Characterized usually by a strong sense of community, ethnic islands frequently placed their distinctive imprint on the rural landscape by retaining home country barn and house styles and farmstead layouts, while their inhabitants may have retained their own language, manner of dress, and customs. With the passing of the generations, rural ethnic identity has tended to diminish, and 20th-century adaptations and dispersions have occurred. When long-enduring through spatial isolation or group determination, ethnic islands have tended to be considered landscape expressions of folk culture rather than purely ethnic culture; we shall return to them in that context in Chapter 7. Similar concentrations of immigrant arrivals are found in Canada. Descendants of French and British immigrants dominate its ethnic structure, both occupying primary areas too large to be considered ethnic islands. British origins are most common in all the provinces except Quebec, where 75% of the population is of French

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199

Figure 6.8

Ethnic islands in the United States.

Source: Redrawn Settlement Patterns in Missouri by Russel L. Gerlach, by permission of University of Missouri Press © 1986 by Curators of the University of Missouri.

descent and over 80% of French Canadians make their home. French descendants are the second-largest ethnic group in Atlantic Canada and Ontario but fall to fifth or sixth position among minorities in the western provinces. Chinese have concentrated in British Columbia, Italians in Ontario and Quebec, and Ukrainians are the third-largest minority in the Prairie Provinces. The ethnic diversity of that central portion of Canada is suggested by Figure 6.9. European immigrants arriving by the middle of the 19th century frequently took up tracts of rural land as groups rather than as individuals, assuring the creation of at least small ethnic islands. German and Ukrainian Mennonites in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, for example, Doukhobors in Saskatchewan, Mennonites in Alberta, Hutterites in South Dakota, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, the Pennsylvania Dutch (whose name is a corruption of Deutsch, or “German,” their true nationality), Frisians in Illinois, and other ethnic groups settled as collectives. They sometimes acted on the advice and the land descriptions reported by advance agents sent out by the group. In most cases, sizable extents of rural territory received the imprint of a group of immigrants acting in concert.

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Such cluster migration was not unique to foreign colonies. In a similar fashion, a culturally distinctive American group, the Latter-day Saints (Mormons), placed their enduring mark as the first and dominant settlers on a large portion of the West, focusing on Utah and adjacent districts (Figure 6.10). In general, however, later in the century and in the less arable sections of the western United States, the disappearance of land available for homesteading and the changing nature of immigrant flows reduced the incidence of cluster settlement. Impoverished individuals rather than financially solid communities sought American refuge and found it in urban locations and employment. While cluster migration created some ethnic concentrations of Anglo America, others evolved from the cumulative effect of chain migration—the assemblage in one area of the relatives, friends, or unconnected compatriots of the first arrivals, attracted both by favorable reports and by familiar presences in specific locales of the New World (see also p. 88). Although such chain migration might not affect sizable districts, it could and did place a distinctive imprint on restricted rural ethnic islands and, particularly, urban areas. “Chinatown,” “Little Sicily,” and other urban

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Figure 6.9

Ethnic diversity in the Prairie Provinces of Canada. In 1991, 69% of all Canadians claimed some French or English ancestry. For the Prairie Provinces with their much greater ethnic mixture, only 15% declared any English or French descent. Immigrants comprise a larger share of Canadian population than they do of the U.S. population. Early in the 20th century most newcomers located in rural western Canada and by 1921 about half the population of the Prairie Provinces was foreign born. Later immigrants concentrated in the major metropolitan centers. In the late 1990s, some 42% of Toronto’s population was foreign born and 35% of Vancouver’s. In the period 1981–1991, 48% of Canada’s immigrants were from Asia and only 25% from Europe, the traditionally dominant source region. From 1991–1996, the disparity increased: to 57% and 19%. Source: D. G. G. Kerr, A Historical Atlas of Canada, 2d ed., 1966. Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1966.

enclaves, the concentration of Arab Americans in Dearborn, Michigan, and the Italian and Armenian farm communities of California’s Central Valley, are examples of chain migrations and congregate settlement.

Black Dispersions Some entire regions of North America—vastly larger than the distinctive ethnic islands—have become associated with larger ethnic or racial aggregations numbering in the thousands or millions. Such ethnic provinces include French Canadians in Quebec, African Americans in the United States Southeast, Native Americans in Oklahoma, the Southwest, the Northern Plains and Prairie Provinces, and Hispanics in the southern border states of the United States West (Figure 6.11). The identification of distinctive communities with extensive regional units persists, even though ethnicity and race have not been fully reliable bases for regionalization in North America. Cultural, ethnic, and racial mixing has been too complete to permit United States counterparts of Old World

ethnic homelands to develop, even in the instance of the now-inappropriate association of African Americans with southern states. African Americans, involuntary immigrants to the continent, were nearly exclusively confined to rural areas of the South and Southeast prior to the Civil War (Figure 6.12). Even after emancipation, most remained on the land in the South. During the 20th century, however, established patterns of southern rural residence and farm employment underwent profound changes, although southern regionalization of blacks is still evident (Figure 6.13). The decline of subsistence farming and share-cropping, the mechanization of southern agriculture, the demand for factory labor in northern cities starting with World War I (1914–1918), and the general urbanization of the American economy all affected traditional patterns of black residence and livelihood. Between 1940 and 1970, more than 5 million black Americans left their traditional southeastern concentration— the largest internal ethnic migration ever experienced in Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

201

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Four North American ethnic groups and their provinces. Note how this generalized map differs from the more detailed picture of ethnic distributions shown in Figure 6.8.

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Figure 6.10

The Mormon culture region as defined by D. W. Meinig. To express the observed spatial gradations in Mormon cultural dominance and to approximate its sequential spread, Professor Meinig defined the Salt Lake City core region of Mormon culture as “a centralized zone of concentration . . . and homogeneity.” The broader concept of domain identifies “areas in which the . . . culture is dominant” but less intensive than in the core. The sphere of any culture, Meinig suggests, is the zone of outer influence, where only parts of the culture are represented or where the culture’s adherents are a minority of the total population.

300 miles 300 km

Source: Redrawn with permission from Annals of the Association of American Geographers, D. W. Meinig, vol. 55, p. 214, Association of American Geographers, 1965.

America. A modest return migration of, particularly, middleclass African Americans that began in the 1970s picked up speed during the 1980s and became a major flow by the late 1990s. Projections suggest that if the end-of-century pace of return continues, a net flow of 2.7 million—more than half of the great post-1940 migration—will have returned South between 1975 and 2010. The growing African American population (over 12% of all Americans in 2000) has become more urbanized than the general population; 86% were residents of metropolitan areas in 1999, compared to 75% for all Americans combined. Although recent national economic trends, including industrial growth in the Sunbelt, have encouraged a reverse migration, almost half of African Americans in 2000 resided outside the South (Figure 6.13). Black Americans, like Asian Americans and Hispanics, have had thrust on them an assumed common ethnicity that does not, in fact, exist. Because of prominent physical or linguistic characteristics, quite dissimilar ethnic groups have been categorized by the white, English-speaking majority in ways totally at odds with the realities of their separate national origins or cultural inheritances. Although the U.S. Census Bureau makes some attempt to subdivide Asian ethnic groups—Chinese, Filipino, and Korean, for example—

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Percentage of Total Population 50% or more black 75% or more black

Figure 6.12

African American concentrations, 1850.

these are distinctions not necessarily recognized by members of the white majority. But even the Census Bureau, in its summary statistics, has treated “Black” and “Hispanic Origin” as catchall classifications that suggest ethnic uniformities where none necessarily exist. In the case of African Americans, such clustering is of decreasing relevance. Their spatial mobility was encouraged by the industrial urban labor requirements first apparent during World War I and continuing through the Vietnam era of the 1960s. Government intervention, mandating and promoting racial equality, further deracialized the economic sector. As a result, the black community has become subdivided along socioeconomic rather than primarily regional lines. No common native culture united the slaves brought to America; few of their transported traits or traditions could endure the generations of servitude. By long residence and separate experiences, African Americans have become as differentiated as comparably placed ethnics of any other heritage.

African American Percentage of State's Population 1999

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Figure 6.13

Evidence of African American concentration endures in the South. African Americans, in response to employment opportunities in metropolitan areas of the North and West, are now more widely distributed than a century ago. However, over half (55%) still lived in the South in 2000, reflecting both tradition and a pronounced return migration in the later 20th century.

Source: Data from U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Hispanic Concentrations Similarly, the members of the multiracial, multinational, and multicultural composite population lumped by the Census Bureau into the single category of “Hispanic or Latino” are not a homogeneous group either. Hispanic Americans represent as much diversity within the as-

sumed uniform group as they do between that group and the rest of the population. They also constitute the most rapidly growing minority component of U.S. residents— increasing nearly 57% (to over 35.3 million) between 1990 and 2000 to surpass African Americans as the largest minority, as Table 6.5 indicates. Indeed, by 1990

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TABLE 6.5

TABLE 6.6

Actual and Projected United States Population Mix: 2000, 2025, and 2050 Percent of Total

Population Group (One race options)

Composition of U.S. Hispanic Population, 2000

Hispanic Subgroup Mexican

Number (millions)

Percent

20.6

58.4

Puerto Rican

3.4

9.6

52.8

Cuban

1.2

3.4

24.5

Central and South American

3.1

8.8

12.9

13.2

Dominican

0.8

2.3

3.7

6.2

8.9

Other Hispanic origina

6.2

17.5

0.9

0.8

0.8

Total Hispanic or Latino

2000

2025

2050

Non-Hispanic White

69.1

62.0

Hispanic or Latino

12.5

18.2

Black or African American

12.3

Asian/Pacific Islander Native American

35.3

100

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Projection Program. Totals do not round to 100%.

a”Other Hispanics” includes those with origins in Spain or who identify themselves as “Hispanic,” “Latino,” “Spanish American,” etc.

Note: Black, Asian, and Native American categories exclude Hispanics, who may be of any race.

Source: U. S. Bureau of Census.

Hispanics had already outnumbered blacks in four of the country’s ten largest cities and by 2000 they exceeded African Americans in seven of the top ten. Mexican Americans account for nearly 60% of all Hispanic Americans (Table 6.6). They are overwhelmingly located in the five southwestern states that constitute the ethnic province called the Hispanic American borderland (Figure 6.11). Beginning in the 1940s, the Mexican populations in the United States became increasingly urbanized and dispersed, losing their earlier primary identification as agricultural braceros (seasonal laborers) and as residents of the rural areas of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. California rapidly increased its Mexican American populations (Figure 6.14), as did the Midwest, particularly the chain of industrial cities from southeastern Wisconsin through metropolitan Chicago to Detroit. Mexican Americans, representing a distinctive set of cultural characteristics, have been dispersing widely across the United States, though increases in the Midwestern states have been particularly noticeable. In similar fashion, immigrants from equally distinctive South, Central, and Caribbean American countries have been spreading out from their respective initial geographic concentrations. Puerto Ricans, already citizens, first localized in New York City, now the largest Puerto Rican city anywhere in numerical terms. Since 1940, however, when 88% of mainland Puerto Ricans were New Yorkers, there has been an outward dispersal primarily to other major metropolitan areas of the northeastern part of the country. The old industrial cities of New Jersey (Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, Passaic, and Hoboken); Bridgeport and Stamford, Connecticut; the Massachusetts cities of Lowell, Lawrence, and Brockton; and Chicago and other central cities and industrial satellites of the

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Midwest have received the outflow. By the end of the 1990s, New York City retained only about one-quarter of the mainland Puerto Ricans. Miami and Dade County, Florida, play the same magnet role for Cubans as New York City earlier did for Puerto Ricans. The first large scale movement of Cuban refugees from the Castro revolution occurred between 1959 and 1962. There followed a mixed period lasting until 1980 when emigration was alternately permitted and prohibited by the Cuban government. Suddenly and unexpectedly, in April 1980, a torrent of Cuban migration was released through the small port of Mariel. Although their flow was stopped after only five months, some 125,000 Marielitos fled from Cuba to the United States. A 1994 accord between the United States and Cuba allows for a steady migration of at least 20,000 Cubans each year, assuring strong Cuban presence in Miami as the largest Hispanic group among a growing number of other, largely Central American, immigrants. Altogether, Hispanics accounted for 56% of the total population of Dade County in the late 1990s. Early in the period of post-1959 Cuban influx, the federal government attempted a resettlement program to scatter the new arrivals around the United States. Some remnants of that program are still to be found in concentrations of Cubans in New York City, northern New Jersey, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The majority of early and late arrivals from Cuba, however, have settled in the Miami area, with Florida as a home to two-thirds of all Cuban Americans. Immigrants from the Dominican Republic, many of them undocumented and difficult to trace, appear to be concentrating in the New York City area. Within that same city, Central and South Americans have congregated in the borough of Queens, with the South American

Figure 6.14

Street mural in a Los Angeles barrio. Nearly half of Los Angeles’ population in 2000 was Hispanic and overwhelmingly Mexican American. Their impact on the urban landscape—in choice of house colors, advertising signs, street vendors, and colorful wall paintings—is distinctive and pervasive.

contingent, particularly Colombians, settling in the Jackson Heights section. Elsewhere, Central American Hispanics also tend to cluster. Los Angeles is estimated to hold some 40% of Central American immigrants; other concentrations include San Francisco, New York City, and Washington, D.C. Each concentration differs in its country of origin. Most Nicaraguans are found in the Miami area, most Hondurans in New Orleans. As noted, migrants from the Dominican Republic seek refuge in New York City; Salvadoran and Guatemalan migrants have dispersed themselves more widely. New arrivals tend to follow the paths of earlier countrymen. Chain migration and the security and support of an ethnically distinctive halfway community are as important for recent immigrants as for their predecessors of earlier times and different cultures. As the residential concentrations of the different Central American subgroups suggest, Hispanics as a whole are more urbanized than are non-Hispanic populations of the United States. In

2000, over 91% of Hispanic households were in metropolitan areas compared to 78% for non-Hispanic whites and 86% for blacks.

Asian Contrasts With their numbers more than doubling, Asians were the country’s fastest-growing ethnic component between 1981 and 1990, continuing a pattern of rapid increase (141%) evident during the 1970s. Though second to Hispanics in number of new arrivals, Asians still made up nearly one-third of the legal immigrant flow between 1991 and 2000. By that date, Asian Americans totaled over 10 million (see also Table 6.7), almost 4% of the entire U.S. population. In 1980 they accounted for just 1.5% of the total. Their rapid growth has resulted from two different causes. First were changes in the immigration law enacted in 1965 that abolished the older national origins system and favored family reunification as an admission criterion. Educated Asians, taking advantage of professional preference categories in

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205

TABLE 6.7

U.S. Asian Population by Ethnicity, 2000 Estimatesa Number (000)

Percent of Asian American Total

Chinese

2453

24.0

Filipino

2169

21.1

Asian Indian

1284

12.5

Vietnamese

1088

10.6

Korean

1022

10.0

Japanese

1003

9.8

Laotian

194

1.9

Cambodian

181

1.9

Thai

139

1.3

Pakistani

112

1.1

Hmong

93

0.9

(Video) Chapter 1 Key Issue 1 - Basic Concepts - AP Human Geography

Ethnicity

Other Asian Total aBased

504 10,242

4.9 100

on Bureau of the Census and INS reports.

the immigration laws to move to the United States (or remain here on adjusted student visas), could become citizens after five years and send for immediate family and other relatives without restriction. They in turn, after five years, could bring in other relatives. Chain migration was an important agency. Second, the flood of Southeast Asian refugees admitted during 1975–1980 under the Refugee Resettlement Program after the Vietnam War swelled the Asian numbers in the United States by over 400,000, with 2.4 million more Asian immigrants admitted between 1980 and 1990. At the start of the 21st century, nearly 28% of the U.S. foreign-born population were from Asia. Canada shows a similar increase in the immigrant flow from that continent. Although the annual share of immigrants coming from Asia to Canada never exceeded 5% during the 1950s, by the mid-1990s close to two-thirds of new arrivals were from Asia. Asia is a vast continent; successive periods of immigration have seen arrivals from many different parts of it, representing totally different ethnic groups and cultures. The major Asian American populations are detailed in Table 6.7, but even these groups are not homogeneous and cannot suggest the great diversity of ethnic groups—Burmese, Cambodian, Hmong, Mien, Indonesians of great variety, and many more—who have joined the American realm. Although settled in all sections of the country and, like Hispanic Americans, differently localized by ethnic group, Asian Americans as a whole are relatively concentrated in residence—far more so than the rest of the population. In 1999 53% of them resided in the West (and almost 40% in California alone), where only 22% of all Americans

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lived; 35% of the whole population lived in the South, but only 20% of Asian Americans were found there. Japanese and Filipinos are particularly concentrated in the western states, where more than half of the Chinese Americans also live. Only some 18% of all Asian Americans lived in the Northeast, but about one-third of the country’s Asian Indians were localized there. The distribution of Koreans emphasizes Asian American concentration; over 26% of the nation’s population of Korean descent reside in Los Angeles, largely in its “Koreatown.” The Vietnamese, as a result of a refugee dispersal program, were initially more widely distributed than other major Asian American communities. Eventually, however, most Indochinese drifted to the milder climates of the West Coast; by 1990 about 40% were in California, concentrated particularly in the central valley south of San Francisco, although the largest Vietnamese community outside of Vietnam is found in Orange County, south of Los Angeles. In whatever part of the country they settled, Asian Americans (and Pacific Islanders) were drawn to metropolitan areas, where 96% of them lived in 1999—more than half in suburban areas.

French Uniformity The stamp of the French charter group on the ethnic province of French Canada is overwhelming. Quebec Province—with ethnic extensions into New Brunswick and northernmost Maine—is the only extensive region of North America (except northern Canadian Native American homelands) where regional delimitation on purely ethnic lines is possible or appropriate. In language, religion, legal principles, system of land tenure, the arts, cuisine, philosophies of life, and landscapes of rural and urban occupance, Quebec stands apart from the rest of Canada (Figure 6.15). Its distinctiveness and self-assertion have won it special consideration and treatment within the political structure of the country. Although the Canadiens of Quebec were the charter group of eastern Canada and for some 200 years the controlling population, they numbered only some 65,000 when the Treaty of Paris ended the North American wars between the British and the French in 1763. That treaty, however, gave them control over three primary aspects of their culture and lives: language, religion, and land tenure. From these, they created their own distinctive and enduring ethnic province of some 1.5 million square kilometers (600,000 sq mi) and 7.3 million people, 82% of whom have French as their native tongue (see Figure 5.15) and adhere to the Roman Catholic faith. Quebec City is the cultural heart of French Canada, though the bilingual Montreal metropolitan area with a population of over 3 million is the largest center of Quebec Province. The sense of cultural identity prevalent throughout French Canada imparted a spirit of nationalism not similarly expressed in other ethnic provinces of North America. Laws and guarantees recognizing and strengthening the position of French language and culture within the province assure the preservation of this

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.15

(a) The hotel Château Frontenac stands high above the lower older portion of Quebec City, where many streets show the architecture of French cities of the 18th century carried over to the urban heart of modern French Canada. (b) Rural Richelieu Valley in the Eastern Townships of Quebec Province.

distinctive North American cultural region, even if the movement for full political separation from the rest of Canada is not successful.

Urban Ethnic Diversity and Segregation “Little Havanas” and “Little Koreas” have joined the “Chinatowns,” “Little Italys,” and “Germantowns” of earlier eras as part of the American urban scene. The traditional practice of selective concentration of ethnics in their own frequently well-defined subcommunities is evidence of a much more inclusive, sharply defined social geography of urban America, in which ethnic neighborhoods have been a pronounced, enduring feature.

Protestant Anglo Americans created from colonial times the dominating host culture—the charter group—of urban North America. To that culture the mass migrations of the 19th and early 20th centuries brought individuals and groups representative of different religious and ethnic backgrounds, including Irish Catholics, eastern European Jews, and members of every nationality, ethnic stock, and distinctive culture of central, eastern, and southern Europe. To them were added, both simultaneously and subsequently, newcomers from Asia and Latin America and such urbanizing rural Americans as Appalachian whites and Southern blacks. Each newcomer element sought both accommodation within the urban matrix established by the charter group and acceptable relationships with other in-migrant ethnic groups. That accommodation has characteristically been achieved by the establishment of the ethnic community or neighborhood—an area within the city where a particular culture group aggregates, which it dominates, and which may serve as the core area from which diffusion or absorption into the host society can occur. The rapidly urbanizing, industrializing society of 19th-century America became a mosaic of such ethnic enclaves. Their maintenance as distinctive social and spatial entities depended on the degree to which the assimilation of their population occurred. Figure 6.16 shows the more recent ethnic concentrations that developed by the late 20th century in one major American city. The increasing subdivision of the immigrant stream and the consequent reduction in the size of identified enclaves make comparable maps of older U.S. cities such as New York and Chicago nearly unintelligibly complex. Immigrant neighborhoods are a measure of the social distance that separates the minority from the charter group. The greater the perceived differences between the two groups, the greater the social distance and the less likely is the charter group to easily accept or assimilate the newcomer. Consequently, the ethnic community will endure longer as a place both of immigrant refuge and of enforced segregation. Segregation is a shorthand expression for the extent to which members of an ethnic group are not uniformly distributed in relation to the rest of the population. A commonly employed measure quantifying the degree to which a distinctive group is segregated is the segregation index or index of residential dissimilarity. It indicates the percentage difference between the distribution of two component groups of a population, with a theoretical range of values from 0 (no segregation) to 100 (complete segregation). Evidence from cities throughout the world makes clear that most ethnic minorities tend to be sharply segregated from the charter group and that segregation on racial or ethnic lines is usually greater than would be anticipated from the socioeconomic levels of the groups involved. Further, the degree of segregation varies among cities in the same country and among different ethnic mixes within each city. Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

207

Whites Hispanics

San Fernando

Blacks Mixed

Asians

Va l l ey

Altadena Duarte Monrovia Pasadena Alhambra (Chinese) Beverly Hills

Sawtelle (Japanese) Pacific Palisades Santa Monica

Hollywood

Glendora Covina (Filipinos)

Chinatown

Koreatown Monterey Park

Downtown

East Los Angeles

South Central

Gardena

Pomona

Santa Fe Springs

Watts

Airport

Walnut Industry

Compton

Pacific Ocean Cerritos (Cambodians)

5

0 miles

Wilmington

0 km

5

10 10

15

15

Long Beach

Figure 6.16

Ethnic patterns in Los Angeles, 1990 are greatly generalized on this map, which conceals much of the complex intermingling of different ethnic groups in several sections of the city. Source: Data from Eugene Turner and James P. Allen, “An Atlas of Population Patterns in Metropolitan Los Angeles and Orange Counties, 1990.” Occasional Publication no. 8, Center for Geographical Studies, California State University, Northridge.

Among major United States metropolitan areas in 2000, for example, Chicago, Illinois, had a black–white segregation index of 81 while for Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, it was 46. Within the Detroit metropolitan area, on the other hand, the black–white index of residential dissimilarity was 85 but the Hispanic–white and Asian–white indexes were much lower, each at 46. In the country as a whole in 2000, the typical white neighborhood was nearly 83% white and the typical African American lived in a neighborhood that was 54% black. On average, Hispanics resided in areas 42% Hispanic and Asians in communities that were only 19% Asian. Collectively, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians lived in more integrated neighborhoods than did whites. Each world region and each country, of course, has its own patterns of national and urban immigration and immigrant residential patterns. Even when those population movements involve distinctive and contrasting ethnic groups, American models of spatial differentiation may not be applicable. Foreign migrants to West European cities, for example, frequently do not have the same expectations of permanent residence and eventual amalgamation into the host society as their American counterparts. Many came under labor contracts with no initial legal assurance of permanent residence. Although many now have been joined by their families, they often find citizenship difficult to acquire; in Germany, even German-born children of “guest workers” are considered

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aliens. Their residential choices are consequently influenced by difficulties or disinterest in integration or amalgamation, a high degree of migrant self-identity, restriction to housing units or districts specially provided for them, and the locational pull of chain migration. Culture and religion are important in that regard as even small ethnically homogeneous groups, confined perhaps to part of a city block or to a single apartment building, help to maintain the life-style and support systems of home territories. The Islamic populations from North Africa and Turkey tend to be more tightly grouped and defensive against the surrounding majority culture of western European cities than do African or south and east European Christian migrants. France, with some 5 million Muslim residents, most of them from North Africa, has tended to create bleak, distant outer city ghettoes in which Arab legal and illegal immigrants remain largely isolated from mainstream French life. Rapid urbanization in multiethnic India has resulted in cities of extreme social and cultural contrasts. Increasingly, Indian cities feature defined residential colonies segregated by village and caste origins of the immigrants. Chain migration has eased the influx of newcomers to specific new and old city areas; language, custom, religion, and tradition keep them confined. International and domestic migration within ethnically diverse Africa has had a similar residential outcome. In the

Ivory Coast, for example, the rural-to-urban population shift has created city neighborhoods defined on tribal and village lines. Worldwide in all continental and national urban contexts, the degree of immigrant segregation is at least in part conditioned by the degree of social distance felt between the newcomer population and the other immigrant and host societies among whom residential space is sought. Constraints on assimilation and the extent of discrimination and segregation are greater for some minorities than for others. In general, the rate of assimilation of an ethnic minority by the host culture depends on two sets of controls: external, including attitudes toward the minority held by the charter group and other competing ethnic groups, and internal controls of group cohesiveness and defensiveness.

External Controls When the majority culture or rival minorities perceive an ethnic group as threatening, the group tends to be spatially isolated by external “blocking” tactics designed to confine the rejected minority and to resist its “invasion” of already occupied urban neighborhoods. The more tightly knit the threatened group, the more adamant and overt are its resistance tactics. When confrontation measures (including, perhaps, threats and vandalism) fail, the invasion of charter-group territory by the rejected minority proceeds until a critical percentage of newcomer housing occupancy is reached. That level, the tipping point, may precipitate a rapid exodus by the former majority population. Invasion, followed by succession, then results in a new spatial pattern of ethnic dominance according to models of urban social geography developed for American cities and examined in Chapter 11, models less applicable to the European scene. Racial or ethnic discrimination in urban areas generally expresses itself in the relegation of the most recent, most alien, most despised minority to the poorest available housing. That confinement has historically been abetted by the concentration of the newest, least assimilated ethnic minorities at the low end of the occupational structure. Distasteful, menial, low-paying service and factory employment unattractive to the charter group is available to those new arrivals even when other occupational avenues may be closed. The dockworkers, street cleaners, slaughterhouse employees, and sweatshop garment workers of earlier America had and have their counterparts in other regions. In England, successive waves of West Indians and Commonwealth Asians took the posts of low-pay hotel and restaurant service workers, transit workers, refuse collectors, manual laborers, and the like; Turks in German cities and North Africans in France play similar lowstatus employment roles. In the United States there has been a spatial association between the location of such employment opportunities— the inner-city central business district (CBD) and its

margins—and the location of the oldest, most dilapidated, and least desirable housing. Proximity to job opportunity and the availability of cheap housing near the CBD, therefore, combined to concentrate the United States immigrant slum near the heart of the 19th-century central city. In the second half of the 20th century, the suburbanization of jobs, the rising skill levels required in the automated offices of the CBD, and the effective isolation of inner-city residents by the absence of public transportation or their inability to pay for private transport maintained the association of the least competitive minorities and the least desirable housing area. But now those locations lack the promise of entry-level jobs formerly close at hand. That U.S. spatial association does not necessarily extend to other cultures and urban environments. In Latin American cities, newest arrivals at the bottom of the economic and employment ladder are most apt to find housing in squatter or slum areas on the outskirts of the urban unit (Figure 11.42); prestigious housing claims room near the city center. European cities, too, have retained a larger proportion of upper income groups at the urban center than have their American counterparts, with a corresponding impact on the distribution of lowerstatus, lower-income housing (Figure 11.38). In French urban agglomerations, at least, the outer fringes frequently have a higher percentage of foreigners than the city itself.

Internal Controls Although part of the American pattern of urban residential segregation may be explained by the external controls of host-culture resistance and discrimination, the clustering of specific groups into discrete, ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods is best understood as the result of internal controls of group defensiveness and conservatism. The self-elected segregation of ethnic groups can be seen to serve four principal functions—defense, support, preservation, and “attack.” First, it provides defense, reducing individual immigrant isolation and exposure by physical association within a limited area. The walled and gated Jewish quarters of medieval European cities have their present-day counterparts in the clearly marked and defined “turfs” of street gang members and the understood exclusive domains of the “black community,” “Chinatown,” and other ethnic or racial neighborhoods. In British cities, it has been observed that West Indians and Asians fill identical slots in the British economy and reside in the same sorts of areas, but they tend to avoid living in the same areas. West Indians avoid Asians; Sikhs isolate themselves from Muslims; Bengalis avoid Punjabis. In London, patterns of residential isolation even extend to West Indians of separate island homelands (see “The Caribbean Map in London”). Their own defined ethnic territory provides members of the group with security from the hostility of antagonistic social groups, a factor also underlying the Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

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The Caribbean Map in London

A

lthough the movement [to England] from the West Indies has been treated as if it were homogeneous, the island identity, particularly among those from the small islands, has remained strong. . . . [I]t is very evident to anyone working in the field that the process of chain migration produced a clustering of particular island or even village groups in their British destination. . . . The island identities have manifested themselves on the map of London. The island groups can still be picked out in the clusters of

settlements in different parts of the city. There is an archipelago of Windward and Leeward islanders north of the Thames; Dominicans and St. Lucians have their core areas in Paddington and Notting Hill; Grenadians are found in the west in Hammersmith and Ealing; Montserratians are concentrated around Stoke Newington, Hackney and Finsburry Park; Antiguans spill over to the east in Hackney, Waltham Forest and Newham; south of the river is Jamaica. That is not to say that Jamaicans are found only south of the river or

white flight to “garrison” suburbs. That outsiders view at least some closely defined ethnic communities as homogeneous, impenetrable, and hostile is suggested by Figure 6.17, a “safety map” of Manhattan published in the newspaper l’Aurore for the guidance of French tourists. Second, the ethnic neighborhood provides support for its residents in a variety of ways. The area serves as a halfway station between the home country and the alien society, to which admittance will eventually be sought. It acts as a place of initiation and indoctrination, providing supportive lay and religious ethnic institutions, familiar businesses, job opportunities where language barriers are minimal, and friendship and kinship ties to ease the transition to a new society. Third, the ethnic neighborhood may provide a preservation function, reflecting the ethnic group’s positive intent to preserve and promote such essential elements of its cultural heritage as language and religion. The preservation function represents a disinclination to be totally absorbed into the charter society and a desire to maintain those customs and associations seen to be essential to the conservation of the group. For example, Jewish dietary laws are more easily observed by, or exposure to potential marriage partners within the faith is more certain in, close-knit communities than when individuals are scattered. Finally, ethnic spatial concentration can serve what has been termed the attack function, a peaceful and legitimate search for, particularly, political representation by a concentration of electoral power. Voter registration drives

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that the only West Indians in Paddington are from St. Lucia. The mixture is much greater than that. The populations overlap and interdigitate: there are no sharp edges. . . . [Nevertheless, north of the river] there is a west-east change with clusters of Grenadians in the west giving way to St Lucians and Dominicans in the inner west, through to Vincentians and Montserratians in the inner north and east and thence to Antiguans in the east. Source: Ceri Peach, “The Force of West Indian Island Identity in Britain,” in Geography & Ethnic Pluralism, ed. Colin Clarke, David Ley, and Ceri Peach. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

among African and Hispanic Americans represent concerted efforts to achieve the promotion of group interests at all governmental levels.

Shifting Ethnic Concentrations Ethnic communities once established are not necessarily, or even usually, permanent. With recent diversified immigration, older homogeneous ethnic neighborhoods have become highly subdivided and polyethnic. In Los Angeles, for example, the great wave of immigrants from Mexico, Central America, and Asia has begun to push African Americans out of Watts and other well-established black communities, converting them from racially exclusive to multicultural areas. In New York, the Borough of Queens, once the stronghold of European ethnics, has now become home to more than 110 different, mainly non-European nationalities. In Woodside in Queens, Latin Americans and Koreans are prominent among the many replacements of the formerly dominant German and Irish groups. Elsewhere within the city, West Indians now dominate the old Jewish neighborhoods of Flatbush; Poles and Dominicans and other Central Americans have succeeded Germans and Jews in Washington Heights. Manhattan’s Chinatown expands into old Little Italy, and a new Little Italy emerges in Bensonhurst. Further, the new ethnic neighborhoods are intermixed in a way that enclaves of the early 20th century never were. The restaurants, bakeries, groceries, specialty shops, their customers and owners from a score of different countries and even different continents are now found within a two- or three-block radius. In the Kenmore

Figure 6.17

A “safety map” of Manhattan. According to the editors of the French newspaper l’Aurore, any place north of 96th street in Manhattan was (late 1970s) best avoided both by day and by night. The perceived “danger area” included all of central and east Harlem. Source: From l’Aurore as reproduced in Peter Jackson, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, School of Geography, Oxford University, 1980.

Avenue area of East Los Angeles, for example, a halfsquare-mile (1.3 km2) area of former Anglo neighborhood now houses over 9000 people representing Hispanics and Asians of widely varied origin along with Pacific Islanders, Amerindians, African Americans, and a scattering of native-born whites. Students in the neighborhood school come from 43 countries and speak 23 languages, a localized ethnic intermixture unknown in the communities of single ethnicity so characteristic of earlier stages of immigration to the United States (see “Colonies of Immigrants”).

Increasing ethnic diversity coupled with continuing immigration flow has, in some instances, expanded rather than reduced patterns of urban group segregation. The tendency for separate ethnic groups to cluster for security, economic, and social reasons cannot be effective if a great many relatively small numbers of different ethnic groups find themselves in a single city setting. Intermixture is inevitable when individual groups do not achieve the critical mass necessary to establish a true identifiable separate community. But as continuing immigration and natural increase allow groups to expand in size, they are able to create more distinctive self-selected ethnic clusters and communities. The 2000 census clearly shows the New York region, for example, to be more ethnically diverse and more segregated than was suspected during the 1990s, with multiple clearly recognizable enclaves and districts each with its own distinctive ethnic or racial composition and character. Immigration growth during the preceding decade yielded not only greater ethnic diversity but greater evident segregation as well. Even when an ethnic community rejects or is denied assimilation into the larger society, it may both relocate and retain its coherence. “Satellite Chinatowns” are examples of migration from city centers outward to the suburbs or to outer boroughs—in Los Angeles’ San Gabriel Valley, stretching in a 20-mile swath eastward from Alhambra and Monterey Park to West Covina and Diamond Bar; in San Francisco, from the downtown area along Grant Avenue to the Richmond district 3 miles away. In New York City the satellite move was from the still-growing Canal Street area in lower Manhattan to Flushing, about 15 miles away (Figure 6.18) and to Elmhurst which, with immigrants from 114 different countries, is the city’s most ethnically diverse neighborhood. Other growing, older ethnic communities—needing more space and containing newly affluent and successful members able to compete for better housing elsewhere—have followed a similar pattern of subdivision and relocation. For some ethnics, assimilation in job and society does not reduce the need for community identity.

Typologies and Spatial Results When both the charter group and the ethnic group perceive the social distance separating them to be small, the isolation caused by external discriminatory and internal cohesiveness controls is temporary, and developed ethnic residential clusters quickly give way to full assimilation. While they endure, the clusters may be termed colonies, serving essentially as points of entry for members of the particular ethnic group. They persist only to the extent that new arrivals perpetuate the need for them. In American cities, many European ethnic colonies began to lose their vitality and purpose with the reduction of European immigration flows after the 1920s. Earlier in the century, however, European

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Colonies of Immigrants

I

n the following extract from his 1904 book Poverty, Robert Hunter conveys a sense of the ethnic diversity found in American cities: [In American cities] great colonies, foreign in language, customs, habits, and institutions, are separated from each other and from the distinctly American groups on national or racial lines. By crossing the Bowery one leaves behind him the great Jewish colony made up of Russians, Poles, and Roumanians and passes into Italy; to the northeast lies a little Germany; to the southwest a colony of Syrians; to the west lies an Irish community, a settlement of negroes, a remnant of the old native American stock; to the south lie a Chinese and a Greek colony. On Manhattan alone, either on the extreme west side or the extreme east side, there are other colonies of the Irish, the Jews, and the Italians, and, in addition, there is a large colony of Bohemians. In Chicago there are the same foreign poor. To my own knowledge there are four Italian colonies, two Polish, a Bohemian, an Irish, a

Jewish, a German, a negro, a Chinese, a Greek, a Scandinavian, and other colonies. So it is also in Boston and many other cities. In New York alone there are more persons of German descent than persons of native descent, and the German element is larger than in any city of Germany except Berlin. There are nearly twice as many Irish as in Dublin, about as many Jews as in Warsaw, and more Italians than in Naples or Venice. . . . To live in one of these foreign communities is actually to live on foreign soil. The thoughts, feelings, and traditions which belong to the mental life of the colony are often entirely alien to an American. The newspapers, the literature, the ideals, the passions, the things which agitate the community are unknown to us except in fragments. . . . While there is a great movement of population from all parts of the old world to all parts of the new, the migration to the United States is the largest and the most conspicuous. Literally speaking,

colonies were dynamic components of every major eastern and midwestern city, as the excerpt “Colonies of Immigrants” describes. When an ethnic cluster persists because its occupants choose to preserve it, their behavior reflects the internal cohesiveness of the group and its desire to maintain an enduring ethnic enclave or neighborhood. When the cluster is perpetuated by external constraints and discriminatory actions, it has come to be termed a ghetto. In reality, the colony, the enclave, and the ghetto are spatially similar outcomes of ethnic concentrations whose origins are difficult to document. Figure 6.19 suggests the possible spatial expressions of these three recognized ethnic-cluster models.

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millions of foreigners have established colonies in the very hearts of our urban and industrial communities. . . . In recent years the flow of immigrants to the cities, where they are not needed, instead of to those parts of the country where they are needed, has been steadily increasing. Sixtynine percent of the present immigration avows itself as determined to settle either in the great cities or in certain communities of the four great industrial states, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. According to their own statements, nearly 60 percent of the Russian and Polish Jews intend to settle in the largest cities. As a matter of fact, those who actually do settle in cities are even more numerous than this percentage indicates. As the class of immigrants, drawn from eastern and southern Europe, Russia, and Asia, come in increasing numbers to the United States, the tendency to settle in cities likewise increases. Source: Robert Hunter, Poverty. (New York: Macmillan, 1904.)

Both discrimination and voluntarism determine the changing pattern of ethnic clustering within metropolitan areas. Where forced segregation limits residential choices, ethnic or racial minorities may be confined to the older, low-cost housing areas, typically close to the city center. Growing ethnic groups that maintain voluntary spatial association frequently expand the area of their dominance by growth outward from the core of the city in a radial pattern. That process has long been recognized in Chicago (Figure 6.20) and has, in that and other cities, typically been extended beyond the central city boundaries into at least the inner fringe of the suburbs.

Figure 6.18

The Flushing, Queens, area of New York City contains one of the developing “satellite Chinatowns.” Like those in other cities, it reflects both the pressures exerted by a growing Chinese community on their older urban enclaves and the suburbanization of an affluent younger generation that still seeks community coherence.

African Americans have, traditionally, found strong resistance to their territorial expansion from the Anglo charter group, though white-black urban relations and patterns of black ghetto formation and expansion have differed in different sections of the country. A revealing typology of African American ghettos is outlined in Figure 6.21. In the South, the white majority, with total control of the housing market, was able to assign residential space to blacks in accordance with white, not black, self-interest. In the early southern ghetto of such pre-Civil War cities as Charleston and New Orleans, African Americans were assigned small dwellings in alleys and back streets within and bounding the white communities where they worked as (slave) house and garden servants. The classic southern ghetto for newly free blacks was composed of specially built, low-quality housing on undesirable land—swampy, perhaps, or near industry or railroads—and was sufficiently far from better-quality white housing to maintain full spatial and social segregation. In the North, on the other hand, African Americans were open competitors with other claimants for space in a generalized housing market. The early northern ghetto

Figure 6.19

Types of ethnic areas.

Source: David T. Herbert and Colin J. Thomas, Urban Geography, London: David Fulton Publishers, 1987. Redrawn by permission.

represented a “toehold” location in high-density, aged, substandard housing on the margin of the central business district. The classic northern ghetto is a more recent expansion of that initial enclave to surround the CBD and to penetrate, through invasion and succession, contiguous zones as far as the numbers and the rent-paying ability of the growing African American community will carry. Finally, in new western and southwestern cities not tightly hemmed in by resistant ethnic neighborhoods or ethnic suburbs, the black community may display a linear expansion from the CBD to the suburban fringe.

Native-Born Dispersals Immigration flows to the United States during the last third of the 20th century—unlike those of earlier massimmigration periods—have begun to affect both the broad regional ethnic make-up of the United States and the internal migration pattern of native-born Americans. The spatial consequence has been dubbed a “demographic balkanization,” a pronounced and apparently reinforcing

Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

213

areal segmentation of population by race/ethnicity, economic status, and age across extended metropolitan areas and larger regions of the country. Early 20th-century immigration streams resulted, as we have seen, in temporary ethnic segregation by urban neighborhoods and between central cities and suburbs. Immigration legislation of 1965 dropped the national-origin quotas that had formerly favored European immigrants, replacing that with a more inclusive formula emphasizing family reunification. That change, plus economic and political pressures in many countries of Asia and Latin America, has swelled the influx of poorer, less-skilled Asians and Hispanics. Highly dependent on family members and friends for integration into the informal and formal American job market, the new arrivals are drawn to primary port-of-entry metropolitan areas by chain migration links. In those areas where immigrants account for most of the present and prospective population growth, the trend is toward increasingly multicultural, younger, and poorer residents and dominantly of Hispanic and Asian origins.

Figure 6.20

The outward expansion of racial and nationality groups in Chicago. “Often,” Samuel Kincheloe observed in the 1930s, “[minority] groups first settle in a deteriorated area of a city somewhere near its center, then push outward along the main streets.” More recently, many—particularly young, innovative, and entrepreneurial—immigrants have avoided traditional first locations in central cities and from their arrival have settled in metropolitan area suburbs and outlying cities where economic opportunity and quality of life is perceived as superior to conditions in the primary inner city.

Source: The American City and its Church by Samuel Kincheloe. Copyright 1938 by Friendship Press, New York.

Figure 6.21

A typology of black ghettos in the United States.

Source: David T. Herbert and Colin J. Thomas, Urban Geography, London: David Fulton Publishers, 1987. Redrawn by permission.

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The high degree of areal concentration of recent immigrant groups initiated a selective native-born, particularly white, retreat, not only fleeing the cities for the suburbs but leaving entire metropolitan areas and states. California, with nearly one-quarter of its population foreign born in the mid-1990s, saw a departure of one native-born white or black resident for nearly each foreign-born arrival. Individual urban areas echoed California’s state experience. The New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, and Boston metropolitan areas—5 of the top 11 immigrant destinations—lost 9 native residents for every 10 immigrant arrivals. For whites, top destinations were to cities and states away from coastal and southern border immigrant entry points, from San Francisco to Houston in the West, Boston to Washington plus Miami in the East, and the Chicago district in the interior. African Americans, too, are leaving most of the high-immigration metropolitan areas with Atlanta, Georgia, the preferred destination. A visible spatial consequence, then, of recent patterns of U.S. immigration and settlement is a decline of the older ideal and reality of immigrant assimilation and of racial and cultural urban mixtures. Instead, the emerging pattern is one of increasing wholesale segregation and isolation by metropolitan areas and segments of the country. Immigrant assimilation may now be more difficult than in the past and social and political divisions more pronounced and enduring.

Cultural Transfer Immigrant groups arrive at their destinations with already existing sets of production techniques and skills. They bring established ideas of “appropriate” dress, foods, and building styles, and they have religious practices, marriage customs, and other cultural expressions in place and ingrained. That is, immigrants carry to their new homes a full complement of artifacts, sociofacts, and mentifacts. They may modify, abandon, or even pass these on to the host culture, depending on a number of interacting influences: (1) the background of the arriving group; (2) its social distance from the charter group; (3) the disparity between new home and origin-area environmental conditions; (4) the importance given by the migrants to the economic, political, or religious motivations that caused them to relocate; and (5) the kinds of encountered constraints that force personal, social, or technical adjustments on the new arrivals. Immigrant groups rarely transferred intact all of their culture traits to North America. Invariably there have been modifications as a result of the necessary adjustment to new circumstances or physical conditions. In general, if a transplanted cultural element was usable in the new locale, it was retained. Simple inertia suggested there was little reason to abandon the familiar and

comfortable when no advantage accrued. If a trait or a cultural complex was essential to group identity and purpose—the religious convictions of the rural Amish, for example, or of urban Hasidic Jews—its retention was certain. But ill-suited habits or techniques would be abandoned if superior American practices were encountered, and totally inappropriate practices would be dropped. German settlers in Texas, for example, found that the vine and the familiar midlatitude fruits did not thrive there. Old-country agricultural traditions were, they discovered, not fully transferable and had to be altered. Finally, even apparently essential cultural elements may be modified in the face of unalterable opposition from the majority population. Although American in origin, the Latter-day Saints (Mormons) were viewed as outsiders whose practice of polygamy was alien and repugnant. To secure political and social acceptance, church members abandoned that facet of their religious belief. More recently, the some 30,000 Hmong and Mien tribespeople who settled in the Fresno, California, area after fleeing Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos found that their traditional practices of medicinal use of opium, of “capturing” young brides, and of ritual slaughtering of animals brought them into conflict with American law and customs and with the more Americanized members of their own culture group. Every relocated ethnic group is subject to forces of attraction and rejection. The former tend toward assimilation into the host society; the latter, innate to the group, encourage retention of its self-identity. Acculturation tends to be responsive to economic advantage and to be accelerated if the immigrant group is in many basic traits similar to the host society, if it is relatively well educated, relatively wealthy, and finds political or social advantages in being “Americanized.” Rejection factors internal to the group that aid in the retention of cultural identification include the element of isolation. The immigrant group may seek physical separation in remote areas, or raise barriers of a social nature to assure its separation from corrupting influences. Social isolation can be effective even in congested urban environments if it is buttressed by distinctive costume, beliefs, or practices (Figure 6.22). Group segregation may even result in the retention of customs, clothing, or dialects discarded in the original home area. Rejection factors may also involve culture rebound, a belated adoption of group consciousness and reestablishment of identifying traits. These may reflect an attempt to reassert old values and to achieve at least a modicum of social separation. The wearing of dashikis, the adoption of “Afro” hairstyles, the popularity of Ghanian-origin kente cloth, or the celebration of Kwanzaa by American blacks seeking identification with African roots are examples of culture rebound. Ethnic identity is fostered by the nuclear family and ties of kinship, particularly when reinforced by residential proximity. It is preserved by such group activities as distinctive Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

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Figure 6.22

Ultra-orthodox Hasidim, segregating themselves by dress and custom, seek social isolation and shun corrupting outside influences even in the midst of New York City’s congestion.

feasts or celebrations and by marriage customs; by ethnically identified clubs, such as the Turnverein societies of German communities or the Sokol movement of athletic and cultural centers among the Czechs; and by ethnic churches (Figure 6.23).

The Ethnic Landscape Landscape evidence of ethnicity may be as subtle as the greater number and size of barns in the German-settled areas of the Ozarks or the designs of churches or the names of villages. The evidence may be as striking as the buggies of the Amish communities, the massive Dutch (really, German-origin) barns of southeastern Pennsylvania (Figure 6.24), or the adobe houses of Mexican American settlements in the Southwest. The ethnic landscape, however defined, may be a relic, reflecting old ways no longer pursued. It may contain evidence of artifacts or designs imported, found useful, and retained. In some instances, the physical or customary trappings of ethnicity may remain unique to one or a very few communities. In others, the diffusion of ideas or techniques may have spread introductions to areas beyond their initial impact. The landscapes and landscape evidences explored by cultural geographers are

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many and complex. The following paragraphs seek merely to suggest the variety of topics pursued in tracing the landscape impacts evident from the cultural diversity of Anglo America.

Land Survey The charter group of any area had the option of designing a system for claiming and allotting land appropriate to its needs and traditions. For the most part, the English established land-division policies in the Atlantic Seaboard colonies. In New England, basic land grants were for “towns,” relatively compact blocks ideally 6 miles (9.7 km) square. The established central village, with its meeting house and its commons area, was surrounded by larger fields subdivided into strips for allocation among the community members (Figure 6.25). The result was a distinctive pattern of nucleated villages and fragmented farms. From Pennsylvania southward, the original royal land grants were made to “proprietors,” who in turn sold or allotted holdings to settlers. In the southern colonies, the occupants claimed land in amounts approved by the authorities but unspecified in location. The land evaluated as best was claimed first, poor land was passed over, and parcel boundaries were irregular and unsystematic. The metes-and-bounds system of property description of the region, based largely on landform or water features or

Figure 6.23

These young girls, dressed in traditional garb for a Los Angeles Greek Orthodox Church festival, show the close association of ethnicity and religion in the American mosaic.

Figure 6.24

The Pennsylvania Dutch barn, with its origins in southern Germany, has two levels. Livestock occupy the ground level; on the upper level, reached by a gentle ramp, are the threshing floor, haylofts, and grain and equipment storage. A distinctive projecting forebay provides shelter for ground-level stock doors and unmistakably identifies the Pennsylvania Dutch barn. The style, particularly in its primitive log form, was exported from its eastern origins, underwent modification, and became a basic form in the Upland (i.e., off the Coastal Plain) South, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. An example of a distinctive ethnic imprint on the landscape, the Pennsylvania Dutch barn also became an example of cultural transfer from an immigrant group to the charter group.

such temporary landscape elements as prominent trees, unusual rocks, or cairns, led to boundary uncertainty and dispute (Figure 6.26). It also resulted in “topographic” road patterns, such as those found in Pennsylvania and other eastern states, where routes are often controlled by the contours of the land rather than the regularity of a geometric survey. When independence was achieved, the federal government decided that the public domain should be systematically surveyed and subdivided before being opened for settlement. The resulting township and range rectangular survey system, adopted in the Land Ordinance of 1785, established survey lines oriented in the cardinal directions and divided the land into townships 6 miles (9.7 km) square which were further subdivided into sections 1 mile (1.6 km) on a side (Figure 6.26). The resultant rectilinear system of land subdivision and ownership was extended to all parts of the United States ever included within the public domain, creating the basic checkerboard pattern of minor civil divisions, the regular pattern of section-line and quarter-line country roads, the block patterns of fields and farms, and the gridiron street systems of American towns and cities. Elsewhere in North America, the French and the Spanish constituted charter groups and established their own traditions of land description and allotment. The Ethnic Geography: Threads of Diversity

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Figure 6.25

Wethersfield, Connecticut: 1640–1641. The home lot and field patterns of 17th-century Wethersfield were typical of villages of rural New England.

Source: Charles M. Andrews, “The River Towns of Connecticut,” in Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 7th series, VII-VIII-IX (1899), opposite p. 5.

Figure 6.26

A contrast in survey systems. The original metes-and-bounds property survey of a portion of the Virginia Military District of western Ohio is here contrasted with the regularity of surveyor’s townships, made up of 36 numbered sections each one mile (1.6 km) on a side. Source: Redrawn by permission from Original Survey and Land Subdivision, Monograph Series No. 4, Norman J. W. Thrower, p. 46, Association of American Geographers, 1966.

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French impress has been particularly enduring. The longlot system was introduced into the St. Lawrence Valley and followed French settlers wherever they established colonies in the New World: the Mississippi Valley, Detroit, Louisiana, and elsewhere. The long lot was a surveyed elongated holding typically about 10 times longer than wide stretching far back from a narrow river frontage (Figure 6.27). The back of the lot was indicated by a roadway roughly parallel to the line of the river, marking the front of a second series (or range) of long lots. The system had the advantage of providing each settler with a fair access to fertile land along the floodplain, lower-quality river terrace land, and remote poorer-quality back areas on the valley slopes serving as woodlots. Dwellings were built at the front of the holding, in a loose settlement alignment called a côte where access was easy and the neighbors were close. Although English Canada adopted a rectangular survey system, the long lot became the legal norm in French Quebec, where it controls land survey even in areas where river access is not significant. In the Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico and Texas, Spanish colonists introduced a similar long-lot system.

Settlement Patterns The United States rural settlement pattern has been dominated by isolated farmsteads dispersed through the open countryside. It is an arrangement conditioned by the block pattern of land survey, by the homesteading tradition of “proving up” claims through residence on them, and by the regular pattern of rural roads. Other survey systems, of course, permitted different culturally rooted settlement choices. The French and Hispanic long lots encouraged the alignment of closely spaced, but separated, farmsteads along river or road frontage (Figure 6.28). The New England village reflected the

Figure 6.27

A portion of the Vincennes, Indiana–Illinois topographic quadrangle (1944) showing evidence of original French long-lot survey. Note the importance of the Wabash River in both longlot and Vincennes street-system orientations. This U.S. Geological Survey map was originally published at the fractional scale of 1:62,500.

Source: U.S. Geological Survey map.

Figure 6.28

Land survey in Canada. Adjacent areas of Canada demonstrate the effects of different survey systems and cultural heritages on rural settlement patterns. The regular plots of Ontario in English Canada (left map) display the isolated farmsteads characteristic of much of rural Anglo America. The long-lot survey of Quebec in French Canada (right map) shows the lot-front alignments of rural dwellings.

Source: Redrawn by permission from Annals of the Association of American Geographers, George I. McDermott, vol. 51, p. 263, Association of American Geographers, 1961.

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transplanting of an English tradition. Agricultural villages were found as well in Mormon settlement areas, in the Spanish American Southwest, and as part of the cultural landscapes established by early communistic or religious communities, such as the Oneida Community of New York; the Rappites’s Harmony, Indiana; Fountaingrove, California; and other, mostly short-lived “utopias” of the 19th and early 20th centuries. To encourage the settlement of the prairies, the Mennonites were granted lands in Manitoba not as individuals but as communities. Their established agricultural villages with surrounding communal fields (Figure 6.29) re-created in North America the landscape of their European homelands. (Ethnically German, some Mennonites had colonized in Russia and Ukraine before relocating in North America.)

Figure 6.29

A transplanted ethnic landscape. The Germanspeaking Mennonites settled in Manitoba in the 1870s and recreated the agricultural village of their European homeland. Individual farmers were granted strip holdings in the separate fields to be farmed in common with the other villagers. The farmsteads themselves, with elongated rear lots, were aligned along both sides of a single village street in an Old World pattern. Source: Redrawn from Carl A. Dawson, Group Settlement: Ethnic Communities in Western Canada. Vol. 7, Canada Frontiers of Settlement (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1936), p. 111.

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Ethnic Regionalism Other world regions display even more pronounced contrasts in the built landscape, reflecting the more entrenched homeland pattern of long-established ethnic regionalism. In areas of intricate mixtures of peoples— eastern and southeastern Europe, for example—different house types, farmstead layouts, even the use of color can distinguish for the knowledgeable observer the ethnicity of the local population. The one-story “smoking-room” house of the northern Slavs with its covered entrance hall and stables all under one roof marks their areas of settlement even south of the Danube River. Blue-painted onestory, straw-roofed houses indicate Croatian communities. In the Danube Basin, areas of Slovene settlement are distinguished by the Pannonian house of wood and strawmud. In Spain, the courtyard farmstead marks areas of Moorish influence just as white stucco houses trimmed with dark green or ochre paint on the shutters indicates Basque settlement. It is impossible to delineate ethnic regions of the United States that correspond to the distinctive landscapes created by sharply contrasting cultural groups in Europe or other world areas. The reason lies in the mobility of Americans, the degree of acculturation and assimilation of immigrants and their offspring, and the significance of other than ethnic considerations in shaping the activities, the associations, and the material possessions of participants in an urbanized, mass communication society. What can be attempted is the delimitation of areas in which particular immigrant-group influences have played a recognizable or determinant role in shaping tangible landscapes and intangible regional “character.” The “melting pot” producing a uniform cultural amalgam, we have seen, has been more American myth than reality. Therefore, there has occurred an inevitable, persistent disparity between the landscapes created by diverse immigrant groups and the national uniformity implicit either in the doctrine of first effective settlement or the concept of amalgamation. That disparity was summarized by Wilbur Zelinsky, as shown in Figure 6.30. The cultural areas are European in origin and can be seen as the expansionary product of three principal colonial culture hearths of the Atlantic Seaboard: the New England, the South, and the Midland. As the figure indicates, the “Middle West” is the product of the union of all three colonial regions. The popularly conceived American “West” probably exists not as a separate unit but as a set of subregions containing cross sections of national population with cultural mixing, but as yet with no achieved cultural uniformity.

APPROXIMATE DATES MAJOR SOURCES OF SETTLEMENT OF CULTURE AND FORMATION (listed in order of importance)

REGION

NEW ENGLAND 1a. Nuclear New England 1b. Northern New England THE MIDLAND 2a. Pennsylvania Region 2b.

1620–1750 1750–1830

1682–1850

New York Region or 1624–1830 New England Extended

THE SOUTH 3a. Early British Colonial South 3b. Lowland or Deep South

England and Wales, Rhineland, Ulster,19th-Century Europe Great Britain, New England, 19thCentury Europe, Netherlands

1607–1750

England, Africa, British West Indies

1700–1850

Great Britain, Africa, Midland, Early British Colonial South, aborigines France, Deep South, Africa, French West Indies Midland, Lowland South, Great Britain Upland South, Lowland South Upland South, Lowland South, Lower Middle West

3b-1. French Louisiana

1700–1760

3c. Upland South 3c-1. The Bluegrass 3c-2. The Ozarks

1700–1850 1770–1800 1820–1860

THE MIDDLE WEST 4a. Upper Middle West

1800–1880

4b.

Lower Middle West

1790–1870

4c.

Cutover Area

1850–1900

Figure 6.30

England Nuclear New England, England

New England Extended, New England,19th-Century Europe, British Canada Midland, Upland South, New England Extended, 19thCentury Europe Upper Middle West, 19th-Century Europe

REGION

APPROXIMATE DATES MAJOR SOURCES OF SETTLEMENT OF CULTURE AND FORMATION (listed in order of importance)

THE WEST 5a. Upper Rio Grande Valley

1590–

5b. Willamette Valley 5c. Mormon Region

1830–1900 1847–1890

Mexico, Anglo America, aborigines Northeast U.S. Northeast U.S., 19th-Century Europe 5d. Central California (1775–1848) (Mexico) 1840– Eastern U.S., 19th Century Europe, Mexico, East Asia 5e. Colorado Piedmont 1860– Eastern U.S., Mexico 5f. Southern California (1760–1848) (Mexico) 1880– Eastern U.S., 19th and 20th-Century Europe, Mormon Region, Mexico, East Asia 5g. Puget Sound 1870– Eastern U.S., 19th and 20thCentury Europe, East Asia 5h. Inland Empire 1880– Eastern U.S., 19th and 20thCentury Europe 5i. Central Arizona 1900– Eastern U.S., Southern California, Mexico REGIONS OF UNCERTAIN STATUS OR AFFILIATION A. Texas (1690–1836) (Mexico) 1821– Lowland South, Upland South, Mexico, 19thCentury Central Europe B. Peninsular Florida 1880– Northeast U.S., the South, 20th-Century Europe, Antilles C. Oklahoma 1890– Upland South, Lowland South, aborigines, Middle West

Culture areas of the United States based on multiple lines of evidence.

From Wilbur Zelinsky, The Cultural Geography of the United States, © 1992, pp. 118–119. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, N.J.

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Ethnic Geography Although more than a million individual web text pages may be referenced through such key words as ethnic, race, and native, the number of substantive organizational home pages on those and related topics are relatively few and, usually, highly specialized by group and interest. In the Anglo American context, good starting points for examination of immigration volumes and ethnic makeup are the respective federal immigration services of the United States and Canada. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service is found at www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/index.htm. Select the Service’s “Statistics” and “Reports and studies” entries from its Public Affairs Public Information List. The Canadian counterpart Citizenship and Immigration Canada home page provides access to its own research, publications, and statistics and links to outside immigration-related sites: www.cic.gc.ca/. The U.S. Census Bureau provides “Minority Links” to data on Black, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander Americans and American Indians at www.census.gov/pubinfo/www/ hotlinks.html. Nongovernmental, institutional, and private sites of potential interest in the study of ethnic relations, patterns, and interests—and good starting points for further links—include the following: The Ethnicity, Racism and the Media (ERaM) program at England’s Bradford University provides e-mail and Internet contacts for discussion and research “on issues of racism, ethnicity, and the media” and an extensive set of links to index, media, and organizational websites related to ethnicity: www.brad.ac.uk/research/eram/wwwsites.html. CIEMEN’s Ethnic World Survey at www.partal.com/ ciemen/ethnic.html is useful to students interested in indigenous ethnic studies. Ciemen, a Catalan organization, claims a purely cultural and humanitarian interest in “marginated” peoples; its links to Africa, the Americas, Asia/CIS, Europe, and Oceania are of mixed value, but contain references not easily found elsewhere. Both the WWW Virtual Library of Indigenous Studies at www.cwis.org/wwwvl/indig-vl.html and the Center for World Indigenous Studies’ Fourth World Documentation Project at www.cwis.org/ are concerned with “fourth world” peoples. Created by the same agency, the websites are slightly different in

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their approach. NativeWeb provides access to subordinate pages on geographic regions, different nations and peoples, languages, and historical material together with links to newsletters, organizations, information sites, and the like: www.nativeweb.org. Several U.S. universities or their members maintain websites concerned with various aspects of ethnic studies. Michigan State University’s page on Diversity and Pluralism introduces a database of articles searchable by keyword or letter, cross-referenced by subject and author: www.msue.msu.edu/msue/imp/moddp/masterdp.html. The University of California-Santa Barbara serves as host to Alan Liu’s Voice of the Shuttle: Minority Studies Page with links to general resource sites and ethnic-specific home pages (African American; Asian American; Chicano, Latino, Hispanic, etc.): http://vos.ucsb.edu/shuttle/minority.html. The National Association for Ethnic Studies hosted by Kansas State at www.ksu.edu/ameth/naes/ethnic.htm provides linked references to other university ethnic studies programs and to a number of ethnic websites and other ethnic-related resources. Less inclusive are Ethnic Studies at USC at www.usc.edu/isd/ archives/ethnicstudies/ and the University of Maryland’s Diversity Database on National Origin, Race, and Ethnicity at www.inform.umd.edu/Diversity/Specific/Race/ Your own web surfing will reveal still others. The Internet site links provided through organization and university pages may be supplemented by the extensive web connections found through the WWW Virtual Library of Migration and Ethnic Relations at www.ercomer.org/wwwvl/ In the North American context, About.com has a series of ethnic “Guide Sites,” including Afro American, Asian American, French Canadian, Arctic/Northern, and Latino cultures. Find them through http://about.com/culture/. Several organizations and websites are concerned primarily with Native Americans. Those similarly interested might check Native American Resources at www.cowboy.net/ native/ and Native American Indian Resources at http://indy4.fdl.cc.mn.us/}isk/mainmenu.html. Finally, don’t forget to check our own textbook’s home page at www.mhhe.com/fellmann7e/ for websites added or corrected by the publisher or contributed by helpful users.

Summary Ethnic diversity is a reality in most countries of the world and is increasing in many of them. Immigration, refugee streams, guest workers, and job seekers all contribute to the mixing of peoples and cultures in an area. The mixing is not complete, however. Ethnicity—affiliation in a group sharing common identifying cultural traits—is fostered by territorial separation or isolation. In much of the world that separation identifies home territories within which the ethnic group is dominant and with which it is identified. In societies of immigrants—Anglo America, for example—such homelands are replaced by ethnic colonies, enclaves, or ghettos of self-selected or imposed separation from the larger host society. Cluster migration helped establish such colonies in rural America; chain migration encouraged their development in cities. The 19th- and early 20th-century American central city displayed pronounced areal segregation as immigrant groups established and clung to protective ethnic neighborhoods while they gradually adjusted to the host culture. A continual population restructuring of urban areas occurred as older groups underwent acculturation, amalgamation, or assimilation, and new groups entered the urban social mix. The durability of ethnic neighborhoods has depended, among other considerations, on the degree of social distance separating the minority group from the host culture and on the significance the immigrant group

places on long-term maintenance of their own cultural identity. That is, ethnic communities have been the product of both external and internal forces. In other world regions, similar spatial separation of immigrant groups by racial, cultural, national, tribal, or village origin within the alien city is common. In Europe, because of the uncertain legal and employment status of many foreign populations and the restricted urban housing market they enter, ethnic enclaves have taken a different form, extent, and level of segregation than has been the case in Anglo America. Ethnicity is one of the threads of diversity in the spatial cultural fabric. Throughout the world, ethnic groups have imprinted their presence on the landscapes in which they have developed or to which they have transported their culture. In land division, house and farm building style, settlement patterns, and religious structures, the beliefs and practices of distinctive groups are reflected in the cultural landscape. Ethnicity is not, of course, the sole thread in the regional tapestry of societies. Folk culture joins ethnicity as a force creating distinctions between peoples and imparting special character to area. Countering those culturally based sources of separation is the behavioral unification and reduction of territorial distinctiveness that result from the leveling impact of popular culture. It is to these two additional strands in the cultural fabric—folk and popular culture—that we turn our attention in the following chapter.

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Key Words acculturation adaptation

195

ethnic enclave

190

amalgamation theory assimilation

195

195

behavioral (cultural) assimilation chain migration charter group colony

195

200

199

cluster migration

200

212

host society

191

188

natural selection

ethnic island

199

race

ethnic province ethnicity

201

207

social distance 189

190

190

segregation

189

first effective settlement gene flow

215

ghetto

188

ethnic group

ethnocentrism

211

culture rebound

212

ethnic geography

207

structural assimilation 199

tipping point

195

209

190

genetic drift

190

For Review 1.

224

How does ethnocentrism contribute to preservation of group identity? In what ways might an ethnic group sustain and support new immigrants?

2.

How are the concepts of ethnicity and culture related?

3.

What have been some of the principal time patterns of immigration flows into the United States? Into Canada? How are those patterns important to an

Patterns of Diversity and Unity

understanding of present-day social conflicts in either or both countries? 4.

5.

How may segregation be measured? Does ethnic segregation exist in the cities of world areas outside of North America? If so, does it take different form than in American cities? What forces external to ethnic groups help to create and

perpetuate immigrant neighborhoods? What functions beneficial to immigrant groups do ethnic communities provide? 6.

What kinds of land surveys were important in the allocation of property in the North American culture realm? With which charter groups were the different survey systems associated? How did survey systems affect settlement patterns?

Focus Follow-up 1.

Ethnicity implies a “people” or “nation,” a large group classified according to common religious, linguistic, or other aspects of cultural origin or background, or, often, to racial distinctions. In common with nearly all countries, the United States and Canada are multiethnic. Past and current immigration streams—earlier primarily European, more recently Asian and Latin American—have intricately mixed their populations. 2.

or acculturation has not been complete, and areal expressions of ethnic differentiation persist in America in the form of ethnic islands, provinces, or regional concentrations. French Canadian, black, Amerindian, Hispanic, Asian American, and other, smaller groups display recognizable areal presences. Among immigrant groups, those concentrations may result from cluster and chain migration.

What are the implications and bases of “ethnicity” and how have historic immigration streams shaped Anglo American multiethnicity? pp. 188–195.

How were the dominant Anglo American culture norms established and how complete spatially and socially are its ethnic minorities integrated? pp. 195–207. The first effective settlers of Anglo America created its English-rooted charter culture to which other, later immigrant groups were expected to conform. Assimilation

3.

What patterns of ethnic diversity and segregation exist in the world’s urban areas and how are they created or maintained? pp. 207–215. Ethnic communities, clusters, and neighborhoods are found in cities worldwide. They are a measure of the social distance that separates minority from majority or other minority groups. Segregation measures the degree to which culture groups are not uniformly distributed within the total population. Although different world regions show differing patterns, all urban segregation is

based on external restrictions of isolation and discrimination or ethnic group internal separatism controls of defense, mutual support, and cultural preservation. Ethnic colonies, enclaves, and ghettos are the spatial result. 4.

What have been some of the cultural landscape consequences of ethnic concentrations in Anglo America and elsewhere? pp. 215–221. Landscape evidence of ethnicity may be subtle or pronounced. In Anglo America, differing culturally based systems of land survey and allocation—such as metes-andbounds, rectangular, or long-lot—of earlier groups may still leave their landscape impacts. Clustered and dispersed rural settlement customs; house and barn types and styles; distinctive, largely urban, “Chinatowns,” “Little Havanas,” and other cultural communities; and even choices in dwellinghouse colors or urban art are landscape imprints of multiethnicity in modern societies.

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Selected References Allen, James P., and Eugene Turner. “Spatial Patterns of Immigrant Assimilation.” Professional Geographer 48, no. 2 (1996): 140–155.

Harris, Chauncy. “New European Countries and Their Minorities.” Geographic Review 83 no. 3 (1993): 301–320.

Arreola, Daniel D. “Urban Ethnic Landscape Identity.” Geographical Review 85, no. 3 (1995): 527–543.

Harris, Cole. “French Landscapes in North America.” In The Making of the American Landscape, edited by Michael P. Conzen, pp. 63–79. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Asante, Molefi K., and Mark T. Mattson. Historical and Cultural Atlas of African Americans. New York: Macmillan, 1991. Boal, F. W. “Ethnic Residential Segregation.” In Social Areas in Cities, vol. 1, edited by D. Herbert and R. Johnston, pp. 41–79. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Brewer, Cynthia, and Trudy Suchan. Mapping Census 2000: The Geography of U.S. Diversity. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001. Clark, William A. V. The California Cauldron: Immigration and the Fortunes of Local Communities. New York: Guilford, 1998. Conzen, Michael P. “Ethnicity on the Land.” In The Making of the American Landscape, edited by Michael P. Conzen, pp. 221–248. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990. “Ethnicity and Geography.” GeoJournal 30, no. 3 (July 1993). Special issue. Fernández-Armesto, Felipe, ed. The Times Guide to the Peoples of Europe. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995. Frantz, Klaus, and Robert A. Sauder, eds. Ethnic Persistence and Change in Europe and America: Traces in Landscape and Society. Innsbruck, Austria: University of Innsbruck, 1996. Veröffentlichungen der Universität Innsbruck 213. Frey, William H. “Immigration, Domestic Migration, and Demographic Balkanization in America: New Evidence for the 1990s.” Population and Development Review 22, no. 4 (1996): 741–763.

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Hornbeck, David. “Spanish Legacy in the Borderlands.” In The Making of the American Landscape, edited by Michael P. Conzen, pp. 51–62. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Nostrand, Richard L. The Hispano Homeland. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. O’Hare, William P. “America’s Minorities: The Demographics of Diversity.” Population Bulletin 47, no. 4. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1992. Pinal, Jorge del, and Audrey Singer. “Generations of Diversity: Latinos in the United States.” Population Bulletin 52, no. 3. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1997.

“International Migration and Ethnic Segregation: Impacts on Urban Areas.” Special issue of Urban Studies 35, no. 3 (March 1998).

Pollard, Kelvin M., and William P. O’Hare. “America’s Racial and Ethnic Minorities.” Population Bulletin 54, no. 3. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1999.

Kaplan, David H., and Steven R. Halloway. Segregation in Cities. Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1998.

Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. Immigrant America. 2d ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Lee, Sharon M. “Asian Americans: Diverse and Growing.” Population Bulletin 53, no. 2. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1998.

Price, Edward T. Dividing the Land: Early American Beginnings of Our Private Property Mosaic. Geography Research Paper 238. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

MacDonald, John S., and Leatrice D. MacDonald. “Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation and Social Networks.” Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 42, no. 1 (January 1964): 82–91.

Riche, Martha F. “America’s Diversity and Growth: Signposts for the 21st Century.” Population Bulletin 55, no. 2. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 2000.

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Shinagawa, Larry Hajime, and Michael Jang. Atlas of American Diversity. Walnut Creek, Calif.: Altamira Press/Sage Publications, 1998.

Noble, Allen G., ed. To Build in a New Land: Ethnic Landscapes in North America. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

Shumway, J. Matthew, and Richard H. Jackson. “Native American Population Patterns.” Geographical Review 85, no. 2 (1995): 185–201.

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Morris dancers in Tilford, Surrey, England. Folk culture and traditions are cherished and preserved in all societies.

Focus Preview A. Folk Culture 1. Anglo American hearths and folk building traditions, pp. 229–241. 2. Nonmaterial folk culture: foods, music, medicines, and folklore, pp. 242–249. 3. Folk regions and regionalism, pp. 249–251.

B. Popular Culture 4. The nature and patterns of popular culture: inside the mall and out, pp. 251–257. 5. Diffusion and regionalism in popular culture, pp. 259–263.

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n rural and frontier America before 1850 the games people played were local, largely unorganized individual and team contests. Running, wrestling, weight lifting, shooting, or— if the Native American influence had been strong— shinny (field hockey), kickball, or lacrosse. In the growing cities, rowing, boxing, cricket, fencing, and the like involved the athletically inclined, sometimes as members of sporting clubs and sponsored teams. Everywhere, horse racing was an avid interest. In the countryside, sports and games relieved the monotony and isolation of life and provided an excuse, after the contests, for meeting friends, feasting, and dancing. Purely local in participation, games reflected the ethnic heritage of the local community—the games of the homeland—as well as the influence of the American experience. In the towns, they provided the outdoor recreation and exercise otherwise denied to shop-bound clerks and artisans. Without easy transportation, contests at a distance were difficult and rare; without easy communication, sports results were of local interest only. The railroad and the telegraph changed all that. Teams could travel to more distant points, and scores could be immediately known to supporters at home and rivals in other cities. Baseball clubs were organized during the 1850s throughout the East and the Middle West. The establishment of the National Association of Base Ball Players in 1857 followed shortly after the railroad reached Chicago, and even before the Civil War, New York teams were competing throughout that state. After the war, the expanding rail network turned baseball into a national craze. The National League was organized in 1876; Chicago, Boston, New York, Washington, Kansas City, Detroit, St. Louis, and Philadelphia all had professional teams by the 1880s, and innumerable local leagues were formed. Horse racing, prizefighting, amateur and professional cycling races, and intercollegiate sports—football, baseball, rowing, and track and field contests— pitted contestants and drew crowds over long distances. Sports and games had been altered from small-group participations to national events. They were no longer purely local, traditional, informal expressions of community culture; rather, organized sport had emerged as a unifying, standardized expression of national popular culture (Figure 7.1).

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The kaleidoscope of culture presents an endlessly changing design, different for every society, world region, and national unit, and different over time. Ever present in each of its varied patterns, however, are two repeated fragments of diversity and one spreading color of uniformity. One distinctive element of diversity in many societies derives from folk culture—the material and nonmaterial aspects of daily life preserved by smaller groups partially or totally isolated from the mainstream currents of the larger society around them. A second source of diversity in composite societies, as we saw in Chapter 6, is surely and clearly provided by ethnic groups, each with its distinctive characterizing heritage and traditions and each contributing to the national cultural mix. Finally, given time, easy communication, and common interests, popular culture may provide a unifying and liberating coloration to the kaleidoscopic mix, reducing differences between formerly distinctive groups though perhaps not totally eradicating them. These three elements—folk, ethnic, and popular—of the cultural mosaic are intertwined. We will trace their connections particularly in the Anglo American context, where diversified immigration provided the ethnic mix, frontier and rural isolation encouraged folk differentiation, and modern technology produced the leveling of popular culture. Along the way, we will see evidences of their separate influences in other societies and other culture realms.

Figure 7.1

Spectator sports emerged as a major element in American popular culture following the Civil War. The Cincinnati Red Stockings of 1869, shown in this photograph, were the first openly professional baseball team; the National League was established in 1876. Mark Twain, an early fan, wrote: “Baseball is the very symbol, the outward and visible expression of the drive and push and struggle of the raging, tearing, booming nineteenth century.” Organized football was introduced as a college sport—also in 1869—when Rutgers played Princeton in the first intercollegiate game.

Folk Cultural Diversity and Regionalism Folk connotes traditional and nonfaddish, the characteristic or product of a homogeneous, cohesive, largely selfsufficient group that is essentially isolated from or resistant to outside influences, even of a larger society surrounding it. Folk culture, therefore, may be defined as the collective heritage of institutions, customs, skills, dress, and way of life of a small, stable, closely knit, usually rural community. Tradition controls folk culture, and resistance to change is strong. The homemade and handmade dominate in tools, food, music, story, and ritual. Buildings are erected without architect or blueprint, but with plan and purpose clearly in mind and by a design common to the local society using locally available building materials. When, as in Anglo America, folk culture may represent a modification of imported ideas and techniques, local materials often substitute for a less-available original substance even as the design concepts are left unchanged. Folk life is a cultural whole composed of both tangible and intangible elements. Material culture is made up of physical, visible things: everything from musical instruments to furniture, tools, and buildings. Collectively, material culture comprises the built environment, the landscape created by humans. At a different scale it also constitutes the contents of household and workshop. Nonmaterial culture, in contrast, is the intangible part, the mentifacts and sociofacts expressed in oral tradition, folk song and folk story, and customary behavior. Ways of speech, patterns of worship, outlooks and philosophies are parts of the nonmaterial component passed to following generations by teachings and examples.

(a)

Within Anglo America, true folk societies no longer exist; the universalizing impacts of industrialization, urbanization, and mass communication have been too pervasive for their full retention. Generations of intermixing of cultures, of mobility of peoples, and of leveling public education have altered the meaning of folk from the identification of a group to the recognition of a style, an article, or an individual preference in design and production. The Old Order Amish, with their rejection of electricity, the internal combustion engine, and other “worldly” accoutrements in favor of buggy, hand tools, and traditional dress are one of the least altered—and few—folk societies of the United States (Figure 7.2). Canada, on the other hand, with as rich a mixture of cultural origins as the United States, has kept to a much later date clearly recognizable ethnically unique folk and decorative art traditions. One observer has noted that nearly all of the national folk art traditions of Europe can be found in one form or another well preserved and practiced somewhere in Canada. From the earliest arts and crafts of New France to the domestic art forms and folk artifacts of the Scandinavians, Germans, Ukrainians, and others who settled in western Canada in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, folk and ethnic are intertwined through transference of traditions from homelands and their adaptation to the Canadian context. Folk culture today is more likely to be expressed by individuals than by coherent, isolated groups. The collector of folk songs, the artist employing traditional materials and styles, the artisan producing in wood and metal products

(b)

Figure 7.2

(a) Motivated by religious conviction that the “good life” must be reduced to its simplest forms, Old Order Amish communities shun all modern luxuries of the majority secular society around them. Children use horse and buggy, not school bus or automobile, on their daily trip to this rural school in east central Illinois. (b) Distribution of Old Order Amish communities in the United States. Source: (b) Redrawn by permission from Annals of the Association of American Geographers, William K. Crowley, vol. 68, p. 262, Association of American Geographers, 1978.

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identified with particular groups or regions, the quilter working in modern fabrics the designs of earlier generations all are perpetuating folk culture: material culture if it involves “things,” nonmaterial if the preserved tradition relates to song, story, recipe, or belief. In this respect, each of us bears the evidence of folk life. Each of us uses proverbs traditional to our family or culture; each is familiar with and can repeat childhood nursery rhymes and fables. We rap wood for luck and likely know how to make a willow whistle, how to plant a garden by phases of the moon, and what is the “right” way to prepare a favorite holiday dish. When many persons share at least some of the same folk customs—repeated, characteristic acts, behavioral patterns, artistic traditions, and conventions regulating social life—and when those customs and artifacts are distinctively identified with any area long inhabited by a particular group, a folk culture region may be recognized. As with landscape evidence of ethnicity, folk culture in its material and nonmaterial elements may be seen to vary over time and space and to have hearth regions of origin and paths of diffusion. Indeed, in many respects, ethnic geography and folk geography are extensions of each other and are logically intertwined. The variously named “Swiss” or “Mennonite” or “Dutch” barn introduced into Pennsylvania by German immigrants has been cited as physical evidence of ethnicity; in some of its many modifications and migrations, it may also be seen as a folk culture artifact of Appalachia. The folk songs of, say, western Virginia can be examined either as nonmaterial folk expressions of the Upland South or as evidence of the ethnic heritage derived from rural English forebears. In the New World the debt of folk culture to ethnic origins is clear and persuasive. With the passage of time, of course, the dominance of origins recedes and new cultural patterns and roots emerge.

Anglo American Hearths Anglo America is an amalgam of peoples who came as ethnics and stayed as Americans or Canadians. They brought with them more than tools and household items and articles of dress. Importantly, they brought clear ideas of what tools they needed, how they should fashion their clothes, cook their food, find a spouse, and worship their deity. They knew already the familiar songs to be sung and stories to be told, how a house should look and a barn be raised. They came, in short, with all the mentifacts and sociofacts to shape the artifacts of their way of life in their new home (Figure 7.3). (Mentifacts, sociofacts, and artifacts are discussed in Chapter 2.) Their trappings of material and nonmaterial culture frequently underwent immediate modification in the New World. Climates and soils were often different from their homelands; new animal and vegetable foodstuffs were found for their larders. Building materials, labor skills, and items of

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Figure 7.3

Reconstructed Plimoth Plantation. The first settlers in the New World carried with them fully developed cultural identities. Even their earliest settlements reflected established ideas of house and village form. Later, they were to create a variety of distinctive cultural landscapes reminiscent of their homeland areas, though modified by American environmental conditions and material resources.

manufacture available at their origins were different or lacking at their destinations. What the newcomers brought in tools and ideas they began to modify as they adapted and adjusted to different American materials, terrains, and potentials. The settlers still retained the essence and the spirit of the old but made it simultaneously new and American. The first colonists, their descendants, and still later arrivals created not one but many cultural landscapes of America, defined by the structures they built, the settlements they created, and the regionally varied articles they made or customs they followed. The natural landscape of America became settled, and superimposed on the natural landscape as modified by its Amerindian occupants were the regions of cultural traits and characteristics of the European immigrants (see “Vanished American Roots”). In their later movements and those of their neighbors and offspring, they left a trail of landscape evidence from first settlement to the distant interior locations where they touched and intermingled. The early arrivers established footholds along the East Coast. Their settlement areas became cultural hearths, nodes of introduction into the New World—through relocation diffusion—of concepts and artifacts brought from the Old. Locales of innovation in a new land rather than areas of new invention, they were—exactly as their ancient counterparts discussed in Chapter 2—source regions from which relocation and expansion diffusion carried their cultural identities deeper into the continent (Figure 7.4). Later arrivals, as we have seen in Chapter 6, not only added their own evidence of passage to the landscape but often set up independent secondary hearths in advance of or outside of the main paths of diffusion. Each of the North American hearths had its own mix of peoples and, therefore, its own landscape distinctiveness. French settlement in the lower St. Lawrence Valley

Vanished American Roots

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merica, like every other world region, had its own primitive, naïve, and indigenous original architecture. But this was the architecture of Indians— the bark houses of the Penobscots, the long houses of the Iroquois, the tipis of the Crows, the mounds of the Mandans, the pueblos of the Zuñi, the hogans of the Navajos, the [plank] dwellings of Puget Sound. Some of these were even elegant, many contained seeds of promise; but we swept them all aside. Indian words and Indian foods passed into the American culture but nothing important from the Indian architecture, save a belated effort to imitate the form but not the function of the pueblos. (The so-called

“Spanish” architecture of the Hispanic borderlands and northern Mexico, however—adobe-walled with small windows and flatroofs supported by wooden beams—was of Amerindian, not European, origin.)

Source: From John Burchard and Albert BushBrown, The Architecture of America: A Social and Cultural History, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 57. © 1961, The American Institute of Architects

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Figure 7.4

Early Anglo American culture hearths. The interior “national hearth,” suggested by Richard Pillsbury, represents a zone of coalescence in the eastern Midwest, from which composite housing ideas dispersed farther into the interior. Source: Based on Allen G. Noble, Wood, Brick, and Stone, vol. 1 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984); and Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Richard Pillsbury, vol. 60, p. 446, Association of American Geographers, 1970.

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re-created there the long lots and rural house types of northwestern France. Upper Canada was English and Scottish with strong infusions of New England folk housing carried by Loyalists leaving that area during the Revolutionary War. Southern New England bore the imprint of settlers from rural southern England, while the Hudson Valley hearth showed the impress of Dutch, Flemish, English, German, and French Huguenot settlers. In the Middle Atlantic area, the Delaware River hearth was created by a complex of English, Scotch-Irish, Swedish, and German influences. The Delaware Valley below Philadelphia also received the eastern Finns, or Karelians, who introduced, according to one viewpoint, the distinctive “backwoods” life-styles, self-sufficient economies, and log-building techniques and house designs of their forested homeland. It was their pioneering “midland” culture that was the catalyst for the rapid advance of the frontier and successful settlement of much of the interior of the continent and, later, of the Pacific Northwest. Coastal Chesapeake Bay held English settlers, though Germans and Scotch-Irish were added elements away from the major rivers. The large landholdings of the area dispersed settlement and prevented a tightly or clearly defined culture hearth from developing, although distinctive house types that later diffused outward did emerge there. The Southern Tidewater hearth was dominantly English modified by West Indian, Huguenot, and African influences. The French again were part of